HUGO RIPELIN OF STRASSBURG:  
*Compendium Theologicae Veritatis*  
(A Compendium of Theological Truth)

PROLOGUE

Since the sublimity of theological truth is a ray of supernal splendor illumining the intellect and is a feast of royal delights revitalizing the affections, I have thought it fit to assemble a brief compendium from the writings of the great theologians. By this means, prolixity (the mother of tedium) is avoided, and yet a pathway and an inducement are furnished—to one who is wise—for investigating many topics. Assuredly, theology is the queen, and chief, of all the intellectual disciplines, to which the other arts serve as attendants. For from the natures of things [theology] receives, for her own use alone, those [items] from which she is able to make for herself a mirror in which she beholds the Creator. Theology is the prime intellectual discipline; it is praised above all philosophical speculation, and in terms of worthiness and usefulness it takes precedence over all [the other intellectual disciplines]. Granted, philosophy itself is distinguished into natural philosophy, rational philosophy, and moral philosophy. Although natural philosophy teaches [one] to know creatures, nevertheless [it does not teach one to know] the Creator. Although rational [philosophy] teaches [one] to make inferences with respect to men, nevertheless [it does not teach one] to resist the Devil. And although moral [philosophy] teaches [one] to acquire the cardinal virtues, nevertheless it does not teach [one] to acquire love. However, our philosophy—namely, theological truth—accomplishes all these things. For it teaches [one] to know God, to resist the Devil, and to devote oneself to works of love. It is a repository-of-divine-spices that is more delightful than honey and a honeycomb. It is also a treasure that is more desirable than gold and than a very precious stone. It is a fount issuing forth from a source of pleasure [and] irrigating the paradise of the Church militant.

In short, I have divided the present writing into seven books, and in each one of them I have placed individual topics with their own headings.

- The first [book] is on the nature of the Deity.
- The second is on the works of the Creator.
• The third is on the corrupting-effect of sin.
• The fourth is on Christ’s humanity.
• The fifth is on the sanctifying-effect of the graces.
• The sixth is on the efficacy of the sacraments.
• The seventh is on the last times and on the punishments of those who are evil and on the rewards of those who are good.

If, then, I have anywhere in this writing departed from the truth, let me be excused, for I have done so as one who is unknowing. But where I have proceeded correctly, let the grace of Jesus Christ be praised, for whose honor and the honor of His Blessed Mother I have compiled the present short work.

BOOK ONE: ON THE NATURE OF THE DEITY

Chapter One: That God Exists

That God exists is shown in many ways: (1) Right faith attests to it; (2) Sacred Scripture affirms it; (3) a comparison of things (a comparison made with respect to God) indicates the same thing; (4) the saints proclaim it; (5) creatures declare it; (6) natural reason dictates it.

First, then, faith attests that God exists; for the Catholic Faith believes that God …, believes in God, and believes God. (a) Indeed, to believe that God … is to believe that He exists. (b) To believe in God is to love God by believing and, by loving, to go unto Him and to be incorporated into His members. (c) But to believe God is to believe His words. The first and the third [forms of belief] are characteristic [both] of those [human beings] who are good and of those who are evil; but the second [form of belief is characteristic] only of the good. For to believe that God … and to believe God are common to those who are good and to those who are evil; but to believe in God is characteristic specifically of the good. God alone, then, has complete being. For that is complete, none of whose [being] lies beyond itself. Hence, because our being has something of itself beyond itself, it is incomplete. For there is lacking to us the portion of our being that is already past and the portion that is yet to be. However, since the Divine Being exists all at once, He is fully complete.

Secondly, Scripture affirms that God exists. Psalms 89:2: “From eternity to eternity Thou art God.”1 Exodus 3:14: “He-who-is has sent
me.” John of Damascus: “‘He-who-is’ seems to be a more fundamental [name] than all [other] names from among those that are said of God.”

Thirdly, a comparison of things—a comparison made with respect to God—indicates that God exists. For God has such true being that our being, compared to His, is nothing. Rather, God by means of His ever-present being gives being to all things, so that if He were to withdraw Himself from things, then just as they were made from nothing so they all would dissolve into nothing. Gregory: “Compared with God’s justice and God’s beauty, all human things that are [called] just [or called] beautiful are neither just nor beautiful nor at all exist.”

Fourthly, the saints proclaim [that God exists]. Anselm in his Proslogion [says]: “O Lord, we believe You to be Something than which nothing greater can be thought of.” Dionysius: “The being of all things is supersubstantial divinity.” (But this is understood causally, not formally.) Moreover, as Anselm says, that has being maximally which is maximally distant from not-being [and] which, indeed, does not have not-being subsequent to its being and does not have being subsequent to its not-being and which cannot be thought not to be.

Fifthly, creatures declare that God exists. For all things say in their own manner that He made us and not we ourselves. For God Himself is the voice of nature, by which voice all things beautiful attest that He is most beautiful; all things pleasant, that He is most pleasant; all things sublime, that He is most sublime; all things pure, that He is most pure; all things strong, that He is most strong; and so on. For just as in Heaven God is a Mirror in which creatures are reflected, so, conversely, on this pilgrim’s pathway creatures are a mirror by which the Creator is seen. Hence, the Apostle [states]: “Now we see through a mirror, in a dark manner.” The same [Apostle says]: “The invisible things of Him (i.e., of God) are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.”

Sixthly, natural reason dictates that God exists. It arrives at a knowledge of cause by means of effect. For everything caused needs something else in order to exist, and, again, that thing needs something else in order to exist. So [either] there will be a proceeding unto infinity, or there will be a circle there, or we will come to something that is the Cause of all else. But there is no circle with respect to individual things, since it would be necessary for some [individual] thing to be [both] earlier and later than itself. Nor will there be a proceeding unto
infinity, since the totality of the things caused is, as a whole, itself caused—whether the totality is finite or infinite. Therefore, it needs something else in order to exist. And this [something else] will be outside the totality of things that are caused; and this [something else] is God, from whom all things flow forth.

Chapter Two: That There Is [Only] One God

That there is [only] one God is shown by authority. Hence, Deuteronomy 32:39: “See that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me.” The Apostle [in] Ephesians 4:5: “… one Lord, one faith, one baptism.” Boethius: “He is, if it can be said, altogether one.” In other words: always [existing] in one manner, He has within Himself nothing except Himself. This [Being] is truly one thing, in which there is no numerical plurality; in Him is nothing else besides that which He is. The same point is shown also by reason. For if the simple form of divinity were not one and the same in number but were impartible to more than one thing, then it would be contracted—with a component-part—to particular being. And so, it would be joined with something else and would not be altogether simple—[an implication] that is false, since there can be no component-part in the Supreme Good; for it is altogether simple.

But we must note that insofar as one is taken to be the beginning of number, it does not in this respect befit God. In another way—insofar as one is substitutable for being—it does in this respect befit God rather than any creature. For since one is undivided in itself but is distinct from others: there is nothing (except for God alone) in which there is not understood to be a certain division—whether actual or potential. For when “oneness” or some number is predicated of God, it does not posit anything, as certain say, but it only negates. Consequently, when “there is one God,” is said, we understand that there are not several Gods.

Now, something is not one in three ways: either (1) with respect to plurality in accordance with different species (for example, angels and stars, which are one in genus but differ in species) or (2) with respect to mutability in accordance with the fact that one man is said to be many (which man at one time is healthy, at another time is sick, at one time is rich, at another time poor) or (3) with respect to propagation in accordance with the same species (insofar as a man is many in the offspring who are propagated from him). But none of these
forms of predication are applicable to God. In the Athanasian Creed we have the opposite of the first way: “The Catholic Faith is this: that we worship one God in Trinity and Trinity in Oneness.” Psalms 101:27 [has the opposite] of the second [way]: “They shall perish, but You remain.”¹ Bernard [says]: “God does not have temporal alteration or substantial alteration.”² Pope Leo [states]: “Nothing can be added to or subtracted from the nature of Simple Divinity.” Psalms 80:10 [has the opposite] of the third [way]: “There shall be no new God in you”³—“new,” that is to say, “newly formed” or “newly born”.

Three kinds of men multiply divinity: namely, (1) idolaters (Psalms 95:5: “All the gods of the Gentiles are devils.”⁴), (2) necromancers, who ascribe power to magical signs and to other such foolishnesses, (3) carnal men such as gluttons, who worship their belly (the Apostle: “…whose God is their belly”),⁵ and the covetous, who love money above all other things (the Apostle: “…covetousness, something which is a serving of idols”).⁶ So there is in God true Oneness because of His simplicity, immutability, and singularity, and because of the likeness of created oneness [to God’s Oneness]. For just as oneness does not derive from anything but all plurality flows forth from it, so God does not derive from anything but all things [flow forth] from Him.

Moreover, just as oneness begets from itself oneness, so God the Father begets from Himself another than Himself, as Augustine says—i.e., another like Himself or other than Himself, namely, the Son. The name “God” is construed in three senses: to wit, with regard to nature, with regard to adoption, and as an appellative. In the first sense it applies to God alone. In the second sense it applies to good men who are partakers of Divine Goodness through the grace of Providence and/or through learning and through the power of elevated authority, and through the power of miracles. Psalms 81:6: “I have said ‘You are gods and are all sons of the Most High.’”⁷ In the third sense idols are called gods—but in name alone. For the name’s referent, namely, divinity, does not befit them. In the first sense the name “God” does not, per se, have a plural, since there is only one true God and since divinity does not admit of division. However, in the second and the third senses [the name “God”] does have a plural.

Chapter III: That There Is Only One Beginning

Just as there is only one God, so there is only one Beginning.
This point is shown by multiple considerations.

First, [it is shown] in the following way: that if there are two Beginnings—namely, one that is supremely good and another that is supremely evil—then either they have in common existing through themselves (as Socrates and Plato, if they exist at the same time, have it in common to exist [through themselves]) or they do not. If they do not, then the one of them will be an existent by way of the other; and so, there will not be two Beginnings. If they do, then since to-exist-through-itself is a good and since the evil [existent] would be more evil if it did not have that good, then [the evil existent] is not supremely evil. For it it had existence through itself: this existence, which is a good, would prevent it from being supremely evil.

Moreover, four things are found in creatures: namely, multitude, order, imperfection, and union. With respect to each of these it is proven that there is only one Beginning. (1) According to Dionysius¹ all multitude takes its origin from oneness; therefore, there has to be one Beginning of all multitude. Likewise, (2) since every order has an earlier and a later, it must have one Beginning. Furthermore, according to Boethius,² everything imperfect takes its origin from something unqualifiedly perfect—and this is our God. Moreover, every union of different things has something one [as] the cause of its union and its conservation—and this is God. Moreover, if there were one supreme-ly evil [Beginning] from which all evils would exist, it would follow that Christ, with respect to His body, would derive from that evil Beginning, (for in His body would be present the evil of pain). [But] to make this claim is absurd.

From the aforesaid [considerations] it is evident that God is the Supreme, the First, and the Unique Beginning—[evident] not only on the basis of dignity but also on the basis of antecedence and on the basis of causality.

Chapter IV: That [God] Is Father

That [God] is the eternal Father is shown by the fact that since He is most powerful, most wise, and best, He is able to, knows how to, and wills to, impart Himself supremely. But [to do] this is to give the fullness of His majesty to another. Therefore, from eternity God the Father begat a Son equal to Himself, to whom He imparted the essence of His divinity. For in Isaias the Lord says: “If I [am He] who bestows on others [the power of] begetting, shall I be barren?”¹ As if to answer, “No.”
“Father” is construed in multiple ways. For it is said with respect to:

- eternal generation: Isaias 53:8: “Who shall declare His generation?”

- predestination: Ephesians 1:2&5: “Grace to you and peace from God our Father…who has predestined us unto the adoption of sons.”

- creation: Deuteronomy 32:6: “Is He not your Father who has possessed you and made you and created you?” (He made [you], that is, according to your body; He created [you] according to your soul; He possessed [you] according to both.)

- redemption: Isaias 63:16: “You, O Lord, are our Father, our Redeemer; Your name is from everlasting.”

- sacramental regeneration: I Peter 1:3: “Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who according to His great mercy has regenerated us.”

- the instruction of faith: John 1:12: “He gave them—those who believe on His name—power to be made sons of God.”

- adoption [as a product] of grace: Romans 8:15: “You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry ‘Abba, Father’.”

- the conferral of glory: Galatians 4:7: “Therefore, now he is not a servant but a son. And if a son, an heir also through God,” (i.e., through the works of God; for through God our works, being meritorious of eternal life, are greater than through ourselves).

In the first mode “father” is construed personally; and this construal befits the Father alone. In the fourth mode, namely, as regards redemption ([redemption] not only effectively but also [redemption] through the conducting of the ministry) [“father”] is also construed personally. And this construal befits only the Son, in accordance with the fact that the mode of redemption was by means of the Son’s death. But all the other modes befit all three Persons; for the works of the Trinity are undivided, unless perhaps some one of these construals would befit some one [of the Persons] by way of special assignment.
As regards begetting, note four statements by means of which we can see whether the Divine Essence begets or is begotten. The first statement is [the following]: “Essence begets Essence.” The second is “Essence begets Person.” The third is “Person begets Essence.” The fourth is “Person begets Person.” The first three of these statements are false; but the fourth is true. For it is the rule in theology that the Divine Essence does not beget and is not begotten. Nevertheless, we must say (1) that the Father by virtue of the Essence present in Him begets and (2) that the Essence is imparted to the Son by means of Begetting, even as [it is imparted] also to the Holy Spirit by means of Procession.

Chapter V: That [God] Is Son

Since Father and Son are correlatives, [God] is shown to be Son by means of the same considerations by which He was shown to be Father.

Furthermore, the most perfect of all emanations is the begotten-ness by means of which the begotten is similar to its begetter—[something] that other emanations do not effect. Therefore since a most perfect emanation befits the most abundant Fount of goodness, it is evident that the Person who is the Father (who is the Fount of all goodness) begets a Son equal to Himself—[a Son] to whom He imparts the fullness of His majesty.

There is a Son of God through the grace of union—for example, the man Christ. There is a [Son of God] through the reality of birth—for example, Christ insofar as He is God. There is a [son of God] through adoption, as are the saints. There is a [son of God] through creation, as is whatsoever creature. Athanasius in his dispute with Arius says of the Son that He is called the Conceptualization (sensus) by which all things are thought, the Wisdom by which the things thought are carried out, the Power by which the things carried out are perfected. [He is] the Word by which the things perfected are made known, the Light by which the things made known are clarified. Therefore, the Son of God is said to be the Wisdom of the Father—not because the Father is Begotten-Wisdom but because He begat the Son, to whom wisdom is especially assigned. Hence, the Father is said to have made all things in wisdom (i.e., with Wisdom, which is the Son), since the works of the Trinity are outwardly undivided. Hence, the preposition “in” signifies subordination in the Son, who has from the Father the fact that He creates things. (For, in general it is true that
whatever a person has and uses, he has from him from whom he exists.) As to how the Son is from the Father: note that this [Latin] preposition “de” sometimes signifies efficient cause (as when we say “Christ was conceived of [de] the Holy Spirit”). Sometimes [it signifies] material cause (as when we say “Christ was born of [de] the Virgin Mary”). Sometimes [it signifies] identity of essence (as when we say “The Son is begotten of [de] the Father”). Sometimes [it signifies] transubstantiation (as when we say “The Body of Christ is made from [de] bread”). Sometimes [it signifies] order, in accordance with the creature’s being said to be made from [de] nothing.

Chapter VI: The Son Is the Image of the Father

Image is threefold: namely, of equality, of imitation, of representation. In the first respect the Son is the Image of the Father.¹ In the second respect man was made in the image of God.² In the third respect the world is called a mirror of the Creator.

Note that “image” is predicated with respect to that thing whose likeness it bears and for the imitating of which it was made. But this [imitating] occurs in two ways: either (1) with regard to species and a sign of species (and in this way a man’s image is present in his son, who imitates him in terms of human species and human form; and this is a perfect image) or (2) with regard only to sign and not with regard to the truth of the species (just as a stone statue is an image of a man but is an imperfect image). In the first way the Son is the Image of the Father, as one who shares His nature. In the second way the image of God is present in a man, although less perfectly. In a third way the world is said to be a mirror of the Creator. So, as in the case of the Son, there is an Image that is not in the image of; for this preposition “in” [“ad”] indicates a distance between the imaged and the imaging. This [unlikeness] does not apply to the Son. Hence, He is rightly said to be the Image of the Father but not rightly said to be in the image [of the Father]. Moreover, there is an image that is in the image of, as in the case of a man and an angel. Furthermore, there is something that is not an image but that is in the image of; an example is this world, which is properly said not to be an image of, but to be a vestige of, the Creator. For although [the world] represents the Trinity, nevertheless it does not imitate the Trinity; nor is it capable of imitating [the Trinity], as is a man. However, the world was made in the image of God; for God had no other Exemplar than Himself in whose likeness to make
creatures. There is a Begotten Image, as in the case of the Son, and a created image, as is a man and as is an angel. And there is a made-image, as is a statue-of-Hercules, which represents Hercules.

