ABBREVIATIONS
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**ABBREVIATIONS**

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<td>DM</td>
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<td>DP</td>
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<td>LG</td>
<td><em>De Ludo Globi</em> [Vol. IX (edited by Hans G. Senger) of <em>Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia</em> (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1998)].</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td><em>De Li Non Aliud</em> [Latin text as contained in J. Hopkins, <em>Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-other: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Li Non Aliud</em> (Minneapolis: Banning, 3rd ed. 1987)].</td>
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De Pace Fidei [Vol. VII (edited by Raymond Klibansky and Hildebrand Bascour) of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1970)].


Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae [in Vol. II (1980) of Index Thomisticus, ibid.].

De Venatione Sapientiae [Vol. XII (edited by Raymond Klibansky and Hans G. Senger) of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1982)].
PRAENOTANDA

1. (a) In the English translations brackets are used to indicate words supplied by the translator to complete the meaning of a Latin phrase, clause, or sentence. (b) When a clarifying Latin word is inserted into the translation, brackets are used if the case ending or the verb-form has been modified; otherwise, parentheses are used.

2. All references to Nicholas of Cusa’s works are to the Latin texts in the following editions (unless explicitly indicated otherwise):

A. Heidelberg Academy edition of *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Felix Meiner Verlag: Hamburg): *De Concordantia Catholica; De Coniecturis; De Deo Abscondito; De Quaerendo Deam; De Filiatione Dei; De Dato Patris Luminum; Coniectura de Ultimis Diebus; De Genesi; Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae; De Pace Fidei; De Theologicis Complementis; De Beryllo* (1988 edition); *De Principio; Cribratio Alkorani; De Ludo Globi; De Venatione Sapientiae; De Apice Theoriae; Sermones* (Haubst’s numbering of the sermons is given in roman numerals; margin number and line numbers are given in parentheses.)

B. Texts authorized by the Heidelberg Academy and published in the Latin-German editions of Felix Meiner Verlag’s series *Philosophische Bibliothek: De Docta Ignorantia*.

C. Editions by J. Hopkins: *De Aequalitate* [in *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: Volume One*]; *Idiotae de Sapientia, de Mente, de Staticis Experimentis* [in *Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge*]; *De Visione Dei* [in; *Nicholas of Cusa’s Dialectical Mysticism* (2nd ed.)]; *De Possett* [in *A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa* (3rd ed.)]; *De Li Non Aliud* [in *Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-other* (3rd ed.); *Compendium* [in *Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge*]. Except in the case of *De Aequalitate*, the left-hand margin numbers correspond to the margin numbers in the Heidelberg Academy editions; line numbers and some paragraph-breaks differ.


The references given for some of these treatises indicate book and chapter, for others margin number and line, and for still others page and line. Readers should have no difficulty determining which is which when they consult the particular Latin text. E.g., ’DI II, 6 (125:19-20)’ indicates *De Docta Ignorantia*, Book II, Chapter 6, margin number 125, lines 19-20 of the edition in the series *Philosophische Bibliothek* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag).

3. References to the Bible are given in terms of the Douay version. References to chapters and verses of the Psalms include, in parentheses, the King James’ locations.

4. Italics are used sparingly, so that, as a rule, foreign expressions are italicized only when they are short. All translations are mine unless otherwise specifically indicated.

5. Citations of Nicholas’s sermons are given in terms of the sermon numbers assigned by Rudolf Haubst in fascicle 0 [=zero], Vol. XVI of *Nicolai de Cusa Opera*
These numbers revise Josef Koch’s earlier numbers. Haubst’s dates are also used. [For Josef Koch’s earlier numbers and dates, see Koch, Cusanus-Texte. I. Predigten. 7. Untersuchungen über Datierung, Form, Sprache und Quellen. Kritisches Verzeichnis sämtlicher Predigten [Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse (1941-1942, Abhandlung 1)].

A reference such as “Sermo XX (6:26-29)” indicates Sermon XX [Haubst number], margin number 6, lines 26-29.

NOTES

NOTES TO THE PREFACE

1. I did not entitle the volume to which this one is a sequel “Volume One,” because I could not be absolutely certain that there would be a Volume Two. But now that Volume Two has been completed, I will refer to its predecessor as Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: Volume One.

2. These publications are all in print and are listed, with full publication data, under my name in Books in Print (Bowker Company). I have not translated Nicholas’s mathematical opuscula or his Coniectura de Ultimis Diebus, which are not among his major works. By contrast, his almost 300 sermons are of major importance and deserve to be translated once all of the critical editions of the Latin texts are completed.


4. Students of Cusanus will be interested in the information found on the webpages of the American Cusanus Society and of the Institut für Cusanus-Forschung—webpages located at

   http://www.mse.jhu.edu/research/history/cusa.html
   and
   http://www.uni-trier.de/~cusanus/

URL addresses, as we all know, oftentimes become changed. Yet, I am hoping that these will remain constant.

5. Among these previously acknowledged individuals I would like to mention again Rektor Otto Berberich, of the Cusanus Hospice, Bernkastel-Kues, and the Mitarbeiter at the Cusanus Institute in Trier: Dr. Marc-Aeilko Aris, Prof. Walter Euler, Dr. Alfred Kaiser, Dr. Heinrich Pauli, and Dr. Hermann Schnarr.
NOTES TO THE ORIENTING STUDY


3. Haubst, Streifzüge, op. cit., p. 25: “So entfalten sich vor allem die cusanischen Leitideen der coincidentia oppositorum und der docta ignorantia vom Philosophischen ins Theologische hinein; Nikolaus gewinnt sie teils von der sinnlichen Anschauung her, teils aus kritischer Denkerfahrung: von daher aber weisen und leiten sie mit einer erstaunlichen Kraft bis in die letzten erreichbaren Tiefen des theologischen Glaubensverständnisses.”


7. It is important to keep in mind that Nicholas claims only that some of his views are novel and not that the whole of De Docta Ignorantia is unique.

8. Cusa, DI III (264:4-5).

9. DC, Preamble (1:11-12). Latin quoted by me in the nominative, rather than in the actually-used accusative, case.

10. DC I, Prologue (3:7).

11. Maarten J. Hoenen, “‘Ista prius inaudita’. Eine neu entdeckte Vorlage der Docta ignorantia und ihre Bedeutung für die frühe Philosophie des Nikolaus von Kues,” Mediaevalia, 21 (1995), 375-476. This tractate is contained in Latin ms. Eichstätt (Germany), University Library, Codex st 687, folia 4r-10r. Hoenen, in his transcription of this Latin text makes certain mistakes, which should be corrected. (1) On his p. 456, line 6 [corresponding to ms. f. 5r, line 11], the word “Quare” should be corrected to “Ergo”. (2) On his p. 458, lines 5-6 [corresponding
to ms. f. 6r, line 4 from bottom], the word “tantum” should be corrected to “tamen”.

(3) On his p. 466, line 2 [corresponding to ms. f. 7r, line 17], the word “quaere” should be corrected to “Quare” (or “quare”). (4) On his p. 466, line 11 from bottom [corresponding to ms. f. 7r, line 7 from bottom], the word “magis” should be corrected to “maius”. (5) On his p. 472, line 10 [corresponding to ms. f. 9r, line 14], the word “aut” should be corrected to “vel”. (6) On his p. 474, line 8 from bottom [corresponding to ms. f. 10r, line 4], the words “sicilect imperfectum” should be simply “sicilect perfectum”. (The anonymous author or the scribe abbreviates “sicilect” with marks before and after the abbreviation. Hoenen has mistaken one of these marks as a prefix for “perfectum”, thus reading, mistakenly, “imperfectum”. Cf. “sicilect” at ms. f. 4v, last line; f. 5r, line 10; f. 8v, line 4.) (7) On his p. 476, last line [corresponding to ms. f. 10r, line 2 from bottom], the word “hoc” should be corrected to “haec”. (8) Hoenen should point out misspelled and misabbreviated words, such as “quidtitas” on f. 4, line 5, and “vagi” on f. 10r, line 6 from bottom.


