ABBREVIATIONS

Ap. Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae
DC De Coniecturis
DD De Dato Patris Luminum
DI De Docta Ignorantia
DP De Possess
IL De Ignota Litteratura (by John Wenck; Latin text edited by J. Hopkins 1981)
MFCG Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft (ed. Rudolf Haubst)
NA De Li Non Aliud
PNC A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2nd edition 1980)
SHAW Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Heidelberg: C. Winter
VS De Venatione Sapientiae
tim renderings of certain of their German sentences. The notes do not always point out these sentences.

6. In the notes foreign expressions are italicized only where they indicate titles and where there is italicization in a direct quotation.

PRAENOTANDA

1. All references to Nicholas’s works are to the Latin texts—specifically to the following texts in the following editions:
   B. Heidelberg Academy editions as found in the Latin-German edition of Felix Meiner Verlag’s Philosophische Bibliothek: De Docta Ignorantia, De Coniecturis, De Beryllo, De Possess (Minnesota reprint), De Venatione Sapientiae, Compendium.
   C. Strasburg edition as reprinted by W. de Gruyter: All remaining Cusanus works, unless specifically indicated otherwise.

   For some treatises the reference indicates book and chapter; for others, margin number and line; for still others, page and line. Readers should have no difficulty determining which is which when they consult the particular Latin text. For example, “DI II, 6 (125:19-20)” indicates De Docta Ignorantia, Book II, Chap. 6, margin number 125, lines 19 and 20.

2. Any Latin words inserted into the English translations for purposes of clarification are placed in parentheses—except that nouns whose cases have been changed to the nominative are bracketed. All expansions of the translations are bracketed.

3. References to the Psalms are to the Douay version (and, in parentheses, to the King James’ version).

4. The corrigenda for De Dato Patris Luminum have not been incorporated into the Latin text as reprinted in the Appendix. Nonetheless, these corrections have been taken account of in the English translation.

5. The summaries of the positions of Walter Schulz, Klaus Jacobi, and Heinrich Rombach frequently contain, in translation, nearly verba-
NOTES TO THE PREFACE


2. In Vol. 11 (Spring 1981), pp. 113-136, of the Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies T. Wilson Hayes published a transcription of a seventeenth-century English translation of DD. This translation was made by John Everard; and it was transcribed by Hayes from Folger Shakespeare Library manuscript V. a. 222, folios 1-52. Hayes's published text is riddled with transcription errors, almost all of which change Everard's meaning, thereby marring his translation. Examples of such errors are the following (page numbers refer to Hayes's published text):

- p. 125, line 2 from bottom: change 'we' to 'which'.
- p. 126, line 1: change 'sheweth' to 'seemeth'.
- p. 127, line 8: change each occurrence of 'he' to 'it' (corrected in ms. to 'it')
- p. 129, line 15: change 'sure' to 'such'.
- p. 129, line 16: change 'with God' to 'which had'.
- p. 130, line 4: change 'worlds' to 'worlde'.
- p. 130, line 10 from bottom: change 'certainly' to 'certaine'.
- p. 130, line 4 from bottom: change 'seasons' to 'reasons'.
- p. 131, line 15: change 'maketh from' to 'maketh known'.
- p. 131, line 19: add comma after 'reason'.
- p. 132, line 18: add comma after 'somewhat'.
- p. 133, line 2 from bottom: change 'reap' to 'reason'.
- p. 134, line 9: change 'fall by' to 'shall be'.
- p. 135, line 6 from bottom: change to 'laves & praeccepts'.
- p. 135, line 3 from bottom: change to 'Philosophers.' (conjecture from Paris ed.)

In note 1 on p. 122 Hayes explains that he has retained Everard's archaic spellings, while editorializing the punctuation. Yet, p. 122, line 8 has 'been' instead of 'bene'; and p. 122, line 9 has 'For' instead of 'Ffor'. Moreover, on p. 135, line 4 from the bottom, Hayes wrongly revises Everard's translation, banishing the correct translation to a footnote and failing properly to repunctuate the sentence.

The translation ends with the words "Amen./ Deo gratias./ F. Martis/ Novemb. 27./ 1632". Hayes believes (p. 113, n. 1) that "F. Martis" is "Either the name of a scribe or a pseudonym for Everard himself." He surmises that the name may refer to Fernand Martins, "a close friend of Cusanus . . . . . ." Hayes thereby fails to recognize that "F. Martis" is a Latin expression and stands for "Feria Martis," i.e., Tuesday; thus, it is part of the date and is not the name of a person. In all respects Hayes's published text is uncritical. Hayes offers no evaluation of the quality of Everard's translation. He does not point out either its strengths or its errors and omissions. He does not attempt to explain why there are italics on pp. 133 and 135. He does not cite important Scripture verses, such as the one needed to clarify the thought behind lines 1-3 on p. 133. He is not aware—the basis of the occurrence of the name "Salomon" in line 12 of p. 123—that Everard is following the Paris ed. (or, at least, some edition which is based on the Paris ed.).

