COMPLETE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL TREATISES of ANSELM OF CANTERBURY

Translated by JASPER HOPKINS and HERBERT RICHARDSON

The Arthur J. Banning Press
Minneapolis
In the notes to the translations the numbering of the Psalms accords with the Douay version and, in parentheses, with the King James (Authorized) version. A reference such as “S II, 264:18” indicates “F. S. Schmitt’s edition of the Latin texts, Vol. II, p. 264, line 18.”
DE GRAMMATICO


Student. Concerning (an) expert-in-grammar I ask that you make me certain whether it is a substance or a quality, so that once I know this I will know what I ought to think about other things which in a similar way are spoken of paronymously.

Teacher. First tell me why you are in doubt.

S. Because, apparently, both alternatives—viz., that it is and is not [the one or the other]—can be proved by compelling reasons.

T. Prove them, then.

S. Do not be quick to contradict what I am going to say; but allow me to bring my speech to its conclusion, and then either approve it or improve it.

T. As you wish.

S. The premises

(i) Every/Everything expert-in-grammar is a man,
(ii) Every man is a substance,

suffice to prove that (an) expert-in-grammar is a substance. For whatever (an) expert-in-grammar possesses that results in substantiality is possessed only by virtue of the fact that (an) expert-in-grammar is a man. Therefore, once it is conceded that (an) expert-in-grammar is a man, then whatever is a consequence of being a man is a consequence of being (an) expert-in-grammar. On the other hand, the philosophers who have dealt with this topic maintain clearly that expert-in-grammar is a quality. And it is impudent to reject their authority on these matters.

Furthermore, it is necessary that (an) expert-in-grammar be either a substance or a quality. Thus, whichever one of these it is, it is not the other; and whichever one it is not, it has to be the other. Accordingly, whatever suffices to prove the one alternative disproves the other; and whatever counts against the one counts

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1 The Latin word “grammaticus” is usually rendered throughout as “(an) expert-in-grammar,” so that it may function either as an adjective or as a noun, depending upon whether the article “an” is included or ignored. “Grammatica” is translated as “expertise-in-grammar.”

2 Composed at Bec, during the interval 1080-1085, or perhaps even earlier.
for the other. Therefore, since one of these disjuncts is true and the other false, I ask that by detecting the falsity you show me the truth.

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T. The arguments which you have invoked in support of both disjuncts are compelling—except for your saying that if the one disjunct is true, then the other cannot be true. Hence, you ought not to require me to show that the one disjunct is false (something which no one can do), but to require me to disclose (if I can) how these alternatives are not inconsistent with each other.

But first I would like to hear from you what objections you think can be raised against these arguments of yours.

S. I was eagerly waiting to hear from you the very thing which you are now demanding of me. But since you maintain that these arguments are irreproachable, it is up to me, who am in doubt, to disclose what troubles me, and it is up to you to show the tenability of each disjunct and the compatibility of both.

T. Tell me, then, what you think; and I shall try to do what you are requesting.

S. The proposition which says that (an) expert-in-grammar is a man can, it seems to me, be contested in the following way:

(i) Nothing expert-in-grammar can be conceived without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar.
(ii) Any man can be conceived without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar.

Moreover,

(iii) Every expert-in-grammar admits of more and less.
(iv) No man admits of more and less.

From each of these sets of two premises one and the same conclusion follows: viz., that

(v) Nothing expert-in-grammar is a man.

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T. This conclusion does not follow.

S. Why not?

T. Well, do you think that the name “animal” signifies some-
thing other than living-substance-capable-of-perception?

S. Assuredly, an animal is nothing other than a living-substance-capable-of-perception, and a living-substance-capable-of-perception is nothing other than an animal.

T. This is true. But tell me, as well, whether whatever is nothing other than a living-substance-capable-of-perception can be conceived without conceiving of rationality, and whether it need not be rational.

S. I cannot deny it.

T. Therefore, any animal can be conceived without conceiving of rationality, and no animal is necessarily rational.

S. I cannot say that it does not follow from the premises I have conceded—although I especially dread what I suspect you are aiming at.

T. Now, no man can be conceived without conceiving of rationality; and it is necessary that every man be rational.

S. I am hemmed in on both sides. For if I agree, then you will conclude that no man is an animal; and if I disagree, then you will say that not only can I be conceived without conceiving of rationality but also that I really am without rationality.

T. Do not be alarmed. For there does not follow what you think [follows].

S. If [the outcome] is as you promise, then I willingly grant all that you have premised; but if [the outcome is] not [as you promise, then] I am unwilling [to grant your premises].

T. Well, then, formulate into two syllogisms the four last statements which I made.

S. Surely they can be arranged in the following order:

(i) Any animal can be conceived without conceiving of rationality.

(ii) No man can be conceived without conceiving of rationality.

Moreover,

(iii) No animal is necessarily rational.

(iv) Every man is, necessarily, rational.

From each of these arrangements of two propositions there is seen to follow:

(v) No man is an animal.

1See Daniel 13:22.
But nothing is more false than this conclusion. Yet, I do not see that the foregoing premises are in any respect untenable. For the two premises which have “man” as their subject-term are so self-evident that it would be impudent to prove them; and the two premises which have “animal” as their subject-term seem to be so well-established that it would be impudent to deny them. Now, I see that the structure of these two syllogisms is in every respect similar to the two syllogisms which I set forth, a little earlier. Therefore, I suspect that you have introduced them only for the following reason: viz., that when I would recognize their obviously false conclusion, I would recognize the same thing about the similar syllogisms which I had constructed.

T. This is true.

S. Therefore, show in what respect there is—both in the present case and in the preceding one—so much deception that although the premises are seen to be true and to be conjoined according to the rules for syllogisms, nevertheless truth does not support their conclusions.

T. Let me do this in the case of your syllogisms. And, if you like, you examine mine by yourself.

S. Let it be done in accordance with your judgment.

T. Iterate and construct, once more, the syllogisms which you made.

S. “Any man can be conceived without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar.”

T. What do you say that a man can be conceived as without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar?

S. [He can be conceived as] a man.

T. Therefore, in this premise, say what you mean.

S. Any man can be conceived as a man without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar.

T. I grant it. Add the minor premise.

S. “No/Nothing expert-in-grammar can be conceived without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar.”

T. What is (an) expert-in-grammar unable to be conceived as without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar?