16. Hoenen, op. cit., pp. 413-414 and 412-413, respectively.
17. E.g., the Cusan passages on Hoenen’s p. 465 and on his pp. 453 and 455 do not appear in the Fundamentum Naturae.
18. E.g., see the passage (from the Fundamentum) that appears on Hoenen’s p. 468.
19. E.g., see the passages (from the Fundamentum) that appear on Hoenen’s pp. 450 and 458.
24. Note Albertus Magnus: “Deinde ostendit <Avicenna> identitatem in ipso <id est, in deo> per oppositum contrarietatis et diversitatis, quia quamvis ipse in se praebhebat diversa et contraria omnia, habet tamen ea in se secundum excellentem identitatem, qua non sunt in ipso secundum suum esse materiale, sed sunt in ipso divina essentia.” Alberti Magni super Dionysium De Divinis Nominibus, Chap. 9, section 9 [= p. 383, lines 43-48 in Vol. 37, Part I (in Alberti Magni Opera Omnia), edited by Paul Simon (Münster: Aschendorff, 1972)]. Not all Christian Aristotelians were
among the “Aristotelian sect” that Nicholas criticized in Apologia 6.
25. See n. 19 above.
philosophiques et théologiques 3 (July 1909), 525-531. See also Vol. 10, pp.
269-272 of Duhem’s Le Système du monde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques
on Nicholas’s alleged epistemological (vs. metaphysical) borrowings from Thierry;
but he allows (p. 172) that these borrowings do not reach the level of plagiarism. See
Conference ( Villanova, Pennsylvania).
29. DI II, 7 (129:10-12).
30. Liber de Causis XVII (XVIII), 143 [text edited by Adriaan Pattin, pp. 90-
203 of Tijdschrift voor Filosofie [Louvain], 28 (March 1996).
31. See n. 19 above. The composer of the Tractate also leaves aside certain
Aristotelian themes that were a banality. See, for example, Hoenen, op. cit., p. 455 (as
compared with p. 454).
32. See the first reference in n. 17 above.
33. See n. 18 above.
34. See the text flagged by n. 20 and n. 21 above.
35. See Hoenen, op. cit., pp. 460 and 468, where the Fundamentum Naturae
retains the reference to the Platonists.
36. DI II, 8 (132:13-14).
37. DI II, 8 (136-137).
38. Hoenen (p. 435) understands the phrase “qui ista prius inaudita legerint”
to refer to DI II, 7-10. Presumably, he accepts Wilpert’s translation of the entire pas-
sage, just as he also uses Wilpert and Senger’s second edition of the Latin text (see
Hoenen’s n. 19 on his p. 382): “Fortassìs admirabuntur, qui ista prius inaudita legerint,
postquam ea vera esse docta ignorantia ostendit. Scimus nunc ex istic universum
trinum, et nihil universorum esse, quod non sit unum ex potentia, actu et conexionis
motu …” etc.: “Vielleicht erfaßt die Leser dieser früher nie gehörtnten Lehren
Verwunderung nachdem die belehrte Unwissenheit ihre Wahrheit gezeigt hat. Wir
wissen jetzt aus dieser Darstellung um die Dreifaltigkeit des Universums, und daß es
nichts von allem gibt, was nicht eine Einheit aus Potenz, Akt und der Bewegung der
Verknüpfung wäre …” etc. [See the opening lines of DI II, 11, as found in Wilpert and
Senger’s 2nd edition of De docta ignorantia. Die belehrte Unwissenheit [Hamburg:
Meiner, 1977 (Philosophische Bibliothek, Heft 15 b)]].
39. “Saranno presi da meraviglia, forse, coloro che leggeranno codeste cose,
non mai prima ascoltate, ma che la dotta ignoraanza ha mostrato essere vere. Finora
sappiamo che l’universo è trino, e che non c’è alcuna cosa in esso che non sia unità
formata da potenza, da atto e da moto di connessione …” etc. La Dotta ignoranza. Le
170. In his footnote Santinello adds: “Prius inaudita: inizio solenne all’esposizione
delle nuove tesi cosmologiche.”


41. *DI* III (264:4-5): “Secundus <libellus> ex illo <conceptu> paucis de universo supra philosophorum communem viam elicit rara multis”: “From this [concept] Book Two elicits a few [teachings] about the universe—[teachings which go] beyond the usual approach of the philosophers and [which will seem] unusual to many.


47. Kristeller, op. cit., p. 133. Kristeller adds: “Taken in this sense, Christian humanism is only one of many currents within the broader humanist movement.”

48. Kristeller, op. cit., p. 113. Kristeller adds: “Unlike the liberal arts of the
earlier Middle Ages, the humanities did not include logic or the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music), and unlike the fine arts of the eighteenth century, they did not include the visual arts, music, dancing or gardening.”


50. DM 11 (131).


52. DI I, 2 (8-9-9).

53. De Concordantia Catholica I, Preface (2-9-17).


56. See n. 46 above.


58. See n. 33 of Notes to De Theologicis Complementis in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: Volume One] (Minneapolis: Banning, 1998).

59. See pp. 75-77 of my Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge (Minneapolis: Banning, 1996).

60. Cusa, De Staticis Experimentis [translated into English in my Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge, op. cit. (n. 59 above)].

62. DP 44:1-3.
63. Nicholas speaks of medicine as an art [DI II, 1 (94:13-14)] but, no doubt, he regarded it also as a science.
65. Cf. DI II, 12 (164:11-12), where he states that “a hand is not a proportion-al part of a man, although its weight does seem to bear a comparative relation to the body—and likewise regarding its size and shape.”
66. LG I (42:8-14).
70. See, below, n. 422 of Notes to De Coniecturis. See also Karl Bormann, Nikolaus von Kues: “Der Mensch als zweiter Gott” (Trier: Paulinus, 1999) [Trierer Cusanus Lecture 5 (16 pp.).]
71. Jesus is the maximal human being. DI III, 7 (223:1).
72. DVD 20 (88). Nicholas does not always make his points about maximal union and infinite union clear. See my discussion on pp. 37-40 of the introduction to my Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Docta Ignorantia (Minneapolis: Banning, 2nd edition, 1985). Cf. n. 10 on p. 281 of my Miscellany on Nicholas of Cusa (Minneapolis: Banning, 1994).
73. DVD 20 (88:15-18): “Maxima igitur est unio eius naturae humanae, ut humanae, ad divinam, quia maior esse nequit. Sed non est simpliciter maxima et infini-ta, ut est unio divina.”
75. Sermo XXII (32:7-10): “Nam nisi Deus assumpsisset humanam naturam, cum illa sit in se ut medium alias complicans, totum universum nec perfectum, immo nec esset.”
77. DI III, 3 (197:8-9). The use of the word “enfolding” is, of course, highly metaphorical. One could just as well use the metaphor of reflecting: human nature is
a “reflection” of all other natures, so that the whole universe “shines forth” in and through human nature. For human reality represents the intersection of the material world and the immaterial world. The human body is a composite of the four elements (earth, air, fire, water) that are found in all things material. And the human intellect (intellectus) partakes of the higher angelic intelligence, so that the latter is reflected in the former; similarly, human reason (ratio) exercises the discriminating power that is associated with human perceiving, so that the lower orders of conscious beings partake of it and reflect it. See DM 4 (76:2-7). See also, below, n. 29, n. 217, n. 355, and n. 358 of Notes to De Coniecturis.

78. Compendium 8.
81. DI II, 13 (178).
83. PF 1 (6:2-3).
84. VS 12 (32:10-13).
85. DM 15 (159:7).
86. DC II, 15 (147:5-8).
87. DM 3 (71:1-2).
88. De Filiatione Dei 5 (83:1-10).
91. 1 Corinthians 3:19.
94. VS 27 (82). De Apice 21.
96. Sermo CXXXV (15:9-10).
98. LG I (34:9-13).
99. VS 4.
100. Rudolf Haubst, “Nikolaus von Kues ueber die Gotteskindschaft,” pp. 29-
46 in Nicolò da Cusa, op. cit. (n. 44 above). See also n. 523 below.

101. LG I (36:6-10).


107. LG I (57-58).

108. Fatum (fate, destiny) is but the “reverse side,” so to speak, of fortuna. Italian humanists such as Francesco Petrarca, Leon Battista Alberti, and Marsilio Ficino, addressed these twin themes. See, for example, Alberti’s Fatum et Fortuna and Ficino’s *Epistola de Fortuna* [pp. 169-173 of Vol. II of Supplementum Ficinianum, edited by Paul Kristeller (Florence: Olschki, 1937)].

109. See the references in n. 119 below. Nicholas’s Christian humanism leads him to declare that man is able to discover himself only in God. DI II, 13 (180:10-11). DM 11 (133:1-3).

110. See, below, n. 3 and n. 4 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*.

111. DC I, Prologue (2:4-5): “… consequens est omnem humanam veri positivam assertionem esse coniecturam.”

112. See the reference in n. 62 above. See also, below, n. 152 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*.

113. DC II, 17 (171:3).

114. DC I, 7 (29:13-14).


117. DM 10 (127:3-4).

118. DC I, 11 (60:1) and II, Prologue (70:8).


122. VS 29 (87:7-10).

pythagoreisierender Zahlensymbolik verpflichtet ist.”