From the aforesaid things it is evident that to be an image befits [both] the Creator and the creature. To be sure, [it befits] the Creator, because [it befits] the Son, who is the Image of the Father. But it befits not only the corporeal creature but also the incorporeal creature and the composite creature. Nevertheless, properly speaking, we say that a corporeal creature is a vestige of the Creator. Hence, the Apostle [writes]: “The invisible things of God [are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood] by [“per”] the things that are made.” Here the preposition “per” does not indicate a disposing medium insofar as the [corporeal] creature is considered in and of itself but indicates a stimulating medium insofar as the creature is a likeness of the Creator. For [the creature] does not dispose [us] toward a knowledge of the Creator but, rather, through such a mode hinders a knowledge [of the Creator], since between the Creator and the [corporeal] creature there is more unlikeness than likeness. But the incorporeal creature is said to be a likeness of the Creator. (Ezechiel 28:12: “You were a seal of likeness …,” etc.) And this is true because in the case of an angel there is, because of the simplicity of nature, a more express likeness to God than in the case of a human being. But a composite creature—i.e., a human being—is said to be an image of God. (Genesis 1:26: “Let us make man in [our] image and likeness,” etc.) And this is true because in a man there are found to be more trinities than in an angel. Hence, in accordance with this fact a man is more properly called an image of the Trinity.

The Son of God possesses a threefold excellence, as the Apostle indicates. (Hebrews 1:3: “Who since He is the Brightness of His glory and the Figure of His Substance, and upholding all things by the word of His power …”.) [The Son possesses a first [excellence] with respect to the Father, by whom He is produced; and thus He is the Brightness of the Father’s glory. For He is, as Dionysius says, a Fontal Ray manifesting in Himself the Father’s glory. [The Son possesses] a second [excellence] with respect to the Holy Spirit, whom He produces from Himself; and thus [the Son] is the Figure—i.e., the Likeness—of the Father’s Substance. For there is another Person from Him, just as [there is another Person] from the Father. [But] the Holy Spirit, unlike the Son, did not receive from the Father this [having of another Person
from Him]. [The Son possesses] a third excellence with respect to creatures, which are produced by Him; and thus He upholds all things by the word of His power.

Because of the first [excellence] the Son is said to be the Father’s Word. For He perfectly bespeaks the goodness and the supreme loving-kindness of the Father, who willed to have nothing that He would not impart to His Son. This is the eternally begotten Word, temporally promised by the Prophets and preached by the Apostles [and] announced by the Angel at the time of the Incarnation. Because of the second [excellence] the Son is said to be the Image of the Father. For although the three Persons are equal with respect to eternity, majesty, and power, nevertheless the Son, rather than the Holy Spirit, is called the Image of the Father. For not only does He agree inwardly with the Father with respect to identity of Essence (as does also the Holy Spirit), but He also agrees outwardly with the Father by virtue of the fact that just as the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, so too the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; but no one [proceeds] from the Holy Spirit. For according to our form of understanding, aspects of relations of this kind exist externally, because they are of someone rather than in someone. For an understanding of relations says something with regard to that to which the understanding is traced back. Hence, if I have no father, then I am not a son; and vice versa. Because of the third [excellence] the Son is said to be the Power of the Father. (I Corinthians 1:23-24: “But we preach Christ … [as] the Power of God and the Wisdom of God.”)

An image of the Trinity is found in us: namely, in our memory, understanding, [and] will—i.e., in our mind, our knowledge, and our love. In terms of these we are likened, respectively, to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Spirit.

Chapter VII: That [God] Is Holy Spirit

In God there is a twofold emanation. One is by way of nature; and this is a begetting, in accordance with which the Son is from the Father. The other is by way of the will; and it is given the name “proces-sion” but is properly called a breathing-out, in accordance with which the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son. But this [latter] emanation is said to be by way of will because the Holy Spirit is Love; and love occurs with respect to the will. Now, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father intermediately and immediately. [He proceeds] inter-
mediately because the Son breathes Him out, [and] the Son has this [prerogative] from the Father. But [He proceeds] immediately because the Father Himself breathes Him out.

Chapter VIII: The Holy Spirit Is the Father and the Son's Love

The Holy Spirit is God's Love (amor Dei); and this is true in a threefold sense: namely, essentially, personally, and exemplarily. The Holy Spirit is said to be Love essentially insofar as He is one God with the Father and the Son. For insofar as the Three are One in Essence they love one another with an Essential Love, which is given the name “Holy Spirit”. Moreover, the Holy Spirit is said to be Love Personally insofar as He is the Union of the Father and the Son. For the Father and the Son love each other with a Love that proceeds from them [both and] that is not the Father or the Son but is the Holy Spirit. Regarding this Union Augustine says: “There is a certain ineffable Bondedness in the Trinity. It is not begotten but is the Bondedness of the Begetter and the Begotten; [and it] diffuses [itself] with prodigious abundance of agreeableness to all creatures for their taking.” Furthermore, the Holy Spirit is said to be Exemplar Love, since the Holy Spirit not only is the efficient Cause of the gratuitously-bestowed love that is in us but also is its Exemplar and Final Cause. For the love that is in us is from the Holy Spirit efficiently, and this [being-in-us occurs] insofar as the Holy Spirit is God. But love is present in us in the manner of an exemplar insofar as the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of Love from the Father and the Son. But our love is in us as goal-directed insofar as the Holy Spirit, from whom our love stems, has the Form of the Primary Good, toward which our love tends.

It must be noted that the Love which is the Holy Spirit is the Union of the Trinity by way of Proceeding; yet, on account of the procession, [the Holy Spirit] is distinct from the Father and the Son. But on account of the perfection of the Divine Nature He is a Person (persona et suppositum); and on account of the Divine Simplicity He is God and is the supremely Good. Therefore, the Spirit is the Love by which Father and Son love each other. But when it is said that Father and Son love each other by the Holy Spirit, it can be interpreted in two different ways. First, in the following way: They love each other by the Holy Spirit, i.e., by the Love that is the Holy Spirit; and in this respect the statement is true. Secondly, as follows: They love each other by the Holy Spirit, i.e., through the Holy Spirit, or through the Love that is the
[Holy] Spirit; and in this respect the statement is not to be granted; for there would be the understanding that the Holy Spirit is a Beginning, [or an Origin], in the Trinity—[a statement] that is false. The reason [for the falsity] is that [the Holy Spirit] proceeds from the Father and the Son [and] that nothing in this statement is such that the word “through” indicates a Beginning, [or an Origin]. There is the [grammatical] rule that the word “through” [“per”] always indicates the notion of a beginning as regards the thing placed in the statement [after the word “through”]. [This occurs,] for example, when we say “The Father effects creatures through the Son.” For here the notion of a Beginning, [or Origin], is signified to be in the Son with respect to the effecting. Likewise, the following [statement] is permitted: “The Son effects [creatures] through the Father.” For here the notion of a Beginning, [or Origin], is in the Father. And this [holds true] in a double sense: namely with respect to the Son and with respect to the effecting.

Chapter IX: The Holy Spirit Is Love and Is a Gift to the Saints

Since there is often found [stated] in the Scriptures that the Holy Spirit is Love (charitas) and since He is often called a Gift,1 we must carefully note how this [wording] is to be understood and whether the Holy Spirit is the Love (charitas) by which we love God and neighbor. Consequently, we must note that “love” (amor sive charitas)2 is construed in three ways. (1) In one way [it is to be understood] in an effecting sense. And in this way it is true without doubt that the Holy Spirit is the Love (amor) by which we love God, because the Holy Spirit effects in us the disposition and motion of love [charitas]. (2) In another way “love” is construed in an exemplar-sense: in this sense, too, the Holy Spirit is the Love by which we love God and neighbor. For the Love that is the Holy Spirit is the Exemplar of our love. (3) In a third way, [“love”] is construed formally by way of inherence, and in this sense love is said to be a disposition of virtue in the soul, by which disposition we love God and neighbor. But in accordance with this sense the Holy Spirit is not called Love. And [this just-made claim] does not contradict the statement of Augustine’s—[i.e.,] that the love by which God loves us and by which we love God is [one and] the same love.3 For although [Augustine’s statement] is true, nevertheless it admits of two different construals. For God loves us formally by means of this [love]; but we love Him efficiently and exemplarily, not formally. For every being and doing are from a form inherent in the agent—[a form] which is the beginning, and form, of the doing, as heat [is the
beginning and form] of fire.

However, it must be known that the Holy Spirit is given, [and that] when He is given the gift of Him is a good. For the Holy Spirit is Love and is the Primary Good; but the latter [namely, Good], is not given without the former, [namely, Love]. Moreover, the mystical Body, [i.e., the Church], is one through love. Therefore, since nothing created is a single thing in different particulars, it is necessary that the members of the mystical Body be united by one Uncreated Love, which is the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, since according to Augustine⁴ man’s complete evil consists in using the things that are meant to be enjoyed and enjoying the things that are meant to be used, it is evident that man’s complete good [consists in] the opposite: namely, in enjoying the things that are meant to be enjoyed and in using the things that are meant to be used. But in order to enjoy that which is meant to be enjoyed there is required the presence of the enjoyable thing and also a proper disposition for enjoying [the enjoyable thing]. Hence, there is required (1) the presence of the Holy Spirit and (2) the Holy Spirit’s gift, namely, the love by means of which to cling to Him. However, when the Holy Spirit is given to us, He does not begin to be in a new place; rather, [He begins to be present] in a new manner through the producing of a new effect, and of a new respect, whereby a creature is related to the Holy Spirit differently from earlier on. Accordingly, [the Holy Spirit] is said to be present in the creature in a different way from previously. For He is in the creature as in someone who acknowledges Him and loves Him—which was not the case earlier.

From the things already said it is evident that in the case of our justification a twofold love is given to us: namely, a created [love] and an Uncreated [Love]: the love by which we love and the Love by which⁵ we are loved. That is, there is given to us a created [love], by means of which we love formally, and an Uncreated [Love], by means of which we love as an effect (because the Uncreated [Love] creates our loving). From these points we infer that although God is in all things through His Essence, His Presence, and His Power, He is not possessed by all things through grace.

Now, there is a twofold sending of the Holy Spirit, even as also of the Son. One [manner of sending] is visible—[for example,] as He appeared above Christ in [the form of a] dove⁶ and appeared above the Apostles in fiery tongues.⁷ The other [manner of] sending is invisible, whereby He is sent into the mind for sanctifying the creature. And this
[latter] sending is done for indwelling the rational creature; but the former [sending] is done for showing the indwelling to others. Similarly, the sending of the Son is twofold: namely, one sending that is visible (as is the Incarnation) and another that is invisible (as is the inner enlightening of the mind). We must note that the sending of the Son and the sending of the Holy Spirit are inseparable. However, [the sending] is said to be [the sending] of the Son when by grace the mind is enlightened for knowing God; and it is said to be [the sending] of the Holy Spirit when the affections are inflamed for loving God.

We are to know that it is the characteristic of the Father alone to send and not to be sent. For since the Father proceeds from no one, He is never said to be sent. But because the Son both brings forth and is brought forth, He sends and is sent. But because the Holy Spirit is brought forth eternally but brings forth only temporarily, it is the unique characteristic of Him to be sent and not to send (except with respect to the creature, as the Apostles are said to be sent by the Holy Spirit for the conversion of the people). Possibly, [the Holy Spirit] might be said to send the Incarnate man. Yet, the Holy Spirit is also said to send insofar as together with the Father and the Son He is the same in respect to the Essence of the Trinity, though not in respect to Person. Likewise, too, the Son sends Himself. Hence, Augustine in his book De Trinitate [writes]: “Let us understand the Incarnation and the birth from the Virgin (by means of which birth the Son was sent) to have been done by one and the same work of the Father and the Son inseparably—with the Holy Spirit also not being separated.”

From the foregoing points it is evident that the following [statements] are improper and are to be repudiated: (1) The Holy Spirit sends Himself and (2) sends the Son, and (3) the Son sends Himself. [This last statement is to be rejected] unless it is understood insofar as the Son was born of the Virgin. For God the Son sends Himself as a man, and in this regard [the statement] is true. Here is the reason why: because “sending” indicates [the Son’s] authorship by reason of an eternal bringing forth.

As to the modes by which the Holy Spirit was given in a visible sign, we must note that He appeared (1) in fire, so that He warmed those who were cold; and (2) in tongues, so that He taught the unknowing; and in sound, so that He frightened the rebellious. He also appeared in three other signs: namely, (1) in a cloud to Moses, so that He was Moses’s Guide in regard to the pillar of the cloud, as is
read\textsuperscript{14} in Isaias 61:1 and 63:11, 14. Furthermore (2) [He appeared] in a dove over Christ when Christ was baptized\textsuperscript{15}—[appeared] for showing the fullness of grace that was in Christ. Moreover, (3) [He appeared] in a breath after the Resurrection\textsuperscript{16} for the purpose of signifying the enlivenment of the emotions, for breath proceeds from inside. Thus, the Holy Spirit is given twice after the Resurrection: namely, (a) on earth, on account of love of neighbor, and from Heaven, on account of love of God. [The Holy Spirit] was given on earth for remitting the sins of others. (John 20:22-23: “[Jesus] breathed on them and said to them: ‘Receive the Holy Spirit. Those whose [sins] you shall forgive …,’ ” etc.) (b) He was given from Heaven at Pentecost for [spiritual] strengthening and for working miracles. Regarding these two [givings see] Psalms 32:6: “By the word of the Lord the heavens were established” concerns the first [giving]; and “by the Spirit of His mouth all their power [was established]” concerns the second one.\textsuperscript{17} A third conferral of the Holy Spirit was made to the Apostles, before [Christ’s] Passion, when they were baptized. For their baptism is indicated here: “He who is washed need only wash his feet.”\textsuperscript{18} As a sign of the aforesaid [events] a man is anointed on three occasions in order to signify this triple sending of the Holy Spirit: namely, at baptism, at confirmation, and at death.

From the presence of the Holy Spirit the Apostles obtained four results. First, [they obtained] eloquence in languages.\textsuperscript{19} Secondly, [they obtained] courage amid torments.\textsuperscript{20} Thirdly, [they obtained] the power to work miracles.\textsuperscript{21} Fourthly, [they obtained] protection from vices, since after Pentecost they did not sin mortally. Even now many [believers] receive the Holy Spirit in a useful fashion. Indeed, sinners [receive Him] in fire for being purified. (Matthew 3:11: “He will baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire.”) Likewise, penitents [receive Him] for advancing [in the faith]. (Psalms 142:10: “Your good Spirit shall lead me.”)\textsuperscript{22} Likewise, the perfect [receive Him] for being sanctified. (II Corinthians 1:22: “Who gave the pledge of His Spirit in our hearts.”) Likewise, the blessed [receive Him] for enjoying [Him]. (Psalms 76:3: “My soul refused to be comforted,” etc.)\textsuperscript{23} Likewise, the troubled [receive Him] for being comforted. (Romans 8:15: “You have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear …,” etc.) Likewise, the unknowing [receive Him] for being instructed. (John 14:26: “But the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send …,” etc.)

We must take note of the time at which the Holy Spirit was given.
This [giving occurred] on the fiftieth day [after the Crucifixion] in order that [the Holy Spirit] be shown to be the Author of forgiveness; for the Jubilee Year served as a year for remission. Moreover, [the Holy Spirit] came on the first day of the week, so that it would be a day of renewal, which day was also the day of creation. Furthermore, He was given at the third hour, because the first man is said to have lost grace at the third hour. Hence, it was fitting that [the Holy Spirit] be sent to the Apostles at this same hour. Likewise, He was given at the third hour for another reason: namely, in order that it might be manifest that God’s grace is given to us also at the third hour. For there are three moral times: namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction.

Regarding the name “Holy Spirit” it must be known that it can be a circumlocution for a proper name; and in this case it befits only the Third Person in the Trinity. On the other hand, these words can be taken separately; and in this way each of the three Persons is a holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit [in the sense of the Third Member of the Trinity] has multiple names. For He is called Spirit from “spirando” in the active sense [of the word], with respect to the fact that He breathes-out. (John 3:8: “The Spirit breathes where He will.”) According to this [active] mode the name “Spirit” is common to all three Persons but befits the Holy Spirit by special assignment. In another way He is called “Spirit” from “spirando” in a passive sense, with respect to the fact that He is breathed-out. And this fact is proper to the Holy Spirit, because He proceeds by way of being breathed out. But not only is He said to be Spirit but there is added “holy”; for “holy” is the same thing as “pure” or “firm” or “apart from earth”. But these characteristics do not befit Him alone, with respect to Himself, but [befit Him] also relationally with respect to us. For through the grace of the Holy Spirit we are cleansed from sins, established in things good, and separated from things earthly. Therefore, He is Holy not only in and of Himself but also because He makes us holy from His Holiness. (About this Holiness Dionysius says: “Holiness is free from all impurity and is perfect, and altogether immaculate, Purity.”)