Last of all, Hayes's introduction to the translation is a bundle of misconceptions. On p. 113 we are told that DD "provides an excellent summary of the radical epistemology that became influential among insurgent thinkers in the years leading up to the English Civil War"; yet, DD does not contain any radical epistemology. P. 115 speaks of Nicholas as "rejecting both the logic of rational theology and the intuition of mystical theology"; yet, Nicholas accepts intuition and mystical theology in a sense which Hayes nowhere mentions. Hayes's discussion of universals on p. 116 is utterly imprecise, as is the claim on p. 118 that, for Nicholas, "the created world represents the world of ideal forms." Moreover, DD does not discuss "the Platonic theory of Forms," as Hayes alleges on the same page. Nor does it identify the Father of lights (i.e., God) with the sun, as Hayes also contends on p. 118. Nor does Nicholas teach—whether in DD, De Mente, or anywhere else—that the human mind "has in it divine seeds that encapsulate the totality of everything knowable but which, to blossom and bear fruit, must be planted in the soil of the sensible world. These seed-like manifestations
of divinity, somewhat suggestive of DNA, need to be carefully fertilized in order to realize their potential" (p. 118). Nor does DD conclude with "a vision of a future world" (p. 120). On p. 120 Hayes also asserts, without offering any textual support, that "according to Cusanus, there is no Aristotelian or Thomistic essence in things, no fixed nature to which a thing is bound, there is no hierarchy among created things"; yet, this assertion conflicts with Nicholas's doctrine in DI. Similarly, Hayes is mistaken when he states, unqualifiedly: "In seeking to connect the general and the universal to the particular and individual, to the immediately sensible, Cusanus expressed a truly grand tolerance for all points of view, because his unified intellectual vision led him to see that no one point of view had any priority, but each individual perception was conditioned by the thing perceived and by the perceiver's angle of vision" (pp. 116-117). Many of Hayes's statements are philosophically and historically naive: e.g., we are told that in Nicholas's theory of knowledge "sense perception is no longer decadent, sinful knowledge" (p. 117). Yet, since the time of Plato's *Theaetetus* who has ever claimed, simplistically, that sense perception is (sinful) knowledge? Why, then, the words "no longer"?

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION


2. The German word "Neuzeit," which I have here and elsewhere translated by "modern period," signifies the period from the end of the Middle Ages to the present. By contrast, in British and American circles, the modern period is usually distinguished from both the Middle Ages and the contemporary period.

3. Rombach, pp. 236-237. See also p. 150, n. 4.

niemand auf ihn berufen, kaum einer sich seiner erinnert."
5. Jaspers, p. 223: "Cusanus, der selber nicht als Forscher einen Platz
im Gange moderner Wissenschaften hat, und nicht diese Wissenschaften
nach ihrem Sinn grundsätzlich begriffen hat, ist trotzdem durch seine
Philosophie auch eine Orientierung in der seit seiner Zeit erwachsenen
wissenschaftlichen Welt."
6. Michael Glossner, Nikolaus von Cusa und Marius Nizolius als Vor-
läufer der neueren Philosophie (Münster: Theissing, 1891), p. 33.
8. Ekkehard Fränzki, Nikolaus von Kues und das Problem der abso-
9. Richard Falckenberg, Grundzüge der Philosophie des Nikolaus
Cusanus mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Lehre vom Erkennen.
Problemgeschichtliche Stellung und systematische Bedeutung
13. Bett, pp. 132-133. Also note p. 142: "Nicholas thinks of God and the
world as in the most intimate and the most necessary relation: the
infinite and the finite are like two correlative aspects—the internal and
the external, or the essential and the accidental, as we might say—in
which all that is and all that can be exists. God is the one, eternal,
uncreated, unchangeable essence of all that appears as multiple and
mutable in the created universe."
14. Bett, pp. 110-111. In support of his interpretation Bett alludes in a
general way to the sermon "Pax hominibus bonae voluntatis," in Excitati-
onem V. When we look at this sermon, we find Nicholas saying:
"Deus omnia propter semetipsum operatus est ut notas faceret divitias
gloriae; et hoc, quia bonus. Boni enim natura sic se habet quod est
suintius diffusiva, quia se multiplicare appetit, quia bonum" (Paris
edition, folio 88v). But a few lines later Nicholas also writes: "Creavit
autem deus naturam magis suae bonitatis participem, scilicet intellec-
tualern. Quae in hoc quod habet lberum arbitrium est creatori similior
et est quasi alius deus. In ista natura deus voluit magis ostendere divitias
gloriae suae" (folio 89r). Nicholas is not teaching that God is under
natural or moral necessity to create but is rather teaching that He
creates freely since His will is good. However, His will is not subject
to goodness as if to a "necessity" of moral nature. Bett's exposition is
uncritical, taking account neither of the Scripture verses that Nicholas
has in mind [Ps. 113:3 (115:3); Rom. 9:23] nor the Pseudo-Dionysian
source [De Divinis Nominibus, Chap. 4, Sec. 20 (PG 3:719A)].
16. See my Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance: A Translation and
an Appraisal of De Docta Ignorantiae (Minneapolis: The Arthur J.
Banning Press, 1981) and my Nicholas of Cusa's Debate with John
Wenck: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Ignota Literatura und
Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning
Press, 1981), where my critique of Vincent Martin can also serve, muta-
tatis mutandis, as a critique of Henry Bett, by whom Martin is influenced.
My critique of Klaus Jacobi, in Chap. 2 of the present volume, also
bears upon Bett.
21. Also note the last section of De Visione Dei 24, as well as the
important statement at De Coniecturis II, 17 (182:7-8).
22. DJ III, 8 (228:20-26).
24. Nicholas, however, also uses "explicatio" in other contexts. For
example: "Faith enfolds within itself everything which is understand-
able. But understanding is the unfolding of faith" [DI II, 11 (244:9-11)].
Moreover, there are the illustrative mathematical and metaphysical
illustrations (e.g., plurality is unfolded from oneness; motion is
unfolded from rest).
26. See VS 12 (31:26-29), where Nicholas denies that posse fieri is
comprehensible.
28. Lewis Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors
31. See, for example, DI II, 9 (150:5-6); DP 12 (last sentence); VS 7
(18:21-22).
34. Beck, p. 66.
35. Beck, p. 66.
36. Beck, p. 66: “What is true of the relation of God to the world is true of the relation of the world to the individual things in it: each individual thing is the whole universe in condensed form (contracte).”
37. Beck, p. 66.
40. Also note DI II, 3 (109:11-15).
42. Beck, p. 60.
43. Beck, p. 69.
44. Beck, p. 70.
45. Beck, p. 70, n. 31.
46. Moreover, in DI III Nicholas nowhere uses the expression “God-man,” which Beck attributes to him (p. 70). Instead, he repeatedly speaks of Jesus as “God and man.”

