DE CONIJECTURIS
(On Surmises)
by
NICHOLAS OF CUSA

(Translated from Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia.
Vol. III: De Coniecturis.
Edited by Josef Koch, Karl Bormann, and Hans G. Senger.
Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1972)
ON SURMISES
(De Coniecturis, Part One)¹

Nicholas of Cusa to his revered instructor, the divinely loved, most reverend father, Lord Julian, most eminent Cardinal of the Holy Apostolic See.²

Since a favorable moment of sorts has now presented itself, I will disclose my conception regarding surmises. Although I know this conception to be partly unclear because of the usual shortcomings characteristic of human inventions and because of the more particular obscurities that result from my somewhat obtuse intellect, nevertheless with confidence I have expounded it for you, most excellent Father, most familiar with all literature. [I have done so] in order that [my conception] may receive the clarification that is possible by means of the almost divine light of the admirable resplendence of your most expert intellect. For I know that this new method in the investigative arts cannot perish because of its rough form if the man who is the brightest of all will, by his refining correction, deign to make it worthy of acceptance. Therefore, by means of your very illustrious authority furnish [correction] to [the thoughts] entering my mind with regard to [this] concise but very abundant way of pursuing whatsoever lofty matters.

PROLOGUE

Now, in my previous books of Learned Ignorance you have seen—more deeply and more clearly than have I myself by means of my endeavor—that precise truth is unattainable.³ Accordingly, it follows that every human affirmation about what is true is a surmise. For the increase in our apprehension of what is true is endless. Hence, since without [the aid of] any comparative relation our actual [increase] is directed toward this maximal, humanly unattainable knowledge, our weak apprehension’s uncertain falling short of the pure truth implies that our affirmations about the true are surmises.⁴ Therefore, the unattainable oneness-of-truth is known by means of a surmising otherness; and the surmising otherness is known in and through a most simple oneness-of-truth. Hereafter, we will come to understand this matter more clearly.
3  Created intellect, of finite actuality, is present in something other
than itself only in a way that is other [than the way it exists in it-
self], so that a difference remains among all those who are making sur-
mises. Therefore, it cannot but be most certain that the surmises
of the different individuals (as regards the same inapprehensible truth)
differ by degrees (and yet are disproportional to one another), so that
no individual ever perfectly grasps another’s meaning, although one
individual comes perhaps closer [to it] than does another. Thus, ac-
cept as being my surmises the new thoughts5 which I here append—
thoughts elicited (by no small reflective effort) in accordance with the
capability of my modest intellect. [These surmises are] perhaps far un-
equal to more ingenious intellectual ideas. Although I fear that they
will be spurned by many because of the inept way they are [now] 
being presented, nevertheless I am administering them as food that is
not altogether unfit for being transubstantiated into clearer intellectu-
al expression by minds deeper [than mine]. For he who seeks to elic-
it here some spiritual nourishment by means of quite careful chewing
and by frequent rumination will obtain a sustaining repast, even if at
first my [views] seem, rather, to be uncooked and unpalatable because
of their newness.

4  By means of a certain hand-in-hand guidance I must lead younger
individuals, all of whom lack the light of experience, to a disclosure
of [these] concealed points, so that they may be elevated progressively
to things more unknown. Hence, in clarifying more suitably the hid-
den intent of my surmises, I will first—by means of a certain rational
progression very well known to all6—fashion for my conception
demonstrative examples by means of which my line-of-thought can
proceed to the general art of surmising. Secondly, I will set forth cer-
tain embellishing remarks; and in adding illustrative diagrams7 that are
beneficial in regard to certain very pleasing analyses, I will solici-
tously endeavor to feed souls that are hungry for truth.

5  CHAPTER ONE
Whence the origin of surmises.

It must be the case that surmises originate from our minds, even as
the real world originates from Infinite Divine Reason.8 For when, as
best it can, the human mind (which is a lofty likeness of God) partakes
of the fruitfulness of the Creating Nature, it produces from itself, qua
image of the Omnipotent Form, rational entities, [which are made] in
the likeness of real entities. Consequently, the human mind is the form of a surmised [rational] world, just as the Divine Mind is the Form of the real world. Therefore, just as that Absolute Divine Being is all that which there is [essentially] in each existing thing, so too the oneness of the human mind is the being of its own surmises. Now, God works all things for His own sake, so that He is both the Intellectual Beginning and [Intellectual] End of all things. Similarly, the unfolding of a rational world—an unfolding which proceeds from our enfolding mind—exists for the sake of the producing mind. For the more subtly the mind contemplates itself in and through the world unfolded from itself, the more abundantly fruitful it is made within itself, since its End is Infinite Reason. Only in Infinite Reason will the mind behold itself as it is; and Infinite Reason alone is the Rational Measure for all things. We are elevated to a nearer likeness of this Reason in proportion as we have deepened our mind, of which Infinite Reason is the unique vital Center. This is why we aspire, by means of a natural desire, unto the perfecting branches of knowledge.