T. Therefore, say what you mean.
S. No/Nothing expert-in-grammar can be conceived as (an) expert-in-grammar without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar.
T. Conjoin these two propositions—thus expanded, as you have just now presented them.
S. (i) Any man can be conceived as a man without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar.
(ii) No/Nothing expert-in-grammar can be conceived as (an) expert-in-grammar without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar.
T. See, then, whether they have a common term, without which they do not entail any conclusion.
S. I see that they do not have a common term and, hence, that no conclusion follows from them.
T. Construct the other syllogism.
S. It is no longer necessary for you to take pains to lay out this syllogism, because I already detect its fallacy. For I was constructing its propositions to mean:
(iii) No man is more or less a man.
(iv) Every/Everything expert-in-grammar is more or less (an) expert-in-grammar.
And since these two propositions have no common term, they entail no conclusion.
T. Does it seem to you, then, that in the case of these conjoined premises of yours no conclusion at all can be inferred?
S. I certainly thought so. But your question makes me suspect that perhaps some logical power lies hidden in them. Yet, without a common term how can they entail any conclusion?
T. The common term of a syllogism must be common not so much in verbal form as in meaning. For just as no conclusion follows if it is common in verbal form but not in meaning, so no harm is done if it is common in meaning but not in verbal form. Indeed, the meaning—rather than the words—determines a syllogism.

S. I await your drawing an inference from my premises.
T. Assuredly, they entail something, but not what you expect.
S. Whatever it is, I accept it gratefully.
T. Does not someone who says
   
   (i) Any man can be conceived as a man without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar,
   and (ii) No/Nothing expert-in-grammar can be conceived as (an) expert-in-grammar without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar,

signify the fact that?:

   (iii) Being (a) man does not require expertise-in-grammar,
   and (iv) Being (an) expert-in-grammar does require expertise-in-grammar.

S. Nothing is more true.
T. Do these two propositions—which I have just now said to be signified in those other two propositions—have a common term?
S. They do.
T. Therefore, it follows that

   (v) Being (an) expert-in-grammar is not identical with being (a) man. (That is, there is not the same definition of each.)

S. Assuredly, I see that this follows and is the case.
T. Nevertheless, it does not hereby follow that (an) expert-in-grammar is not a man—in the sense in which you were construing [this proposition]. However, if you construe “(An) expert-in-grammar is not (a) man” to mean

   (vi) (An) expert-in-grammar is not the same thing as (a) man (i.e., they do not have the same definition),

then this conclusion is true.

S. I understand what you mean.
T. Well, then, if you correctly understand what I have said, tell me how you would refute the following syllogism if someone constructed it like this:

   (i) Every/Everything expert-in-grammar is spoken of as a quality.
   (ii) No man is spoken of as a quality.
So: (iii) No man is (an) expert-in-grammar.
S. This seems to me to be like saying:

   (iv) Everything rational is spoken of as a quality.
   (v) No man is spoken of as a quality.
So: (vi) No man is rational.
But no proof can make it true that “rational” is not predicable of any man. Similarly, the syllogism which you have just now set forth does not conclude with logical necessity that “expert-in-grammar” is not predicable of any man. For if we understand them in accordance with their truth, the premises of your syllogism signify as if the following were being said:

(vii) Every/everything expert-in-grammar is spoken of as (an) expert-in-grammar, in terms of a quality.
(viii) No man is spoken of as a man, in terms of a quality.

But from these two premises it does not at all follow that

(ix) “Expert-in-grammar” is not predicable of any man,
because [in them] the term affirmed of expert-in-grammar and denied of man is not the same. However, there would be a common term in these premises, and they would necessitate a conclusion, if, given the major premise as it has been stated, the following minor premise were true:

(x) No man is spoken of as (an) expert-in-grammar, in terms of a quality,
or else if, given the minor premise, the following major premise were true:

(xi) Every/everything expert-in-grammar is spoken of as a man, in terms of a quality.

For from each of these conjunctions there follows that

(xii) “Expert-in-grammar” is not predicable of any man.

However, suppose someone wants to construe the proposition

(xiii) (A) man is not (an) expert-in-grammar

to mean

(xiv) (A) man is not the same thing as (an) expert-in-grammar,
(as if I were to say “Lightning is a brilliant-flash” or “Lightning is not a brilliant-flash”—i.e., that lightning is (or that it is not) the very same thing as a brilliant-flash). If someone thus construes

(xv) (A) man is not (an) expert-in-grammar,
then in accordance with this construal it follows from those premises—if their meaning is rightly examined—that

(xvi) No man is (an) expert-in-grammar.
For, indeed, the meaning of those propositions does have a common term which serves to prove that

(xvii) Being (a) man is not identical with being (an) expert-in-grammar.

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T. You have correctly understood what I have said. But perhaps you have not paid careful attention to what I have said.

S. In what way have I correctly understood it and yet not paid it careful attention?

T. Tell me what would follow if someone were to set forth the following premises:

(i) No man can be conceived without conceiving of rationality.
(ii) Any stone can be conceived without conceiving of rationality.

S. What would follow except?:

(iii) No stone is a man.

T. How do you construe this conclusion? [Do you take it to mean] that

(iv) A stone is in no respect a man

or [to mean] that

(v) (A) stone is not the same thing as (a) man [i.e., that the two do not have the same definition].

S. [To mean] that a stone is in no respect a man.

T. Tell me, then, how this syllogism differs from that syllogism of yours in which you say:

(vii) A man can be [conceived without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar].

So: (viii) (An) expert-in-grammar is not a man.

S. As far as concerns the cogency of the reasoning, I see that your syllogism does not differ from mine. For just as in mine we must understand that

(ix) (An) expert-in-grammar cannot be conceived as (an) expert-in-grammar without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar,

and (x) A man can be conceived as a man without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar,
so in yours we must understand that

(xi) A man cannot be conceived as a man without conceiving of rationality,
and (xii) A stone can be conceived as a stone without conceiving of rationality.