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

3. Schulz, p. 11. However, Schulz does mention, along the way, Nicholas’s influence on Giordano Bruno (p. 23).
5. Schulz, pp. 11 and 22.
7. I have translated this directly from the Latin text cited by Schulz on p. 113, n. 6: “Ostendo quod non ita videtur mihi modo, ut quia sit ideo intelligat, sed quia intelligit ideo est, ita quod Deus est intellectus et intelligere, et est ipsum intelligere fundamentum ipsius esse.”
11. Schulz, p. 15. These last two sentences are direct quotations: “Das Sichtbare ist als Gesehenes das abbildhaft Ausgefaltete des im ersehenden Gott noch Eingefalteten. Das sichtbare Abbild ist also schon immer, aber als unsichtbares, im bildenden Urbildner; und umgekehrt: das unsichtbare Urbild ist, aber als sichtbar gewordenes, immer noch im Abbild aufbewahrt.”
13. Schulz, p. 16. Also note p. 22, where Schulz says that Nicholas's metaphysics places God in “essentially indissoluble relation to the world and to man.”
14. This is translated from Schulz’s German translation on p. 18: “Was anderes, Herr, ist Dein Sehen, wenn Du mich mit dem Auge der Zuneigung anblickst, als dass Du von mir gesehen wirst?” Schulz gives the Latin, from De Visione Dei 5, on his p. 113, n. 9: “Quid aliud Domine est videre tuum, quando me pietatis oculo respicis, quam te a me videri?” Schulz is using the Paris edition (1514).
15. Translated from Schulz’s German translation on p. 19: “Dass Du nicht zu mir hinsieht, das ist eben dies, dass ich nicht zu Dir hinsehe, sondern Dich geringschätzt und verachte.” Schulz gives the Latin, from De Visione Dei 5, on his p. 113, n. 10: “Quod enim me non respicis, est, quia te non respicio, sed respuo et contemno.”
16. Translated from Schulz’s German translation on p. 19: “Wenn ich sehe, wie in bezug auf meine Veränderung der Blick Deines Bildes und Dein Antlitz verändert erscheint, so kommst Du mir vor, als seist Du, weil Du mir verändert begegnest, gleichsam der Schatten, der der Veränderung des Sichbewegenden folgt.” Schulz gives the Latin, from De Visione Dei 15, on his p. 113, n. 11: “Nam dum video, quomodo ad mutationem meam videtur visus iconae tuae mutatus et facies tua mutata, quia mutatus occurris mihi, quasi sis umbra quae sequitur mutationem ambulantis.” Schulz inadvertently omits “videtur”: “tua
videtur mutata".
19. Schulz is aware of Nicholas’s view that God is a unitary trinity of See, Seen, and the Union of both—so that God sees not only the world but also Himself, as Exemplar. See pp. 14-15. Schulz’s discussion of this topic, when compared with Nicholas’s text, is unduly vague.
22. On p. 29 Schulz incautiously writes: “Dass die Transzendenz nur mein Abbild ist . . .” But the word “nur” (which Schulz adds to Nicholas’s idea) is inconsistent with the further point that “die Transzendenz ist mein Urbild” (p. 30).
25. This clause is part of a longer sentence governed by the word “if”: “Si videre tuum est creare tuum et non vides aliud a te, sed tu ipses obiectum tui ipsius—es enim videns et visibile atque videre—quomodo tunc creas res alias a te?” But it is clear that Nicholas is endorsing this antecedent clause. Even Schulz admits, on p. 14, that God sees Himself, according to Nicholas.
27. DI I, 3 (110:4-6 and 11-25).
28. This theory of vision is traceable back to Aristotle’s De Anima. N. B. In De Visione Dei 12 Nicholas states that God, who sees Himself, is a triunity of Seer, Seen, and Seeing. But this is a point about the Godhead, not a point about God’s relationship to the world. That is, God-as-seen is not the world but is the second member of the Trinity.
30. De Visione Dei 15. Schulz, being misled by the punctuation in the Paris edition, mistranslates a portion of this passage. See n. 11 on his p. 113, as well as his corresponding translation on p. 19. These are reproduced in n. 16 above.
32. See DI I, 24 (78).
33. In spite of Schulz’s unscholarly method, his imprecise expression, and his exuberant eisegesis, his treatment of Cusa has too often been too uncritically accepted. For example, Leo Gabriel, in his editor’s introduction to Volume III of the Dupré’s German translation of Nicholas’s treatises, refers approvingly and deferentially to Schulz’s interpretation of De Visione Dei. [Nikolaus von Cues, Philosophisch-theologische Schriften, ed. by Leo Gabriel, translated by Dietlind and Wilhelm Dupré (Vienna: Herder, 1967), Vol. III, p. xii.]