Furthermore, the Holy Spirit is called “Union,” “Unity,” and “Embrace”. And [He is called] these in relation to the Father and the Son. Likewise, He is said to be the Gift of the Most High; and [He is said to be] this in relation to us, for “every best gift and every perfect gift is from above…,” etc. Furthermore, He is said to be a Living Fount, because He flows to us with a sevenfold stream of gifts: Isaias
11:2-3: “... the spirit of wisdom and of understanding, the spirit of counsel and of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge and of godliness, and ... the spirit of the fear of the Lord.” Moreover, He is called Fire because He ignites the affections. Likewise, He is called Love (charitas) not only because He is the Love (amor) of the Father and the Son but also because He makes us to be loving. Moreover, He is said to be a spiritual Anointing, because He makes all worldly troubles to be agreeable and untroubling, in accordance with the [text]: “In labor, rest; in heated turmoil a temperate calming ...,” etc. Furthermore, He is said to be the Index Finger of the Right Hand of God, because just as material objects are pointed out with the index finger, so through the Holy Spirit immaterial things are shown to the immaterial eye. Likewise, He is called Paraclete, because He instills in minds Heavenly comforts. Moreover, [He is called] the Best of teachers because He enlightens the understanding with respect to a knowledge of God and of Himself.

Chapter X: In the Trinity of Persons Is a Oneness of Essence

In the Oneness of the Divine Nature there are three Persons: the first of these is from no other; the second is from the first alone, by begetting; the third is from the first and the second by way of a common out-breathing. Nevertheless, this [set of relationships] is such that the Trinity of Persons does not exclude from the Essence Oneness, Simplicity, Immensity, Eternity, and Immutability. The reason for this is manifest through the fact that if someone believed that God is not able to impart Himself, he would be denying in Him Power. But if he believed that God is able to do this [namely, to impart Himself] but did not know how to, he would be denying in Him Wisdom. If he believed that God is able and knows how to but is unwilling to, he would be denying in God Goodness. Therefore, since the Father was able to, knew how to, and willed to, impart Himself supremely, He did this eternally—namely, by having Love and a Beloved, i.e., [by having] a Holy Spirit and a Son.

Moreover, every good is diffusive of itself, as says Dionysius. Hence, since the Father is the Fount of Goodness, then from Him there will be a most perfect emanation, which is Begetting. Moreover, the emanation will be most joyous—which is in the mode of loving-kindness and generosity. And this emanation is Love (amor), which is the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son. And love is right-
ly said to be an emanation of generosity, since love is the first gift that proceeds from generosity; for it is an intrinsic gift in the giver. In this [gift], namely, love, all other things are given.

This Blessed Trinity is made known to us in three ways; for it is evident in the Scriptures; it is manifest in symbols; it shines forth in creatures. First, I say, the Blessed Trinity is evident in the Scriptures. Hence, Pope Leo [says]: “We believe that the Holy Trinity—Father and Son and Holy Spirit—is one omnipotent God, of one Substance, of one Essence, of one Power.” Moreover, Isaias heard the Seraphims saying three times “Holy, Holy, Holy” in praise of the Blessed Trinity and adding in the singular “Lord God of hosts” for confessing the Oneness of the Divine Essence. If, then, there were not three Persons, there would not be said in Genesis 1:26 “Let us make man in our image and likeness.” Rather, “[in] my [image and likeness] would be said]. And, on the other hand, if there were three Persons but not one Substance, there would not be said “in [our] image” but, rather, “in our images”. In order to make manifest [this point], the word “God” is expressed three times in Psalms 66:7-8, when there is said: “May God, our God, bless us; may God bless us.” Rather, “[in] my [image and likeness] would be said]. And, on the other hand, if there were three Persons but not one Substance, there would not be said “in [our] image” but, rather, “in our images”. In order to make manifest [this point], the word “God” is expressed three times in Psalms 66:7-8, when there is said: “May God, our God, bless us; may God bless us.” And, nevertheless, there is put only the [singular] pronoun “Him” where there is added: “And may all the ends of the earth fear Him.” Moreover, Jeremias 1:6 [says]: “Ah, ah, ah, Lord God; behold, I cannot speak.” See that “ah” is in triplicate but [that Jeremias] says in the singular “Lord God”—a fact that indicates Trinity and Oneness. Furthermore, the Apostle [says] in Romans 11:36: “Of Him and through Him and in Him are all things. To Him be glory forever.” And note that this preposition5 “of” indicates authorship and an existing from no other; this befits the Father, who is a Beginning without a Beginning. But the preposition “through” indicates an operation, or an intermediary, and an existing from someone else; hence, hereby the Son is understood, who is a Beginning from a Beginning. And the preposition “in” indicates a conserving and an existing from others: and, accordingly, it befits the Holy Spirit, who is the Repository of all good.

Furthermore, the Blessed Trinity is manifested in symbols. For example, it is symbolized by means of Job’s three friends. Likewise, [it is symbolized] by means of the three angels whom Abraham received with hospitality. He saw three [angels], but he worshiped one [God]. Moreover, [it is symbolized] by the three fingers by which the bulk of the earth is apprehended. Furthermore, [it is symbolized] by
the three cities of refuge distant from one another by an equal space.9
Also, [it is symbolized] by the three difficulties of investigating10 [and] also by the three cities that Ezechiel saw.11

Moreover, a vestige of the Blessed Trinity shines forth in creatures. For the Power of the Father is known in and through the greatness of creatures; the Wisdom of the Son [is known] in and through the disposition [of creatures]; the Goodness of the Holy Spirit [is known] in and through the orderly arrangement [of creatures]. Furthermore, in each individual you will find power, form, and usefulness: the first of these befits the Father; the second, the Son; the third, the Holy Spirit. Then too, in the sun you see essence and brightness and heat; in these you will recognize the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Likewise, with respect to the soul consider the Trinity of Persons (in accordance with memory, understanding, and will) and the oneness of Substance. Also, in the higher Heavenly hierarchy God is in the Thrones as majesty, is in the Cherubims as truth, is in the Seraphims as love; hereby the Trinity of Persons is detected. Moreover, understand this same point with regard to the theological virtues faith, hope, and love. Likewise, [understand the Trinity] by reference to the three endowments of the soul: namely, knowledge, understanding, and love.

But we must take note of the fact that God shines forth in one way in pilgrims here below and in another way in the blessed [in Heaven]. [Consider] the example of a mirror in which someone known is seen by us in one way, and someone unknown is seen by us in another way. For that which is known is seen \textit{in} a mirror; that which is unknown is seen \textit{through} a glass [darkly].12

From the aforesaid things it is evident that although the Blessed Trinity is known not only in and through material creatures but also in and through immaterial creatures and in and through creatures composed of material and immaterial components, nevertheless [the Trinity is known] in different modes, insofar as any one of the [material creatures] is said to be a vestige of the Creator and because one [of the immaterial creatures] is said to be a likeness of the Creator, and one [of the composite creatures, is said to be] an image of the Creator—just as it was noted previously in Chapter 6 that the Son is the \textit{Image} of the Father.

Finally, we must know that according to Bernard\textsuperscript{13} it is (1) presumptuousness to question (a) the plurality of Persons in the Oneness...
of Essence and (b) the Oneness of Essence in the plurality of Persons;
(2) it is devoutness to believe [this; and] (3) is eternal life to know it.

Chapter XI: *Trinity Is of Different Kinds*

Different kinds of trinity are found in the Scriptures. For example, there is the Uncreated Trinity, which is Supreme and Ineffable. Other trinities are created. Among these is one that has fallen: namely, the rational faculty, the desiring faculty, the irascible faculty. There is another [trinity—one] through which man has fallen: namely, the Devil’s prompting, sensuality’s delight, and reason’s consent. These three are symbolized in Paradise by the serpent, the woman, and the man. A third [trinity] is that into which [human beings] fell: namely, ignorance of the true, powerlessness with respect to the good, concupiscent-desire for evil. A fourth [trinity] is that through which [human beings] rise again: namely, faith, hope, and love.

Moreover, there is a trinity through which we are restored to grace—namely, the threefold substance that is in Christ: in particular, divinity, soul, and flesh. And there is another [trinity—one] through which we are regenerated: namely, Spirit, water, and blood. I mean the Spirit of sanctification, the water of absolution, the blood of redemption. John mentions to us this [trinity] in his Epistle. There is also another trinity—[one] through which we are refashioned unto glory: namely, the three endowments of the soul: specifically, knowledge, love, understanding. There is also a manifold trinity in creatures; it is a vestige of the Blessed and Uncreated Trinity, and you learn about this in Chapter X above—[learn] that the Trinity of Persons is a Oneness of Essence.

Chapter XII: *There Is Equality of the Persons*

The equality of the Persons consists in three things. Hence, Augustine [writes]: “No one [of the three] (a) precedes [the other] in eternity or (b) exceeds [the other] in greatness or (c) prevails [over the other] in power.” That there is equality in God with respect to these three [characteristics] is shown as follows: Because in lower objects there are these three things, namely, substance, quality, and quantity: oneness in substance causes identity; but oneness in quality causes likeness; and oneness in quantity causes equality. However, in God there is equality only with respect to a threefold quantity—insofar as there can be said, although improperly, to be quantity in God. First, [there is equality] with respect to quantity-of-Might, which is Power.
In another way, [there is equality] with respect to quantity-of-duration, which is eternity. In a third way [there is equality] with respect to quantity-of-greatness, by reason of which God is present in all things and present beyond all things and by reason of which He contains all things and locates all things.

The equality of Persons [in God] in the foregoing three respects is shown [to be present] in a different way from [its presence in creatures]. For in creatures a threefold greatness is found: namely, temporal greatness, dimensional greatness, and greatness of power. The first [kind of] greatness is present in things mutable; the second [kind] in things material; the third [kind] in immaterial, created things. In the Creator three other [characteristics] correspond to these three [characteristics in creatures], with respect to which [Divine characteristics] the Divine Persons, are also equal. These [characteristics] are (1) eternity-in-being, (2) greatness-in-immensity, and (3) power-in-terms-of-capability. However, although this capability is present in God according to the truth of the matter, [nevertheless] in accordance with a difference of things [the three characteristics] do not have existence in God but [have existence only] with respect to our understanding. Therefore, it must be said that equality in the Trinity is so great that, according to Augustine, two [Persons] or all [three Persons] are not anything more than one [God]; nor are all [the Persons together] anything greater than is any one [of them separately].

The Divine Persons are also co-eternal, because in God there are only two genera: namely, [the genus] of substance and [the genus] of relation. But quantity and quality pass over into the genus of substance, even as equality and likeness indicate relations. But the substance is common to the three Persons. Now, it is a proper characteristic of things relative [to one another] to exist at the same time. Therefore, in no way is the Father earlier than the Son—neither with respect to the fact that he stands in relation [to the Son] nor with respect to the fact that He is absolute. The same fact is shown by an example occurring in the natural world. For although brightness is from the sun, nevertheless it would be co-eternal with the sun if the sun were eternal.

Chapter XIII: There Is a Difference between Essence and Person

With the Greeks there are four words, namely οὐσία, οὐσίωσις, ύπόστασις, πρόσωπον. In Latin these are equivalent to the following four [words]: namely, 

essentia, substantia, subsistentia, persona.
Among these [terms] there is the following difference [of meaning]: οὐσία, or “essentia,” is predicated of creatures absolutely and without concreteness; an example is humanity. οὐσίωσις indicates a nature, i.e., the substratum of a nature; for example, human nature. οὐσίωσις indicates that which is distinguishable but is not distinct by virtue of a determinate property; for example, a man. πρόσωπον, or “persona,” indicates that which is distinct by virtue of a determinate property as regards a pertinent unique-identifier; for example, Peter. Consequently, just as individual men are distinct by virtue of their individual qualities, so Father and Son and Holy Spirit [are distinct by virtue of] their individual conceptualizations. But just as the Greeks said that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three hypostases (i.e., three subsistences), so we too say that they are three subsistences—i.e., three things that need no other thing in order to exist.

Therefore, the Divine Essence considered in and of itself is altogether indistinct. But a [Divine] Person [considered] in and of Himself is distinct by virtue of His individual properties. But if the Essence is considered in the Persons, or if the Person [is considered] in the Essence, an intermediate mode obtains: namely, a oneness-and-distinctness. And this fact is evident from the assigned names that befit all the Persons—[names] such as “Power,” “Wisdom,” “Goodness”—but that are more specifically assigned to some one [of the Persons].¹ Note that “substance” is always taken for “essence” and that “essence” is never used for signifying person. There are three definitions of “person”: “Person is the individual substance of a rational creature.”² This [definition] is construed in accordance with a thing’s nature. A second [definition] is Hugo of St. Victor’s [and] is as follows: “Person is what subsists per se in accordance with a certain singular mode.”³ This [definition] is construed with respect to the etymology of the word; for “per-son” is said as in the sense of “per se one”. A third definition is magistral, as follows: “Person is a hypostasis that is distinct by virtue of a property that pertains to its unique identity.” Note also that with respect to creatures these four [terms]—namely, “essence,” “substance,” “subsistence,” “person”—according as they are set forth and exemplified above, differ in reality and in name. But with respect to God they differ only formally.

Chapter XIV: On God’s Immensity

There is in God quantity not of dimension but of Power; and God
is present everywhere not in terms of bodily bulk but by presence of majesty. And in this way He is said to be immense. But note that intensity with respect to God includes four things: namely, infinity, incomprehensibility, uncircumscribability, eternity. For if God is considered in and of Himself, He is in this respect Infinite. Psalms 144:3: “Of His greatness there is no end.” But if He is considered in relation to the intellect, then in this respect He is incomprehensible. The Apostle [says]: “O the depth of His riches …,” etc. And for this reason He is also said to be seated above the Cherubims, i.e., above the fullness of finite knowledge and above all [finite] understanding. But in relation to place, He is in this respect uncircumscribable. Ambrose [writes]: “The Trinity has nothing prescribed, nothing circumscribed, nothing measured [and] is not enclosed in a place, is not reached by calculation, does not vary in age.” But if [God] is considered with respect to duration, He is in this respect eternal. The Apostle [writes]: “to the Immortal King of the ages …,” etc. We must discuss these four attributes successively in what follows.

We must hold it to be most certain that in God there is not, properly speaking, length or width or height or depth; rather, these are in God metaphorically speaking. For example, there is in God a breadth of Love, by which He calls us back from error. Jeremias 31:3: “I have loved you with an everlasting love; therefore, I have drawn you, taking pity on you.” And there is length of Long-suffering, with which He awaits those who are evil. For He leaves men’s sins unrequited because of men’s penitence. There is in Him height of Wisdom, by which He excels all the senses. The Apostle [writes]: “All things are naked and open to His eyes.” Moreover, there is in Him a depth of Justice, by which He condemns sinners. Matthew 25:41: “Depart from me, O accursed ones, into eternal fire.”

Chapter XV: On God’s Infinity

We must not doubt that God is Infinite. For since in God Power is the same thing as Essence, it is evident that His Essence is Infinite, just as is His Power. Thus, just as God’s Power cannot be so present in so many things that it cannot be present in [even] more things, so too God’s Essence is not so present in some things that it cannot be present in [even] more things. Rather, if there were an infinite number of worlds, He would fill them all [with His presence].

Moreover, although God is the Efficient, Formal, and Final Cause
of things, [nonetheless] we are not to say of Him, insofar as He is Efficient Cause, that He is effected or, insofar as He is Formal Cause, that He is formed. Similarly, by the same reasoning, we are not to say, since He is Final Cause, that He is finite. Therefore, in no manner is it to be said that God is finite with regard to Substance—unless “finite” means complete and perfect.

The word “infinite” is rightly predicated in three different ways: negatively, privatively, and contrarily, or disparately. “Infinite” is predicated negatively with regard to a denial of a limit. And in this sense that thing is said to be infinite which is not limited; and in this way the infinite is that which by its nature is not able to be limited. The privatively infinite is that which by its nature is able to be limited but is not limited. The infinite contrarily is that which has a disposition that is opposed to being limited. In the first sense the Divine Essence is Infinite because it does not have a limit and by its nature is not able to be limited. The case is similar if [the Divine Essence] is said to be infinite in the third sense. But if [the Divine Essence] is said to be privatively infinite, it cannot [rightly] be called infinite in this sense, because by its nature it is not able to be limited [as are things privatively infinite]; indeed, it limits all things.

Likewise, “limit” is predicated in a threefold way. For it indicates a terminal point; and in accordance with this [meaning] a continuous quantity is called infinite because it is immeasurable ad infinitum. And this is true because in a continuum there is no end-point of productivity, even as in the case of numbering there is no end-point to addition. In another sense, limit is said to be the same thing as perfection. In a third sense a limit is said to be that on account of which any given thing is limited. In the first sense God is Infinite—not according to dimensional quantity (which is not present in God) but according to quantity of Power (which is present in God). But because in God there is no separation at all between Power and Essence, there cannot be an infinity of Power that is not also an infinity of Essence. In the second sense matter is said to be infinite because it lacks perfection [i.e., is not complete without form]. In the third sense the evil of guilt is said to be infinite because it is not ordered to an end.