And so—since the conclusion of your syllogism (viz., that a stone is in no respect a man) is certain—you seem to me earlier to have obscured by your clever explanations the conclusion of my syllogism (a syllogism which is in every respect similar to yours). Hence, I now understand why you said that I have correctly understood but have not paid careful attention. For I correctly understood what you meant when you spoke to me, but I did not pay careful attention to the point you were making, because I did not realize how [what you said] was misleading me.

T. On the contrary! Your analysis was incorrect in that you did not realize how [what I said] was leading you.

S. In what way [was that]?

T. Surely, if the syllogism which I have just set forth were interpreted (as I interpreted yours) in such way as to say

(xiii) No man can be conceived as a man without conceiving of rationality,
but (xiv) Any stone can be conceived as a stone without conceiving of rationality,

it would have no other deductive power than I said that yours has. But since my syllogism can be construed in another way—a way in which yours cannot be construed—it has the conclusion

(xv) A stone can in no respect be a man.

For when I say that

(xvi) No man can be conceived without conceiving of rationality,
and (xvii) Any stone can be conceived without conceiving of rationality,

these propositions can—indeed, they ought to—be interpreted as if to say:

(xviii) No man can in any respect be conceived without conceiving of rationality.
(xix) Any stone can, in whatever respect, be conceived without conceiving of rationality.

And from these there follows that

(xx) No stone is in any respect a man.
But in your premises the truth does not at all allow for a similar construal. For, indeed, we cannot say either that

(xxii) No/Nothing expert-in-grammar can in any respect be conceived without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar,

or that

(xxii) Any man can, in whatever respect, be conceived without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar.

For, on the one hand, every man who is (an) expert-in-grammar can be conceived as a man without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar. And, on the other hand, no man can be conceived as (an) expert-in-grammar without conceiving of expertise-in-grammar. Therefore, your premises cannot entail that

(xxiii) (An) expert-in-grammar is in no respect a man.

S. I do not have anything to say against this verdict of yours. But since you have tacitly admonished me not to be content merely to understand what you mean but to pay attention to the point you are making, I think we must pay attention to the conclusion which you showed to be derivable from my syllogism: viz., that

(i) Being (an) expert-in-grammar is not identical with being a man.

For if this conclusion is true, then it is not necessarily the case that what is (an) expert-in-grammar is thereby a man. Now,

(ii) If man follows from expert-in-grammar, then being a man follows from being (an) expert-in-grammar.

But,

(iii) Being a man does not follow from being (an) expert-in-grammar.

Therefore,

(iv) Man does not follow from expert-in-grammar.

Therefore,

(v) It is not the case that every/everything expert-in-grammar is a man.

But since for every/everything expert-in-grammar there is one and the same reason why they are all men: assuredly,

(vi) Either every/everything expert-in-grammar is a man or else no/nothing [expert-in-grammar is a man].
Now, it has been shown that

(vii) Not every/everything [expert-in-grammar is a man].

Therefore,

(viii) No/Nothing [expert-in-grammar is a man].

Thus, it seems that you have conceded—by obtaining it more skillfully—the very conclusion which you have skillfully eliminated from my syllogism.

T. Although I tacitly admonished you to pay attention to what you hear, nevertheless I did not, it appears, do so in vain. For although you prove sophistically that no/nothing expert-in-grammar is a man—doing so by means of the consideration that being (an) expert-in-grammar is not identical with being a man—nevertheless this proof will be profitable to you when you will behold exposed in its fallaciousness the sophism which is deceiving you under the guise of correct reasoning.

S. Show, then, that this proof which I have just constructed concerning expert-in-grammar is misleading me; and show at what point it is misleading me.

T. Let’s go back to the case of animal and man. In the case of these we so “feel” (so to speak) the truth that no sophism can persuade us—even though it enjoins us—to believe a falsity. Tell me, then, whether the [fact of] being such-and-such a thing is captured by that thing’s definition.

S. This is true.

T. Is the definition of “man” identical with the definition of animal?  

S. By no means. For if “rational, mortal animal” (which is the definition of “man”) were the definition of “animal,” then whatever “animal” applied to, “rational and mortal” would apply to—something which is false.

T. Therefore, it is not the case that being a man is identical with being an animal.

S. This follows.

T. Therefore, from this proposition you can prove that no man is an animal—doing so by means of the same argument by which you have just proved that no/nothing expert-in-grammar is a man. Hence, if you see to be obvious falsity that which your line of reasoning entails in this case, do not believe to be assured truth that
which deludes you in that other case.

S. You have now showed that my reasoning misleads me. Show, as well, at what point it misleads me.

T. Do you not remember what I said and you agreed to a short while ago, viz., that “being (an) expert-in-grammar is not identical with being a man” amounts to saying “the definition of ‘expert-in-grammar’ is not identical with the definition of ‘man’” (i.e., it is not the case that (an) expert-in-grammar and a man are in every respect the same)? For just as “man” ought not to be defined in terms of expertise-in-grammar, so “expert-in-grammar” cannot be defined except in terms of expertise-in-grammar. Therefore, your argument ought to be construed in the following way:

If (ix) Being (an) expert-in-grammar is not identical with being a man in an unqualified sense of “being a man,”
then (x) If anything is (an) expert-in-grammar, there does not thereby follow that it is a man in an unqualified sense of “being a man.”

Similarly, we must understand that man, in an unqualified sense of “man,” does not follow from expert-in-grammar. That is, if something is (an) expert-in-grammar, there does not follow that it is a man in an unqualified sense of “man.” Thus, no other conclusion follows except that

(xi) No/Nothing expert-in-grammar is a man in an unqualified sense of “man.”

S. Nothing is more clear.

T. Now, if it were proved (as I think can easily be done) that being (an) expert-in-grammar is not identical with being a man (just as being white is not identical with being a man; for a man can exist without the color white, and the color white can exist without the man), then it would truly follow that some/something expert-in-grammar is able to be not-a-man.

S. Why, then, are we going to all this trouble, if this conclusion can be proven? Prove it, and let our inquiry be finished.