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

3. Much of the recapitulation is almost verbatim, though in English translation.
8. Jacobi, p. 149.
11. Jacobi, pp. 151-152: “Weil die geschenkte Ewigkeit nur in eingeschränkter Weise aufgenommen wurde, deshalb existiert die anfangund ursprünglose Ewigkeit (aeteritas sine principio) als in angefangen und gegründeter Weise (principiatis) aufgenommene. Die Welt also, sofern in ihr die Ewigkeit ihr ganzes Sein ist, hat keinen Ursprung. Aber weil die Ewigkeit nur in gegründeter Weise im Abstieg der Welt aufgenommen wurde, deshalb ist die Welt nicht die absolute Ewigkeit, sondern die in gegründeter Weise zusammengesetzte Ewigkeit. Die Ewigkeit der Welt also wurde eine gegründete, und die ewige Welt wurde eine gemachte. Und es ist nicht eine andere Welt, die beim Vater ewig ist, und
wieder eine andere, die durch den Abstieg vom Vater gemacht wurde, sondern ebendieselbe Welt.' . . . So ist gleichsam die Welt der veränderliche, abschattungshafte Gott, und die unveränderliche und nicht abgeschattete Welt der ewige Gott." Jacobi's German partly mistranslates the Latin. Cf. my translation in Chap. 5 of the present volume. Also see n. 68 below.


16. DP 67. Translated from Jacobi's German translation, p. 157: "Die Verneinung also, die auf das Sein geht, verneint, dass dies Sein das . . . vorausgesetzte Sein ist, und das heisst nichts anderes, als dass das Sein nach dem Nichtsein keineswegs das ewige und unausprechliche Sein ist . . . So sehe ich Gott wahrer als die Welt. Denn die Welt sehe ich nur mit dem Nichtsein und negativ, wie wenn ich sage: ich sehe, dass die Welt nicht Gott ist; Gott aber sehe ich vor dem Nichtsein, deshalb wird kein Sein von ihm verneint. Sein Sein ist also jedes Sein von allem, was ist oder in irgendeiner Weise sein kann."

20. On p. 159 Jacobi cites DD 5 (122:2-4), which he construes as: "The Word Himself, who is the infinite Light of the Father, . . . manifested Himself perceptibly to us—without contraction—in our Lord Jesus Christ." At the beginning of Section 2.5 below, I indicate that this is a mistranslation.
22. Jacobi, p. 159.

27. DD 2 (97). Maria Liaci is one of the few persons who take these words seriously. See her fine article "Accenti spinoziani nel 'De dato patris luminum' del Cusano?" in Nicolò da Cusa (Florence: Sansoni, 1962), pp. 217-242 (Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Magisterio dell' Università di Padova).

28. Also note DI III, I (182:5-8): "Book One shows that the one absolutely Maximum—which is incomunicable, unintermixable, incontrastible to this or that—exists in itself as eternally, equally, and unchangeably the same."

29. DD 2 (98:1-2).
30. DD 2 (98:2-18).
31. DD 2 (102:2-3).
32. In DI Nicholas refers to God as the Being of all things, the Essence of all things. But he means that God is the Being of all beings, the Essence of all essences. See pp. 10-12 and 21-22 of the Introduction in my Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Docta Ignorantia (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1981).

33. Cf. Proposition 5 of the list of propositions attached to NA.
34. DI II, 3 (111:15-22).
35. Cf. DI II, 3 (111:15-17); III, I (188:10-13).
36. Cf. DI II, 3 (110:4-6).
38. DI II, 2 (103:3-9).
39. Cf. DP 67:9-11: "His being is the complete being of all the things which either are or in any way can be." The context shows that Nicholas's point is the following: God is the being of all things insofar as these are enfolded in Him.
40. DI II, 3 (111:3-5). When Nicholas here says that the world is "altogether nothing," he means that it is totally dependent being and, therefore, of itself altogether nothing.
42. Cf. DI II, 7 (130:14-15).
43. Jacobi, p. 149, n. 33.
44. DD 2 (97:15-17).
45. DD 2 (98:1).
46. See, in particular, DI II, 2 and 3 and parts of Ap. 8, 9, 16, and 26.
48. DI II, 2 (98:6-8).
49. DI II, 2 (98:11-15).
50. DD 2 (99:5-8).
51. DI II, 2 (104:5-13).
52. Jacobi, p. 152.
53. DI II, 2 (104:6).
54. Jacobi, p. 149.
55. *DI II*, 2 (104:6-7).
56. E.g., *DI II*, 9 (150:9-10); 11, 13 (177:9-10).
58. *DI III*, 1 (183:10-13). The context here is that of the two natures of Christ.
60. *DD* 2 (97:15-17).
61. *DD* 3 (107:4-6).
64. *DD* 3 (106:2-3).
66. *DD* 3 (106:9). In *DP* 71:17-19 Nicholas says that “all things—in their own most congruent eternal being—are most clearly most simple Eternity itself.” Here he is talking about things insofar as they exist in God. This passage is important for showing that Nicholas sometimes uses “a thing’s own being” to refer to a thing’s state of enfoldedness in God, even though in *DD* he uses this expression to refer to a thing’s state of unfoldedness from God.
67. *DD* 3 (106:5-6). Cf. *DP* 59:11-13. An “originated eternity” is not really eternity. Nicholas uses this expression in order to indicate that the world, which is originated from God, was enfolded in God ontologically (not temporally) prior to its having been unfolded. As enfolded in God, it is God’s Eternity; as unfolded from God it is neither God nor eternal.
68. *DD* 3 (106:14-16). The world is unchangeable and is the Eternal God only insofar as it is present in God.
70. E.g., *NA* 16 (79:5). Cf. *VS* 21 (62:8).
71. *VS* 22 (65:26-27); 7 (16:7-8).
72. *De Beryllo* 16 (18:7-10): “Et attende quod veritas, quae est id quod esse potest, est impardicipabilis, sed in simulitudine suo, quae potest secundum magis et minus recipi secundum dispositionem recipientis, est communicabilis.” See *VS* 7 (16:7-8) and 22 (65:26-27).
73. *DD* 2 (99:4-5).
74. But even the word “likeness” and the sense in which creatures, for Nicholas, are a likeness of God needs clarification. See pp. 14-16 of my *Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance* and pp. 19-28 of *PNC*.
75. *DD* 2 (99:13). A mirror receives not the face itself but a likeness of the face itself.
76. Similarly, created being is not a contraction of the Absolute but is a contracted “likeness” of the Absolute. Jacobi misses this point when he ascribes to Nicholas the view that the empirical world is the contraction of the Absolute (p. 152).
78. *DD* 4 (111:33).
79. See *DD* 5 (115-117).
80. According to Jacobi’s interpretation of Nicholas “the creature is theophany,” *God in the mode of manifestation*, but not God Himself (p. 148). Jacobi accentuates the phrase “God in the mode of manifestation” by quoting, approvingly, Heinrich Rombach’s interpretation of Cusa: “Necessarily, then, finite beings both are and are not God” (Jacobi, p. 148, n. 31).
81. Section 1.2 above
87. Strictly speaking, Nicholas regards the signification of “soul,” in any respect that we can understand it, to be infinitely removed from signifying God as He is in Himself. He does not, however, for this reason reject, *tout simplement*, the affirmation that God is the World-soul. Cf. *DI II*, 9 with 1, 24.
89. *DP* 75:1-3.
91. Jacobi, p. 159. Jacobi takes this citation from *DD* 5 (122:2-4).
92. The Latin sentence at *DD* 5 (122:1-4) should be repunctuated in the Heidelberg Academy edition of *Nicholai de Cusa Opera Omnia*.
93. *DI III*, 1 (183:10-13); 111, 1 (182:5-6).
98. For a discussion of this passage see my *Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance*, pp. 37-40.
99. “In all unserem Erkennen ist also Gott der Erkannte” (p. 154).
100. "... all unsere Erkenntnis im Grunde Gotteserkenntnis ist ..." (p. 155).