Chapter XVI: On God’s Incomprehensibility

Here below and also in Heaven the Creator cannot be fully known by reference to creatures because there is no comparative rela-
tion of the finite to the Infinite. The Trinity is known to itself alone and to the man Christ. Hence, Bernard [states]: “Nothing is more present than is God, and nothing is more incomprehensible. Indeed, what is more present to each thing than is its own being?” I might rightly say that God is the Being of all things—not that they are what He is but because “all things are of Him and through Him and in Him.” For our understanding bears a much weaker relation to that Inaccessible Light than the sight of a night-owl or of a bat bears to daylight. Hence, it is said in Psalms 17:11: “He flew upon the wings of the winds”—i.e., above even angelic understandings. However, here below God is comprehended in a certain manner by means of faith. Augustine [says]: “The weak power of the human mind is not focused on such excellent Light unless [the mind] is cleansed by the righteousness of faith.” Regarding the same point Bernard [says]: “God is present in non-rational creatures in such a way that He is not apprehended by them. But He can be apprehended by all rational [creatures] through the knowledge of faith; yet, only by [rational creatures] who are good is He apprehended by means of love.” Therefore, let us say that regarding God we can know what He is not, not what He is. Augustine [states]: “We understand God to be good without quality; great without quantity; Creator without need; governing without a residence; containing—without relatedness and without circumference—all things; present everywhere as a whole without location; everlasting without time; making mutable things without mutation of Himself and without undergoing anything.”

God is also comprehended in Heaven through an Image—in proportion to the worthiness of one’s merits. Augustine [notes]: “We shall behold the essence of Your majesty, and each one shall behold more clearly insofar as he has lived the more purely here below.” Furthermore, there is the illustration with respect to the ocean, which offers itself to sight, and yet its entire circumference cannot be seen. And this is true both because of the ocean’s breadth and because of the disproportionality of our sight to its so vast surface. The following tenet must be accepted: that here below we can know of God that He exists, and in Heaven [we can know] that He exists in such and such a way. But [we can] never [know]—neither here nor there—what He is [in and of Himself].

Bodily sight is hindered in three ways: namely, through darkness, through false light, through a turning away from the visible object.
Similarly, spiritual sight is hindered as regards a knowledge of God. First, [it is hindered] through the darkness of sin or of error. I John 2:11: “He who hates his brother” (i.e., he who sins) “is in darkness.” II Corinthians 3:15: “Even until this day: when Moses is read, a veil is placed on their heart.” Secondly, [spiritual sight is hindered] through false light. And this happens when someone measures eternal things in terms of natural things. An example is had in the case of rotten wood that at night seems to have a certain light; but when daylight comes, [the glow] is nothing. Thirdly, [spiritual sight is hindered] through a turning away from the visible, i.e., knowable, object. This occurs when someone, having spurned immutable good, clings to things mutable. The light is hateful to the eyes of such [individuals], since [such individuals] are sick; but the light is most lovely to the pure [of heart].

God is known [both] inwardly and outwardly. [He is known] inwardly in two ways. For (1) at times [He is known] through inspiration—something given to [but] few. The Apostle [says] in II Corinthians 12:2: “I know a man in Christ …,” etc. (2) At times [He is known] through reasoning—a mode through which many philosophers have had a knowledge of God. Romans 1:20: “The invisible things of God …,” etc. Outwardly, too, [God] is known in two ways. [He is known] (1) through creatures. The Apostle [states]: “Now we see through a glass [darkly],”¹⁰ i.e., [the glass] of creatures, which now at present are a mirror of the Creator. So too, conversely, God Himself will be a Mirror of creatures in the future—[a Mirror] in which we shall see all the things that will pertain to our joy. Likewise, [He is known] (2) through the teaching of the Apostle: “Faith comes by hearing.”¹¹ Just as a living thing is known at times from hearing, at times from sight, at times from relishing, so God is known in a certain manner from hearing. For they know God who hear the word of God and thereby believe. Theologians, who read of God in the Scriptures, know [of Him] from sight—as do philosophers, who descry Him in and through creatures. Good [persons] alone know [Him] from relishing. Psalms 33:9: “Taste and see that [the Lord] is pleasant,” etc.¹² And this last mode is the most perfect and the most sure.

Dionysius states that God is known in three ways: namely, (1) through removal, or negating, as when we say “God is not this, or is not that.” Thus, Dionysius [writes]: “Negative statements are true of God; but affirmative statements are improper.”¹³ Or, again, (2) [He is known] through eminence, as when, since power is found in creatures,
Supreme Power is supposed to be attributed to God—and so on as regards other features. Finally, (3) [God is known] through cause, in accordance with the fact that through the effect we come to knowledge of the cause, or [come] through knowledge of things moved to knowledge of the mover.

Furthermore, note that the soul perceives physical objects by the senses—through forms in matter—only when the material object is present. But by the imagination it perceives, with the object present or even with it absent, the likenesses of material objects and the forms abstracted from matter. But by the faculty of reason [the soul perceives] the natures of material objects; by the intellect [it perceives] the created spirit; but by the intelligence, the Uncreated Spirit. Moreover, we must know that certain knowable things fall short of accessibility to reason, certain are immediately accessible to reason, [and] certain are beyond reason. Those things that we perceive by the senses fall short of accessibility to reason—for example, white, black, and things of this kind. Things that we perceive by means of reason are immediately accessible to reason—for example, things true or false or just or unjust. Beyond reason are the things that are understood by Divine revelation alone or else are believed on the authority of the Scriptures—for example, that the Three Persons are One God.

Chapter XVII: On God’s Uncircumscribability

God is everywhere and nevertheless is nowhere, because He is neither absent from any place nor situated in any place. Augustine [notes]: “God is not enclosed within the world, is not shut out of the world, is not elevated above the world nor sunken below the world.”

From the foregoing [considerations] it is evident that God is present within all things; and this [is the case] because He fills all things and is everywhere present. Likewise, He exists outside of (extra) all things, because He contains all things and can never be confined. But note that the preposition “extra” here indicates not an actual presence at a place but a presence in terms of the Power that is God’s Immensity. [This Power] can fill an infinite number of worlds, were they to exist. Moreover, [God] is above all things, for He governs all things, and no thing is equal to Him. Furthermore, He is below all things, because He upholds all things, and without Him nothing would exist. Also, we say that He is everywhere. It is not as needing things that He is in them; but, rather, things need Him in order, through Him, to exist. For before

Hugo of Strassburg
the creation of the world God was where He now is, namely, in
Himself, since He is sufficient unto Himself. Hence, [we have] the
verse: “Tell [me], where was He then, since besides Him there was
nothing? [He was] then where He is now, [namely,] in Himself, since
He is sufficient unto Himself.”

Through this [foregoing consideration] there is evident the solu-
tion to a question of certain simple persons who ask: “Where was God
before there was a world?” Therefore, it must be known that something
is in a place [in different ways, namely]: (1) circumscribedly and deter-
nately, as is a material object; (2) as something determinately but
non-circumscribedly, as is an angel; (3) as something neither circum-
scribedly nor determinately, as is God. (This [is the case with God]
because He is not individuated through matter, as is a material object,
nor through an immaterial substance, as is an angel. (4) Moreover,
something is present in a place partly circumscribedly and partly deter-
nately, as is the Body of Christ in the sacrament [of the eucharist]:
it is present as a whole under the entirety of the host, so that it does not
exceed [the host]; and in this respect it is present circumscribedly. It is
also present under the host in such a way that it is not everywhere else;
and in this respect it is there determinately in a certain manner.
However, although the Body of Christ is not present everywhere, since
it is a creature and cannot be equated with the Creator in regard to [a
presence] of this kind, nevertheless it is in more than one place as a
whole under [numerically] different hosts. And this [last point is the
case] because of the union of the flesh with the Word. Hence, more
than any other creature, it rightly has [the prerogative], namely, that it
can be in many places at one and the same time. From [these] preced-
ing [remarks] it is evident that being everywhere befits, unqualifiedly,
only the Creator but that to be in [only] one place [at a single time]
benefits only creatures. But to be in more than one place [at the same
time], but not to be everywhere, befits the Body of Jesus Christ.

Note that God is in things in multiple ways. For instance, [He is
in them] through nature; and in this way He is everywhere through His
Power and His Presence. Moreover, [He is in things] through grace;
and this is the way He is present in those who are good. John 15:5: “He
who abides in me and I in him, he …,” etc. Furthermore, [He is in
things] through glory. In this way He is present as truth in the soul’s
rational power, present as goodness in [the soul’s] desiring [power],
present as godliness in [the soul’s] irascible [power]. Also, [He is pres-
This is the way that He was—in the womb of the Virgin—united to a human nature and, in the tomb, was united to the flesh and, in Hell, was united to Christ’s soul. Moreover, God is said to be somewhere with respect to the revelation of hidden matters. Genesis 28:16: “Truly, the Lord is in this place.” Furthermore, God is said to be in Heaven, because there He especially shines forth by means of His Power, Wisdom, and Goodness. And God is present in things through an identity of nature, as (1) the Son is in the Father and (2) the Father in the Son and (3) the Holy Spirit is in them both. Or again, God is present in things through the working of miracles. Exodus 8:19: “The Finger of God is here.” Also, God is in things through conservation and governance; this is the way He is in the world. God exists in and of Himself, as Alpha and Omega, in accordance with the query: “Tell me, where was He then …?” etc. For He is in the world as a king is in his kingdom. Bernard says: “God reigns everywhere, commands everywhere; everywhere His Majesty fills all things and embraces all things.” Likewise, God is present in an angel as elegance and in the soul as truth and also as a savoring with regard to goodness. Likewise, He is present in the Church as a Head of household in his house. Hence, the verse: “Behold, I am with you even until the end of the world.” Again, He is present in the elect as One who frees from evils and as Helper with regard to things good. And this is what Bernard says: “In creatures God is wonderful; in human beings He is lovable; in angels He is present as desirable; in Himself He is incomprehensible; in the reprobate He is present as intolerable.” Furthermore, in the damned, He is present as fear and horror. Augustine writes: “He who goes away from You, where does he go except from You as well-pleased and again to You as angered?” For we cannot escape from the Hand of the Lord. Psalms 138:8: “If I ascend into heaven, You are there …,” etc.

But if one doubts whether God is present in the Devil, it must be known that there are certain names that signify natures insofar as they are necessary; and we must grant that God is present in them. There are other names by means of which deformities are signified, as in the case of the Devil; regarding deformities we must not say that God is present in them—unless there is added “insofar as [the Devil] is a spirit,” or some such qualification. God is in the believing soul as a
bridegroom is in the bridal chamber; as a king is in his kingdom; as a
tower is in a castle; a teacher, in schools; a fountain, in gardens; light,
amid darkness; a treasure, in a field; wine, in a wine cellar; a precious
stone, [inlaid] in gold—or as grain is in a storehouse; as a seal is on a
document; as medicine is in a medicine chest; a cithara is at a banquet;
an image is in a mirror; [or] as fruit is on a tree; oil is in a lamp; a lily
is in an enclosed valley.

Chapter XVIII: On God's Eternity

Just as God is everywhere but nevertheless is not circumscribed
or contained by any place, so too He is eternal but nevertheless is not
measured by any time. For time does not befit Him—neither present
time nor past time nor future time. For present time has no being,
because it is always passing away; but God remains ever the same.
Hence, Hilary [writes]: “Being is not an accident to God; rather, He is
Subsistent Truth and the Abiding Cause.”¹ Likewise, past time neither
exists now nor has subsistent being; however, of God it is said in
Psalms 101:27: “They shall perish, but You remain.”² Likewise, future
time does not exist but is awaited; but God exists always. Hence,
Mercurius [says]: “Only the One is Alpha and Omega. This is the case
because God is a Beginning without a beginning and is an End with-
out an end.”³ For since He is altogether simple, He does not have
within Himself a principle-of-contrariety, which is the cause of corrup-
tion. But [as to] what eternity is according to fact: we must know that,
properly speaking, eternity is said to be without beginning, without end,
and without mutability. And in accordance with this [understanding]
eternity befits only the Divine Nature, in which is immense durability.
However, according to etymology eternity is spoken of as being beyond
boundaries, because it lacks both an initial and a final boundary.

But according to Boethius’s definition in his book On the
Consolation of Philosophy: “Eternity is at once the perfect possession,
and complete enjoyment, of interminable life.”⁴ [With regard to this
definition]:

(A) We must note, for an understanding of this definition, that
in certain things there is terminability in an unqualified sense: for
they can be corrupted in part, given that they are things generable
and corruptible. In order to differentiate [eternity] from these
things, the word “interminable” is used [by Boethius]. And “inter-
minable” is said by way of negation, because things simple—and
especially divine things—are manifest in no better way than
through removal, as says Dionysius. And the reason for this fact is that the intellect cannot perfectly comprehend the being of things simple and divine; and so, from the negation of those [features] which are removed from them, the intellect is led to those [features] which can be known to some extent.

(B) Moreover, in certain things there is interminability of essence but not of life—as is the case with heavenly bodies. In order to differentiate [eternity] from these things, the words “immutability of life” are added. Now, the Apostle says of God that He alone has immortality. For in every mutable nature there is some death, namely, the changing; for [change] causes there not to be in the nature something that the nature previously was. Hence, even a human being, when born, begins to die in a certain respect.

(C) But in certain things there is interminability of life, but nevertheless accompanied by wretchedness and unhappiness, as in the case of demons and the damned. In order to differentiate [eternity] from these, there is added “a joyous possession”—in whose meaning is [contained the idea of] joyousness of happiness. For the possession of something is called joyous when it is had gladly.

(D) In certain things there is possession of interminable life but not complete possession, as with all the blessed prior to the (Last) Judgment: their happiness is in accordance with a part of the soul but not of the body. Regarding a differentiation of these things [from eternity], the word “complete” is used, because the complete is that which is not diminished and to which there is nothing more to add.

(E) In certain things there is complete possession of interminable life, as in the blessed angels before the Judgment. With respect to the whole of their substance they have a happy, interminable life—but not all at once, since there is in them some successiveness of revelations and joys. In order to differentiate [eternity] from these [beings], the words “all at once” are used.

(F) In certain things (as in the case of angels and of blessed human beings after the Judgment) there is complete possession of interminable life all at once but nevertheless not perfect possession in the way in which we say that what is perfect has need of nothing. In order to differentiate [eternity] from these, the word “perfect” is added—i.e., “needing nothing else for its being happy.”

Therefore, from the preceding definition it is evident that there are posited there three conditions that are inseparable from Uncreated Eternity, which is God: (1) The interminability there is a possession of interminable life. (2) Likewise, the unchangeability there is all at once, for in God nothing is changeable, but the whole [of God] exists at
once. (3) Also, the simplicity there is perfect, for that thing is supreme-
ly perfect to which no addition is possible. Through the first [factor] God is distinct from everything material; through the second, from everything changeable; through the third, from everything composite. Furthermore, note that that which lacks a beginning and an end is said to be eternal, as is God, whose Being is unterminated. But things that have a beginning but lack an end are called perpetual, as are angels and human beings. But those things that have a beginning and an end are called temporal, as are corruptible things such as plants, brute animals, and sensing beings, and other such things.

Chapter XIX: On God’s Immutability

God is Immutable and Untransformable, because there is not in Him accidental motion, or increase. (Pope Leo: “Nothing can be added to or taken away from the simple Nature of the Divinity. For it is always that which it is.” ¹) Likewise, there is no decrease. (Malachi 3:6: “I am the Lord, and I change not.”) Nor is there alteration. (James 1:17: “… with whom there is no change …,” etc.) Or again, there is no change according to place, because He is present everywhere. (Jeremiah 23:24: “I fill heaven and earth.”) But He is Untransformable because there is not in Him substantial motion that is from not-being to being (as in the case of generation), for He did not have a beginning. ² Nor [is there in Him] that [substantial motion] which is from being to not-being (as in the case of corruption), for He will not have an end. For that alone is turnable into nothing which was made from nothing.

Moreover, God is immutable because of the fact that there is not present in Him motion as a result of activity. For to be at rest while acting befits God alone. Thus, Boethius [writes]: “O You who govern the world by a perpetual plan, O Creator of lands and of heaven, You who command time to go out from eternity and who while remaining steadfast cause all things to be moved!” ³ Hence, when God does a thing, there does not occur in God any change; rather, [it occurs] in the thing upon which God works. But that God made [Jonas] preach the overthrow of Nineveh⁴ and that He foretold the death of Ezechias,⁵ neither of which things happened: in such matters God did not change the deliberation which He had in mind from eternity. Rather, He changed the judgment that was related to these matters. For Nineveh was going to be overthrown in accordance with its merits;⁶ and Ezechias was going to die in accordance with lower causes. But these [merits and
causes] did not impose necessity on the Divine Power. Moreover, three [kinds of] motion are distinguished: namely, natural, voluntary, and constrained. Natural [motion] is that by which things naturally tend toward their own proper place. But constrained motion occurs when things are compelled to be outside of their own proper place. And voluntary motion is present in human beings and in angels. But brutes are moved naturally when they run or react or act. And this [voluntary] movement is intermediate between natural movement and constrained movement, because it is partly natural (namely, insofar as the will is joined to its own act, as cause to effect) and partly constrained (insofar, that is, as its members are moved counter to their natural motion, on account of which the members also tire—which never tire from their natural motion).