In order that you may be led to grasp what is meant and may recognize that the mind is the beginning of surmises, take note of [the following]: just as the First Beginning of all things, including our minds, is shown to be triune (so that of the multitude, the inequality, and the division of things there is one Beginning, from whose Absolute Oneness multitude flows forth, from whose Absolute Equality inequality flows forth, and from whose Absolute Union division flows forth), so our mind (which conceives only an intellectual nature to be creative) makes itself to be a triune beginning of its own rational products. For only reason is the measure of multitude, of magnitude, and of composition. Thus, if reason is removed, none of these [three, viz., multitude, magnitude, and composition, as conceptually measured] will remain—even as, if Infinite Being is denied, it is evident that, likewise, the [finite] being of all things is denied. Therefore, the mind’s oneness enfolds within itself all multitude, and its equality enfolds all magnitude, even as its union enfolds all composition. Therefore, mind, which is a triune beginning, first of all unfolds multitude from the power of its enfolding-oneness. But multitude begets inequality and magnitude. Therefore, in and through the primordial multitude, as in and through a first exemplar-multitude, the mind seeks the diverse and unequal magnitudes, or perfections, of each thing as a whole; and thereafter it progresses to a combining of both [multitude
and magnitude]. Therefore, our mind is a distinguishing, a proportioning, and a combining beginning.  

### CHAPTER TWO

**Number is a symbolic exemplar of things.**

Number is a certain natural, originated beginning that is of reason’s making; for those [creatures] that lack a mind, e.g., brute animals, do not number. Nor is number anything other than reason unfolded; for number is proved to be the beginning of those things that are attained by reason—proved to such an extent that if number is removed, then reason shows that none of those things [attained by reason] would remain. Moreover, reason’s unfolding of number and its using number to make surmises is nothing other than reason’s using itself and mentally fashioning all [surmised] things in a natural, supreme likeness of itself—just as in and through His Co-eternal Word, God (who is Infinite Mind) communicates being to things.

Furthermore, it is not the case that any [finite] thing can be prior to number. For all things other than number attest, necessarily, that there was already number. For all things deriving from most simple oneness are composed in their own [distinctive] manner. But a composite cannot be understood [to be a composite] in the absence of number. For a plurality of parts and a diversity of parts, together with the proportion of their compositeness, are from number. For substance, quantity, whiteness, blackness, and so on, would not be distinct things in the absence of otherness, which comes from number.

But number is composed of itself. For example, the number three is to be conceived as composed of three [units] that are combined; otherwise, the number three would be no more than if you envisioned separately a house’s wall, its roof, and its foundations and wanted [therefrom] to conceive of the house’s form. So it is necessary to imagine number not separately but combinedly at once; and, in that case, the combination of the three [units] will be none other than the number three. Therefore, the number three is composed of itself.

Moreover, the first contracted oppositeness must be contracted in and of itself—something impossible apart from number. Therefore, each number—being composed of opposites, which differ and which are related proportionally to one another—exists in such a way that these opposites are the number. Number that is even is opposed to
number that is odd; and every number, whether even or odd, exists from the even and the odd, i.e., exists from itself. The number four is composed of three, which is odd, and of four, which is even. The fact that four seems to be combined from two twos is not to be attributed to the essence of the number four but to its quantity.

9 How could anything be conceived to be more similar to mind than is number? Isn’t a oneness of the number three trine? And isn’t an equality of the number three trine? Likewise the union of the number three is trine. Therefore, number’s essence is the mind’s first exemplar. For a triunity (or unitrinity) that is contracted in plurality is found to be impressed antecedently on [every] number. Indeed, inferring symbolically and surmisingly from the rational numbers of our mind to the real, ineffable numbers of the Divine Mind, I say that in the Mind of the Creator number is the first exemplar of things, just as number that arises from our reason is the first exemplar of our corresponding [mental] world.

10 CHAPTER THREE
The natural progression [of number].

It is expedient that you contemplate the nature of number more keenly the more deeply you are endeavoring to investigate other things by means of a likeness to number. Turn your attention, first of all, to number’s progression, and you will ascertain that its progression is completed in the number four. For 1, 2, 3, and 4, added together, will make 10, which unfolds the numerical power of simple oneness. Indeed, from the number ten, which is a second oneness, the squared unfolding of the root [ten] is attained by means of a similar four-term progression: 10, 20, 30, and 40, when added together, are 100, which is the square of the root ten. Similarly, by means of a like movement, centenary oneness, [i.e., the number 100], gives rise to 1000: 100, 200, 300, and 400, when added together, are 1000. There is no continuing on in this way (as if there remained something further), although there is no denying that after 10 (viz., with 11, where, after 10, a return is made to oneness) the process repeats itself, just as it also does after 1000.