128. Koch, Die Ars coniecturalis, op. cit. See especially pp. 12-13, 26, 46-47. See the references in n. 176 below.

130. DC II, 16 (157:1). DC II, 16 (155:10-13) and II, 16 (156:5-9).
132. See n. 77 above. See, below, n. 37 of Notes to De Coniecturis. See especially DC II, 10 (121 and 123-124) and DC II, 13 (136:7-9). Similarly, through partaking of reason, plants and animals also partake of intelligence. DC II, 16 (156:14-15).
133. DC II, 17 (179:7-11).
134. DC II, 6 (104:12-13). DC II, 16 (155:10-13).
135. DC II, 16 (166:4-6).
136. DC II, 17 (180:4).
137. DC I, 6 (23). Note also DC II, 1 (78:13-15): “In divina enim complicatione omnia absque differentia coincidunt, in intellectuali contradictoria se compatiuntur, in rationali contraria, ut oppositae differentiae in genere.” In place of the verb “se compatiuntur” Nicholas could have repeated the verb “coincidunt”. Cf. DC II, 1 (78:11-13). See n. 142 below. Note the reference to DC at Ap. 15:14.
138. DC I, 8 (34).
140. DC I, 8 (34).
142. DC II, 16 (168:18-20). Cf. Ap. 15:8-13: “Therefore, in the domain of reason the extremes are separate; for example, with regard to a circle’s definition (viz., that the lines from the center to the circumference be equal), the center [of a circle] cannot coincide with the circumference. But in the domain of the intellect—which has seen that number is enfolded in oneness, that a line is enfolded in a point, that a circle is enfolded in a center—the coincidence of oneness and plurality, of point and line, of center and circle is attained by mental sight apart from inference ....”
144.  For example, the method of reason requires the rule that there is no coincidence of opposites.  *DC* II, 1 (76:9-11).
145.  For example, God’s seeing differs from the intellect’s seeing, which differs from rational sight, which differs from perceptual sight.  *DC* II, 1 (73).
146.  *DC* I, 10 (53:4-5).
148.  *DC* II, 10 (121).
150.  *DC* I, 10 (49:6-9).
151.  This statement anticipates the conclusion that Nicholas does (contrary to Platzeck’s claim) have an ontology in *DC*.
152.  Koch, *Die Ars coniecturalis*, op. cit. (n. 124 above), p. 16: “Zur Seinsmetaphysik gehört die Unterscheidung des Seins (d. h. Gottes) und der Seienden, dazu gehört die Seinsanalogie, die Unterscheidung von Seinsstufen, die Lehre von der Zusammensetzung aller Seienden aus Wesenheit und Seinsakt und der Wesenheit alles körperlichen Seienden aus Form und Stoff, dazu gehört die Anerkennung des Widerspruchsprinzips als Seinsgesetz usw. All das wird nun von Cusanus weder genannt noch bekämpft, aber Stück für Stück durch seine Einheitsmetaphysik ersetzt.”
155.  See n. 120 above.
156.  *DI* I, 6 (17:1-5).
164.  See the discussion in section 5 below.
167. See n. 152 above.
168. See n. 137 above.
169. See n. 144 above.
171. DC II, 14 (144:5-6). See n. 158 above.
172. DI I, 4 (cf. 11:14 with 12:4-5). Contrary to what Koch says (Die Ars coniecturalis; cf. the bottom of p. 13 with the bottom of p. 46) the formula should be translated as “God is all that which can be” and not as “God is all that which He can be.” This fact is clear from 12:4-5: “… maximum absolute est omnia absolute actu quae esse possunt …” (“… the absolutely Maximum is absolutely and actually all things which can be …”). Nicholas’s formula is also repeated at LG I (46:8-9). As Nicholas says in De Possest 12:3-5: “Deo enim nil omnium abest quod universaliter et absolute esse potest, quia est ipsum esse, quod entitas, potentiae et actus” (“God does not fail to be anything at all which is at all possible to be. For He is the very being—that is, the entitas—of possibility and of actuality”). When Nicholas’s formula is translated correctly, then it is cognate with Nicholas’s statement at DC I, 1 (5:8-9): “… [the] Absolute Divine Being is all that which there is [essentially] in each existing thing ….” Cf. Sermo XXXVIII (12:5-8) as regards man’s not being omne quod est, i.e., everything which is (vs. everything which he is).
173. See n. 159 above.
175. Although in DC Nicholas does not use of God the expression “Absolute Maximum,” he does hold that God is Absolute Maximum because he there holds that God is Infinity and that Infinity is a Maximum—a Maximum not admitting of degrees, as does a contracted maximum. See DC II, 7 (106:9-11): “Therefore, Absolute Oneness coincides with Absolute Infinity; intellectual oneness coincides with intellectual infinity; rational oneness coincides with rational infinity, even as perceptible oneness coincides with perceptible infinity.” In this same section Nicholas speaks of God as “Absolute, Super-divine Infinity.” There is no disagreement here with DI.
178. DC II, 12 (132:2).
179. Diagram P is the so-called diagram of the pyramid in DC I, 9 (41). Diagram U is the so-called diagram of the universe in DC I, 13 (66).
180. DC I, 13 (66:3-4). See also DC II, 2 (83-84). DC II, 7 (109-8).
181. DC II, 2 (84-85). See, below, n. 171 and n. 172 of Notes to De Coniec-
182. See, below, n. 128 of Notes to De Ludo Globi.


186. Koch, Die Ars coniecturalis, op. cit. (n. 124 above), pp. 9-10: “In De doct. ign. finden sich sieben ausdrückliche Hinweise auf etwas, was er in De coni. behandeln wolle oder für diese Schrift zurückgestellt habe. In der Heidelberger Ausgabe sind diese Hinweise im Apparat an dem Text von De coni. ‘verifiziert’. Prüft man diese Verifizierungen nach, so stimmt keine einzige.”

187. The seven places where DI mentions DC are the following: II, 1 (95:13-14); II, 6 (123:9); II, 6 (126:1-2); II, 8 (140:11-13); II, 9 (150:25-26); III, 1 (187:8); III, 1 (188:20-21). In the Heidelberg Academy edition of DI [viz., Vol. I of the series Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Meiner Verlag, 1932)], these references correspond to: 63:20-21 [= p. 63, lines 20-21]; 79:7; 80:25; 89:24-25; 96:9-10; 121:17; 122:14.

188. The chapter-numbers of DC, Book One differ in the Paris edition and in the Heidelberg Academy edition. They are the same for Book Two.

189. DI I, 4 (11:12-13). Note DC I, 9 (41), where God is said to be unitas without any alteritas.


191. LG II (81:12-13). Note also LG II (81:4-6): “God creates all things, even things that are alterable and changeable and corruptible; however, He does not create otherness and mutability and corruption. Since God is Being, He creates being, not destruction.”

192. DC II, 16 (166:12-13).

193. DC II, 16 (167:1).

194. DC I, 1 (5:4-8).

195. DC II, 16 (161:10-11). See also DC II, 16 (163:6-7): “the higher rational nature … absorbs the otherness of images by the light of its oneness ….” The fact that in this context the verb “absorbere” is used by Cusa to signify both abstracting and making to be intellect does not require that it be so used in other contexts, as it is not. See pp. 29-31 of my Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge (Minneapolis: Banning, 1996), as well as n. 151 of its Notes to the Introduction.


198. DC II, 16 (159:5).
199. Note, by way of comparison, VS 29 (86:7-12 and 87:15-17).
200. Literally: “… with respect to the size of the [circle] circumscribed [to it] …”
201. DC I, 1 (5:10-11).
203. DC II, 17 (182).
204. DC II, 17 (180).
205. DC I, 5 (20:1-2).
206. DC II, 14 (145:5).
207. DC II, 6 (105:10-13).
208. DC I, 2 (7:10).
209. See n. 127 above.
210. See, below, n. 128 of Notes to De Ludo Globi.
211. A version of the game was actually manufactured in 1983 in Marburg, Germany through the prompting of Hannelore Goldschmidt. See p. 3, n. 1 of her Globus Cusani. Zum Kugelspiel des Nikolaus von Kues (Trier: Paulinus, 1989).
212. LG I (50). See, below, n. 129 of Notes to De Ludo Globi.
214. LG I (54:17).
215. LG I (51:4-5 and 51:7).
217. Hans G. Senger is one of the few interpreters to emphasize the fact that De Ludo Globi is more than a work of metaphysics, because it is also a Moralitätsschrift that portrays a moralisierendes Globusspiel. See pp. 290-305 of his “Globus intellectualis. Geistshäre, Erkenntnissphäre und Weltosphäre bei Plotin, Nikolaus von Kues und Francis Bacon,” pp. 275-307 in Gregorio Piaia, editor, Concordia Discors: Studi su Niccolò Cusano e l’umanesimo europeo offerti a Giovanni Santinello (Padua: Antenore, 1993).
218. LG I (54:1-8).
219. LG I (51:3-5).
220. LG I (53:8-9).
221. LG I (53:11-14).
222. LG I (58:2-8).
223. LG I (58:2-8).
224. LG I (6). See n. 237 below.
225. LG I (32:1-9).
226. “The soul is an incorporeal substance and is the power of various powers. For the soul is [the power of] perception; it is also [the power of] imagination; it is also reason and intellect. In the body it exercises both [the power of] perception and [the power of] imagination; apart from the body it exercises reason and understanding. There is [but] a simple substance consisting of perceptuality, imagination, reason, and intellect, although the senses are neither the imagination nor reason nor
intellect. Likewise, neither imagination nor reason nor intellect is any of the others.”