Therefore, in the first mode—namely, natural [motion]—there is not [movement] in God. And this fact is proved by four considerations. The first [consideration] is that every movement is toward rest and occurs because of a need, as the Philosopher says; but God is in need of nothing. The second [consideration] is that since [God] is everywhere, He has no necessity to be moved from place to place. The third [consideration] is that there is not in Him heaviness or lightness by virtue of which He is moved upwards or downwards. The fourth [consideration] is that since God always remains in Himself, He has no necessity to seek, outside Himself, a place that is His own and that is natural to Him—as do creatures. Moreover, [God] is not moved in the second mode, i.e., by constrained movement, because no constraint happens to Him. (Job 9:19: “If strength is demanded, He is most strong.”) Furthermore, He is not moved in the third mode, i.e., by voluntary movement, because He does not tire in acting, as do animals.

Moreover, some motion is circular, some straight, some oblique. Circular motion is characteristic of superior material objects insofar as the firmament is moved in accordance with its form (as says the Philosopher), not in accordance with its substance. [To say] this is to say that [the firmament] is not moved to a place but in a place. Now straight motion is upwards or downwards in accordance with the fact...
that lower material objects are moved because of lightness or heaviness. Oblique motion is a composite of straight [motion] and circular [motion]. Hence, it has from circular motion the fact that it is bent; and it has from straight motion the fact that it proceeds in a straight line. However, God is not moved in any of these ways, because the properties of these movements do not befit Him. But we can say that these modes befit God mystically, so that He is said to be moved with a circular movement when He rules over, and governs, all things. Likewise, [He is moved] with a straight [movement] when He rewards those who are good. Or again, [He is moved] with an oblique [movement] when He punishes the wicked. Similarly, it can be said that God is moved with a natural movement by which, with accustomed goodness, He imparts Himself to creatures for their reception. Furthermore, [He is moved] with a constrained movement by which He justly damns sinners. Likewise, [He is moved] with a voluntary movement by which He conserves all things in being. In this way the saying of the Philosopher\textsuperscript{10} can be expounded. ([The Philosopher] spoke of motion away from a center and toward a center and around a center.) For God is moved toward the center in the Incarnation; and [He is moved] away from the center in the Ascension; and [He is moved] around the center in prophesying. Because of these [factors] and [factors] similar to these, there is said in the book of Wisdom that the Holy Spirit is both active (\textit{mobilis}) and steadfast (\textit{stabilis}).\textsuperscript{11} [He is] active because He makes saints active for acting well and makes them to progress in the good. And He is steadfast because He causes [saints] to persevere in the good. He is active here below, steadfast in Heaven; active in those who act [and] steadfast in contemplatives; active in some saints, steadfast in Christ. (Isaias 11:2: “The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him,” etc.)

It must be known that certain activities are ascribed to God in accordance with causality and essence (for example, knowing). Certain [are ascribed] in accordance with causality but not essence (for example, eating and running). Certain [are ascribed] in accordance with essence but not causality (for example, creating and justifying). Certain [activities are] not [ascribed to Him] in either way (for example, sinning and lying, and the likes).

Chapter XX: On God's Simplicity

God and an angel and a soul are simple—but in different respects. For in God what He \textit{is} is one and the same thing as by what
He is; and this is perfect simplicity. This sole Uncreated Nature reserves for Himself this Simplicity, so that He is not found in different modes, places, or times. To be sure, as regards Him: that which He has and that which He is, He is always and in a single way. But as regards an angel and a soul: what it is and by what it is differ; and so, there is present there a certain otherness and compositeness, although there is there no dimension of quantity. Hence, Mercurius [writes]: “In supercelestial things there is oneness; in celestial things there is otherness; in subcelestial things there is plurality.”¹ Therefore, God is simple in essence, because nothing can be an accidental feature for Him; rather, perfect Simplicity is present there since there is no potential addition there. For whatever is in God is God. Hence, Pope Leo [notes]: “Nothing can be added to, or subtracted from, the Nature of the Simple Divinity, because it is always that which it is. To be eternal is proper to it; to live and to understand are for it the same thing.”²

But [God] is multiple in His gift-giving. The Apostle [writes]: “To one the word of wisdom is given by the Spirit,” etc.³ James [says]: “Every best gift and every perfect gift …,” etc.⁴ In God there is no composition of integral parts, as in a house; nor [is there composition] of potential parts, as in a soul; nor [is there composition] of genus and differentia, as in a species; nor of matter and form, as in material objects; nor [is there composition from] an accumulation of units, as in a number. Nor [is there a composition] of what He is and by what He is, as in an angel; nor of substance and accident, as in an individual; nor of material and immaterial substance, as in a human being. Regarding these matters Bernard [writes]: “God does not consist of parts, as does a material object; nor does He have different emotions, as does a [human] soul; nor is He a subject for forms, as is everything that is made.”⁵ This fact is also shown by rational considerations. For since everything composite is [ontologically] later than its components, and since nothing at all is earlier than the First Beginning, namely, God: it is necessary that God, who is the First Beginning, not be a composite. Besides, no composite is, as a whole, its own being. Accordingly, since God is His own Being, He will not be composed. Hence, Bernard [states]: “God is not formed [but] is Form. God is not an effect [but] is the Efficient Cause of all things. God is not composed [but] is Simple.”⁶

Chapter XXI: On God’s Excellence

The excellence of the Divine Eminence is so great that the mind
fails when thinking of God, since He is Incomprehensible. The senses do not perceive Him, since He is invisible. The tongue does not explain Him, since He is Ineffable. Place does not capture Him, since He is Uncircumscribable. Writing does not elucidate Him, since He is Inconceivable. Time does not measure Him, since He is Immeasurable. Strength does not attain to Him, since He is Inaccessible. Desires and wishes do not reach\textsuperscript{1} [Him], since He is Insurmountable and Incomparable. And, to put it briefly: every creature, compared to God, is defective, for of the finite to the Infinite there is no comparative relation.\textsuperscript{2} Indeed, it is evident that Divine Excellence has need of nothing, because it is sufficient unto itself, for it is Best. It does not need, for example, a body in order to exist, nor space in order to exist somewhere, nor time in order to exist sometime, nor cause in order to exist from something, nor form in order for its matter to exist [actually], nor a subject in which to exist or which to assist.

There are also other [features] that befit only the Divine Majesty and not a creature.\textsuperscript{3} In and through them there appears the excellence of His dignity: for example, being Omnipotent, All-Good, Omniscient. For He knows all things present, past, and future; and He alone knows all individual things at once [and] actually. He alone knows, through Himself, (1) the things that are subject to free will and (2) the thoughts of human beings. Likewise, it pertains to Him alone to be everywhere present; to create things from nothing; to accomplish things instantaneously; to be at rest while acting; to perform miracles; to do with each creature, on the basis of His authority, that which He wills to; to know a human being’s will; to raise the dead in the blink of an eye; to penetrate [all the way to] a human being’s essence; to forgive sins; to infuse grace; to preserve a body in an everlasting fire. When something that befits the Creator befits a creature [as well], it is, nevertheless, predicated of God more excellently. For example, if in the creature there is power, then in God there is Supreme Power; if wisdom, then in God there is Supreme Wisdom. And so on. Hence, such things are said of God in the superlative; accordingly, God is said to be most Powerful, most Wise, most Just, most Good, most Beautiful—and so on. Augustine in his book \textit{De Trinitate} [states]: “It is necessary that we confess (1) that God (whose prerogative it is to perceive and understand all things supremely) is able neither to die nor to be corrupted nor to be changed nor to be a material object but (2) that He is a Spirit most Omnipotent, most Gentle, most Good, [and] most Blessed.”\textsuperscript{4} The rea-
son [for this] can also be understood and ascribed other than on the basis of authority. For good things are present more excellently in God than in creatures, because something is always more noble in its cause than in the caused. We see, too, that water is purer in its source than in a stream; moreover, the sun’s rays are brighter in the sun itself than in the air; and sweetness is more greatly present in honey than in a thing sweetened with honey.

Chapter XXII: On God’s Distinguishing Characteristics

God’s Distinguishing Characteristics are five: namely Fatherhood, Sonship, Procession, Innascibility, and a Common Breathing-out. The first [Characteristic] is of the Father; the second, of the Son; the third, of the Holy Spirit; the fourth, of the Father; the fifth, of the Father and of the Son. The first three Distinguishing Characteristics are called personal ones because they constitute the Persons and distinguish them from one another. And they alone are the three respective Characteristics of the three Persons by virtue of which there are said to be three Persons. Consequently, although the Father has more than one property, nevertheless with respect to Fatherhood there is only one Father, indistinct in Himself but distinct from the other [Persons]. And Innascibility is present in the Father [alone] and is construed privatively with respect to the fact that the Father does not exist from anyone else. And, nevertheless, “Father” signifies a distinctness as regards Person. (By way of comparison: an individual sheep is not signified [by the word “sheep”] with respect to the fact that it is distinct from others signified [as sheep]). Likewise, a Common Breathing-out is a single Characteristic, and that singleness is the same in the Father and the Son; and it is distinct from any other Characteristic. Therefore, we must note that, properly speaking, there are three personal properties—namely, Fatherhood, Sonship, and Procession—because a personal property is a property that befits only one Person and that distinguishes that Person from every other thing.

However, there are four Relations [in God]. For one [Relation] is that of the Father to the Son, namely, Fatherhood; another is of the Son to the Father, namely, Sonship; a third is of the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit, namely, a Common Breathing-out; and a fourth [Relation] is that of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son, namely, Procession. But there are five Distinguishing Characteristics, because each [of the four] Relations is a Distinguishing Characteristic. And, in
addition, Innascibility [is a Distinguishing Characteristic]; it befits the Father by virtue of the Father’s lack of relation to a beginning, [but] it is not a relation. The Distinguishing Characteristics (notiones) have many names. For example, they are called Distinguishing Characteristics (notiones) because they make known the Persons. They are also called Distinctions, because they distinguish the Persons. They are called Relations, because by means of them the Persons have reference to one another. They are also called Properties, because they are present in the Persons individually, [i.e., are not present commonly to all].

Take note of the norms governing the Distinguishing Characteristics. (1) No Distinguishing Characteristic is predicated of another [of the Distinguishing Characteristics]. Moreover, (2) the Divine Essence, which is God, is each one of them. Furthermore, (3) all the Characteristics are a single Essence. Likewise, (4) no Characteristic applies to the Divine Essence; the Characteristic distinguishes, but [the Essence itself] is not distinguished. Then too, (5) the Characteristics, when taken abstractly, are predicated of the Essence; but when taken concretely, they are not. Hence, it is rightly said that the Essence is Fatherhood; but it is not rightly said that the Essence begets. Furthermore, (6) a Characteristic always carries with it the idea of a dignity. Likewise, (7) when a Characteristic is designated, Person is not designated. For something befits a Characteristic which does not befit a Person; for individually to distinguish befits a Characteristic; but to be distinguished individually befits a Person.

Chapter XXIII: On the Divine Names

Every name that is used for God is either an Essential Name or a Personal Name or the name of a Distinguishing Characteristic. Certain of the Essential [Names] are nouns—for example, “God,” “Creator,” and the likes. But certain [of them] are adjectives—for example, “Good,” “Eternal,” “Immense,” and the likes. There are [also] Personal [Names], as are “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit”. [And] there are Characterizing [Names], as are “Fatherhood,” “Sonship,” “Innascibility,” and the likes.

As regards the foregoing [names], we must note that a substantial name—i.e., an essential name—that is [also] an abstract noun can in no way be used for designating a Person. Hence, the following [statements] are false: “Essence begets Essence” and “Divinity begets Divinity.” For the act of begetting must always be spoken of concrete-
ly. However, concrete [names], even if they are essential [names], can nonetheless be used to designate a Person; and this [Person is designated] by uniquely Characterizing words and by uniquely Characterizing propositions. Hence, the following [statements] are true: “God begets God,” “The Creator begets the Creator,” and “[He is] God from God.” A similar point holds regarding names that are intermediate [names], as, for example, “Light from Light.” Likewise, the name “Wisdom,” although abstract, [can be used]—as [in the expression] “Wisdom from Wisdom.” Certain of the essential adjectives—as, for example, “Good” and “Existing”—indicate outright the Divine Substance. Certain [of them indicate] the Divine Essence by connoting (1) the lack of a beginning and an end—as does, for example, “Eternal”—and (2) the lack of a certain spatial measure, as does “Immense.” Certain [words] signify the Divine Essence principally and connote an actual effect on creatures (as, for example, “Creates,” “Justifies”) or [connote an effect] with respect to disposition (as, for example, “Just” and “Merciful”) or [both signify principally and connote] with respect to power (as, for example, “Omnipotent”).

There are certain words such that neither their signification nor their manner of signifying befits God: for example, “to run” and “to walk”. For a manner [of signifying] is an inclination (one way or another) of the mind that displays the mind’s different effects. A manner of signifying is nothing other than a tendency [imposed] on a vocal sound to constitute a meaning with respect to a given construal and thereby [to signify] the object. Therefore, when “to walk” and “to run” and other such [words] are said of God, the signification of these [words]—as they are actually [significative]—does not befit God. But the manner of signifying brings with it the idea of a certain imperfection ([an imperfection], I mean, with respect to motion). Of necessity, this motion cannot befit God. There are certain [words] whose signification befits God but whose manner of signifying does not—[words] such as “to create,” “to make”. There are certain [other words] whose signification does also befit God, as is evident in the words of Exodus: “He-who-is has sent me to you.”

Moreover, we must take note of the fact that all [features] that are of perfection are predicated of God. But [features] that are of imperfection are not predicated of God; [but] if they are said [of God] they are said in accordance either with [God’s] assumption of human nature or figuratively. Furthermore, with respect to God there are only two
modes of predicating: namely, through the mode of substance and through the mode of relation. But [in God] “Substance” contains [the idea] of Oneness, and “Relation” has to do in a multiple way with Trinity. There are certain names that are said of God in an eternal sense—for example, “Lord” and “Merciful”—which connote an effect on creatures in accordance with disposition. But [certain words are predicated of God] temporally—for example, “Ruler” and “Compassionate One”—which connote an effect on creatures in accordance with an activity. Certain [words are predicated of God] plurally, as [when saying] “Persons”. Certain, singularly—as, for example, “God”. Certain, properly—as [when speaking of] the properties of the Persons. Certain, by special assignment—as, for example, “Power,” “Wisdom”. Certain, positively (for example, “Just”); certain privatively (for example, “Immortal”); and these [negative terms] are more properly used of God than are positive [terms], because it is better said of God what He is not than what He is. Certain [words are said of God] figuratively, as are the words “Lamb” and “Lion,” which are said of God symbolically.

Theology [i.e., our knowledge of God] is twofold: namely, symbolical theology and mystical theology. Symbolical theology names God from what is lower; mystical theology names Him from what is higher. Symbolical theology names God by reference to the fittingness of things, [as] when He is called “Lion,” “Lamb,” and things of this kind. But mystical theology, i.e., occult theology, names God with reference to that which, in what is hidden, it senses of Him by way of intellectual sight (i.e., contemplation), as when it names God “Pleasant,” “Sweet,” “Lovely,” and such things. Nevertheless, in both theologies God is named by reference to creatures; but in symbolical theology [He is named] by reference to outer [realities, whereas] in mystical theology [He is named] by reference to inner, more worthy affections which the soul receives from a power higher than itself and which, through the gift of wisdom, it thus assigns [to God]. Its own experience of this kind is its knowing what God is. Certain [words] are predicated [of God] collectively, as are “Trinity” and “Trine”. Certain [are predicated] relatively, as is “Equal” and the likes. Certain [are predicated] with respect to creatures, as, for example, “Creator,” “Refuge”. And these names do not indicate God’s relatedness to anything else; rather, other things have a relatedness to Him and to one another.
There are two principal names of God: in particular, “He who is” and “The Good”. By means of the first [name] God’s Absolute Being is signified in and of itself and in this way is considered insofar as it is Infinite. By means of the second [name] the Divine Being is indicated as Cause; for God made all things on account of His Goodness. In theology the [neuter Latin words] “*quod*” and “*hoc*” [“which” and “this”] are used as substitutes for essential names such as “God,” “Divinity,” “Power,” “Essence,” “Nature”. Likewise, [the masculine Latin word] “*quis*” [“who”] is used as a substitute for “Person” and for a Distinguishing Characteristic.

Moreover, the Divine Substance is spoken of by means of the neuter gender; a [Divine] Person [is spoken of] by means of the masculine gender; a Distinguishing Characteristic [is spoken of] by means of the feminine gender. And herefrom it is evident that we ought not to sing in the hymn [the words] “*Unus* [=masculine] *Patri cum Filio*” because Father and Son are not one in Person but are one in Substance. Hence, we ought rather to sing: “*Unum* [=neuter] *Patri cum Filio.*”

Chapter XXIV: God Is Ineffable

Because of God’s excellence nothing is said of Him worthily and properly. (1) For we do not speak of God properly by means of *nouns,* because nouns signify a substance together with its qualities. And so, in that case, there is understood to be a composite of form and matter; [but] no matter is present in God. (2) Nor is God [rightly spoken of] by means of *pronouns,* because when these are uttered with respect to God, they fall short of pointing Him out. For with respect to God there can be no pointing to His senses, since He is immaterial. Nor can there be a pointing to His intellect, since He is unknowable. If you say, then, that such pronouns—[which] according to Priscian fall short of indicating [God]—will be empty and meaningless: we must answer that with respect to God there is a pointing-to on the part of faith. (3) Nor [is God rightly spoken of] by means of *verbs* that are significative of acting and of being acted upon—[significative] by means of modes and forms and by means of time without fail. Such [verbs] do not apply to God. (4) Nor [can God rightly be spoken of] by means of *participles,* which conform to the nature of noun and verb. (5) Nor [can God rightly be spoken of] through other parts of speech that are not able to be either subjects or predicates.