11 Therefore, in the natural series there are no more than ten numbers, which are ordered by a fourfold progression; not even beyond the cube-of-the-root-ten, viz., 1000, is there a variation in the repetition. Since this [number, viz., 1000,] arises from the order ten by
means of a four-term progression that is repeated three times, you know that the number 4, which is an unfolding of oneness, contains the power of every number. For universal oneness is instantiated in the four onenesses that are configured in a fitting order. The first [oneness is configured] altogether simply; the second [oneness] belonging to the order has only the added figure of nullity, as befits a second oneness; the third [oneness] adds two [figures] of this [same] nature; the fourth [oneness] adds three [such figures]: [thus we have] 1, 10, 100, 1000. Although all these [facts] are known to everyone, I have reduced them to a visual diagram that suits my purpose:

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**CHAPTER FOUR**

Four onenesses.

Since mind supposes that it encompasses, surveys, and grasps all things, it infers that it is so present in all things, and all things in it, that it asserts that there can be nothing which is beyond it itself and which escapes its purview. And so, by means of a numerical likeness of itself that is elicited from it itself the mind contemplates, as by means of a natural and proper image [of itself], its own oneness, which is its being. On the basis of number mind investigates oneness as being fourfold. For there is an altogether simple [oneness]; and there is a second [oneness], which is a root; and a third oneness, which is squared; and a fourth, which is cubed. Analogously, mind sees, in the beginning of number, most simple oneness [viz., 1]; and after that oneness it sees denary oneness [viz., 10], which is the root of the other [two onenesses]; then it sees centenary oneness [viz., 100], which is
the square of denary oneness; and lastly, it sees millenary oneness [viz., 1000], which is the cube of denary oneness. Between simple oneness and cubic oneness, which are different and opposed, there cannot be a unique and precise middle-term; rather, as is evident, at least two middle-terms are required. One of these middle-terms, being a root-oneness, tends toward simple oneness; the other middle-term, being a squared-oneness tends toward a cube. (For it is impossible that there be a simple union of things unequal; indeed, only the Union of Infinite Oneness and Infinite Equality can be simple.) And so, the mind contemplates its own universal being by means of these four-foldly distinct onenesses. Thus, it sees that the First Oneness is a most simple Mind which exists as Creator, antecedently to all other things; it sees that the second oneness, originated as a very close likeness of the First Oneness, is the root of the other [two onenesses]; and it sees that the third oneness, originated from this root, tends toward the fourth oneness, which, because of its very gross solidity, does not allow further progression.

14 The mind represents these mental onenesses by means of vocal signs. The first, most lofty, most simple Mind, it calls God; the root-oneness, which has no earlier root of itself, it calls intelligence; the third, squared-oneness, which is a contraction of intelligence, it calls soul; but the final, gross unfolded-solidity, which enfolds nothing further, it surmises to be body.

15 Now, in God all things are God; in an intelligence all things are intellect; in a soul all things are soul; in a body all things are body. This claim is none other than the claim that mind embraces all things either (1) divinely or (2) intellectually or (3) as does a soul or (4) as does a body—“divinely,” i.e., according as [what is embraced] is truth; “intellectually,” i.e., not insofar as [what is embraced] is truth itself but insofar as it is present truly; “as does a soul,” i.e., insofar as [what is embraced] is present as true-like; but “as does a body” [when what is embraced] departs from being even a likeness of the true and falls into confusion.

16 The First Oneness is altogether absolute; but the last oneness, escaping all absoluteness insofar as possible, is contracted. The second oneness is in large degree absolute and in small degree contracted; the third oneness is in small degree absolute and in large degree contracted. Therefore, just as intelligence is not altogether divine or absolute, so neither does the rational soul altogether escape partaking
of divinity. Thus, the mind both distinguishes all things and unites all things, [doing so] by means of a marvelous two-way progression in which (1) Divine and Absolute Oneness descends by stages in and through intelligence and reason and (2) the perceptible-contracted oneness ascends through reason unto intelligence.

CHAPTER FIVE
The First Oneness, [viz., God].

Furthermore, let the usefulness of what is going to be said make you more attentive; for I will endeavor to bring to light important and hidden matters. First of all, if number is conceived to be the exemplar of things, then the Divine Oneness is seen to precede and enfold all things. For in preceding all multitude, it also precedes all diversity, otherness, oppositeness, inequality, division, and all other things that accompany multitude. Indeed, oneness is neither the number two nor the number three, etc., even though it is all the things that two, three, four, and the remaining numbers are. If the species of things are distinguished as are numbers, then Absolute Oneness belongs to no species and has no name and no configuration, although in all things it is all things. Absolute Oneness is the Oneness of all plurality, the Oneness, in particular, of the plurality of genera, species, substances, accidents, and of all creatures; it is the one Measure of all measures, the one Equality of all things equal and of all things unequal, the one Union of all things united and of all things separated—just as oneness by means of its simplicity enfolds, unfolds, and unites every number, whether even or odd.