T. You ought not to demand this of me here. For in our inquiry we are not discussing whether some/something expert-in-grammar is able to be not-a-man; rather, we are discussing whether some/something expert-in-grammar is not-a-man. But you see that
it cannot be proven [that some/something expert-in-grammar is not-a-man].

S. I do not yet see [the truth of this point], because I still have an objection to raise against it.

T. State it.

S. Aristotle declared that

(i) Expert-in-grammar belongs to the class of items which are present in a subject,

and (ii) No man is present in a subject.

Therefore,

(iii) No/Nothing expert-in-grammar is a man.

T. Aristotle did not intend for this conclusion to be drawn from his statements. For Aristotle himself says that a man and man and animal are expert [s]-in-grammar.

S. How, then, is this syllogism refuted?

T. Answer the following question for me. When you speak to me of (an) expert-in-grammar, of what shall I understand you to be speaking?: of this name or of the things which this name signifies?

S. Of the things.

T. What things, then, does it signify?

S. Man and expertise-in-grammar.

T. Therefore, upon hearing “expert-in-grammar,” I shall construe it [to signify] (a) man or expertise-in-grammar; and when I speak of (an) expert-in-grammar, I shall be speaking of (a) man or of expertise-in-grammar.

S. This is the way it ought to be.

T. Tell me, then: Is (a) man a substance, or is (a) man present in a subject?

S. (A) man is not present in a subject but is a substance.

T. Is expertise-in-grammar a quality, and is it present in a subject?

S. It is both of these.

T. Therefore, it is not strange for someone to say that with respect to being a man (an) expert-in-grammar is a substance and is not present in a subject, but with respect to expertise-in-grammar expert-in-grammar is a quality and is present in a subject.
S. I cannot deny it. But let me state one more argument for why expert-in-grammar is not a substance: viz., because

(i) Every substance is either primary or secondary substance,
but (ii) Expert-in-grammar is neither primary nor secondary substance.

T. Remember the statement of Aristotle which I cited a moment ago, in which he says (an) expert-in-grammar is both primary and secondary substance, in that he says a man and man and animal are called expert[s] -in-grammar. But, nevertheless, how do you prove that (an) expert-in-grammar is neither a primary nor a secondary substance?

S. Well, because it is present in a subject, whereas no substance is [present in a subject]. Moreover, it is predicated of more than one thing—a fact which is not true of primary substance. And, on the other hand, it is not genus or species, and is not predicated as something essential—both of which features are true of secondary substance.

T. If you correctly remember what we have already said, [you will realize that] none of these [reasons] prevents (an) expert-in-grammar from being a substance. For in a certain respect (an) expert-in-grammar is not present in a subject, and is genus and species, and is predicated as something essential. For (an) expert-in-grammar is man (Man is species) and is animal (Animal is genus); and “man” and “animal” are predicated as something essential. Furthermore, (an) expert-in-grammar is an individual, even as it is man and animal; for even as a man and an animal [are individuals], so an expert-in-grammar is an individual. For instance, Socrates is an animal and a man and an expert-in-grammar.

S. I cannot deny what you say.

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T. If you do not have any other premises from which you can prove that (an) expert-in-grammar is not a man, then prove now that (an) expert-in-grammar is not expertise-in-grammar.

S. I can do this more easily by pointing than by arguing. For, indeed, you crushed all my arguments when you disclosed that different things are signified by “expert-in-grammar” and that we
ought to understand and to speak about (an) expert-in-grammar in accordance with these things. And although I cannot deny this, nevertheless it does not satisfy my mind in such way that my mind rests tranquil, as if what it was seeking had been found. For you seem to me as if you did not care about teaching me, but to care only about impeding my arguments. But just as it was up to me to state what forces me to doubt both alternatives, so it was up to you either to eliminate one alternative or to show how the two alternatives are not inconsistent with each other.

T. It has been shown that the statement “(An) expert-in-grammar is a substance” and the statement “Expert-in-grammar is a quality” are not at all inconsistent with each other, inasmuch as we must understand and speak about (an) expert-in-grammar at times with respect to being a man, at times with respect to expertise-in-grammar. Why do you think that this proof is unsatisfactory?

S. Because anyone who understands the name “expert-in-grammar” knows that “expert-in-grammar” signifies man and expertise-in-grammar. And yet, if with this assurance I were to speak in public and to say

(i) (A) useful expertise is expert-in-grammar,

or

(ii) This man has expert-in-grammar,

then not only would the experts-in-grammar be furious but even the unlearned would jeer. Therefore, I shall not at all believe that the expositors of dialectic did not have some other reason for having so often and so studiously written in their books what they themselves would have been ashamed to say in their conversations. For, indeed, very often when they want to exhibit a quality or an accident, they add the comment: “For example, expert-in-grammar and the like,” although the customary usage of all speakers attests that (an) expert-in-grammar is a substance rather than a quality or an accident. On the other hand, when [these expositors of dialectic] want to teach something about substance, they nowhere say: “For example, expert-in-grammar or the like.” Add to this point the following one: if (an) expert-in-grammar is to be called both a substance and a quality simply because [its name] signifies both man and expertise-in-grammar, then why is not man likewise
both a substance and a quality? For, in fact, “man” signifies a substance together with all the differentiae which are in (a) man—for example, mortality and capability-of-perception. But in none of the places where something has been written about some quality or other has the phrase “as is (a) man” been offered by way of example.

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T. As for your repudiating—simply because it does not apply in the case of the name “man”—the explanation I gave of why expert-in-grammar is indeed both a substance and a quality: you do so, it seems to me, because you do not consider how dissimilarly the name “man” signifies the things of which a man consists and the name “expert-in-grammar” signifies man and expertise-in-grammar. Assuredly, of and by itself the name “man” signifies as a single thing those things of which the whole of (a) man consists. Among these things substance holds the principal place, since it is the cause of the others and since it possesses them (not as itself needing them but) as things needing itself. (For there is no differentia of a substance without which this substance could not exist; yet none of its differentiae can exist without it.) Therefore, although all the things at once, and as a single whole, and in a single signification, and with a single name, are called man, nevertheless the name “man” so principally signifies, and is appellative of, the substance that although it is correct to say

(i) (The) substance is a man, and (the) man is a substance,

nevertheless no one would say

(ii) (The) rationality is a man,

or

(iii) (The) man is rationality.