227. LG I (28-29).
228. LG I (29:13-14).
229. LG I (32:12-14).
230. LG I (33:8-11). Sometimes, as here, Nicholas infers from human triunity to Divine Triunity. At other times, as at DM 11 (132:3 - 133:3), he infers from Divine Triunity to human triunity.
231. E.g., Cusa’s striking analogy of the mapmaker (Compendium 8).
232. One of Nicholas’s most fecund symbolisms is that of the “omnivoyant” icon, as alluded to in his De Visione Dei. In that work Nicholas invokes explicitly the following methodological presupposition, which involves a parallelism: “Whatever is apparent with regard to the icon-of-God’s sight is truer with regard to God’s true sight … Therefore, if in the image the depicted gaze can appear to be beholding each and every thing at once, then since this [capability] belongs to sight’s perfection, it cannot truly befit the Truth less than it apparently befits the icon, or appearance.” DVD 1 (6:3-9).
233. “… personifications”: e.g., as in DI II, 13 (180).
236. LG I (9:11-14).
238. See the references in n. 257 of Notes to De Ludo Globi.
239. DM 9 (119:12-13).
240. LG I (10:2-4).
241. LG I (14:1-8). Regarding Nicholas’s variable views about the universe, see Lynn Thorndike’s “Nicholas of Cusa and the Triple Motion of the Earth,” pp. 133-141 of Science and Thought in the Fifteenth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929).
242. LG I (10:5-6).
243. LG I (10:8-10). Cf. LG II (85:1-3).
244. LG I (13:15-17), my italics.
245. LG I (10:8-9). LG II (85:1-3).
246. LG I (15:24-25).
247. LG I (16:7-8) and (15:16-17).
248. LG I (18:15-22).
249. LG I (17:12-13).
250. LG I (19:1). Other names for God are “Archetypal World” [LG I (45:15)] and “Maximal World” [LG I (42:2)].
251. LG I (43:16-17). Cf. LG II (98:7-8).
252. DI II, 9 (150:13-14).
253. Cf. DI II, 8 (140:2) with DI II, 8 (135:12-16).
255. *DM* 11 (131).
258. *NA*, *propositiones* (115:4-5).
262. *LG* II (104:3-4).
263. *LG* I (38:2-5).
265. Maimonides makes his intent known at the outset of his *Guide for the Perplexed*. Nicholas himself is not beyond wanting to keep Meister Eckhart’s writings from the people because they are so misunderstandable. Ap. 25.
270. *DP* 2:11.
273. See *LG* II (87:7-8) and, below, n. 262 of Notes to *De Ludo Globi*. See also *DVD* 12 (50:15-16). Sermo CCXVI (4:34-35).
274. *DP* 3:3-11.
275. “… divisible”: in Latin, “*partibile*”.
276. *De Principio* 2:3-4.
277. CA II, 2 (90:3-4).
278. The Latin word “divisio” can mean division, differentiation, distinctness, separation, and the likes. Here “separation” seems the best alternative. Cf. n. 275 above. See the use of “divisio” in DI I, 7 (20).
279. The single English word “union” adequately translates the two Latin words “unionem et connexionem” here at Sermo XXIII (17:1-2).
281. De Sapientia II (30:11-12).
282. De Sapientia II (33:6-13). See also, and especially, II (32:20-23).
283. DI I, 24 (79:1-12), my italics.
284. This is Martin Honecker’s rendition in his German translation Der Laie über den Geist. Idiota de mente (Hamburg: Meiner, 1949).
285. Vol. XII (1982) [edited by Raymond Klibansky and Hans G. Senger] of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Hamburg: Meiner). “The intellect desires to know; nevertheless, this natural desire of the intellect to know God’s Quiddity is not innate to it. Rather, [what is innate is its desire] to know that its God is so great that there is no end of His greatness…”
286. “…there is present in all men by means of their specific nature a certain religion that promises them a higher, immortal end…” See, below, n. 439 of Notes to De Coniecturis.
287. “…whatever is present in God is God.” See the references in n. 48 of Notes to De Venatione Sapientiae, in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: Volume One (1998).
289. See p. 114 of Edmond Vansteenberghe’s Autour de la Docte Ignorance. Une controverse sur la Théologie mystique au XV‘ siècle (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Vol. 14 (1915)).
293. For example, Anselm of Canterbury writes: “Deus homo factus est.” Is this sentence best translated as “God became man” or as “God became a man [i.e., a human being]”? The same problem arises in regard to Cusanus: Does “Deus hominem assumpsit” mean that God assumed human nature or that He assumed a human nature?
Although Latin has substitutes for the definite and the indefinite articles (viz., the demonstrative pronoun and the word “quidam,” respectively), these substitutes were used only exceptionally.
294. A striking example of this problem is seen with the verb “potest” in the second sentence of Anselm of Canterbury’s Proslogion 3: “Nam potest cogitari esse aliquid quod non possit cogitari non esse, quod maius est quam quod non esse cogitari potest.” Should the sentence be translated as “For there can be thought to exist
something which cannot be thought not to exist ...” or as “For it [viz., that than which a greater cannot be thought] can be thought to be something which cannot be thought not to be ...”?

Analogous problems occur with Cusanus: e.g., does “Deus est omne id quod esse potest” mean “God is all that which can be” or “God is all that which He can be”? Cf., for example, DP 7:7-8 (“... ita ut solus deus id sit quod esse potest ...”) with DI I, 4 (12:4-5): “Quia igitur maximum absolute est omnia absolute actu quae esse possunt ...” See, above, n. 172.

297. Sermo XXII (11:1).
298. There is also a third manuscript (viz., Hispanic Society of America Latin Ms. HC 327/108) of a fragment of LG. It is of no importance, and I will not be paying any attention to it.
299. Of course, sometimes the errors will be those of Nicholas himself. At DC II, 10 (128:14) the editors rightly correct the manuscripts, all of which have “spiritum corporalem esse per quem” where “spirituale corpus esse per quod” is called for.

300. See, below, n. 123 of Notes to De Ludo Globi.
301. That Nicholas regards material cause as a cause is evident from the references given, below, in n. 123 of Notes to De Ludo Globi.
302. LG I (47:1-5).
303. For a further example of how translating and editing proceed pari passu, see n. 102 of Notes to De Venatione Sapientiae in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: Volume One (Minneapolis: Banning, 1998).
304. Regarding “intellectus” and “ratio” see n. 4 and n. 16 of Notes to De Beryllo in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: Volume One, op. cit.
305. LG I (17).
306. See the many references in Klaus Kremer’s article “Philosophische Überlegungen des Cusanus zur Unsterblichkeit der menschlichen Geistseele,” MFCG 23 (1996), 21-70.
307. See, above, Part One, Section 4.3.
308. Another example of Nicholas’s non-technical language is seen in his use of “universalis intellectus” at De Principio 21:8. See both n. 70 of Notes to De Principio in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: Volume One, op. cit., and the translation which the note marks.
312. A further example of Nicholas’s understanding a word that he does not expressly include in the Latin occurs in Proposition 4 at the end of De Li Non Aliud. See my discussion on pp. 21-23 of my Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-other [Minneapolis: Banning, 1999 (3rd edition; 2nd, emended printing)]. For a third example, see n. 89 of Notes to De Venatione Sapientiae in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: Volume One] (Minneapolis: Banning, 1998).


Graziella Federici-Vescovini, op. cit. (n. 310 above), p. 893: “Alberto: L’hai spiegato sinteticamente. Vedo, infatti, con assoluta certezza, che la dimostrazione è chiara, perché l’immagine non ha nulla se non dall’esemplare e uno solo è l’esemplare di tutte le cose, che è in tutte, e nel quale sono tutte; dopodiché vedrò l’unità dall’esemplare di tutte le diverse immagini. Tu mi hai condotto ad un’alta contemplazione.”

Maurice de Gandillac, op. cit. (n. 311 above), p. 124: “Albert: De façon brévissime tu as éclairé la chose, car de façon certissime je vois que puisqu’en la copie il n’est rien qui ne lui vienne du modèle, et puisqu’il n’est pour toutes choses qu’un unique modèle, celui-là est en toutes choses et toutes choses sont en lui. Claire est la démonstration; en me faisant voir l’unité exemplaire dans toutes les copies variées tu m’as conduit à une haute contemplation.”

Pauline Watts, op. cit. (n. 311 above), p. 89: “Albert: You have expressed yourself most succinctly. Most certainly I see that since the exemplified thing has nothing except from the exemplar and since there is only one exemplar of all things, which is in all things and in which all things are, the proof is clear. Since I have seen the unity of the exemplar of all the various exemplified things, you have led me into high speculation.”


315. See, for instance, n. 281 of Notes to De Venatione Sapientiae in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: Volume One (Minneapolis: Banning, 1998).


318. Graziella Federici-Vescovini, op. cit. (n. 310 above), p. 916: “Lo spirito razionale che desidera per natura sapere, che cosa d’altro cerca se non la ragione e la causa di tutte le cose? Né riposa se non conosce se stesso, il che non può accadere se non vede o sente in sé, cioè nella sua virtù razionale, il suo desiderio di sapere o la causa eterna della sua ragione.”
Maurice de Gandillac, *op. cit.* (n. 311 above), p. 154: “Cet esprit rationnel désireux de savoir, que cherche-t-il, en effet, sinon la cause et raison de toutes choses? Et elle [c’est-à-dire l’âme] n’a de repos qu’elle ne se connaisse elle-même, ce qui ne se peut faire que si elle voit et sent en elle-même, c’est-à-dire dans sa puissance rationelle, ce désir de savoir qui est la cause éternelle de sa propre raison.” (The words between brackets are mine, inferred from de Gandillac’s footnote.)

Dietlind und Wilhelm Dupré, translators, [Nikolaus von Kues], *Philosophische-theologische Schriften* (Vienna: Herder), Vol. III (1967), p. 333: “Denn was sucht der sinnbestimmte Geist, der von Natur zu wissen begehrt, anderes als den Grund und Wesenssinn von allem? Und die Seele kommt nur dann zur Ruhe, wenn sie sich selbst kennt, was nur möglich ist, wenn sie ihr Verlangen nach Wissen bzw. den ewigen Grund ihres Wesenssinnes in sich selbst, d.h. in ihrer verständigen Kraft und Fähigkeit, sieht und wahrnimmt.”

319. *Sermones, p.* Vol. II, f. 80r, lines 24-36. See also *LG* I (17-18), where Nicholas speaks of the world as a derived eternity. Note also *LG* II (82:29), where “in ipso” does refer to *mundus*.