Behold with a depth of mind the infinite power of oneness, for oneness is infinitely greater [in power] than is any positable number. For there is no number, howsoever large, in which the power of oneness is inactive. Since, then, through the power of oneness there can always be had a number greater than any [given] positable number, it is evident from the inexhaustible power of the one alone that oneness is omnipotent. In what has already been said you have heard many things about this topic, and from those things you see that many more things can still be said. In particular, the following are things that could be said: Numbers are numbers of an inexplicable oneness and are numerical figures of an invariable truth that will be seen the more clearly the more absolutely and one-ly it is conceived to be. For he who conceives oneness to be absolute, and absolute only, sees it to
be ineffable. For with respect to what could he select one name rather
than another? If you have [mentally] removed all other things and be-
hold oneness alone,49 if you understand that oneness never was any-
thing else or never is anything else or never can be made to be any-
thing else, and if you [mentally] remove all plurality and every respect
and enter only into most simple oneness, so that you confirm that it
is no more simple than not simple, no more one than not one,50 then
you will have penetrated all things secret. [For] there there is no un-
certainty and no hindrance.

Therefore, by means of this mental escape from all plurality, con-
template the oneness of your own mind. And you will see that the
mind’s life—in its Absolute Oneness,51 in which it is all things—is in-
corruptible.52 The certainty that relates to this Absolute Oneness is
most precise53—including [the certainty] that mind accomplishes all
things in and through this Oneness. Every searching and investigat-
ing mind inquires only in the light of Absolute Oneness. And there can
be no question which does not presuppose Absolute Oneness. Does-
n’t the question whether some thing exists presuppose being,54 the
question what a thing is presuppose quiddity, the question why it is
presuppose cause, and the question for what purpose it is presuppose
a goal? Therefore, that which is presupposed in every doubting must,
necessarily, be most certain. Therefore, because Absolute Oneness is
the Being of all beings, the Quiddity of all quiddities, the Cause of
all causes, the Goal of all goals, it cannot be called into doubt. But
subsequent to Absolute Oneness55 there is a plurality of doubts.

Notice, then, Father Julian, how clear and concise is the theology
that is inexpressible in words.56 For you see that with regard to every
question formable about God there can first be replied that every ques-
tion about Him is ill-formed. For every question allows that only one
of two opposites is truly predicable of what is being sought; or else,
of that which is being sought something must be affirmed or denied
other than what must be affirmed or denied of other things. Now, it
is most absurd to believe these [conditions to hold] in the case of Ab-
solute Oneness, regarding which neither of two opposites is affirmed
or regarding which it is not the case that one of the opposites is af-
irmed rather than the other. But if you were to choose to answer af-
firmatively the question asked, you would be repeating what is pre-

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supposed. Similarly, in regard to the question “What is God?” you would answer “Quiddity”—and so on. In regard to the question whether God is a human being, being and humanity are presupposed; accordingly, we can say that God is that Being through which there is humanity. Likewise, in regard to the question whether God is an angel, the answer would be given that He is the Absolute Being of angelicness. And so on.

But since every affirmation is believed to be opposed to a negation, you notice that these just-mentioned responses cannot be altogether precise. For the First—which anything that is not the First cannot befit—infiniately precedes all oppositeness. Therefore, with regard to the First there is no altogether true surmise (1) that allows affirmation, to which negation is opposed, or (2) that prefers negation to affirmation on the ground that it is truer [than affirmation]. Although the statement “God is none of whatever things can be either conceived or spoken of” does seem truer than the statement that He is some of them, nevertheless negation, to which affirmation is opposed, does not attain precision. Therefore, the concept of truth that rejects both opposites disjunctively as well as conjunctively is the more absolute. For to the question whether God exists there can be no more unrestricting response than that (1) it is not the case either that He exists or that He does not exist and (2) it is not the case that He both exists and does not exist. This is the one loftiest, simplest, most absolute, and most appropriate response to every question regarding the Being which is first, most simple, and ineffable. Indeed, this most subtle surmising-response is a sufficient answer to whatever question is posed [about God]. But it is a surmising-response, because an altogether precise response remains ineffable and unattainable by either reason or intellect.

CHAPTER SIX

The second oneness, [viz., intelligence].