101. Without explicitly drawing the following comparison, Jacobi creates the impression that just as Nicholas believes that "in all things God alone is sought" [DF II, 13 (179:9)], so he believes that in whatever is known God alone is the ultimate object of knowledge.

102. Jacobi, p. 162: "In der Welt kommt Gott nicht vor, ja es kommt, die Welt in ihrer Andersheit und Abstandigkeit genommen, nicht einmal etwas Gott Ähnliches in der Welt vor; Gott bleibt solcher Weltkenntnis in unerkennbarer Transzendenz fern ....

"Obwohl aber die Erkenntnis in der Dimension der Andersheit nicht auf Gott trifft, kann die Erkenntnis des Weltlich-Seienden doch dazu dienen, Gott zu erkennen, dann nämlich, wenn die Gegenstände in all ihrer Mannigfaltigkeit und Varietät als 'Theophanien', als Selbstbeken- dung Gottes durchschaut werden. In allem Erkennbaren wird so nichts anderes als Gott gesehen, der die eine Wahrheit alles Seienden ist. Wenn Gott die eine Wahrheit von allem ist, dann muss diese Erkenntnis, die Gott in allem erkennt, die Andersheit des Seienden als solche negieren."


NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE


3. Rombach, p. 207. Strictly speaking, Rombach contradicts himself. For on p. 207 he states that Nicholas did not have the concept of function ("Cusanus gibt uns zwar den Gedanken der Funktion, aber nicht den Begriff"), whereas on p. 211 he refers to Nicholas's concept of function ("In seinem Begriff von Funktion spielen immer noch Substanzgesichtspunkte hinein"). Accordingly, I take Rombach to mean that Nicholas had no explicit concept of function. As we shall see later, this is just one example of Rombach's many, many imprecisions. Another immediate example is his translation of "qui ista prius inaudita legerint" [DF II, 11 (156:3)] as "[die Leser,] die so Unerhörtes früher nicht lasen" (p. 207, including n. 79).


5. Rombach, p. 183.


7. Rombach, pp. 211-212.

8. Rombach, p. 163: "Funktion meinte, dass eine Sache aufgeht in dem, was sie in anderem wirkt, ist Sein im anderem." Rombach, p. 173: "Es [d.h. ein Ding] ist ja nur, was es (im anderen) wirkt und als was es (durch anderes) bedingt ist."


10. Rombach, pp. 173 and 212.

11. Rombach, p. 177.


15. Rombach, p. 165: "Alle Wesenheiten sind nur die eine und einzige Wesenheit des Alles: 'omnes essentiae sunt ipsa omnium essentia.'"

16. Rombach, p. 163.

17. Rombach, p. 163.


20. Rombach, p. 156.


23. Rombach, p. 159.


27. Rombach, pp. 164-165.

28. DF II, 5 (117:11-13). Translated from Rombach's German translation, p. 208: "... in jedem Geschopf ist das Universum das Geschaffene selbst (in qualibet enim creatura universum est ipsa creatura) und so nimmt jedes alles auf, derart, dass das All in ihm jenes selbst in zusammengezogener Weise ist (ut in ipso sit ipsum contracte)."


30. Rombach, p. 165. Cf. p. 223: "Das Einzelne ist darum diese Ganz-
Note 31. "Heit, ohne dass es in seiner Bestimmtheit aufgelöst wäre."

32. Rombach, p. 165.


34. Rombach, p. 165. Rombach alludes to DI 10 (39:4-11).

35. Rombach, pp. 222-223. It is not clear whether Rombach wants to ascribe this position to Nicholas or whether it is ascribable to functionalism only in general. However, we may presume that what Rombach thinks to be true of functionalism in general, he also thinks to be true of Nicholas's "functionalism"—in the absence of a disclaimer. See the discussion in Section 2.6 below.