Rather, [everyone would say]

(iv) (The) man is someone who has rationality.

However, it is not the case that the name “expert-in-grammar” signifies as a single thing man and expertise-in-grammar; rather, of and by itself it signifies expertise-in-grammar, and on the basis of something else it signifies man. Moreover, although the name “ex-
pert-in-grammar” is appellative of (a) man, nevertheless it is not proper to say that it signifies man; and although “expert-in-grammar” signifies expertise-in-grammar, nevertheless it is not appellative of expertise-in-grammar. Now, I term the name of any given thing appellative of it if this thing is called by this name in the customary course of speaking. For example, it does not accord with the customary way of speaking to say “Expertise-in-grammar is (an) expert-in-grammar” or “(An) expert-in-grammar is expertise-in-grammar.” But [it does accord with the customary way of speaking to say] “A man is (an) expert-in-grammar” and “An expert-in-grammar is a man.”

S. I do not see why you say that of and by itself “expert-in-grammar” signifies expertise-in-grammar and that on the basis of something else it signifies man. [And I do not see] in what sense “expert-in-grammar” signifies only expertise-in-grammar. For just as (a) man consists of animal and rationality and mortality, and thus “man” signifies these three things, so (an) expert-in-grammar consists of man and expertise-in-grammar, and thus the name “expert-in-grammar” signifies both of these. For in the absence of expertise-in-grammar a man is never called (an) expert-in-grammar; and in the absence of a man expertise-in-grammar is never called (an) expert-in-grammar.

T. Well, then, if the facts of the matter are as you claim, being (an) expert-in-grammar and the definition of “expert-in-grammar” would be: man who has expertise-in-grammar.

S. They cannot be anything else.

T. Therefore, since expertise-in-grammar would distinguish (a) man who is (an) expert-in-grammar from (a) man who is not (an) expert-in-grammar, expertise-in-grammar would conduce to the existence of (an) expert-in-grammar, and would be a part of its being, and could not be first present in and then absent from (an) expert-in-grammar without resulting in the destruction of this very subject.

S. What follows from this?

T. Therefore, expertise-in-grammar would not be an accident but would be a substantial differentia; and man would be the
genus, and expert-in-grammar would be the species. And there would be a similar argument concerning the color white and other accidents of this kind. But an exposition of the complete art [of dialectic] would show this outcome to be false.

S. Although I cannot deny what you say, nevertheless I am not yet convinced that “expert-in-grammar” does not signify man.

T. Let us suppose there is some rational animal—other than man—which has expertise-in-grammar, even as does a man.

S. It is easy to suppose this.

T. Therefore, there is something which is not a man but which has expertise-in-grammar.

S. This follows.

T. But anything that has expertise-in-grammar is (an) expert-in-grammar.

S. I grant it.

T. Therefore, there is something which is not a man but is (an) expert-in-grammar.

S. It follows.

T. Now, you say that “expert-in-grammar” signifies man.

S. I do.

T. Therefore, something which is not a man is a man—a conclusion which is false.

S. [I agree that] the argument is brought to this conclusion.

T. Therefore, do you not see that the only reason “expert-in-grammar” seems to signify man more than does “white” is that expertise-in-grammar is an accident only of man, whereas whiteness is not an accident only of man?

S. This follows from what we have supposed. But I want you to prove this without a supposition which is contrary to fact.

T. If man were signified by “expert-in-grammar,” then “man” would not be predicated of anything at the same time as “expert-in-grammar”—just as because animal is signified by “man,” “animal” is not predicated [of anything] at the same time as “man.” For example, it is not appropriate to say that

(i) Socrates is a man who is an animal.

S. This cannot be contradicted.

T. But it is appropriate to say that

(ii) Socrates is a man who is (an) expert-in-grammar.
S. [Yes, it is] appropriately [said].

T. Therefore, it is not the case that “expert-in-grammar” signifies man.

S. I see that this follows.

T. Likewise, if (an) expert-in-grammar were (a) man-who-has-expertise-in-grammar, then wherever “expert-in-grammar” would be put, it would be appropriate to put “man who has expertise-in-grammar.”

S. This is true.

T. Therefore, if it is appropriate to say

(iii) Socrates is a man who is (an) expert-in-grammar,

then it would also be appropriate to say

(iv) Socrates is a man who is a man who has expertise-in-grammar.

S. It follows.

T. Now, every man who has expertise-in-grammar is a man who is (an) expert-in-grammar.

S. This is true.

T. Therefore, Socrates—who is a man who has expertise-in-grammar—is a man who is a man who has (an) expert-in-grammar. And since (an) expert-in-grammar is a man who has expertise-in-grammar, it follows that Socrates is a man who is a man who is a man who has expertise-in-grammar—and so on, to infinity.

S. I cannot resist this obvious inference.

T. Moreover, if we must take “expert-in-grammar” to signify both man and expertise-in-grammar, then we must likewise take any other paronymous name of this kind to signify both that which is named paronymously and that from which the paronymous name is derived.

S. This is what I was thinking.

T. Therefore, “today’s” would signify both today and that which is called today's.

S. What follows next?

T. Thus, “today’s” would signify something along with signifying a time.

S. This would have to be the case.

T. Therefore, “today’s” would be a verb and not a name; for it would be a [simple] utterance—and not a phrase—signifying
something along with signifying a time.

14

S. You have satisfactorily proven to me that “expert-in-grammar” does not signify man.

T. So you realize why I said that “expert-in-grammar” does not signify man?

S. I do, and I am waiting for you to show that “expert-in-grammar” signifies expertise-in-grammar.

T. Did you not say a moment ago that “expert-in-grammar” signifies man-who-has-expertise-in-grammar?

S. Yes, and I believed it.

T. But now it has been satisfactorily proven that “expert-in-grammar” does not signify man.

S. Yes, satisfactorily.

T. What, then, remains?

S. That “expert-in-grammar” does not signify anything other than having-expertise-in-grammar.

T. So it signifies expertise-in-grammar?

S. It has been satisfactorily proven that “expert-in-grammar” is appellative of man but not of expertise-in-grammar, and signifies expertise-in-grammar but not man. But since you have said that of and by itself “expert-in-grammar” signifies expertise-in-grammar and that on the basis of something else it signifies man, I ask you to distinguish clearly for me these two significations, so that I may understand in what sense “expert-in-grammar” does not signify that which in some sense it does signify, and [may understand] in what sense it is appellative of that which it does not signify.