This [second] oneness is intellectual. Since whatever is not the First but derives from this most absolute First cannot be understood as proceeding otherwise than toward otherness, this [second] oneness will not be most simple, as is the First Oneness, but will be an intellectual composite. But reason teaches that compositeness is from one thing and another—that is, is from opposites. Nevertheless, this [second] oneness exists from opposites in no other way than as it is fitting that
a simple root exist. Therefore, the following is not the case: that opposites are prior to it, so that it exists from opposites that have preceded it. Rather, it originates together with opposites (even as number must be intellectually constructed\(^{62}\)). Therefore, in this second oneness’s root-simplicity the opposites are conjoined undividedly and yet irreducibly.\(^{63}\) For [this] denary oneness has no root.\(^{64}\) For it is preceded by no other oneness (except the First Oneness) from the replication of which it arises; it takes its origin from the First Oneness alone, which all oppositeness succeeds. And so, its beginning did not involve any differences. Therefore, whatever becomes divided in subsequent things is not distinguished in that root-oneness—just as opposing differences that are different in species are enfolded [without difference] in the generic-root [i.e., in the genus] of [those] species. And union is simpler and earlier than all disunion.

Therefore, questions which presuppose that one of two opposites is deniable of this [second] being and that only the other opposite is affirmable thereof are, as you see, improperly posed. For whatever is in any way affirmable of intelligence has no incompatible opposite. For intellectual being is loftier and simpler than is that mode-of-being which is incompatible with not-being. Hence, that intellectual oneness is a certain root that [compatibly] enfolds opposites that are incompatible when they are unfolded from it. For in that root are enfolded those opposites which, in the unfolded square of the root’s rational oneness, are incompatible. For example, at the rational level\(^{65}\) movement is incompatibly opposed to rest. But just as, in the First, infinite movement coincides with rest,\(^{66}\) so also, in the very close likeness of the First,\(^{67}\) movement and rest do not expel each other but are compatible. For rest is not so opposed to the movement of intelligence that when intelligence is moved it is not also at rest; for this intellectual movement is simpler than reason can measure.\(^{68}\) A similar point holds regarding rest and all other things.

Therefore, as keenly as you can, conceive of the foregoing matters. For in points previously set forth regarding learned ignorance, I remember that frequently I spoke of God in an intellectual way, by means of conjoining contradictories in a simple oneness.\(^{69}\) But now, in what was just set forth, I have explained my intent in a divine way.\(^{70}\) The negation of opposites—disjunctively and conjunctively—is disproportionally simpler than is the conjunction of opposites. But the way in which we must speak divinely of God in accordance with
the concept of Absolute First Oneness differs from the way in which we must speak of Him in accordance with this intellectual oneness and differs from the still much lower way in which we must speak of Him in accordance with reason. Now, intellectual oneness, which is disproportional\textsuperscript{71} to First Oneness, does not altogether escape composition from opposites; however, in intellectual oneness the opposites have not yet gone out from a compatible concordance. Hence, since from intelligence all questions that proceed from investigatory reason are whatever they are: there can be formed about intelligence no question in which intelligence does not shine forth in the manner of a presupposition. For how could reason—in making its investigation of intelligence, which it grasps by means of no perceptible sign—begin this inquiry without intelligence’s stimulating light illuminating it? Therefore, intelligence is to reason as God is to intelligence.

Therefore, if you wish to respond surmisingly to the questions posed about intelligence, turn to what is presupposed and give that as your answer.\textsuperscript{72} Answer, then, in regard to the question whether intelligence exists, that intelligence is the being that is presupposed by investigatory reason—from which being reason takes its being as from its own root. In regard to the question “What is intelligence?” answer, likewise, that it is the presupposed intellectual quiddity, on which the quiddity of reason is dependent. And so on. Therefore, root-oneness\textsuperscript{73} is certain, although it is not certainty itself, as is First Oneness;\textsuperscript{74} and root-oneness is present in, and presupposed by, all reason—as a root-number is present in, and presupposed by, its square number.

But if you undertake to direct your inquiry toward intellectual truth, you must avail yourself of intellectual terms; these have no incompatible opposite, since there can be no incompatibility as regards the nature of that intellectual oneness. Hence, [the significations of] ordinary terms—terms which are rational entities—do not apply to intelligence. For example, intelligence is neither stationary nor moved nor at rest nor at a location—indeed, is neither form nor substance nor accident in the manner in which these terms, imposed by reason, signify. For just as intellect is the root of reason, so too the intellect’s terms are the roots of reason’s terms. Hence, reason is intellect’s word, in which word intellect shines forth as in an image. Therefore, intellect’s word is the root of vocal terms.

But, as is evident to you, the oneness of simple reason enfolds the rational conception of movement and rest, of curve and straight
line, and of other opposites. Therefore, if in the simplicity of the somewhat absolute oneness-of-reason the rational conceptions of opposites exist compatibly with one another, and if reason is intelligence’s word,\(^75\) then it will be evident to you that intellectual oneness’s enfolding-of-opposites shines forth not in the ordinary terms of reason but rather in reason’s oneness.\(^76\) Therefore, if the question is asked whether intelligence is quantitative, a close surmising-response can be made by reference to rational conception, when one replies that intelligence is quantitative only in the way in which the rational conception of quantity indicates. (For here the term “quantity” is not intellectual but [indicates] the rational conception of quantity.) Similarly, to the question whether intelligence has a location, the answer must be given that it has a location in the way that the rational conception of location indicates. For the location of intelligence is [location in the sense indicated by] the rational conception of location,\(^77\) just as a square number contains its own root. Likewise, intelligence is, [in a sense,] substance; this is because from intelligence there descends the rational conception of substance. The case is similar as regards other things.