From the foregoing [remarks] it is evident that we cannot make
God known through a definition but [only], in some way or other, through a circumlocution. Hence, Bernard [writes]: “What is God? [He is the One] from whom are all things [and] through whom are all things. What is God? [He is the One] than whom nothing better can be thought. What is God? [He is] Omnipotent Will, Most Benevolent Might, Eternal Light, Immutable Reason, Supreme Beatitude; [He is] Invisible, Inaccessible in and of Himself, Admirable in His [works], and alone Marvelous.”

Something is affirmed of God in many ways. First, [affirmations are made] on the basis of natural reason, which declares that the One God is the Rewarder of those who are good and the Punisher of those who are evil. Secondly, [affirmations are made] on the basis of faith, by which we say that God is One with respect to His Substance and Three with respect to His Persons. Thirdly, [affirmations are made] on the basis of Sacred Scripture. Fourthly, on the basis of probable rational considerations. Fifthly, on the basis of the opinions and declarations of others. However, the last two ways are not to be resorted to unless there is a weakness in any of the first three. For the [theological] rule is that if anyone affirms of God something of which he is not certain—[certain] through natural reason or through faith or through Sacred Scripture—then he is being presumptuous and is sinning.

Chapter XXV: On Ideas and on the Book of Life

The Ideas of things and the Exemplar of things and the Forms (rationes) of things are in God in such a way that “Idea” indicates an efficient cause that is conformed to an effect; but “Exemplar” indicates a formal cause; and “Form” indicates a final cause. For God is the Beginning of all things—from which Beginning are the Form and Exemplar in the likeness of which the things exist. And God is the Goal to which [all things] are [directed]. These three things—[namely, Idea, Exemplar, Form]—differ from one another in such a way that the Exemplar is a single thing, because “Exemplar” connotes causality; and things caused are present in their cause as one thing. But the Forms and Ideas are more than one, because they are called Forms and Ideas with respect to things. Therefore, there is a plurality of Ideas—whose names connote a knowing. But things knowable are distinguished in the knower. Likewise, there is also more than one Form in God. For individual [kinds of] things are created with respect to their own Forms. For it is absurd to say, as [rightly] points out Augustine, that a
horse is created by means of the [same] Form by which a human being [is created]. Yet, we must realize that plurality is twofold. (1) The one [kind of] plurality is that of things; and in accordance with this [kind] there is not a plurality of Ideas, or Exemplars, in God. Rather, there is one thing which is the Exemplar of all [other] things: namely, the Divine Essence, which all things imitate insofar as they are goods. (2) The other [kind of plurality] is in accordance with the form of understanding; and in this regard there is more than one Idea in God. For all things, insofar as they exist, imitate the Divine Essence, insofar as it is imitable. [They do so] not in one way only but in different ways and in different degrees. Thus, then, the Divine Essence, in accordance with the fact that it is imitable in this way by this creature, is the proper Form of this creature—and, by similar consideration, [is the proper Form] of the other [creatures]. Hence, in accordance with this fact there is a plurality of Ideas in God, because the Divine Essence is understood in the different respects that things have to it, imitating it differently. [Things] of this kind [i.e., created things] are understood not only by the created5 intellect but also by God’s Uncreated Intellect. Thus [it is that] God knew even from eternity that different creatures would be going to imitate His Essence in different ways; and in this regard there were present in the Divine Mind from eternity the many Ideas, according to the fact that they are understood. Similarly, the proper forms of things are understood to be in God. For the name “idea” implies that [an idea] is a certain form that is understood by an agent, in conformity with whose pattern he intends to produce the external object.

Therefore, it must be said that although the forms and Ideas in God are one power and one light and one essence, nevertheless they are said to be plural because of the plurality of their referents. You have in the natural world an example of this [relationship]. For we see that all the radii of a circle are united in the center; but when they are at a distance from the center they differ from one another. Moreover, the Ideas are (as Augustine says)⁶ the principal-forms-of-things, which are contained in the Divine Understanding. Accordingly, we must say that just as in the mind of an artisan there is the form of the thing before the artisan executes the work, so too the Ideas of things were in the Mind of the Creator before the creation of the world. For [God] did not look to anything outside Himself in conformity with which He made the world. Herefrom it is evident that every creature exists in God before
it exists in itself. Hence, when it proceeds from Him through creation, it begins to be distant from Him in a certain manner. Thus, a rational creature ought to return to Him with whom he was first conjoined before he existed. And this [conjoining] was by means of Ideas which are not (and will not be) anything other than God Himself. In this way “the rivers are returned to the place from which they flowed forth.”

Insofar as things are in God they are called life, [a word] that implies a form of good. (John 1:3-4: “That which was made was in Him life.”)

Moreover, they are called light, which implies a form of a real thing. Augustine in his Literal Commentary on Genesis [states]: “In God creatures are light. They are called this because in God they are neither bad nor unreal.”

There is a difference between the Exemplar and the Book of Life and a mirror. For [the word] “Exemplar” is used with respect to things qua returning, as it were, to their First Cause. For [this word] connotes a creature, as was stated earlier. “Mirror” is used with respect to things going out. Hugh of St. Victor says in his De Libro Vitae (On the Book of Life) that the Book of Life is [a Book] “whose origin is eternal, whose essence is incorruptible, knowledge of which is true knowledge, whose writing is indelible, a viewing of which is desirable whose teaching is easily understood, a knowledge of which is pleasant, whose depth is inscrutable, whose words are innumerable—but all [the words are but] one word.”

Now, the soul, morally speaking, is in God in multiple ways: namely, as a branch is in a tree, as a bee is in a flower, as a ship is at its landing-place, as a seat is in a chamber, as a treasure is in a field, as writing is in a book, as a bird is in a nest, as a fish is in a stream, as each thing is in its own place, as a star is in the sky, as an image is in a mirror, as wax is on a seal, as a jewel is [embedded] in gold, as honey is in a honey-comb.

Chapter XXVI: On the Attributes Assigned to the Divine Persons

Although all the essential [features] betit each of the Persons equally, nevertheless Power is ascribed to the Father, Wisdom to the Son, Goodness to the Holy Spirit. And this [ascribing] is by way of excluding a carnal understanding—lest, that is, the Father by reason of His age be believed to be impotent, the Son by reason of His youth be believed to be unwise, the Holy Spirit by reason of His unrestricted movement be believed to be cruel. The following inference pertains to simple [rational creatures]: namely, that [in them] power naturally pre-
cedes wisdom and that both [power and wisdom] naturally precede a good will.

1. Therefore, speaking about the attributes is done in two ways: either according to substance (and in this way [the attributes] are altogether the same [for the three Persons] and are not assigned separately) or according to relation (and in this way certain of them are individually assigned, [and] certain are not). For individual assignation is nothing other than a special attribution by reason of a conformity with the proprium of that Person. Thus, power bears a likeness to the Father, who is the Universal Beginning; and wisdom [bears a likeness] to the Word; and goodness [bears a likeness] to Love, [i.e., to the Holy Spirit]. The customary usage of the Scriptures has these just-mentioned individual assignations. It attributes to the Father works of manifest power; to the Son, [works] of wisdom; to the Holy Spirit, [works] of goodness.

2. The individual ascriptions of Hilary are different. [Hilary speaks of]: (1) Eternity in the Father (who neither from Himself has a beginning-of-activity nor from anyone else has a beginning-of-existing; (2) Beauty in the Image (i.e., in the Word), because [the Word is] supremely beautiful; Usefulness in the Gift (i.e., in the Holy Spirit), because [the Holy Spirit] is supremely helpful and sharing.

3. By means of other words Augustine deals with this [topic] as follows: “In the Father is Oneness; in the Son, Equality; in the Holy Spirit, the Union of Oneness and Equality.” Now, “oneness” befits the Father because just as oneness is derived from nothing else and all plurality issues forth from oneness, so God the Father is from no one else, and the other Persons are from Him. Moreover, just as oneness begets from itself oneness, so the Father begets from Himself a second Himself, i.e., a Son. And in the Son there is said to be Equality, by which the Son is equal to the Father not only in power and wisdom and goodness but also with respect to the fact that just as the Father gives His own goodness to another Person, so too does the Son. But in the Holy Spirit there is the Union of Oneness and Equality, because He is the Love of both—i.e., of both the Father and the Son.

4. Furthermore, a fourth individual ascription is [the ascription] that in the Father is the Principle of Originating and of Beginning, because the Father is Supremely the Beginning. But in the Son is the Principle of Exemplifying, because [the Son] is Supremely Beautiful. And in the Holy Spirit is the Principle of Acting, because [the Holy Spirit] is Supremely Good.

Chapter XXVII: On God’s Power

God’s power is twofold: namely, absolute and ordained. [God] can do in the first way many things that He cannot do in the second way. For in His power are many things that are not fitting for Him to do—as, for example, doing things evil. Nevertheless, He can do all things that do not involve a contradiction; and so, He has the power to do evil things. God the Father can do all things in all ways, because He can bring [all things] from not-being into being; and [He does] this through creating. Likewise, He can make from what is uncompleted
that which is completed; and [He does] this through propagating. Furthermore, He can transform one completed thing into another completed thing, as is evident in the transubstantiation of bread into the Body of Christ. About such matters Augustine says: “Let us grant to God the ability to do something and [grant] that we cannot understand [it].” The power of God is manifest in the world’s beginning, middle, and end. [It is manifest] in the beginning because God created things from nothing. And [it is manifested] in the middle because by His power He holds things together lest they return to nothing. And [it is manifested] in the end because with marvelous quickness He will raise the dead. God’s power appears also in things immaterial. For although the Devil has in us the power of transforming the senses and the imagination, nevertheless, an angel has power over these and over the intellect. [But] God alone not only has power over the just-mentioned three things but can also change the will. Augustine says that “God precedes us in order that we may will and succeeds us lest we will in vain.”

Although God is omnipotent, nevertheless blameworthy actions are not attributed to Him—[actions] such as lying and evilly willing. Nor are distressing actions [attributed to Him]—[actions] such as expressing fear and as lamenting. Nor are physical actions, such as eating and sleeping, unless perhaps metaphorically. Nor are unfitting actions, which can occur in a threefold sense. First, an act [is unfittingly ascribed to God] if it contradicts the Divine power—as would be [this power’s] making itself greater. Secondly, [it is unfittingly ascribed to God] if it contradicts Divine truth, as would be its causing something both to be and not to be at the same time or its causing that what is past be future. Thirdly, [an act is unfittingly attributed to God] if it contradicts God’s goodness, as would be His damning Peter and saving Judas. About these matters Anselm [writes]: “Whatever is unfitting, even the least bit unfitting, is impossible with God.” The basis for these [judgments] is the following: that since God’s power is most perfect, it is not ineffective nor is it subject to anything else. Hence, it cannot fail by sinning; nor can it yield because of suffering something; nor can it be needy, seeking assistance in certain respects. And, accordingly, it cannot be blameworthy or material or subject to distress.

Moreover, we must say that God can do all things through Himself and through creatures. I mean that He can do all those things that are characteristic of power. This is said [in this way] because to be able to sin is not characteristic of power but of weakness. Perfect capa-
bility befits God—i.e., perfect divine ability, about which Dionysius
[says]: “Dominion is not only the riddance of quite evil things but also
the perfect possession in every respect of all things beautiful and
good—a strength that is firm and unable to fail.”

Therefore, we must note that certain activities are attributed to
God according to causality but not according to His Essence: for exam-
ple eating, running. Certain [activities are ascribed to Him] in accor-
dance with His Essence [but] not in accordance with causality: for
example, justifying, creating. Certain [activities are attributed to Him]
neither in the one way nor in the other: for example, sinning.

Chapter XXVIII: On the Power of Miracles

Since miracles are performed through Divine power, we must say
something about them. Now, Augustine calls this a miracle: [namely,]
whatever is seen to be difficult or unusual [and] beyond the expecta-
tion or the skill of the one who is astonished. In order that something
be a miracle four things are required and [must] concur: first, that it be
from God; secondly, that it be additive to the natural; thirdly, that it be
evident; fourthly, that it be for a confirming of faith. Hence, if any of
these four things are absent, [the work] can be called a wonder [but]
not a miracle.

Note that certain [events] are above nature, certain are against
nature, certain are additive to nature. Above nature are those things to
which there is nothing similar in nature and in the power of nature—
as, for example, a virgin’s giving birth. Against nature are [those
things] which are done by an instrumentation that is contrary to nature
but is directed toward a conformity to nature—as, for example, a blind
man’s obtaining sight. But additive to nature are [those things] which
occur in a way similar to nature but not through the originating power
of nature—as, for example the changing of rods into serpents. For that
[event] could have occurred in the order of nature through lengthy
putrefaction, as is evident through those things which occur in accor-
dance with seminal principles. Nevertheless, because the operation of
nature was not present there, [the event] was a miracle.

At times an event is brought about subsequently by an efficient
cause that is similar [to it]; this [occurrence] is attributed to nature and
is called a natural [event]. At times [an event] is brought about instant-
ly by an efficient cause that is dissimilar [to it]; and this [event] is
attributed to God and is called a miracle.
It must be known that at times a power and its activity are natural—as, for example, sight and seeing. At times a power is miraculous, and its activity is natural—as, for example, when a blind man, with sight restored, sees. At times both [the power and its activity] are miraculous—as, for example, a virgin’s giving birth. Note that miracles and wonders occur sometimes with respect to a non-living object—as, for example, the sun’s standing still and its moving backwards. Sometimes they occur with respect to a plant, as when Aaron’s rod blossomed. Sometimes [they occur] with respect to an animal, as happened with regard to the speaking of Balaam’s ass. Sometimes [they occur] in the case of a rational being, as happened on the part of the lame with regard to walking, on the part of the deaf with regard to hearing, on the part of the dead with regard to resurrection, on the part of a virgin with regard to giving birth.

But so that we may know when a miracle occurs, note the difference between causal principles, seminal principles, and natural principles—[namely, the following differences]: (1) A causal principle is a creature’s passive power, without any natural disposition, so that by means of this [creaturely causal] power God alone brings about that which He wills to, as happened in the Virgin’s giving birth. And in such cases it is a miracle purely and simply. (2) However, a seminal principle is a creature’s passive power, but with the [natural] disposition removed, as happened with the rods from which serpents were made. And this was done instantaneously. But nature would have done the same thing, only more gradually through [a process of] prolonged putrefaction. Hence, it is evident that those things which are done in accordance with seminal principles are partly natural, partly miraculous. (3) A natural principle is a power together with an immediate disposition, as is evident in the case of matter, when there is in its basic disposition [the disposition] to receive form. And in accordance with this mode there is present in grain-that-is-sown a natural principle for the production of corn. And this [happening] is not a miracle.

Chapter 29: On God’s Knowledge

God knows all things as present and knows them simultaneously and also perfectly and immutably. I say as present, i.e., very clearly, as if all were existing in the present. Moreover, He knows all things simultaneously, because in seeing Himself (who is present to Himself) He sees all things. Furthermore, [He knows all things] perfectly,
because His knowledge can be neither increased nor decreased. Likewise, He knows [all things] immutably, because He knows all things through the nature of His Intellect, which is immutable. Therefore, we must say that God knows temporal things eternally, mutable things immutably, contingent things infallibly, future things as present, dependent things independently, created things uncreatedly. But things other than Himself [He knows] in and through Himself.

Note the difference between God’s knowledge, Christ’s knowledge, an angel’s knowledge, and a man’s knowledge: [namely,] that God knows all things simultaneously, for He sees many things in one thing, i.e., in Himself. Hence, in God’s vision there is no difference between that which He sees and that through which He sees. (The case is similar in man, who sees through his eye; for he sees himself through himself; and in himself he sees [by means of images] all the things [that he sees].) Now, Christ insofar as He is a man, knows, with the knowledge of vision, all the things that God knows, although not as clearly as does God. But an angel has an intellect that is like God’s: i.e., those things which [an angel] knows he knows simultaneously and actually and with the knowledge of vision, as does God; nonetheless, [an angel] does not know everything that God knows. A man, however, knows actually only one thing [at a time], because although he sees many things, nevertheless he does not see them by means of one act of seeing but by means of many acts of seeing—i.e., through many likenesses of objects.