36. Rombach, pp. 222-223, n. 89.

37. Rombach, p. 223.

38. Rombach, p. 223.


40. Rombach, p. 175.

41. Rombach, p. 175.

42. Rombach, p. 175 (verbatim, in translation).

43. Rombach, p. 168 (verbatim, in translation).

44. Rombach, pp. 168-169 (verbatim, in translation).

45. Rombach, p. 171 (verbatim, in translation).

46. Rombach, p. 151.

47. See n. 3 above.

48. "All the essences are only the one and only essence of all things" [DI, I, 16 (45:7)].

49. Two sentences earlier Rombach writes: "Alle Dinge sind also—nimmt man sie nur grundsätzlich und streng—das gleiche; sie sind: die Welt."

50. Rombach, pp. 164 and 175.


52. See Rombach, p. 172, first new paragraph.

53. Rombach, p. 172: "Insofern nun alles in Gott ist, ist Gott, gemessen an allem, das absolut Größte (minimum absolutum), und sofern er in allem steckt und nichts so klein zu sein vermag, dass es nicht ihn, und zwar als ganzen, enthielte, ist er zugleich auch das Kleinste (minimum absolutum)."


55. Rombach, p. 207, n. 78: "Gott hat 'die Verhältnisse der Teile wechselweise aufs genaueste zusammengestimmt (ita proportionabiliter partium ad invicem proportionem constitucens), dass überall die Bewegung der Teile zum Ganzen führt (ut in qualibet sit motus partium ad totum)' (D. ign. 11, 13).—Dies ist die vielleicht klarste Definition der Funktion in den cusanischen Texten."


57. My translation of the Latin.

58. NA 10 (37:21-23): "But if you see the essence as free from other and in Not-other, surely in accordance with the nature of that in which you see it [viz., in Not-other], you see it to be indestructible." Insofar as the essences are unfolded, Not-other is said to be in them [NA 10 (37:7-12)].

59. Cf. NA 14 (53:7-10); 13 (52:10-17); 10 (38:5-6).

60. See n. 3 above.

61. Rombach, p. 171.

62. DP 68:11-23 (my translation): "Cardinal: If in its essence the sun were also thereby all the things it is not, then assuredly it would be prior to not-being and so [would be] both sun and all things, since nothing could be denied of it. John: I grant it. But the concept of the sun—a sun which is finite—confuses me. Cardinal: Assist yourself, then, and look at the very being of the sun. Next, remove (1) [the determination] of the sun and (2) everything which is not abstract—thereby removing [all] negation. You now see that nothing is denied of the 'sun's' being. For when you see that the being of the sun is not the being of the moon, this [recognition] occurs because you see being which is inabstract and is contracted and limited in such way that it is called solar. Therefore, if you remove the boundary and see Boundless or Eternal Being, then you undoubtedly see it in its priority to not-being."


64. DP 8:14-15.


67. DP 2:3-6.

68. DP I I:1-12.

69. Rombach, p. 171, italics mine.

70. Rombach, p. 152: "Nichts ist alles, ein jedes zeigt sich in dem, was es ist, dadurch dass es anderes nicht ist."

Nichts ist es selbst; alles ist Alles.”

72. Rombach, p. 163.
74. *DI* II, 5 (118:14-17).
75. Rombach, p. 165.
76. Rombach, p. 228: “Ein absoluter Beobachter, der ausserhalb der Welt steht und die Relationen nicht als einzelne Relationen aufgreift, sondern auf das Ganze blicken möchte, würde nichts zu sehen bekommen. Für Gott ist die Welt nicht ’da‘.”
77. Rombach, p. 168: “Zwar ist die Welt ihrem Inhalte nach Gott, aber der Form nach von ihm durch eine unendliche Kluft getrennt.”
78. Rombach, p. 224: “ . . . dass es innerhalb der funktionalistisch gedachten Welt keinen anderen Inhalt gibt, als diese Welt selbst . . . .”
87. Rombach, p. 163.
88. Rombach, p. 208.
94. *DI* II, 2 (101:1-3; 101:1-3); *DI* I, 3 (110:11-12).
97. Rombach, p. 163.
81. Rombach, p. 165.
84. Rombach, p. 211: “Das endliche ‘Seiende’ ist der Gott im Nichts. Deus in nihilo. Der ’geschaffene Gott‘ (Deus creatus), der vereinzelte (auf eine zufällige Bedingung eingeschränkte) Gott (Deus occasionatus).”
95. *DI* II, 5 (121:4-13).
104. Cf. *DD* 2 (100:13-20): “The substantial form of Socrates is one, simple, indivisible form. The whole of it is in the whole of Socrates and in each of his parts; through this form Socrates and all that is a part of him exist. For example, the [hand of Socrates] has from the form of Socrates the fact that it is Socrates’ hand and not someone else’s. But because the hand does not receive the form of Socrates with the simplicity and universality by which this form is the form of Socrates but rather with a particular descent (viz., as such a member), the hand of Socrates is not Socrates. The case is similar regarding the other members.”
90. *DI* II, 1 (189:1-3): “Principia enim individuantia in nullo individuo in tali possunt harmonica proportione concurrere sicut in alio, ut quodlibet per se sit unum et modo quo potest perfectum.”
Notes to Chapter Three