Therefore, intelligence is none of the things that can be spoken of or named but is the beginning of the [respective] rational conception of all things,\(^78\) just as God is the Beginning of intelligence. Reflect on these matters with diligent persistence, and when you enter into them with depth-of-mind, then things difficult for many others will be manifest to you with the sweet-agreeableness of intellectual sweetness, which surpasses incomparably all sensory delight.

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CHAPTER SEVEN
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The third oneness, [viz., the rational soul].

The soul, which intelligence unfolds quadratically,\(^79\) is not unsuitably conceived as intelligence’s number—just as intelligence is Super-simple Oneness’s number. For intelligence’s oneness is numbered in the soul when this oneness is contracted in multiple ways. But since intelligence’s oneness is unfolded in the soul, intelligence shines forth in the soul as in its own image. God is intelligence’s light, because He is intelligence’s Oneness; similarly, intelligence is the soul’s light, because intelligence is the soul’s oneness. Pay quite close attention to the following point: since, likewise, corporeal, [visible] form is oneness-of-soul’s number,\(^80\) we perceptibly behold the soul’s power, or
oneness, not in the soul itself but in the soul’s corporeal unfoldedness. Likewise, too, we behold intelligence not in it itself but in the soul; and we behold the first, most simple, and most absolute Oneness not as it is in itself but in intelligence as in its number and sign. Therefore, God is the Form of intelligence; intelligence is the form of the soul; and the soul is the form of the body. Therefore, since every body is, rightly, oneness-of-soul’s number, the soul’s power presents itself to you as great. Therefore, consider [the soul’s] reason, not insofar as it is the root of cubic body but insofar as it is the intermediary through which the intellectual-root descends unto body. For [the soul’s] reason, is the instrument of intellect; and, in this way, it is the beginning, or the instrumental-root, of corporeal things. Centenary oneness [viz., 100] symbolizes the soul; millenary oneness [viz., 1000] symbolizes the corporeal. But 1000 arises from a multiplying of 10 by 100—i.e., from a replication of intelligence by way of soul.

Therefore, since in all things corporeal the soul shines forth as an instrumental-root, you will have no difficulty investigating the soul by means of all the perceptible signs for it; for soul is a form impressed on bodies by intelligence—impressed as [the form] of a seal is impressed on wax. Therefore, every [remark] perceived by hearing bears the soul’s imprint. Therefore, whatever questions you hear to be posed about the soul you may conceive to be signs of the soul. Hence, all questions presuppose the soul’s reason. For example, the question whether the soul exists comes from reason, and so do all other questions. Therefore, there can be no doubt about whether the soul exists, since without the soul doubts could not be raised. If someone asks whether the soul is quantitative, then answer that it is not corporeally quantitative but is quantitative insofar as it is intelligence’s number. For since the soul is the oneness of perceptible objects, whatever is perceptibly diverse is, in the soul, one. Therefore, perceptible, or corporeal, quantity and quality (and likewise as regards whatever else is perceptible) are such that the soul’s reason, from whose oneness they come forth, is the oneness of them all. Therefore, things that are perceptibly diverse, other, and opposed have one rational ground, which, when variously contracted, produces the variety of perceptible things. Therefore, the soul’s judgments are as two numbers, one of which is even and the other of which is odd but which, together, are never both even or both odd. Therefore, by means of its reason the soul does not judge opposites to be compatible, since the soul’s judgment is its number.
If you consider the matter more keenly, [you will see that] each [of the four] oneness’s [respective] number exists in a manner that is conformed to its own oneness. For each oneness’s number is perfected in the number ten. The most simple Oneness’s number proceeds unto ten by means of simple number. Therefore, the things which in the First Oneness are that most simple Oneness are, in its numerical unfolding, found to be diverse and to be other than one another. Likewise, intelligences—which are that most simple and absolute Oneness’s number—partake of the nature of number in an intellectual way and in ordered relation to the First. Therefore, there is found to be intellectual difference, opposition, otherness, and whatever else may befit number; but in Absolute Oneness these are Absolute Oneness. Likewise, the quadratic differences, othernesses, and oppositions that are in reason are, [in intelligence], intellectual oneness. And cubic, perceptible, and corporeal oppositions and othernesses are, in [the soul’s] reason, a oneness. Continue on in this way with your inquiries if you wish to arrive at quite true surmises.

CHAPTER EIGHT

The last oneness, [viz., the corporeal].