322. It would be tedious to continue on with further categorizations. But let there be no doubt about its being possible to do so. A few further considerations will indicate that fact. (11) Medieval Latin writers sometimes add an initial ‘h’, as occurs at *LG* II (71:7), where both mss. have “hostium” in place of “ostium”. In some contexts a translator might think that “hostium” is the genitive plural of “hostis”. On the other hand, writers and copyists sometimes dropped the ‘h’ on the second-declension noun “hortus,” thus creating the likelihood that, in some contexts, their word “ortus” would be construed as the fourth-declension noun. Similarly, the dropped ‘a’ on ‘aes’ confuses the copyist of Latin ms. Cracow 682 when (at what corresponds to *LG* II (118:2)) he copies “es” (which he construes as a verb) and then puts “et” for a subsequent “est” (so as not to have two verbs). (12) Still another kind of problem is instanced at *LG* II (97:10), where “verum” is taken by most translators as an adjective meaning *true* rather than as a conjunction meaning *but*. Accordingly, von Bredow has (for “Hoc verum aestimo quod …”): “Und das sehe ich für wahr an …” [Gerda von Bredow, *op. cit.* (n. 309 above), p. 77]. Federici-Vescovini, de Gandillac, and Watts have something similar in their respective translations. These translations are certainly defensible. And yet, I suspect that the preferable rendering is (in English): “But I think the following: viz., that …. “ Here neither alternative will belie the author’s thought. However, there are contexts where a crucial difference will occur, depending upon which meaning of “verum” the translator opts for. (13) Other indeterminacies are present in an author’s very terminology. In *Sermo* CCXI (23:9-10) Nicholas writes: “… quia Deus factus est homo et homo Deus …. ” Someone might be tempted to construe this clause as meaning “… because God was made man and man was made
God ....” But this translation would be misleading, since we know from elsewhere that Nicholas holds the view that the Son of God assumed a human nature, an Adamic human nature. He became an individual man, not universal man. Correspondingly, Nicholas does not hold that man was made God but holds, rather, that a human nature (not human nature as such) was assumed by the Word of God. Accordingly, he writes in DI III, 8 (227:12-16): “There is only one indivisible humanity and specific essence of all human beings. Through it all individual human beings are numerically distinct human beings, so that Christ and all human beings have the same humanity, though the numerical distinctness of the individuals remains unconfused.” And, accordingly, he can write in Sermo XVII (6:27-35): “Et quia Verbum assumens humanitatem suam personalitatem non perdit, sed natura humana assumpta suam perdit, hinc Verbum proprie non dicitur assumpsisse hominem, quoniam hominis suppositum non assumpsit, sed humanitatem. Et si aliquando reperitur Verbum hominem assumpsisse, debet homo pro humana natura capi, quae in Christo a principio fuit assump ta et numquam per se existens.” The ambiguity of the word “homo” will inevitably lead to confusion on the part of translators, who will have to decide how to render it—whether as “a man,” “the man,” “mankind,” “human nature,” “a human nature,” “the human nature,” “humanity,” “a humanity,” “the humanity,” or whatever. And they can do so accurately only insofar as they are acquainted with Nicholas’s theology as stated more clearly in other passages. In the light of his orthodox Christology, the passage under scrutiny will best be translated either as “… God became a man [i.e., a human being]; and the humanity was made God …” or as “… God became a man [i.e., a human being], indeed became a man-God ....” For in Sermo I (23:26) Nicholas uses of Christ the Anselmian expression “Homo-Deus” (or “homo-Deus” or “homo-deus”). And he there and elsewhere maintains, theologically, that the human nature in Christ did not pass over into the divine nature but rather was subsumed into a oneness of person with the divine nature—i.e., was assumed by the person of God the Son.

Likewise ambiguous is the word “essentia,” which can mean either essence or being or existence. A corresponding point is true of “essentialis”. At LG II (93:18) the genitive plural “essentialium” means of things really existent. Words such as “essentia” create more difficulty for someone translating into English than for someone translating into German, inasmuch as English has no word such as the German word “Wesen,” which itself can mean either essence or being; and, thus, the German word serves the German translator well. Similarly, English has no single expression that adequately translates the range of meanings of Cusa’s “posse-fieri,” whereas in German the expression “Werden-Können” suffices. Likewise, the operative meaning of the twenty or more meanings of the Latin word “ratio” can be determined only by the context or by the author’s express clarification. At LG II (93:16) the clause “... cum sit ratio seu numeros motus” means, in my judgment, “since [the rational soul] is the measuring-scale of motion, or the numerical-scale of motion.” But other translators can, not implausibly, argue that the words “ratio ... motus” mean something else. Thus, their translations contain such renderings as: (a) “… weil die Seele der Wesensgrund und die Zahl für Bewegung ist”; (b) “... perché l’anima è la ragione o il numero del movimento”; (c) “... car il [c’est-à-dire le temps] est la raison, c’est-à-dire le nombre,
du mouvement”; (d) “… since time is the measure or number of motion”.

And on and on it goes! Little wonder that Ernst Renan (in another context) spoke of the need to solliciter doucement les textes. In the case of medieval Latin philosophical texts, however, one’s drawing out the authors’ meanings cannot always be done doucement.


324. Pauline Watts, op. cit. (n. 311 above), p. 71, has it right: “… the author of a law, who is moved by reason, ….”

325. “… the relation of half a double [proportion]: i.e., the relation of the geometrical mean of 2, i.e., the relation of the square-root of 2.

326. Viz., Dr. Alexander Patschovsky of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica in the Staatsbibliothek in Munich, Germany.

327. N. B., above, n. 298.

328. It is not true, however, that in ms. K the passage “Eo … exemplar” is written in denser letters. Instead, it is written in red, a fact that the Editor misses.

329. E.g., at LG I (10:1-8) et passim.

330. Here I have adapted the manuscripts’ spellings “existunt” and “que”.

331. C has “et”, whereas K has “Et”. A different typographical problem occurs in the note for II (101:2), where “et” should not be italicized; and, for clarity’s sake the note should be changed to “et C σ”, if that is what is meant. A further typographical error occurs in the note on p. 67, whose first sentence should be corrected to read: “De versibus v. praefationem editoris, supra p. XXVII sqq.” And in the note for 24:15 the word “habet” should be corrected to read “habet2”.

332. Other variants that should be indicated are the following: At II (87:16) K has “est” after “creatura” (so that either K adds “est” or C omits “est”). At II (88:17) K omits “sic”. At II (95:17) K has “ colloquia” instead of C’s “ colloquio”. At II (107:14) K has illum nos whereas C has nos illum”. At II (118:3) K has “sit” instead of C’s “fit”. At I (6:10) K has “impedimentum” instead of “impedientium”. At I (31:6) C has “hee” and not “hae” (or “Hae”).

333. After all, the reading “quod <animae> rationalis in exemplo per beatum Augustinum …” would have made sense.

334. In the Heidelberg Academy edition of Cribratio Alkorani the editor follows this procedure.

335. Both the German name “Johannes” and the German name “Hans” are translated into Latin as “Ioannes” (or as “Iohannes”). Likewise, the Latin name “Ioannes” (or “Iohannes”) comes over into German either as “Johannes” or as “Hans”. There is no special reason to translate the German “Johannes” into Latin as “Ioannes”, while translating “Hans” into Latin as “Iohannes”.

336. See, above, n. 259 and the sentence marked by it.

337. There will be more problems than the foregoing thirteen kinds, whose mention suffices for our present purposes. As an example of further kinds—just to
show that they exist—we may look at LG I (45:2-3), where the lines in the printed edition read: “dum mens [in] se in ea forma quam concepit—et cui conceptui se assimilavit—visibilem facere vellet, ….” Here the brackets indicate that “in” is to be deleted from the text. Yet, there was no overriding reason for the Editor to incorporate “in” into the main body of the text at all. Rather, he might well have chosen to leave it out and might have changed his note to read: “mens: in add. C σ”. The reason for this judgment is that the Editor makes no pretense of following C slavishly. Thus, to use a single example: at I (36:4) he rightly selects for the body of his text K’s word “non” in preference to C’s word “tamen”. By way of comparison, there is no more reason to assume that, at I (45:2-3), K omitted “in” than there is to assume that C added “in”. Other examples where (in the respective editor’s judgment) Codices Cusani 218 and 219 add words are: DI II, 7 (p. 83, line 8 of the Heidelberg Academy edition). De Dato Patris Lumen 115:5. De Mente (Heidelberg Academy edition, 1983) 4 (74:24); 5 (84:5); 7 (105:5); 9 (120:7). Cribratio Alkorani III, 17 (223:4); III, 18 (228:2).

Likewise, to raise a further issue, no harm is done at I (20:4) by the Editor’s changing both manuscripts’ wording “dum de motu globi” into “de motu globi dam”. Yet, no such transformation is necessary, since the meaning of the original wording is clear. Editors have prerogatives; and no two editors will exercise their prerogatives in exactly the same way. A reader must honor this privilege, in order not to hold an editor to unrealistic or unreasonably rigid standards.

338. It does lead to problems. But these problems are not such as to undermine the reliability of the final version of the collated text. They tend to undermine only the critical nature of the edition.

339. For example, lots of items were not clearly visible either on the microfilm or on the printouts that I received from the Jagiellonian University Library in Cracow. For example, at LG I (8:10) “indivisibilis” is not clearly seen to have been corrected to “invisibilis”. Similarly, on my microfilm of Codex Cusaus 219, I could not detect that at LG I (43:19) “capelli” has been corrected to “capilli”. One also cannot tell from my microfilm that at II (67:6) the final “o” on “contento” has been corrected from “e”. Nor at II (74:15) can one tell, with assurance, whether the word is “cupiant” or “capiant”. Likewise, Senger misses the fact that in the Cracow manuscript, the lines that correspond to the printed edition’s 62:2-4 (“Eo … exemplar”) are written in red ink (and not litteris crassioribus, as he says).