111. *DI* II, 13 (175:19-28) and II, 12 (172:12-14).
112. See Section 1.3 above, together with n. 35.
113. *DI* II, 4 (116:4-9). Also see *DI* II, 13 (175:19-28) and II, 12 (172:12-14).
114. Rombach, p. 169: "Vor allem muss man davon ausgehen, dass der Cusaner im vierten Kapitel des zweiten Buches der Docta Ignorantia nichts anderes erreichen will als die Klarheit daruber, dass Gott nur 'vermittelt durch die Welt' mit den Dingen eins ist." Rombach continues: "Eine unmittelbare Identitat lehnt er aufs entscheidenste ab."
115. Rombach, p. 150: "Es ist kaum moglich, die Wichtigkeit des Cusaners fur die Entwicklung der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft zu iiber-...
117. Rombach, p. 159: "Gerade darum, weil die Welt nirgendwo eine notwendige Grenze hat und ihrem Sinne nach uberall ins Unendliche reicht, muss sie an irgendeinem Punkte ihre faktische Begrenzung erfahren als eine Einschrankung von aussen her."
118. Rombach, p. 161: "Die Unendlichkeit der Welt ist identisch mit ihrer Endlichkeit; so kann der Cusaner von der finita infinitas der Welt sprechen."
119. Rombach, p. 158: "Zwar dehnt sich das Weltall nach allen Seiten und in jeder Hinsicht von Wesen her ins Unendliche aus, doch halt diese Ausdehnung an einer bestimmten Stelle faktisch an, so dass die Welt ihre eigene Unendlichkeit nicht erfuellt."
120. Rombach, p. 173: "Ein Ding vermochte nicht allein zu sein; es konnte sich nicht konstituieren. Es bedarf des Durchgangs durch Andersheit, um zu sich selbst zu kommen."
121. *DI* II, 4 (113:4-5). Literally: "[Absolute Maximality,] which is, absolutely, that which all things are . . . ."
122. *DI* II, 4 (113:9-11). Literally: "the world . . . being, contractedly, that which all things are . . . ."
123. *DI* II, 4 (115:3-4). Literally: "In them [viz., the sun and the moon,] the universe is, contractedly, that which they are."
124. I myself am inclined to take "id quod sunt omnia" as having to do with essence, so that the sentences may be construed as I have rendered them above.
125. In my judgment Klibansky is more nearly correct than Wilpert.
130. I am inclined to take the four sentences to mean, respectively:
   (1) "Since each thing is contracted, it is not the case that it can be actually all things; hence, it contracts all things, so that [in it] they are it."
   (2) "Hence, in the 'order of nature,' [as it were,] all things preceded, without plurality, each thing."
   (3) "Therefore, it is not the case that many things are in each thing actually, rather, [in each thing] all things are, without plurality, this respective thing."
   (4) "However, it is not the case that God is in the sun sun and in the moon moon; rather, [in them] He is that which is sun and moon without plurality and difference." Cf. *DI* II, 4 (115:1-3)—specifically the words "in illis."
131. *DI* II, 5 (118:8-10).
132. I tend to think that this Latin sentence and the previous one are equivalent and that Nicholas meant by the previous Latin sentence the same thing that is expressed by this one.
134. Cf. the switch from "in omnibus particularibus" [*DI* II, 4 (116:16)] to "in universis" [ibid. (116:21)].
136. I opt for the latter construal—doing so in the light of the entire context, including *DI* II, 4 (113:4-5).
137. I now regard "seem" as the better translation.
139. I regard the passage in question as emphasizing the harmonic oneness-in-plurality of the universe. Cf. *DI* III, 3 (201:4-6): "All things were created by Him and in consequence of Him in a most excellently and most perfectly congruent order . . . . It is not the case that anything could be more perfect if this order were removed . . . ." (See my list of corrigenda for the Latin text of *DI*—a list found on p. 161 of Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance.)
they are the world. And all these things are God; similarly, as-unfolded-in-the-created-world whatever either has been created or will be created is unfolded from any way either exists or can exist is enfolded in this Beginning. And other than this Form. For this Form is the infinite, most simple, and all being is in this Form. However, in this Form all being can be nothing. And since all being is from this Form and cannot be outside it, 23 (70:22-23) Nicholas says that "all existence exists actually insofar as the absolute, most perfect, and most simple Form, since this Form bestows created (i.e., unfolded) finite self with its own form; (2) as enfolded in Him, in whom it is enfolded .... I want to say that as-enfolded-in-God things are not present without plurality, because they are present in Enfolding One-ness. For in accordance with the fact that things cannot participate equally in the Equality of Being: God, in eternity, understood one thing in one way and another thing in another way. Herefrom arose plurality, which in God is oneness."

The passage in DI III, 4 (204:17-19) is especially difficult to understand, though to John Wenck it seemed obviously heretical (IL 38:18-23). But we know that it cannot violate the doctrine of divine simplicity, since Nicholas asserts this doctrine in the very same breath with affirming that "all things are in God according to themselves with a [respective] difference of degree." At the present moment I am inclined to take this statement to embody a continuation of the point made at DI II, 3 (108:4-11): "Just as number arises from our mind by virtue of the fact that we understand what is commonly one as individually many: so the plurality of things [arises] from the Divine Mind (in which the many are present without plurality, because they are present in Enfolding One-ness). For in accordance with the fact that things cannot participate equally in the Equality of Being: God, in eternity, understood one thing in one way and another thing in another way. Herefrom arose plurality, which in God is oneness."

Actualized-possibility is all things and includes all things; for nothing which is not included [in it] either exists or is able to be made. Therefore, in it all things exist and have their movement and are what they are (regardless of what they are)." Finally, we can remind ourselves of the familiar passage in DD 3 (106): "There is not one world which with the Father is an eternal world and another world which through descent from the Father is a created world. Rather, the very same world [is] without beginning and, by means of a desent, [is] received in its own being with a beginning. With the Father the world is not a changeable world but—existing with perpetual stability and in supreme brightness and without any variation of shadow—is the same as the Father. But as it is received in its own being, in the descent from the Father, it is changeable and fluctuates unstably with variation of shadow."