Although God’s wisdom is not diverse in and of itself, nevertheless it receives different names. For example, insofar as God’s wisdom is cognizant of things possible it is called knowledge. Moreover, insofar as it is cognizant of all things happening in the world, it is said to be vision. Insofar as it is cognizant of those things that are done well, it is called approval. Insofar as it is cognizant of things future, it is called foresight. Insofar as it is cognizant of those things which are going to be done by God Himself, it is called a disposing. Insofar as it is cognizant of those individuals who are to be rewarded, it is called predestination. Insofar as it is cognizant of those individuals who are damned, it is called reprobation. Since Divine knowledge is altogether perfect, it knows all things most distinctly [and] under all the conditions that things have. And for this reason it knows future things to be future, present things to be present, and knows good deeds as [deeds] to be approved of and knows evil deeds as [deeds] to be condemned.
But if you want to know how it is that God knows things evil, you must keep in mind that something comes to be known in two senses: either through an image of itself or through an image of something else. In the first way a possessed-trait is known; in the second way, a privation. Likewise, in the first way light is known; in the second way, darkness. Similarly, it must be said that in the first way what is a good is known; in the second way what is an evil is known (i.e., through an image of what is the opposite of the possessed-trait). For evil is nothing except a privation of the good. Hence, it must be said that God knows the good through a unique means—namely, through His own Essence. But [He knows] things evil by a twofold means, for through His own Essence He knows the possessed-trait that is opposed to the evil; and by means of this possessed-trait (as it is in God Himself as Knower) He knows its defect. And for this reason He is said to know evil things from afar. Hence, Psalms 137:6 [states]: “And He knows things high from afar”—i.e., [knows] things evil.2

Chapter 30: On Predestination

Four definitions of “predestination” are distinguished by Augustine. The first is “Predestination is the foreknowledge of God’s bestowed benefits.”1 The second is “Predestination is the foreordination of someone to glory.”2 The third is “Predestination is a purposed showing of mercy.”3 The fourth is “Predestination is the readying of grace in the present [life] and of glory in the future [life].”4 In the first definition Divine knowledge is indicated; in the second, Divine election; in the third, the Divine will; in the fourth, the Divine directedness toward a goal. God is the Efficient Cause of predestination as regards the effects indicated by the name “predestination”. But the material cause is the individual who is predestinated. However, the formal [cause] is the manner, or order, of predestination, because grace is given first and thereafter glory.5 The final cause is so that we may be holy and immaculate in the sight of God.

Note the distinction that Augustine makes between the following: calling, justification, predestination, and glorification.6 Calling recalls from evil. Justification has to do with the initial good of grace. Predestination has to do with the final good of grace. Glorification is the good of future glory. And you might say that predestination prepares by means of grace; calling offers grace; justification confers grace; and glorification increases glory by means of grace.
We must be aware that with God there is a twofold sense of action, as also in natural matters. [In natural matters] the one [kind of action] imposes something on a thing from outside, as fire’s heat [is imposed]; the other [kind of action] does not [impose anything], as [in the case of] seeing. And, likewise, with God, seeing is a twofold activity. [Its second form of activity does] not [impose necessity]—as illustrated by predestination, which does not impose necessity on things. (For example, God knows whether or not a given individual is going to eat today. Nevertheless, that individual has the ability to eat and to reach his hand to his mouth.) For if predestination imposed necessity on things, many untoward consequences would ensue. For example, rewards would be proposed in vain to those individuals who are good, as would be punishments to those who are evil. Moreover, those who are good would be rewarded unjustly, and those who are evil would be punished unjustly. Furthermore, God would be the Author of our evil deeds. Likewise, there would be no reason to hope for anything or to make supplication for anything. Or again, free choice, which stands in relation to both alternatives, [namely, salvation or damnation], would be nullified. Then too, those doing good would not be praiseworthy, nor would those doing evil be blameworthy.

However, it must be known that this [Divine seeing] is twofold. If God foresees a particular thing, this thing will, necessarily, occur. For when [the antecedent and the consequent of this proposition] are taken together, [this hypothetical proposition] is true; but when they are taken separately, [the proposition] is false. There is here a necessity of inference but not a necessity of the consequent. For although there is a logical inference from the one category, [namely, the antecedent], to the other [namely, the consequent], nevertheless it is not necessary that the terms of the latter, [i.e., of the consequent], be actualized. For example, “If it is a man, then it is an animal.” There is [here] a necessity of logical inference but not a necessity of the consequent. For it can be the case that [the object] is not [a man and also not an animal]; nevertheless, the proposition will remain true. About this [topic] we have the example of Boethius in his book On the Consolation of Philosophy: “If someone sees someone else making a wheel, it is necessary that [that other] be making the wheel; and, nevertheless, his seeing is not the cause of that making.” Similarly, God sees the evil deeds of a given individual; and, nevertheless, [His seeing] is not the cause of that individual’s acting evilly. Yet, [the deed]
will be done if it is foreseen. A further good example: if someone were to have an eye of such great acuity that he could see future things, he would not for this reason force the things to happen. Likewise, an artisan rightly sees in a flawed piece of material the failure of the outcome; yet, he is not at all the cause of the [failed] outcome. Furthermore, there are two pages of the Book of Life: one [page] is of present-day justice; from this [page the name of] someone can be deleted. The other [page] is of an eternal disposition; from this [page the name of] no one will be deleted.

There is a difference between predestination and foreknowledge, because predestination is a foreknowing of those who are good, with a causality on their part. But foreknowledge indicates a [Divine] foreknowing of those who are evil, without [reference to] the causality that resides in free choice. When it is said by the saints that predestination is aided by prayers, this is not to be understood in such a way that what is temporal causes what is eternal. Rather, the following [is to be understood]: prayer helps with respect to the effect of predestination, i.e., with respect to grace and glory. For in accordance with these, free choice cooperates well with predestination. Hence, just as God foresees that someone is to be saved, so too [He foresees] the manner in which that someone is to be saved. Accordingly, he is foolish who says: “I choose to do what pleases [me], because if I am to be saved, I will be saved, and if I am to be damned, I will be damned.” By way of analogy, a sick man would be foolish if he said: “I choose to eat and drink what is pleasing [to me], because if I am to be cured, I will be cured, and if I am to die, I will die.” For in this way physicians and medicines would be useless. Indeed, if God permits free choice (which stands before two alternatives) to fall into evil, then He permits this only justly. Or again, if He intervenes in advance through grace, He wrongs no one. Therefore, when God damns and reprobates the wicked, He acts in accordance with justice. But when He predestines, He acts in accordance with grace and mercy, which do not exclude justice. Now, by a primary act of will God wills that every man qua man be saved. But by a secondary act of will He wills that a just man—insofar as he is just—not be reprobated. Therefore, [God’s] antecedent-will takes as its goal the order-of-nature according as it was established by God. But [God’s] consequent-will takes [as its goal] the order-of-person according as [the person] is goal-directed by his own free choice or by something else.
The foregoing remarks have been made about the reality; but since, logically speaking, man’s salvation is contingent, it cannot be determined by necessity. For that which is possible to be and possible not to be is contingent, not necessary—as the Philosopher says in Book II of On Interpretation. But if one asks why God has predestined, or elected, this individual and not that one: this matter is inexplicable in this mortal life. For because of this [inexplicability] the Apostle exclaims in Romans 11:33: “O the depth of the riches of God’s wisdom and knowledge. How incomprehensible are His judgments and how unsearchable His ways!” For if we say that the reprobate reject grace, this is true. But if they were predestined, they would not reject it ultimately. Hence, Augustine in his book On the Predestination of the Saints [writes]: “Grace,” he says, “which is bestowed hiddenly on human hearts, is refused by no hard heart. And so, indeed, [grace] is bestowed in order that hardness of hearts may be removed.”

Chapter 31: On Foreknowledge and Reprobation

Reprobation is, as Augustine says, a foreknowledge of the iniquity of certain individuals and the readying of the damnation of these same individuals. Hence, take note of the fact that there are three things in regard to reprobation. One thing is the eternal foreseeing of the iniquity. Another thing is a hardening, i.e., a withdrawing of grace in the present [lifetime]. A third thing is the readying of eternal punishment in the future. So if one asks whether reprobation has a cause on man’s part, [the answer is]: With respect to the first thing a man’s merit is not the cause; with respect to the second thing the cause is a deserving and efficacious [cause]; with respect to the third thing the cause is a deserving [cause] but not an efficacious [cause]. On the other hand, in the case of predestination there are three things opposite [to the things in reprobation]. But there is a difference in that predestination prepares glory according to [God’s] good pleasure, whereas reprobation prepares punishment in accordance with the demand of one’s merits.

As regards hardening, we are to know that [the word] is used figuratively, analogously to hardening in material objects. Three properties are characteristic of the hardening of material objects: first, there is an inability to receive an impression; secondly, there is rigidity with respect to [the object’s] remaining as it is; thirdly, there is strength for resisting [change]. In these ways the heart is said to be triply hardened: in one way [it is hardened] because of an inability to receive grace; in
a second way [it is hardened] by an unhealthy clinging to sin; in a third way [it is hardened] through rebellion against Divine infusions and against God’s commandments. Hence, we must ask whether those who are foreknown by God can act unmeritoriously and meritoriously. We must answer that God’s knowledge is to created things as an art is to artifacts. The art not only is cognizant of, but also productive of, those objects which are produced according to [that] art. But regarding those objects with respect to which one veers from the rules of the art, [the art] is only cognizant, [not productive]. Analogously, God’s knowledge is cognizant of, and productive of, all things good. But as regards evils and sins, which are certain veerings from God’s eternal law, God’s knowledge is only cognizing, not causative. And so, [the following] is evident: that those who are good—those who are justified by grace—not only are known by God from eternity but also [are known] to have grace. However, sinners are not justified through grace; nor are they elect or ordained by God to a state of blame. But they are only known not to be going to obtain grace but to be left to their own nature. And because not every agent has power with respect to that which is above itself, a nature that is left to itself has no capability as regards a meritorious act, which is above the capability of the nature. But [the nature] has power with respect to an act-of-sin, which is demeriting—even as [it has power] with regard to something existing below human nature. For a man, by sinning, descends from the dignity of his nature. And thus it is evident that those who are foreknown [not to be saved] can more easily do works of demerit than works of merit.

Chapter XXXII: On God’s Will

God’s will is twofold: namely, a signatory will (voluntas signi) and a disposing will (voluntas beneplaciti). (1) The disposing will is twofold: in particular, an antecedent [disposing will], which often is not executed (regarding this will see the immediately preceding chapter), and a consequent [disposing will], which never remains unexecuted. (2) The other will is signatory; and it remains, at times, unexecuted.

The rationale [for assertions] of the foregoing kind is that God’s will can be construed in two senses: either in a strict sense (and thus it is taken as His disposing will) or in a metaphorical sense (and thus it is taken as His signatory will). In the first sense God is said to will something, and this act of willing is God Himself. In the second sense there is, metaphorically, a relatedness of [God] Himself to a mode of
willing; and this [mode of] willing is not God. Therefore this distinction is not a real distinction but a verbal one. By way of illustration, anger can be spoken of either in a strict sense as the emotion-of-anger or in a metaphorical sense as a sign-of-anger. God’s consequent disposing will is just, efficacious, and unreproachable. Thus, because it is just: no individual is upright unless he is conformed to it. Likewise, because it is efficacious: nothing can be brought about without it [and] nothing can be done counter to it; it cannot be thwarted by anyone. Furthermore, because it is irreproachable: it commands something or permits something only justly; it does something or counsels something only rightly.

There are five signs of the disposing [will]: namely, a precept, a prohibition, a counsel, a permission, and an actual use. The five of these are understood as follows: Divine willing, strictly speaking, is either of things present or of things future. If it is with respect to things present, then either that [which is willed] is good (and thus there is a fulfillment) or it is evil (and thus there is a permission). If it is with respect to things future, then in this respect [the Divine Will] is three-fold: either it is [directed toward] something evil (and thus is a prohibition) or toward a necessary good (and thus is a precept); or [it is directed toward] a good of supererogation (and thus is a counsel). Something can be undertaken contrary to the first three, [namely, precept, prohibition, and counsel], because they apply to something that is yet to be done. But nothing can be undertaken counter to the last two (namely, permission and actual use) because they apply to something that has already been done; and that which is completed cannot not be undertaken.

Regarding the foregoing [five] signs, note that “precept” indicates an obligation to do something that is good. “Prohibition” indicates an obligation to avoid what is evil. “Counsel” indicates advice by means of which we know that if that which is counseled is done, then it brings a reward, [and] if it is not done, it brings punishment. “Permission” indicates a removal of a restraint and is a sign of the Divine Will—[a sign] not with respect to the evil that is permitted but with respect to the good that the permission-of-the-evil is said to be. For God does not permit evil to be done unless He elicits from it some good—as is evident in the case of temptations from the Devil, which in many ways are useful to the saints. Besides, if there were no evil, there would be only absolute beauty, not beauty present in what is
good. But now, because of the contrast with evil, [beauty] shines forth more splendidly. “Actual use” indicates a doing [or a making] in reality, whereby the creature is a pointer toward the Creator.

As regards a conforming of our will to God, the point must be known that “conformity” has a double sense: namely, [the conformity] of proportion and [the conformity] of proportionality. In the first way there is a conformity of things willed in and of themselves in accordance with their essential form. And so, [conformity of willing] is impossible in this way, because of the finite to the Infinite there is no proportion.¹ In the second way there is conformity in accordance with a similarity—something that is possible. For it is possible for [one and] the same thing to be willed in one way on God’s part and in another way on man’s part—as, for example, [when] a man wills that which God wills [and does so] in accordance with the willing by which God wills that we [human beings] will. But if we consider this conformity in regard to the form-of-willing: then if we will to have a reward for our deeds, we must always be conformed to [God’s Will] with respect to our form of willing.

But if it is asked whether we are absolutely obliged [to conform our will to God’s Will], the answer must be that there is a certain conformity as regards the act [of will] but to which [act of will] we are not obliged, except that love must be had—but even then only according to the circumstances of time and place. For example, when someone thinks of God’s truth, i.e. of the articles of faith, he is obliged to believe [them]; [and] when he thinks of God’s Goodness, he is obliged to love [God]. There is conformity in another sense: [namely, conformity] as regards the will’s predisposing tendency. Someone is not obliged with respect to this [kind of conformity] except when he actually reflects on God’s Goodness. For then he is obliged to prepare himself for [receiving] God’s love. But as regards conformity in what is willed, we are to know that in terms of our sensual will we are not obliged to be conformed to the Divine Will—[not obliged] either with respect to what is willed or with respect to the form of willing. For a sensual will is present only in things animated. Hence, in this regard, we would not sin by this will if reason—whose role is to restrain the animal nature—were not joined to this will. However, by means of the will of deliberative reason we are obliged to be conformed to God as regards a willed-thing that—it is evident to us—God wills absolutely (e.g., our salvation) and that it befits us to will. But if it does not befit us [to will

¹ Compendium Theologicae Veritatis, Book I, 32
this thing], then although [the thing] is something good in and of itself, God does not will that we will it. Hence, we are not obliged to will it except insofar as it is what is willed by God. Thus, if I know that God wills the death of my father, nevertheless I can will his life, and I can work to the end that God not will that I will the opposite, [namely, death], for my father. Likewise, in the case of a conditional willing we are not obliged to be conformed to God—as, for example, when it rains [and] we wished that it would not rain, if God [so] willed. For by willing conditionally we are not at odds with God’s Will, because this is not a case of [God’s] willing unreservedly. Moreover, we are not obliged to will that which God does not will unreservedly and unqualifiedly—as, for example, a threatening judgment that at some time He changes, when the merits are changed.\(^2\)

Conformity to the Divine Will can be considered in four ways in accordance with the relation of the four causes. First, [conformity can be considered] according to material cause, as when what is willed is the same as that which serves as a material [and] with respect to which there is the act of will. And so, this is conformity only in a certain respect and not in an unqualified way; for existing unqualifiedly is not characteristic of matter and its form. In a second way conformity is understood according to efficient cause, as when someone wills that which God wills for him to will because God causes in him this will. For God has ordained each will—[ordained it] toward the good—and He wills that we will the good. In the third way [conformity can be considered] according to final cause, as when someone ordains his deeds unto the glory of God. God does all things for the sake of this [glory]. And all conformity consists essentially in these two things.\(^3\) In the fourth way [the Divine Will’s conformity can be considered] according to formal cause, as [when] someone would out of love will that which he wills, even as God from love wills all things. And the perfection of conformity consists in this: namely, that the better and more perfect our will is, the more [the act of our will] is conformed to the Divine Will.

From the aforesaid remarks, conclude that perfect and complete conformity to God includes four things: first that we will what God wills; secondly, that we will what God wills for us to will; thirdly, that we will for the reason that God wills; fourthly, that we will in the way in which God wills. But incomplete conformity is threefold. First, [it occurs if] someone is conformed to God only in regard to the thing...
willed, as even the Jews were conformed to God regarding the death of Christ. Secondly, [it occurs] if someone is conformed with regard to what is willed and with respect to the goal but not with respect to the manner, as when something is not done out of love. Thirdly, [it occurs] when someone is conformed in regard to what is willed and in regard to the manner [in which it is willed] but not with respect to the goal, as when his intention is greatly misdirected to a different good goal.