340. He can also examine them by proxy, faute de mieux.


342. E.g., pp. 11, 387, 403, 453, 541.

343. That is, such an analysis is “biographically informed” but is not “reductionistically biographical.” In other words, an interpreter will take account of biographical details insofar as they influence an author’s thinking; but the interpreter
will not suppose that the author’s ideas are wholly explainable on the basis of these
details.

344. Flasch takes his lead from De Apice 4 and 5. Other passages where
Nicholas comments on his development are DC I, 6 (24), De Aequalitate 49, and VS
prologue—and, according to Flasch, DVD 12 (48).

345. Flasch, p. 42.

346. Flasch, p. 403. See also, for example, p. 565 for another personal disclo-
sure, or see the last lines on p. 410.

347. See, for example, pp. 11, 37-39, 53-56, 98-102, 110, 125-126, 133, 141,
358, 403, 422, 424.

348. Flasch, p. 172. Note also pp. 92 and 481.

349. Flasch, pp. 328 and 544.

the headline “Minutiae without Meaning”).

351. There is some earlier mention of the Hussites on Flasch’s pp. 72-75; and
there is further mention in connection with De Pace Fidei (Flasch, p. 372).

352. Note also “De quaerendo deum” (p. 660, line 5 from bottom) and “De
quaerendo Deum” [p. 169n302 (I have corrected Flasch’s “quaerendo”).]. In this
present section that deals with Flasch, my rule regarding capitalizations of Latin titles
is the following: when speaking on my own behalf, I capitalize the Latin titles much
as I would an English title; however, when speaking with Flasch or for Flasch, I use
his manner of capitalization, in which only the first word of the title is capitalized.
Thus, when speaking for myself I write, for example, “De Theologicis Complementis,”
whereas when speaking with or for Flasch, I write “De theologicis complementis.”

Likewise, as regards my citations to Nicholas’s works: when speaking for myself,
I cite Nicholas’s works as I indicate in my Praenotanda in the back-matter of this pres-
ent book. However, when I am correcting mistakes in Flasch’s footnotes and in other
of his references, I cite the same Cusan editions that he does.

In general, I follow American punctuation style, which requires that (with a few
exceptions) commas and periods go inside of quotation marks. However, occasional-
ly, when I am mentioning words and phrases (vs. using them), I place commas and
periods outside of the quotation marks so that it will be clear that what is being men-
tioned does not including the punctuation.

353. The fact that in listing Flasch’s words (here and elsewhere) I italicize
them does not mean that they are italicized in his text. I italicize them because the
conventions of the English language are such that foreign words are quite often itali-
cized. Having italicized the foreign words, I then also sometimes italicize the non-for-
gn words—e.g., “Study on” and “Study of” a few lines below the sentence marked
by the number of this note. I do not, however, italicize longer Latin or German quo-
tations.

354. Other, howbeit trivial, points that will need attention in a second edition
are the following: On p. 75 (line 16) and on p. 400 (line 15) the respective ellipsis
needs to be indicated by three dots rather than by two dots. On p. 129 (line 15) the
word “und” should be change to “und”. On p. 667, in the Index of Persons: under the
entry “Augustinus” the notation “33” should be corrected to “32-33”.

Notes to the Orienting Study 349
It would be interesting to know why Flasch writes the title “De Possest” with a capital “P” but writes the title “De principio” with a lower-case “p”. After all, both “Possest” and “Principium” are used by Nicholas as names for God in the respective works that bear these titles (and in the titles themselves).

355. Regarding my system of referencing Cusa’s works, see n. 352 above.


357. According to Nicholas whatever is originated is of a finite nature.
There can be no more than one (Absolute) Infinity, just as there can be no more than one (Absolutely) Eternal thing [DI I, 14 (37:12-13). DM 2 (60:12-13). PF 7 (21:8)].

358. See, for example, n. 10 of “Notes to Introduction to Translations,” in my Miscellany on Nicholas of Cusa (1994).

359. See, below, n. 39, n. 40, n. 41, and n. 44 of “Notes to De Ludo Globi.”


363. Sermo XX (6:26-29): “… insofar as He is contracted or with respect to some property that particularly befits God, we name Him, for example, Eternal, Infinite, etc.”

364. Although Flasch here correctly translates “finibilis” as “begrenzbar”, nonetheless on p. 515, line 22, he erroneously translates it as “begrenzt”.

365. Here at the end of this passage Flasch (pp. 528-529) has a colon. I have corrected it to a period.

366. DP 72:6-8: “Quid igitur est mundus nisi invisibilis dei apparitio? Quid deus nisi visibilium invisibilitas, uti apostolus in verbo in principio nostrae collocutio-nis praemisso innuit?”

367. DP 2:3-5: “Ait autem hoc fieri hoc modo: ‘Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas.’ ”

368. Cf. DB 65:14-16.

369. From the time of his writing DI, and even earlier, Nicholas makes clear that God is not mingled with His creation. See DI II, 2 (102:1-2) and III, 1 (182:5-8).


371. DP 72:8-11.

372. See also Flasch, p. 525, second new paragraph.

373. Cf. DI II, 3 (111:3-7).

374. Flasch, pp. 532-533.

375. Cf. DI I, 16 (43:16-20), where Pseudo-Dionysius is quoted favorably. See also CA II, 1.

376. Edmond Vansteenberghen, Autour de la Docte Ignorance. Une controverse sur la Théologie mystique au XVe siècle [Vol. 14 of Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters (Münster: Aschendorff, 1915), p. 114]. In here distinguishing mystical theology from negative theology, Nicholas is here identifying neg-
ative theology with the *via negativa*. This point holds true even though in *Sermones*, p. Vol. II, f. 156', line 2 from bottom through f. 156', line 21, Nicholas identifies mystical theology and negative theology and speaks of “via mystica (ablativ case) negationis.”

377. We must remember that already in *Di* there are glimpses of this view that is more fully expressed in *DC*. See *Di* III, 6 (215), where things that are within time and things that are beyond time are said to coincide in reason. And in *Di* III, 6 (217) we read explicitly that reason governs the senses and that intellect governs reason.

378. See the reference in n. 380 below. Even in *Sermon* XXII (9:7-8) Nicholas had maintained that God is above all opposition and contradiction.


381. Thus, Flasch makes a false dichotomy when on his p. 185 he claims that Nicholas’s defense of the coincidence theory in *Ap.* is really a defense of the version set forth in *DC* and not of the version set forth in *Di*.

382. *DB* 44 and 47.

383. *DB* 39 and 43. This view is also held by Nicholas in earlier works—e.g., in *DM* 11 (137). Cf. *Di* I, 18 (53:15-16).

384. *DB* 44.

385. *DB* 48 and 43.

386. *DB* 44.

387. *DB* 52.

388. *DB* 54. Nicholas here uses the verb “simplificare” to indicate abstracting.

In *DC* II, 16 (159:6-8) he uses the verb “unire”. In *LG* I (28:5-6) he mentions that the mind does abstract. See also *Di* II, 6 (125:12 - 126:2), De Aequalitate 5:15-16. VS 36 (107:2) and *Sermones*, p. Vol. II, f. 146", lines 12-11 from bottom.

389. *DB* 46.


391. *DB* 40 and 46.

392. *DB* 42.


394. Flasch, p. 154: Diese Theorie “sagt, daß es die mens ipsa oder der Geist ist, der Gott und die gesamte Folgeordnung des Universums konstituiert.”


397. *De* 1 (52:11-13): “… cum apud Delphos praecepta sit cognitio, ut ipsa se mens cognoscat coniunctamque cum divina mente se sentiat.”


Although God is partaken of in some sense (viz., His likeness is partaken of [VS 22 (65:23-24)]), He cannot be partaken of as He is in and of Himself. Thus, in NA 16 (79:5-6) Nicholas speaks of the names of God as signifying “a participation in Him who cannot be participated in.” Cf. De Filiatione Dei 4 (78:2-6) and DM 14 (153:12-14).

In this connection one should not ignore what Nicholas writes in Sermo CCLXXXIII: “Considera quomodo anima rationalis habet duas potentias in hoc mundo diversas, ut per unam omnia in se colligat, et est intellectus, intus seu in se legens omnia seu omnia in se intus ligans. Et per aliam ad omnia progreditur ad extra, et se ad omnia ligat, ut est voluntas seu amor. Per illum enim se omnibus unit ac ligat ad omnia. Sed dum est felix, deum habet, in quo in se omnia habet. Et ipsa est in ipso omnibus unita; et hoc est idem scilicet omnia esse in ipsa et ipsam in omnibus, quia deum habet, in quo omnia et qui pariter in omnibus.” Paris edition, Vol. II, f. 184r, lines 21-28.

At the end of Ap. 7 Nicholas alludes to mystical theology as providing a visio invisibilis Dei: a vision of the invisible God. Moreover, in Ap. 2 and 12 Nicholas uses the same example of the sun that is used in DVD 6 (22). Moreover, just as in DVD 12 (48) Nicholas speaks of God as invisible as He is in Himself but visible in
accordance with the existence of creatures, so too in Ap. 11:23 he speaks of God as shining forth in creatures. And, in fact, the distinction between God’s being invisible in and of Himself but visible in and through creatures parallels the difference between DI 26 and DI 24-25.

421. PF 8 (section 23, lines 20-21 on p. 24).

422. “Non enim unitas quae de deo dicitur est mathematica, sed est vera et viva omnia complicans. Nec trinitas est mathematica, sed vivaciter correlativa. Unitrina enim vita est, sine qua non est laetitia sempiterna et perfectio suprema” DP (50:4-8). My edition of the Latin text. Flasch, on his p. 538, cites this passage from Renate Steiger’s edition. (This passage is exactly the same in the two editions.)