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or essence.

154. See the reference in n. 145 above.

155. DI II, 11 (161:12-13).

156. DI II, 4 (115:9).

157. DI I, 24 (77:5-7).

158. DI I, 22 (69:10-11); 1, 23 (70:20-23). See n. 143 above.

159. Cf. DI I, II (30:11-13).


162. DI III, 3 (201:8-11); 11, 5 (121:1-7).

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. This is the interpretation which I have already partially developed in my earlier works on Nicholas of Cusa.

2. “Contractio dicit ad aliquid, ut ad essendum hoc vel illud.”

3. Also note De Genesi 2 (158:10-11).

4. Also note the contrast between “contractio” and “attractio” in De Visione Dei 20 and the interchanging of “contracta” and “constricta” at DC II, 4 (94:10 and 12).

5. De Beryllo 36 (64:15).


7. DI II, 6 (124:11-12).

8. Cf. his redundant expression “comparativa proportio” in the second of the following sentences: (1) “Comparativa igitur est omnis inquisitio medio proportionis utens” [DI I, 1 (2:17-18)]. (2) “Omnis igitur inquisitio in comparativa proportione facili vel difficili exsistit” [ibid., 3:1-2].


10. DD 2 (102:2-5).

11. DD 3 (104:5-8).


13. See De Beryllo 16 (18:1-10) and VS 22 (65:26-27). Regarding the word “likeness,” see n. 17 below.


15. DI II, 2 (104:6).


17. In DP 10:15 Nicholas speaks of a disproporionate likeness (similitudo impropriationalis). But a disproporionate likeness is a symbolic likeness. Created things do not resemble God otherwise than symbolically, teaches Nicholas.


21. De Ludo Globi 2 (66): “Sic vides in animato animam, et simul ipsum animatum in anima. Et in iusto iusticiam, et ipsis [sic!] in ea. Sicut in albo albedinem, et ipsum in ea. Et generaliter in contracto absolutum, et ipsum contractum in absoluto. Humanitatem in homine: et ipsum in humanitate.” Humanitas is not altogether absolute (as is God) but is absolute only in a qualified sense—viz., as a universal which is considered in itself even though it does not exist in itself. Cf. (1) DI II, 4 (114:15-17): “ . . . as if whiteness had, in itself, absolute being apart from any abstarcting on the part of our intellect . . . . . . ” (2) DI II, 6 (125:12-13): “Although universals do not exist as actual apart from particulars, nevertheless they are not mere rational entities.” (3) DI II, 6 (125:18-20): “Absolute being cannot befit universals. For the altogether absolute universal is God.”


23. DC I, 4 (16:1-7): “Prima unitas penitus existit absoluta; ultima vero, quantum possibile est, omnen absonlonem exiens, contracta est; secunda multum absoluta, parum contracta; tertia parum absoluta multumque contracta. Quapropter, sicut intelligentia non est penitus divina seu absoluta, ita nec rationalis anima penitus divinitatis exit participacionem . . . . .”

24. DC I, 4 (16:1).


26. DI I, 5 (14:5).


30. DI I, 8 (22:7-8).
31. DI II, 7 (130:14-15). Also note DI I, 17 (48:3; 51:7-8).
32. DI I, 17 (48:16-20).
33. DI I, 17 (50:17-19).
34. DI I, 16 (45:4); II, 7 (130:14-15).
35. DI II, 4 (115:7-8).
37. DI I, 18 (52:23-27): "Similarly, some beings—viz., simple finite substances—participate more immediately in Maximum Being, which exists in itself. And other beings—viz., accidents—participate in [Maximum Being not through themselves but through the medium of substances]." DI I, 18 (53:15-16): "Wherefore, Aristotle was right in dividing all the things in the world into substance and accident."
38. See the references given in n. 35 and 36 above. Cf. De Visione Dei 9: "Es igitur essentia essentiarum, dans contractis essentiis ut id sint quod sunt. Extra te igitur, domine, nihil esse potest. Si igitur essentia tua penetrat omnia, igitur et visus tuus, qui est essentia tua. Sicut igitur extra to igitur, domine, nihil esse potest. Si igitur essentia tua omnium quae sunt. Extra to igitur, domine, nihil esse potest ab esse suo proprio, ita nec ab essentia tua, quae dat esse essentiae omnibus." (Codex Cusanus 219).
39. DI I, 17 (49:8-11).
40. DI I, 17 (49); I, 18 (52:18-27) Cf. pp. 48-49 supra.
42. DI I, 24 (77:5-7).
43. DI II, 3 (110:4-6).
45. DI II, 4 (116:4-9); II, 2 (101:10-13).
46. De Mente 5 (65:13-14); 13 (104:7-9). DI II, 9. Though Nicholas sometimes speaks, plurally, of eternal forms in God (e.g., DP 4:11), he believes that in God these so-called forms are not actually plural but are the Word of God Himself [DI II, 9 (148:11-13)].
47. DI II, 13 (175:19-28). Moreover, the intelligences (e.g., angelic and human intellects) are incorruptible [DI III, 10 (240:1-2)].
51. DI II, 13 (179:19).
53. See the whole of DI II. 2. Also see DI II, 3 (110:1-3).
70. *Intellect* includes angelic intellect. Angels are intelligences, whereas human beings possess an intellectual faculty.
71. *DC* I, 8 (35:14-27).