T. Suppose that without your knowing about it a white horse has been shut up in a building. And suppose someone says to you: “In this building there is whiteness” (or “In this building there is white”). Would you thereby know that a horse is in that building?

S. No. For whether he said “white” or “whiteness” or “that in which there is whiteness” I would not conceive of the being of any definite thing except of this color.

T. Even if you did conceive of something other than this color, it is certain that you would not—on the basis of the name “white”—conceive of the being of the thing in which this color is present.
S. This is certain. For even if [the thought of] a material object or [of] a surface came to mind (something which happens only because I have experience of the fact that whiteness is usually present in these things), still the name “white” would not itself signify any of these things (even as has been proven about “expert-in-grammar”). However, I am still waiting for you to show that it does signify [such things].

T. What if you saw a white horse and a black ox standing beside each other, and someone said to you with regard to the horse, “Poke it,” but did not indicate by a gesture which one he was speaking of. Would you know that he was speaking of the horse?

S. No.

T. But if in reply to you—who do not know, and who have asked “Which one?”—he were to say “The white one,” would you discern which one he was talking about?

S. On the basis of the name “white” I would understand that the horse was meant.

T. Therefore, the name “white” would signify to you the horse.

S. Yes, it certainly would.

T. Do you not see that [the name “white” would signify the horse] in a way other than does the name “horse”?

S. I see it. Surely, even before I would know that the horse is white, the name “horse”—of and by itself, and not on the basis of anything else—would signify to me the substance of the horse. But the name “white” would not of and by itself signify [to me] the substance of the horse, but would signify it on the basis of something else, viz., on the basis of the fact that I know the horse to be white. For since the name “white” would signify nothing other than does the phrase “having whiteness”: just as by itself this phrase would signify to me whiteness but not the thing which has whiteness, so also the name “white” [would by itself signify to me whiteness but not the thing which has whiteness]. But I would know that whiteness is in the horse, and [I would know] this on some basis other than on the basis of the name “white” (viz., [I would know it] on the basis of sight). Therefore, having understood on the basis of the name “white” that whiteness is meant, I would—on the basis of the fact that I know the whiteness to be in the horse—understand that the horse was meant. That is, on some basis other than on the basis of the name “white,” which is, however, appellative
of the horse, [I would understand that the horse was meant].

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T. Do you see, then, in what sense “white” does not signify that which in some sense it does signify? [And do you see] in what sense it is appellative of that which it does not signify?

S. Yes, I also see these points. For “white” does and does not signify the horse, since of and by itself it does not signify the horse, but on the basis of something else it does signify the horse. And, nevertheless, “white” is an appellative of the horse. And what I see to be the case with the word “white” I recognize to be the case with “expert-in-grammar” and with other paronyms of this kind. Therefore, I think that the signification of names and verbs can be divided in such way that there is (1) signification of and by itself, and there is (2) signification on the basis of something else.

T. Consider also that of these two significations the one which exists of and by itself belongs to significant utterances substantially; but the other signification belongs to them accidentally. For example, when in the definition of “name” or of “verb” it is said that a name or a verb is a significant utterance, we must interpret “significant” to mean only the signification which exists of and by itself. For if that signification which exists on the basis of something else had to be included in the definition of a name or of a verb, then “today's” would no longer be a name but would be a verb. For in terms of this [accidental] signification “today's” would upon occasion signify something together with signifying a time (as I said earlier). And this is the characteristic of a verb rather than of a name.

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S. What you say is clear. But it is not without qualms that my mind accepts the view (1) that expert-in-grammar is a quality (even though it does signify expertise-in-grammar) or (2) that (a) man by himself—i.e., apart from expertise-in-grammar—is (an) expert-in-grammar (even though we have proven that (a) man and expertise-in-grammar are not together (an) expert-in-grammar—from which proof it follows that (a) man by himself is (an) expert-in-grammar, since he cannot be (an) expert-in-grammar except either by himself or together with expertise-in-grammar). For although the name
"expert-in-grammar" signifies expertise-in-grammar, nevertheless to one who asks what (an) expert-in-grammar is it would not be appropriate to answer: "expertise-in-grammar" or "quality." And if no one/thing is (an) expert-in-grammar except by participating in expertise-in-grammar, then it follows that (a) man is not (an) expert-in-grammar except together with expertise-in-grammar.

T. As for the claim that (a) man by himself—i.e., apart from expertise-in-grammar—is (an) expert-in-grammar: this claim can be construed in two ways, in one of which it is true and in the other of which it is false. And this distinction suffices to clear up your perplexity. By himself and apart from expertise-in-grammar (a) man is, in fact, (an) expert-in-grammar, because he is the only one who has expertise-in-grammar. For, indeed, expertise-in-grammar does not—either by itself or together with (a) man—have expertise-in-grammar. On the other hand, by himself—i.e., in the absence of expertise-in-grammar—(a) man is not (an) expert-in-grammar, because in the absence of expertise-in-grammar no one/thing can be (an) expert-in-grammar. The case is comparable to someone's leading another by going before him. By himself the leader is ahead; for the one who is behind is not ahead—either by himself or in such way that the two of them together constitute a single leader who is ahead. On the other hand, it is not the case that by himself the leader is ahead, because if there is not one who is behind there cannot be one who is ahead.

Now, when it is said that expert-in-grammar is a quality, this is correctly said only in the sense which accords with Aristotle's treatise On the Categories.

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S. Does that treatise contain anything other than?:

(i) Everything which exists is either a substance or a quantity or a quality, (etc.).

So if (a) man by himself is (an) expert-in-grammar, (a) substance by itself is (an) expert-in-grammar. In what sense, then, according to that treatise, is (an) expert-in-grammar a quality rather than a substance?