423. Flasch, p. 538, lines 6-5 from bottom; p. 540, lines 5-6.


425. See, for example DI I, 6 (15:3-4). DI II, 8 (136:9-10). DI II, 9 (148:8) and (150:9-10).

426. PF 8 (section 23, lines 11-15 on p. 24).


428. See LG II (101-102), especially II (102:5-7). But also see my discussion of DM 5 (81) on my p. 121 below.

429. Flasch, p. 159.


431. PF XVIII (66).

432. Cf. Flasch, p. 114: “Im kosmologischen Gebrauch, nicht in der spekula-
tiven Theologie, erlebt die docta ignorantia ihre Freuden.”

433. Note the correct name: De theologicis complementis.

434. LG I (22:1-7).

435. Paraphrased by Flasch on his p. 589.


438. Cited from the Heidelberg Academy edition, in the series “Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia” [Vol. XII: De Venatione Sapientiae. De Apice Theoriae. Edited by Raymond Klibansky and Hans G. Senger (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1982)]. Regarding the passage cited, Dupré’s edition has the same words and differs only in that it (1) uses the spelling “quidditatem”, (2) uses a colon rather than a semicolon in the first sentence, and (3) has no comma after “plurificabilem”.


441. Adapted from my translation of De Apice Theoriae in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: Volume One] (1998). Oftentimes Nicholas does
not express himself clearly in Latin. Cf. (in notes 38-40 above) the differences of opinion about the import of Nicholas’s words “qui ista prius inaudita legerint” in DI II, 11 (156:3).

442. Presumably, one should here say “the Duprés’ intuitions,” since the translation and the comments are published under the names of both Dietlind and Wilhelm Dupré.

443. Note the corresponding unscholarliness alluded to in n. 340 above.

444. Flasch tells us apropos of his portraying Nicholas’s thought: es ging “nicht um Rekonstruktion, nicht um eine ‘These’, sondern denn doch eher um ein Erzählbuch, dessen Widerlegung nicht in frontaler Bestreitung bestehen kann, sondern einzig darin, daß jemand von seinen Prämissen aus die gesamten Vorgänge neu und anders erzählt …” (p. 647).


447. See especially De Deo Abscondito 6.


449. VS 12. See also, for example, Sermones, p, Vol. II, f. 177r, lines 12-11 from bottom. [This is Sermo CCLXXVI (Haubst number) from the year 1457.]

450. Kurt Flasch, Nikolaus von Kues. Geschichte einer Entwicklung, op. cit., p. 289. See—above, toward the outset of Section 3.3.2—my discussion of Flasch’s claims about De Mente and the theme of learned ignorance.


453. DM 4 (77:30-32).

454. DM 14 (153:5-8).

455. DM 5 (79:1-10): “Orator: Plato said that judgment is required of the intellect when the senses deliver opposite messages at the same time. Layman: He spoke accurately. For when the sense of touch confusedly presents something as at once both hard and soft or both heavy and light (opposite in the presence of opposite), recourse is had to the intellect, in order that it may judge, regarding the quiddity of both, whether what is perceived confusedly is more than one discrete thing. Likewise, when sight confusedly presents something as both large and small, don’t we need the discriminating judgment of the intellect as to whether it is something large or something small? But in a case where the senses sufficed by themselves, we would not at all recur to the intellect’s judgment … .”

456. Sermones, p, Vol. II, f. 74′, lines 22-24: “In us there is a certain divine seed. This seed is a kind of intellectual power; and this power is sown in the earth of our perceptual life. In that part in which the intellectual power makes contact with the perceptual life it is a reasoning power, for the [intellectual] power is sown in order that it may develop. [However, the situation is] not as Plato says.”

457. DM 7 (99:7-10).

458. See, below, n. 508 and the quotation that is marked by it. In that passage Nicholas does state: “Thereupon, by the operation of its intellective life, mind finds
described within itself that which it is seeking.” See my comments on this passage (at the outset of Section 4.3 below).

459. DM 7 (100:11-14).

460. DM 7 (99:7-8), DM 7 (104:6-8).

461. Nicholas does, though only occasionally, refer to the active and the possible intellects. See Sermones, p., Vol. II, f. 140′, lines 20-24 and f. 164′, lines 5-6, and f. 112′, lines 4-3 from bottom. De Theologicis Complementis 11:67. VS 26 (79:14). Cf. the more general statement in LG I (29:11-12): the soul “makes itself to be a likeness of things . . .”

462. DM 7 (102:7-8).

463. DM 7 (102:21-23).

464. DM 7 (101:1-3).

465. DM 7 (102:4-5).

466. DM 8 (108:11-12) and (109:19-23). Both images and concepts are, for Nicholas, assimilations—the former being more proximate assimilations, the latter being more remote. See the references in n. 460 above.

467. DM 7 (103-104).

468. DM 7 (104:11-17). Cf. DB 71.

469. The mind’s intellect is more free of the material body than are the senses, teaches Nicholas. De Aequalitate 27:1. Cf. Sermones, p., Vol. II, f. 95′, line 11.

470. DM 7 (104:1-4).

471. See the references in n. 388 above.

472. DM 4 (78:8-11).

473. The intellect’s power is the divine seed. This power makes and enfolds conceptual forms. Nicholas, however, nowhere identifies the essence of the intellect with its power. See VS 29 (88:4-5).

474. Cf. LG II (93:1-4 and 9-13): “The soul invents branches of learning—e.g., arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy—and it experiences that they are enfolded in its power; for they are invented, and unfolded, by men…. Hence, too, the ten categories are enfolded in the rational soul’s conceptual power. So too [are enfolded] the five predicables and whatever logical principles and other things are necessary for perfect conceiving (whether they exist independently of the mind or not), since without them no discernment and conception can be perfectly possessed by the soul.”


475. See n. 117 of Notes to Idiota de Mente in my Nicholas of Cusa on Wis-
476. *DM* 11 (135).

477. See the references in n. 387 and n. 388 above, as well as the passages that are marked by them.


481. VS 29 (86:9-10).

482. VS 29 (87:15-20).


490. VS 15 (42:6-8).

491. DM 4 (78:1-2).

492. LG I (47).

493. Sermo XL (5:9).

494. Nicholas uses the example “four is not two” at LG I (28). He does not mention—but would agree with—the example of 4/2.

495. See n. 33 of Notes to De Theologicis Complementis, in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: Volume One.

496. Our knowledge of these principles, says Nicholas is infallible. VS 20 (57:12-15).


498. Sermo LI (8:1-2).

500. *DM* 4 (78:3-7).
501. *Sermones*, p, Vol. II, f. 49v, lines 16-12 and 3-1 from bottom. Regarding *lumen concreatum* see also *De Theologicis Complementis* 2:42-46. Cf. *Sermo CXXX* (5:27-42 and 6:10-11) and *Sermo CCX* (15:11-14). The *lumen divinum* is not a content of the mind but is a power of recognizing and discriminating.
503. Psalms 13:1 (14:1) and 52:1 (53:1).
505. Cf. *DC* II, 16 (165).
508. *DM* 5 (85:5-20). Of course, through experience it must notice these likenesses, from which to make concepts. Cf., below, n. 354 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*.

512. Note Nicholas’s distinction at *VS* 12 (32:10-15): The intellect does not have an innate desire to know God’s Quiddity; it has an innate desire to know only that He is so greatly perfect that He cannot be conceived to be more perfect. Cf. *Sermones*, p, Vol. II, f. 147v, lines 13-18. Cf. also *VS* 15 (42:4-5). Regarding *religio connata*, cf. *DC* II, 15 (147:5-6).
513. See especially *DM* 14 (155:2-3) and *DM* 8 (109:18-20).
515. *DM* 13 (148:6-12) and (149:12-17).
519. *Sermones*, p, Vol. II, f. 134v, last line through f. 135v, line 5: “Memory has within itself truth, justice, beauty, and whatever such things are perpetual and eternal (e.g., a mindfulness of eternity). In the second kingdom [mind] judges about the just, the true, the beautiful. And unless the first kingdom ministered to the second kingdom truth, justice, and beauty, the second kingdom would not have that with which to judge what is just, what is true, what is beautiful. In the third kingdom the mind delights and rejoices that it has found the just, the true, the beautiful.”
522. The word “*virtutes*” should not here be translated as “virtues,” even though in the subsequent English sentence “without virtue” translates “*absque vir-
Here is a splendid example of how a translator’s interpretations enter into his translation. The passage in [Sermones, p, Vol. II, f. 138* lines 16-20] reads: “In cælo igitur naturae intellectualis sunt virtutes multae uti stellae in firmamento, quae omnes a sole iustitiae habent lucem, sine quo spiritu essent penitus absque omni decore et pulchritudine et sic absque virtute. Virtus enim absque ornato decore non est. Sed solus spiritus solis iustitiae efficit vitam divinam quae dicitur filiatio dei.” The many powers that Nicholas is referring to in the intellectual heaven are the many intellects.

At DM 11 (141:3-6) Nicholas mentions the main powers of the mind: “In terms of its powers mind consists of a power of understanding, a power of reasoning, a power of imagining, and a power of perceiving—consists of these in such a way that the whole mind is called the power of understanding, the power of reasoning, the power of imagining, and the power of perceiving.” See also LG (101).