Chapter 33: On God's Justice

God's justice is understood in three ways: in the first way when there is rendered to someone that which he has deserved; in a second way when a promise is kept; in a third way when what is imperfect is perfected. In the first way the rewarding of those who are good and the punishing of those who are reprobate is a work of justice. In the second way the Incarnation of Christ is a work of justice because this [work] was promised by the Prophets. In the third way we say it to be a work of justice when God justifies a sinner when [the sinner] readies himself for grace by doing the best that he can.

Note that in all of God's works justice and mercy are found. But at times the justice is hidden and the mercy is manifest—as in the justification of the wicked and in Christ's First Coming. Sometimes the situation is the contrary: i.e., the justice is evident and the mercy is hidden—as in the punishment of small children who die without baptism and in Christ's Second Coming. Sometimes both [God's justice and His mercy] are hidden—as in the affliction of individuals in spite of their being just and innocent, as occurred in the case of Job [and as occurs] in regard to the illnesses of small children. Sometimes both are manifest—as in the rewarding of the just and the damning of the reprobate. For God rewards the just over and above what is merited, and he punishes the reprobate less than is deserved; [and] this is [a sign] of mercy. Yet, He renders to both groups in accordance with their merits, i.e., [renders] good things to those who are good and bad things to those who are bad; [and] this is [a sign] of justice.

1. If you wish to know by what justice a man is punished eternally for a sin that is of brief duration, look first of all at the authoritative texts

- of Isaias: “Their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched” [Isaias 66:24].
• Psalms 48:20 (49:19): “He shall go in to the generations of his fathers, and he shall never see light.”

• Matthew 25:41: “Depart from me, you accursed, into eternal fire.”

• Apocalypse 14:11: “The smoke of their torments ascends forever.”

• Likewise, Gregory in Book IV of his Dialogues [says]: “If God no more looked at the heart than at the deeds, such justice could be called unjust. But because God views the heart, it is just that they be punished without end who never wished to live without sin.”

2. The same [conclusion] is shown by rational considerations. Because man has sinned in his immortal being, he will rightly be punished in God’s eternal [dimension]. The material for the fire—namely, the stain of sin—is eternal; therefore, the punishment also is eternal. Moreover, sin is against Him who is Infinite; therefore, the punishment ought to be infinite. But this [infinite punishing] cannot be in terms of [infinite] severity; hence, it must be administered in terms of [infinite] duration. Furthermore, when a man sins, he errs undelimitedly in a certain way with respect to his rational nature, his emotional nature, and his desiring nature when he prefers the finite to the infinite when he judges with his reason, clings by means of his emotions, and desires by means of his appetite. Hence, his punishment ought rightly to be infinite. Furthermore, the evil will of the reprobate is eternal; therefore, so is the punishment.

3. Moreover, [the same conclusion] is shown by examples. For a sale, [though] not taking much time, gives a lasting right of possession. And a wound, [though contracted] quickly, leaves a lasting scar. Likewise, a fall into a pit [transpires] rapidly, but the being-trapped [in the pit] is long-lasting. Moreover, the gouging-out of the eyes takes little time, but it brings about lasting blindness. Furthermore, the crime of lèse majesté is [committed] in a short time, but [the resulting penal] servitude is lasting. Likewise, a potion of poison is [drunk] quickly, but it causes lasting death. Augustine says that God renders evils for evils, i.e., [renders] punishment for sins [and does so] for the sake of justice, because He is just. And He renders good for evils, i.e., [gives] grace to the unjust, because He is good. And He renders good things for good
things, i.e., [renders] grace for grace, because He is just and good. [But] He never requites evils for goods, because He is not unjust.

(1) Someone is punished in the present for his own good: namely, so that his past sin may be purged in him. (John 5:14: “Behold, you are made whole. Sin no more.”) (2) Another reason is so that on account of his sin [the sinner] may be forever tormented both here and in the future. You have the example of Herod and of Antiochus. (3) Another reason is so that blame might be set aside—as in the case of Paul, who was a [spiritually] blinded persecutor, in order that he would later be enlightened as a healing proclaimer [of the Gospel]. (II Corinthians 12:7: “Lest the greatness of the revelations should exalt me …,” etc.) (4) Likewise, [one is punished in the present] so that he may be given glory in the future. (Acts 14:21: “We must enter-in [to the Kingdom of God] by means of many tribulations …,” etc.) In the first two cases God exercises justice; in the subsequent two [He exercises] mercy. Fifthly, someone is punished for God’s sake: namely, in order that God be glorified. (“Neither he sinned nor his parents …,” etc.) Sixthly, someone is punished for his neighbor’s sake: namely, in order that [the neighbor] be edified—as Tobias was punished so that he would give to others an example of patience. Similarly, innocent children are also punished lest it seem unfitting to sinners if they [themselves] are sometimes afflicted. By God’s just judgment those individuals are punished who either misuse what has been granted to them, as did Adam, or who endeavor to take by plunder that which was [not] granted, as did Lucifer.

Chapter XXXIV: On God’s Mercy

According to the etymology [of the term], mercy is spoken of in three ways. First, it is spoken of in the sense of removing misery from the heart—as is understood in the following authority: “The heavens do not need mercy, because in them is no misery.” According to this sense mercy is present only on earth. In a second way [mercy] is spoken of in the sense of setting aside rigidity of heart—as is understood here: “Mercy and truth have met each other.” For truth proceeds by means of rigidity, but mercy tempers this rigidity, rewarding in a greater degree than is deserved and punishing less than is warranted. Thus, there is mercy even in Hell. In a third way mercy is spoken of in the sense of a wondrous agreeableness that floods hearts. In this way mercy is present maximally in Heaven. For although God is just and merciful,
nevertheless we say that it is proper to Him to be merciful more than to be just. For nothing is required for His completing a work of mercy except His will. But for completing a work of justice something is also required on the part of man, namely, the necessity of merits.

God’s mercy is evident in the effects of the Divine benefits. For He gives remission to those who stand accused, remitting both the guilt of sin and the consequences of sin. About these two things [are the texts]: “… who forgives all your iniquities;”\(^4\) with respect to the first thing, [and] “… who heals all your diseases;”\(^5\) with respect to the second thing. Likewise, He generously bestows grace upon the just—in particular, by giving them (a) a disposition for virtue and (b) the motivation for virtue. As a result, through the first [of these] He makes a man pleasing to God and worthy of eternal life; but through the second He increases a man’s merit. As regards these two points the Psalmist [writes]: “… who crowns you with mercy,”\(^6\) in regard to the first point, and “… [who crowns you] with compassion,”\(^7\) with regard to the second point; and [the Psalmist] is speaking of a crown of grace. Furthermore, [God] confers glory on the saints; and [He does] this in a twofold manner, because [He does so] now in terms of hope and [will do so], later, in reality. About these points the Psalmist [says]: “… who satisfies your desire with good things,”\(^8\) with regard to the first point, [and] “Your youth shall be renewed like the eagles,”\(^9\) with regard to the second point. Furthermore, out of mercy God patiently awaits sinners, graciously recalls them, refrains from taking vengeance, frees [them] from many dangers, grants grace generously, multiplies [grace] after it has been given, conserves [the grace] that has been multiplied, [and] rewards in Heaven [the grace] that has been conserved. Furthermore, out of mercy God receives gladly a sinner who returns to Him; He softens the heart in order that it repent; He quickly remits an offense; He does not harbor the memory of an injury after its remission. Moreover, out of mercy God gives hardships so that sin may be purged. He gives favorable things in order to induce love [for Himself]. He gives sacraments in order to increase merit. He gives precepts in order to enrich by means of a reward. Likewise, out of mercy He leads back to Himself those who wander away; He conducts unto Himself those who are en route; He lifts up those who are falling; He does not cease to support those who are standing up; He introduces into glory those who persist to the end.
NOTES TO THE TRANSLATION

Chapter I
1. Psalms 89:2 (90:2). References to the Psalms are given first in terms of the Latin Vulgate edition (or Douay English translation) and then, in parentheses, in terms of the King James Version.
2. St. John of Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa, Book I, Chap. 9. (See, online, An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, translated by Frederic H. Chase, Jr.).
3. Gregory the Great, Moralia, Book XXXV, Chap. 2 (PL 76:751 A).
5. Anselm of Canterbury, Cf. Proslogion, Chap. 3.
6. Psalms 99:3 (100:3).
10. “a proceeding unto infinity”: i.e., an infinite regress.

Chapter II
2. Bernard of Clairvaux, De Consideratione, Book V, Chap. 7 (PL 182:798 C).
3. Psalms 80:10 (81:9).
6. Ephesians 5:5.

Chapter III

Chapter IV
1. Isaias (Isaiah) 66:9.

Chapter V
1. Galatians 4:5.
2. Cf. Athanasius, Orationes contra Arianos. E.g., see Oratio II, Chap. 18, n. 38.

Chapter VI
1. Hebrews 1:3.
5. Here I am reading “quem” with the Cologne and Strassburg editions (in place of “quam” in Borgnet’s edition).

7. Here I am reading “Spiritus Sanctus” in place of “Filius”. All three printed editions have “Filius”.

8. Hugh borrows this illustration from Augustine’s De Trinitate, Book X, Chap. 11, n. 17 and Book IX, Chap. 5, n. 8 (PL 42:982 & 965).

Chapter IX


2. Throughout this section Hugo makes no special distinction between his use of “amor” and his use of “charitas”. In Book V, Chap. 24 he does make a distinction.


5. Here I am reading “qua” in place of Borgnet’s “quae”. The Cologne and Strassburg editions have “qua”.


8. In the corresponding Latin sentence the Latin word “est” is misprinted as “esi”. The Cologne and Strassburg editions do not have “est” here.


10. Acts 2:3, which does not mention warming those who are cold.


12. Cf. Acts 2:2, which does not mention the rebellious.


14. Hugo here gives the wrong references.


17. Psalms 32:6 (33:6).


22. Psalms 142:10 (143:10).

23. Psalms 76:3 (77:3). Borgnet’s Latin text here misprints the reference as LXVI, 3.


25. Regarding the first man (namely, Adam) this teaching is not found in either the Old Testament or the New Testament. Christ, the Second Adam, is said to have been crucified at the third hour (Mark 15:25).


29. Here I am reading, with the Cologne and Strassburg editions, “ascendit” and not “ascendit”, as Borgnet’s edition has.


Chapter X

3. Isaias (Isaiah) 6:3.
5. Here I am reading “præpositio” along with the Cologne and Strassburg editions. Borgnet’s text has “propositio”.
8. Isaias (Isaiah) 40:12.
9. Josue (Joshua) 20. Three cities of refuge were established on each side of the Jordan River.

Chapter XI

1. I John 5:8.

Chapter XII

1. Not Augustine but Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum Diaconum*, Chap. 1, n. 4 (*PL 65:674 A*).

Chapter XIII

1. “Power” is especially assigned to the Father, “Wisdom” to the Son, “Goodness” to the Holy Spirit.
2. This is Boethius’s definition in *De Persona et Naturis Duabus*, Chap. 3 (*PL 64:1343 D*).

Chapter XIV

1. Psalms 144:3 (145:3).
2. Romans 11:33.
5. I Timothy 1:17.

Chapter XV

1. Here I am reading “infinita” in place of Borgnet’s “finita”. Both the Cologne and the Strassburg editions have “infinita”.
2. That is, it is not completely measurable at no matter what point.
3. The Cologne and the Strassburg editions here have “in divisione”—whereas Borgnet has “in productione”.

Notes to the Compendium
Chapter XVI

1. Nicholas of Cusa may have been influenced by this passage. See his De Docta Ignorantia, Book I, Chap. 3, opening sentence. See, below, the respective passages (in Hugo’s text) marked by note 2 in Chap. 21 and by n. 1 in Chap. 32.


3. Romans 11:36.
4. I Timothy 6:16.
5. Psalms 17:11 (18:10).
10. I Corinthians 13:12.
12. Psalms 33:9 (34:8).
14. Here I am reading, with the Cologne and the Strassburg editions, “imaginatione” in place of Borgnet’s “imagine”.

Chapter XVII

2. John 15:5.
5. In the second paragraph (English translation) of this present chapter Hugo advances the same question.
7. Matthew 28:20. (Borgnet’s edition gives the wrong reference.)

Chapter XVIII

7. Here I am reading, with the Cologne and the Strassburg editions, “habent” in place of Borgnet’s “habens”.
Chapter XIX

1. Epistola Peregrinorum Monachorum ad Leonem III, Incipit Symbolum Orthodoxae Fidei Leonis Papae (PL 129:1260 C). Note that "accidental motion" is being used by Hugo in Aristotle’s sense of incidental (i.e., non-substantive) change.

2. Borgnet’s text appears to have omitted certain words. Without them his passage makes no sense. From the Strassburg edition I have added the words “de non esse ad esse ut generatio quia initium non habuit. nec ille qui est de esse ad non esse ut corruptio quia finem ….”

5. Isaias (Isaiah) 38:1. Ezechias, i.e., Hezekiah.
6. “merits”: i.e., demerits.
8. Here I delete the word “aliae” in the phrase “aliae creaturae”. The Cologne and the Strassburg editions also have “aliae”.
9. Aristotle is called by the Medievals “the Philosopher”.
10. See n. 9 above.

Chapter XX

1. Hugo may be alluding to Martianus Capella’s De Nuptiis Mercurii et Philosophiae. But see, rather, Alain of Lille’s Theologicae Regulae. Regula II (PL 210:623 D).
2. See n. 1 of Chap. 19 above.

Chapter XXI

1. Here I am reading “transgrediuntur”. All three printed editions have “transgreditur”.
2. See, above, Chap. 16, note 1.
3. Here I discard the word “altri” on the ground that it gives a false view of what Hugo aims to be saying.

Chapter XXII

1. Innascibility is the characteristic of the Father in the Trinity. It is His incapability of being born, of being begotten.
2. Here I am reading “Patrem” for “Parem”—an obvious misprint in Borgnet’s edition.

Chapter XXIII

1. Here I have deleted the word “qui”, as being a mistaken wording.
2. Hugo is thinking of the verbs “to create” and “to make” as connoting the
imperfection of movement, which cannot befit God.
6. “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit” are all masculine nouns in Latin.
7. “Paternitas,” “Filiatio,” and “Processio” are feminine nouns in Latin.

Chapter XXIV
1. The Cologne and the Strassburg editions here have “nomina”, whereas Borgnet has “omnia”. The former editions have the correct reading.
2. Priscian, or Priscianus Caesariusis, was the author of Institutiones Grammaticae, a prescriptive guide to classical Latin expression.
3. Here the allusion is to St. Anselm’s well-known description of God in is Proslogion.

Chapter XXV
1. In the present English translation the English word “Idea” is capitalized when it refers to a form in the Mind of the Creator, of God. Capitalization distinguishes this referent from the referent of human ideas.
2. According to Aristotle a final cause is that for the sake of which something is done. For example, health may be said to be the final cause of one’s exercising daily.
3. The Cologne and the Strassburg editions here have “creata”, whereas Borgnet has “creata”. I am following the two earlier editions.
4. Augustine, De Diversis Quaestionibus 83, q. 46, n. 2 (PL 40:30).
5. Here in Borgnet’s text I correct the misprint “ereato” to “creato”.
6. Augustine, De Diversis Quaestionibus 83, q. 46, n. 2 (PL 40:30).
8. Here Borgnet has “importa”, a misprint for “importat”, which the Strassburg edition has. (The Cologne edition has “important”.)

Chapter XXVI

Chapter XXVII
1. Augustine, Epistola ad Volusianum (=Epistola 137; also called Epistola 3), Chap. 2, n. 8 (PL 33:519).

Chapter XXVIII
1. Augustine, De Utilitate Credendi, Chap. 16, n. 34 (PL 42:90).
Notes to the Compendium

3. Here Hugo makes an erroneous scientific judgment regarding spontaneous generation.
6. Isaia (Isaiah) 38:8.
9. Here I am following the Cologne edition, which has “in rationali” in place of Borgnet’s “in ratione”. (The Strassburg edition has “rationabili”.)
10. Here I am following the Cologne and the Strassburg editions, which have “creaturae” instead of Borgnet’s “naturae”.
11. See n. 3 above.
12. Here I am following the Cologne and the Strassburg editions, which have the word “non”—a word omitted by Borgnet.

Chapter XXIX
1. Here I am reading, with the Strassburg edition, “secundo modo cognoscitur malum scilicet” instead of Borgnet’s “secundo malum scilicet”.

Chapter XXX
4. See n. 2 above. See also De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, Chap. 10, n. 19 (PL 44:974-975).
8. Aristotle, De Interpretatione, Chap. 9 (Bekker page 18b).

Chapter XXXI

Chapter XXXII
1. See, above, n. 1 of Chap. XVI.
2. An example would be God’s judgment against Nineveh; it was changed when the people repented upon hearing Jonah’s preaching.
3. I.e., conformity consists in both man’s and God’s acting for the sake of God’s glory.

Chapter XXXIII
1. Here I am correcting Borgnet’s text to read “Fumus” in place of “Sumus”.
2. [I could not verify this citation.] Cf. I Kings (I Samuel) 16:7.
5. John 9:3

Chapter XXXIV
2. Psalms 84:11 (85:10).
3. See, above, Chap. 33, second paragraph of the translation.
4. Psalms 102:3 (103:3).