T. Although what you have just said is a correct interpretation of that text (because everything which exists is some one of these things), nevertheless it was not Aristotle's primary aim to show this
fact in his book; instead [his aim was to show] that every name and verb signifies some of these things. For he did not intend to show what each thing, individually, is or to show of what things each word, individually, is appellative; instead [he intended to show] of what things [each word, individually,] is significative. But since words signify only things: in saying what it is that words signify, he had to say what it is that things are. To mention only one [evidence of Aristotle's intention]: the classification which he makes at the beginning of his treatise On the Categories amply bears out what I am saying. For he does not say

(ii) Each of those things which exist is either a substance or a quantity, (etc.).

Nor does he say

(iii) Each of those things which are spoken of in accordance with no complexity is called either a substance or a quantity, ([etc.]).

Rather, he says

(iv) Each of those things which are spoken of in accordance with no complexity is spoken of by a word which signifies either a substance or a quantity, ([etc.]).

S. This argument convinces me of the point you are making.

T. Therefore, when Aristotle says “Each of those things which are spoken of in accordance with no complexity is spoken of by a word which signifies either a substance or a quantity,” (and so forth), which signification does he seem to you to be speaking about?: about the signification by which these words signify of and by themselves (and which belongs substantially to these words) or about the other signification, which exists on the basis of something else (and which belongs to these words accidentally)?

S. Only about that signification by which these words signify of and by themselves—which signification he himself (in defining “name” and “verb”) affirmed to be present in these words.

T. Do you think that in his treatise he proceeded otherwise than

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1Words such as “horse,” “man,” “Socrates,” “walks,” “runs” stand alone and signify or name through themselves. They may, however, be combined so as to make a phrase, a clause, or a sentence: “Socrates walks,” “A man runs,” etc. If something is spoken of “in accordance with no complexity,” it is spoken of by a single word rather than by a phrase, clause, or sentence. See Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis, Book I (PL 64:168D-169A and 181B). A complexum is a group of words joined together so as to constitute a phrase, etc.
he proposed to in his classification? Or [do you think] that any of those who succeeded him and who wrote about dialectic wanted to entertain a different view on this matter than he held?

S. Their writings do not at all allow anyone to think this, because nowhere is any one of these writers found to have set forth some word in order to show something which it signifies on the basis of something else; rather they always [do so] in order to [show] that which it signifies of and by itself. For no one who wants to indicate a substance sets forth the word “white” or “expert-in-grammar”; rather, one who teaches about a quality sets forth the words “white,” “expert-in-grammar,” and other words of this kind.

T. Therefore, if having proposed the aforementioned classification I were to ask you “What is expert-in-grammar according to this classification and according to those who adhere to it in writing about dialectic?” then about what would I be asking, or about what would you be answering me?

S. Surely, one can here be asking only about either the word or the thing which the word signifies. Therefore, because it is evident that in accordance with this classification “expert-in-grammar” signifies expertise-in-grammar and not man: if you were asking about the word “expert-in-grammar,” I would unhesitatingly answer that it is a word which signifies a quality; but if you were asking about the thing, [I would answer] that the thing is a quality.

T. You are aware, are you not, that in his book Aristotle himself calls words by the name of the things they signify and not by the name of the things of which they are merely appellatives? For example, he says that

(i) Every substance seems to signify something particular.

That is,

(ii) Every word which signifies a substance [seems to signify something particular].

Likewise, he names—or rather “shows” (as you put it a moment ago)—things by the words which merely signify them but which in many cases are not appellative of them.

S. I cannot fail to be aware of this. Therefore, whether one asks
about the word or about the thing: when one asks “What is (an) expert-in-grammar according to Aristotle's treatise and according to Aristotle's successors?” the correct answer is: “A quality.” And yet with respect to appellation, (an) expert-in-grammar is really a substance.

T. This is true. For if even the experts-in-grammar say one thing in accordance with the form of words and another thing in accordance with the nature of things, then it ought not to disquiet us that the dialecticians write in one way about words with respect to the fact that they signify, and in conversation use them in another way with respect to the fact that they are appellatives. For, in fact, the experts-in-grammar say that “lapis” is masculine in gender, “petra” feminine, but “mancipium” neuter; and that “timere” is active, but “timeri” passive. And yet no one says that a stone [lapis] is masculine or a rock [petra] feminine, or that a servant (mancipium) is neither masculine nor feminine, or that to fear (timere) is to do something, whereas to be afraid (timeri) is to undergo something.

S. Your clear explanation does not allow me to doubt any of the things you have said. But regarding the topic at hand there is still something that I want to learn. If expert-in-grammar is a quality because it signifies a quality, then I do not see why it is not the case that armed is a substance because it signifies a substance. And if the reason armed is a having is that it signifies a having, then I do not know why it is not the case that expert-in-grammar is a having because it signifies a having. For [the following comparison holds] in every respect: Just as “expert-in-grammar” is proved to signify a quality because it signifies the having of a quality, so “armed” signifies a substance because it signifies the having of a substance, viz., the having of weapons. And just as “armed” is proven to signify a having because it signifies the having of weapons, so “expert-in-grammar” signifies a having because it signifies the having of learning.

T. Given this reasoning, I cannot at all deny either that armed is a substance or that expert-in-grammar is a having.

S. Well, then, I would like to learn from you whether a single thing can belong to different categories.
I do not think that one and the same thing can be fitted under different categories, even though in some cases my verdict can be doubted. This issue, it seems to me, needs fuller and deeper examination than we have undertaken in our present short discussion. However, I do not see what prevents a single utterance which signifies more than one thing (but without signifying them as a single thing) from being placed, at times, under more than one category—as, for example, if *white* is said to be both a quality and a having. For it is not the case that as “man” signifies as one thing both the substance and the qualities of which a man consists, so “white” signifies as a single thing both a quality and a having. For the thing of which “man” is appellative is some one thing which consists of the things I have mentioned. But the thing of which “white” is appellative is not some one thing which consists of a having and a quality. For “white” is appellative only of a thing which has whiteness; and this thing does not at all consist of a having and a quality. Therefore, if it were said that

(i) Man is a substance and man is a quality,

then one and the same thing—which is signified by the name “man,” and of which the name “man” is appellative—would be stated to be both a substance and a quality. But this statement seems inconsistent. However, when we say that white is both a quality and a having, we are not stating that the thing of which “white” is appellative is both a quality and a having but are stating that these two things [viz., a quality and a having] are signified by the name “white.” And from this statement nothing inconsistent results.