524. See, above, the quotation marked by n. 501.
527. DM 12 (142:15).
530. Cf. Compendium 6 (18:11-21): “For man qua man is to the brute as a learned man is to an unlearned man. For both the learned man and the unlearned man see the letters of the alphabet. But from the various combinations of these letters the learned man forms syllables, and from the syllables he forms words, and from the words he forms sentences. The unlearned man cannot do these things, because he lacks the art which is present in the learned man—an art acquired [by the learned man] from having made use of his intellect. Therefore, man has from his intellectual power the ability to compound and to divide the natural [perceptual] forms and to make from them intellectual forms and contrived forms and conceptual signs. By means of this power man excels brute animals; and the learned man excels the unlearned man because the learned man has an intellect that has been exercised and modified (reformatum).”

For a somewhat different interpretation of Nicholas’s texts on a priori knowledge—one that sees Nicholas as closer to Plato than to Aristotle—see Klaus Kremer’s well-documented article “Das kognitive und affektive Apriori bei der Erfassung des Sittlichen,” MFCG 26 (2000), pp. 101-144.

531. See also Vittorio Hösle, “Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Nicholas of Cusa’s Philosophy of Mathematics,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal [New School for Social Research, New York], 13 (1990), 79-112.
533. DM 6 (88:19-20) and (95:11-12). Nicholas also uses the plural, when he
speaks of numbers in the Divine Mind [DC I, 2 (9:5-7)].


535. *DM* 15 (158:5-6).

536. *DM* 6 (93:3-5).


538. Numbers exist outside the mind in the sense that they are present in the musical harmonic scale or in the proportions and ratios of a cathedral’s sanctuary, etc. According to Nicholas there is no Platonic χρηστικός. See, below, the reference in n. 540.


541. *DB* 56:16-17. Cf. the parenthetical remark at *DI I*, 5 (14:18-20): “… number, which is an entity-of-reason produced by our [power of] relational discrimination …”


545. *LG II* (79:5-8).


551. *DM* 15 (157:2). Correspondingly, Nicholas is prepared to call God “the Number of all things,” adding that God “is Number without discrete quantity.” *De Theologicis Complementis* 12:58-59.

552. *DM* 7 (98:3-5).


555. *DM* 6 (94:9-12).


Verlag, 1971).

Also note Fritz Nagel, “Nicolaus Cusanus in der Korrespondenz zwischen John Wallis und Leibniz,” pp. 159-165 in his Nicolaus Cusanus und die Entstehung der exakten Wissenschaften (Münster: Aschendorff, 1984). G. W. Leibniz, Textes Inédits, edited by Gaston Grua (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), Vol. I, p. 410. Raymond Klibansky, “Die Wirkungsgeschichte des Dialogs ‘De Pace Fidei.’” MFCG 16 (1984), p. 120: “… Leibniz kannte Nikolaus, ohne jedoch in seiner Philosophie von ihm Gebrauch zu machen. Er gibt einen der Böhmenbriefe heraus. Er weiß um Cusanus’ Mathematik. Er schreibt dem Englander Wallis: ‘nam Cusanus Germanus erat.’ Von einer nachdrücklichen Beschäftigung mit der Philosophie des Cusanus haben wir jedoch kein Zeugnis. Er wußte um die Tätigkeit des Cusanus. In seinen Scriptores rerum Brunsvicensium wird Cusanus immer wieder erwähnt, seine Tätigkeit als Legat, Cusanus als historische Figur, aber nicht als Philosoph.” Nicholas Rescher, Leibniz: An Introduction to his Philosophy (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1979), p. 23: According to Leibniz, the analysis of some propositions ‘will not result in explicit identities; they are only virtually identical, in that their analysis comes closer and closer to yielding, but never actually yields, an actual identity. There can be no doubt that Leibniz’ views on this, however greatly indebted to his work on the infinitesimal calculus, were influenced by the teaching of Nicholas of Cusa (in Chaps. i-ii of De docta ignorantia) that truly accurate reasoning about matters of fact would require an infinite number of inferential steps between the premises and the ultimately desired conclusion, so that the human intellect can only approach, but never attain, the ultimate precision of truth (praecisio veritatis).” Note also Leibniz’s allusion to Nicholas on p. 1677, line 6 of Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. Philosophische Schriften. [Sechste Reihe, Vierter Band, Teil B, edited by the Leibniz-Forschungsstelle der Universität Münster (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999)]: “Nicolaus Cusanus egregie: id est creare primae Menti, quod numerare est nostrae” (“Nicholas of Cusa excellently: to wit, creating is to the First Mind that which numbering is to our mind.”) R. W. Meyer, Leibniz and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution, translated by J. P. Stern (Chicago: Regnery, 1952), p. 64: “In Leibnitz’s Monadology we shall find echoes of all these European trends of thought: of Helmont, Henry More and Jan Amos Komenský (Comenius); of the symbolical language of Plotinus and Nicholas of Cusa, whose concept of a universal centre as the point of coincidence of individual centres Leibnitz translated from theology into anthropology and biology ….”


559. See, below, n. 116 of Notes to De Coniecturis.

560. Some of the secondary sources that are mentioned by Leibniz scholars are Christiaan Huygens [p. 116 of Fritz Nagel’s Nicolaus Cusanus und die Entstehung der exakten Wissenschaften], Giordano Bruno [p. 139 of Nagel, ibid.; p. 159 of

561. Some interpreters of Cusa, such as Robert Zimmermann [“Der Cardinal Nicolaus Cusanus als Vorläufer Leibnizens,” pp. 306-328 of *Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-historischen Classe der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 8 (Vienna, 1852)] or Edmond Vansteenbergh [*Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues (1401-1464)* (Paris, 1920; reprinted in Frankfurt am Main by Minerva Verlag, 1963)] emphasize a closer connection between Cusa and Leibniz. For example, Vansteenbergh comments (pp. 450-451): “Quant à Leibnitz, Zimmermann a surabondamment montré ce qu’il doit à Nicolas: individualisme, principe des indiscernables, optimisme, idée des monades, importance donnée a l’idée de force, etc.”


563. VS 21 (63:18-23) and (61:9-12).

564. VS 21 (59:8-10).


566. *DM* 15 (157:2). However, Nicholas would not be averse to using the word “monas” of the human soul, since he uses “unitas” of it: “Although mind is a divine number, nevertheless it is number in such a way that it is a simple oneness (unitas simplex) that of its own power produces its own numbers” [*DM* 7 (98:12-14)]. According to Ludwig Stein, Leibniz borrowed the term “monad” (in one language or another) from Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont. See Stein’s *Leibniz und Spinoza. Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Leibnizischen Philosophie* (Berlin: Reimer, 1890), p. 213.


568. See, above, Section 4.2 of the “Expository Purview” of the “Orienting Study.” See also, below, n. 129 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*, as well as n. 30 and n. 37 of Notes to *De Ludo Globi*.

and also f. 160v, last line through f. 161r, line 3.

570. De Filiatione Dei 3 (67:1-10).


572. “There are as many mirrors-of-the-universe as there are minds. For every mind perceives the whole universe, but confusedly.” G. W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. Philosophische Schriften (Sechste Reihe, Vierter Band, Teil C), op. cit. (n. 557 above), p. 1989, lines 10-11. Leibniz also writes: “Imo sciendum est mentem nostram semper esse speculum Dei et universi nisi quod obnubilata nunc intuitio et confusa cognitio est.” (“Indeed, it is known that our mind is always a mirror of God and of the universe, except that its intuition is now obscured and its knowledge is now confused.”) Leibniz, ibid., p. 2402, lines 23-24.


575. DI II, 12 (166:9-15).


579. De Dato Patris Luminum 1 (93).


581. Leibniz, loc. cit.


583. Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, op. cit. (n. 580 above), Book I, Chap. 2, Section 3, p. 90. Leibniz and Cusanus would be much closer on the topic of innate ideas were it not for Leibniz’s insistence (1) upon unconscious thoughts, (2) upon a monad’s entire program’s being in-built at its creation, and (3) upon the windowlessness of monads, so that monads are not subject to causal influences from without. That is, Leibniz would have been closer, intellectually, to Cusanus had he not gone beyond saying the first part of: “C’est ainsi que les idées et les vérités nous sont innées, comme des inclinations, des dispositions, des habitudes ou des virtualités naturelles, et non pas comme des actions; quoique ces virtualités soient toujours accompagnées de quelques actions souvent insensibles, qui y repondent.” [“It is in that way that the ideas of the truths are innate to us, as inclinations, dispositions, tendencies, or natural potentialities—and not as actualities, even though these potentialities are always accompanied by actualities (oftentimes imperceptible) that accord with them.] Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais sur l’entendement humain, op. cit. (n. 580 above), Preface, p. 52.
585. Leibniz, *Nouveaux Essais*, op. cit. (n. 580 above), Book I, Chap. 2, Section 4, p. 92. “The true meaning of the rule is that the place of others is the true point-of-view for judging more equitably, when one puts himself there.”
591. For a different interpretation, see the reference in n. 530 above.
595. See the works by Werner Beierwaltes—the ones listed in the present bibliography—that have lucidly shown Nicholas’s Platonistic and Neoplatonistic heritage.
598. Klaus Kremer, “Philosophische Überlegungen des Cusanus zur Un-

599. “Cusanus is neither old nor new, not medieval and not modern. Although he is within time, he belongs to the timeless spirit of men who throughout the millenia meet on the same level when, clothed in the garments of their era and of their nation, they call forth to one another from out of the experience of mankind’s destiny.” Karl Jaspers, *Nikolaus Cusanus, op. cit.*, pp. 215-216.