Perceptible, or corporeal, oneness is oneness that is symbolized by the number 1,000. It is the last oneness because it is the unfolding of [the three preceding] onenesses. It does not enfold anything within itself and thus does not proceed to a further number—even as the First Oneness, which enfolds all things, does not succeed number. This perceptible oneness is solid and very composite, as is the number 1,000. In order to understand better the concept of these [four] onenesses, conceive them to differ as if in the following way: the First Oneness is the oneness of a very simple point, the second oneness is the oneness of a simple line, the third oneness is that of a simple surface, and the fourth oneness is that of a simple corporeal-object. Thereafter you will come to know quite clearly that the oneness of a most simple point is all that which there is in lineal oneness, surface-oneness, and corporeal oneness; but the oneness of a line is all that which there is in surface-oneness and corporeal oneness; and, likewise, surface-oneness is all that which there is in corporeal oneness. The first three onenesses are perceptible by, and distinguishable by, the mind alone, which alone conceives separately of point, line, and surface; but the senses attain only what is corporeal.
31 You will now be able clearly to consider our ineptitude when we attempt to measure things mental by means of things perceptible—when by means of corporeal grossness we try to portray surface-fineness. Indeed, we act ineptly if we attempt to represent a line’s simplicity by means of a corporeal-object. But we act most ineptly when we clothe with corporeal form an indivisible, altogether absolute point. Therefore, by means of these corporeal, perceptible forms, of whatever kind they are, or by means of these present perceptible written-conveyances, we only ineptly and imperfectly represent subtle forms that pertain to theology and to intelligences.

32 The soul’s senses perceive that which is perceptible; but [what is perceptible] would not be perceivable in the absence of a [respective] oneness of the senses. Rather, the perception, removed from all discrimination, would be confused and gross. For the senses perceive but do not discriminate. For every discrimination is from reason, for reason is the oneness of perceptible number. Therefore, if by means of the senses white is distinguished from black, heat from cold, the sharp from the dull, and this perceptible-object from that perceptible-object: this [distinguishing] is due to the property of reason. Therefore, the senses as such do not negate; for negating is a feature of discriminating. The senses only affirm the existence of the perceptible but do not affirm that the perceptible is this or that. Therefore, reason uses the senses as instruments for discriminating between things perceptible; but it is reason itself which discriminates between things that are perceptible by the senses.

33 Notice, then, Father Julian, that all negation and not-being are relegated from the region of things perceptible. But from the region of Supreme Oneness all affirmation is far removed. In the regions of the [two] intermediate onenesses both negation and affirmation are permitted: in the second region [they exist] enfoldedly; in the third region, unfoldedly. In regard to the lowest oneness, words are only of present time; in regard to the first, supreme Oneness words are of no time; in regard to the second oneness words are of present and of not-present time enfoldedly; but in regard to the third oneness words are of present or of not-present time unfoldedly.

34 Therefore, if you adapt your terms to the onenesses which are the subject of your inquiry, you will make truer surmises. For example, when about God the question is asked whether He existed yesterday, then by virtue of the fact that in regard to God words are free of tem-
poral signification, you will readily see what is to be answered. For since, [in the case of God,] *has existed* encompasses *being* and *becoming* and is non-temporal, it befits Eternity. Moreover, if this question were posed about intelligence, and if *has existed* enfolds both *present* and *not-present*, then *has existed* would be able to befit an eternal thing that comes very close to Eternity and is derived from it. And so on. So too, if you speak of one oneness as you would speak of another oneness, then adapt to this [transference] your manner of speaking. For example, when we rational human beings speak of God, we subject God to the rules of reason, so that we affirm some things of God and deny other things of Him and apply diametrical contradictories to Him disjunctively. This is the method of almost all modern theologians, who speak of God in terms of reason. For by this method we accept, in the school-of-reason, many [propositions] that we know should be denied [of Him] according to the region of simple Oneness.

35 Reason analyzes all things in terms of multitude and magnitude. But oneness is the beginning of multitude, and trinity is the beginning of magnitude—as, in the case of polygonal figures, a trigon [is such a joint-beginning]. Therefore, with respect to the method of reason the Beginning of all things is one and trine—not insofar as oneness and trinity are two things (for oneness is the beginning of plurality) but insofar as they are a Oneness which is Trinity. But because intelligence notices the unsuitableness of reason’s terms, it repudiates them. It conceives of God, beyond those things signified, as those things’ Enfolding Beginning. And because by means of that ray of divinity intelligence sees that its conception is inadequate, it affirms (1) that Oneness-which-is-Trinity is to be understood as above all enfolding and unfolding and (2) that God cannot be conceived as He is. (We proceed in a similar way as regards intelligence, when we argue about it rationally.)