S. But why is it not the case that in accordance with Aristotle's classification man is both a substance and a quality because it signifies both a substance and a quality—just as *white* is both a quality and a having because it signifies both a quality and a having?

T. One who asks this question can, I think, be satisfactorily answered by what I said earlier: viz., that “man” principally signifies a substance and that the one thing which “man” principally signifies is a substance; i.e., this thing is not a quality but is something qualified. By contrast, “white” does not principally signify anything, but instead equally signifies both a quality and a having; and it is not the case that from these [viz., from this quality and this having] there results a single thing which would be more
a quality [than a having] or more a having [than a quality]—which predominant thing “white” would signify [the more].

S. I would like to have explained to me more clearly why it is not the case that a single thing results from the [two] things which “white” signifies.

T. If something consisted of these [two] things, then either it would be a substance or else it would be something belonging to one of the other categories.

S. It could not be anything else.

T. But nothing belonging to any of the categories results from a having and a whiteness.

S. I cannot contradict this.

T. Likewise, a single thing is produced from more than one thing only [in one of the following ways]: (1) by means of a composition of parts which belong to the same category (as, for example, an animal consists of a body and a soul); or (2) by means of the harmonious union of a genus and one or more differentiae (as, for example, material object or man); or (3) by means of a species and a collection of distinguishing properties (as, for example, Plato). However, the [two] things which “white” signifies do not belong to a single category; nor is either one of them related to the other as its genus or its differentia or its species or its collection of individuating properties; nor is either one a differentia of a single genus. Rather, both are accidents of the same subject; but “white” does not signify this subject, because “white” does not at all signify anything other than a having and a quality. Therefore, a single thing does not result from those things which “white” signifies.

S. Although the argument seems to prove to me the point you are making, nevertheless I would like to hear what answer you would give if, to your claim that in no respect does “white” signify anything other than a having and a quality, someone raised the following objection:

(i) Since white is the same as having-whiteness, it does not determinately signify this or that thing (e.g., a material object) having whiteness, but indeterminately signifies something-having-whiteness.
(ii) For [in support of the conclusion of (i)] white is either what-has-whiteness or else what-does-not-have-whiteness.

Now, it is not the case that white is what-does-not-have-whiteness. Therefore, white is what-has-whiteness. Thus, since whatever has whiteness can only be something, it is necessary that white be something-which-has-whiteness, or something-having-whiteness. Finally, either “white” signifies something-having-whiteness or else it signifies nothing-having-whiteness. Now, “white” cannot signify nothing-having-whiteness.

(iii) Therefore, it is necessary that “white” signify something-having-whiteness.

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T. The point we are discussing is not whether whatever-is-white is something-[having-whiteness], or is what-has-[whiteness]. Instead, we are discussing whether the signification of the name “white” includes (as the signification of “man” includes animal) the expression “something,” or “what has”—with the consequence that just as a man is a rational mortal animal, so white is something-having-whiteness, or what-has-whiteness. For, indeed, it is necessary for any given thing to be a multiplicity of features which, nevertheless, are not signified by its name. For example, it is necessary for any animal to be colored and to be either rational or non-rational. Nevertheless, the name “animal” does not signify any of these. Therefore, although white is only something-having-whiteness, or what-has-whiteness, nevertheless it is not necessarily the case that “white” signifies this. For let us suppose that “white” or “whiteness” signifies something-having-whiteness. Now, something-having-whiteness is nothing other than something-white.

S. It cannot be anything else.

T. Therefore, “white” or “whiteness” would always signify something-white.

S. This is true.

T. Therefore, where “white” or “whiteness” would be put, it would always be right to substitute “something white.”

S. This follows.

T. Therefore, where “something white” would be said, it would also be correct to say redundantly: “Something something white.” And where this would be said redundantly, it would be correct to
say it a third time, and so on to infinity.

S. This follows and is absurd.

T. Let it also be the case that white is the same as what-has-whiteness. Now, has is nothing other than is having.

S. It cannot be [anything else].

T. Therefore, white would be nothing other than what-is-having-whiteness.

S. Nothing else.

T. But when “having whiteness” is said, this phrase signifies nothing other than white.

S. This is true.

T. Therefore, white would be the same as what-is-white.

S. This follows.

T. Thus, wherever “white” would be put, it would be correct to substitute “what is white.”

S. I cannot deny it.

T. Therefore, if white were what-is-white, it would also be what-is-what-is-white. And if it were this, it would also be what-is-what-is-what-is-white—and so on, to infinity.

S. This inference follows no less logically and is no less absurd than the inference that oftentimes white is something something.

T. However, if someone says that “white” either signifies something-having-whiteness or signifies nothing-having-whiteness, [then this statement can be interpreted in two ways]. If it is interpreted as saying " 'White' " either signifies something-having-whiteness or signifies not- something-having-whiteness] (so that “not-something” is an infinite name), then the disjunction is neither exhaustive nor correct; and so it proves nothing. (It would be like someone's saying “A blind-being either sees something or sees not-something.”) But if the statement is interpreted [as saying] "['White'] either signifies something-having-whiteness or does not signify [something-having-whiteness], then the disjunction is exhaustive and correct; and this construal is not opposed to the points previously made.

S. It is sufficiently clear that “white” does not signify something-having-whiteness or what-has-whiteness but signifies only having-whiteness, i.e., only a quality and a having. And from these [two] alone there is not produced some one thing. And so, white is both of these, because it signifies both of them equally. And I see that
this reasoning holds for all things that are spoken of by a non-complex expression which similarly signifies howsoever many things from which, nevertheless, a single thing does not result. And I do not think that any objection can rightly be raised against the things which you have maintained in this disputation.

T. Right now I do not think so either. However, since you know how vigorously the dialecticians contend, in our day, with the problem you have proposed, I do not want you to cling so tightly to the points we have made that you would hold to them with stubborn persistence even if by weightier arguments someone else could destroy them and could prove something different. But should this destruction occur, you would not deny that at least our discussion has benefited us in the practice of argumentation.