When by means of the foregoing method [of transference] we elevate what-is-perceptible to [the level of] reason or of intelligence or of the first, most absolute Oneness, we must speak of it in accordance with the rules of that region. For example, when we mentally free the oneness of a stone from all perceptible, rational, or intellectual plurality and reduce it to Infinite Simplicity, there is no longer anything affirmative of it. For then it is not stone rather than not-stone; rather, it is all things. (A similar point holds of things other [than a stone].) You will understand this point without hesitation if you note that the Absolute Oneness of a stone is no more the oneness of stone
than of not-stone and that of all things there is one Absolute Oneness, which is God.\textsuperscript{105} Hence, just as the Absolute Oneness of that perceptible and nameable stone is God, so the intellectual oneness of the stone is intelligence. Therefore, it is evident with respect to which rules we are to make surmises about the stone.

I ask that you note one more thing: viz., how it is that perceptible oneness, to which no further pathway of progressing is open, returns upwardly. For whereas reason descends unto the senses, the senses return unto reason. And in this regard notice the stages-of-return: the senses return unto reason; reason returns unto intelligence; intelligence returns unto God, where Beginning and Consummation exist in perfect reciprocity. Therefore, perceptible number returns unto its own beginning-of-oneness in order to be able, through this [its rational] beginning, to arrive at intelligence and, through intelligence, to arrive at God, the Goal of goals. Soul, or reason,\textsuperscript{106} is the goal of things perceptible. Therefore, when perceptible life alienates itself from the oneness of reason, it veers from the pathway of its return and of its goal. Likewise, reason veers from [the pathway of return] when it strays quite far from the oneness of intelligence, just as intelligence [veers from that pathway] if it deviates from Absolute Oneness, which is Truth.

For the present, let the foregoing points be expressed in the foregoing manner.

\textbf{CHAPTER NINE}

Oneness and otherness.

As far as the primitiveness of my meager talent has allowed, I have expounded, from a consideration of the order of numbers, certain fundamental features of my surmises. I will now add a point always to be kept in mind—a point contained among the same fundamental features.

It is evident that every number is constituted from oneness and otherness.\textsuperscript{107} Oneness goes out into otherness, and otherness returns into oneness. Thus, by means of this two-directional progression number is defined and is actually as it is. But it cannot be the case that the oneness of one number is completely equal to the oneness of another number, since with regard to everything finite precise equality is impossible.\textsuperscript{108} Therefore, oneness and otherness will be present in different degrees in every number. For example, an uneven number is
seen to have more oneness than does an even number, (1) because of the indivisibility of the uneven number into equal pairs and (2) because of the possibility [of such divisibility] in the case of the even number. Therefore, since each number is a number [constituted] from oneness and otherness, there will be numbers in which oneness prevails over otherness and numbers in which otherness is seen to absorb oneness.

No one doubts that root-numbers are simpler than are square numbers and cubic numbers. For it is evident that simple root-numbers, which proceed from no other pre-existing root than from simple oneness, have much oneness but little otherness. In comparison with all the other numbers of which root-numbers are roots, there appears to be in root-numbers no otherness. But if any otherness is in them because of their departure from the first, most simple oneness, then otherness is rightly conceived to be [in them] only in comparison with the infinite simplicity of what is first. But in square numbers there must be more otherness, since they arise from a replicating of their root; and replication is a departure from the simplicity of oneness. But you see that square numbers nevertheless contain much oneness on account of their enfolding a [respective] cubic number, which comes from them. But a cubic number has little simple oneness but has much otherness, divisibility, and multiplicity.

On the basis of the foregoing illustrative example, surmise that the universe, all worlds, and whatever things are in them are constituted from oneness’s and otherness’s passing into each other variously and differently. For example, you have heard that the oneness and the otherness of the uppermost heaven are quite simple and are intellectual and root-like, whereas the oneness and the otherness of the middle heaven exist in a middle way, and the oneness and otherness of the lowest heaven exist perceptibly and cubically. For intellectual numbers are simple and are the simple essences of rational and of perceptible numbers. From intellectual numbers arise rational numbers (which are proportional, for only reason attains the nature of proportions), and thereafter comes perceptible, more cubic number.

Now, the oneness of intellectual number, insofar as [that oneness] is a threeness, is indivisible and unreplicable, for there cannot be more than one threeness. But it is altogether evident that the ratios of what-is-triple can be repeated and can be replicated by contraction to what is perceptible. However, it is clear that [intellectual] three-
ness enfolds much more than does a triple proportion.\footnote{114} For it enfolds everything trine and everything trinely understandable or trinely numerable, without which things there could not be a triple proportion. Therefore, since triple proportion does not pertain to the essence of [intellectual] threeness but, on the contrary, [intellectual] threeness encompasses everything trine (whether it be triple or not), [intellectual] threeness’s enfolding is maximal. The triple also enfolds the many triple numbers and enfolds everything at all capable of becoming triple; but it does not at all enfold the number three. For example, when I count $a, b, c$ and call them three, I unfold the number [three].\footnote{115} By means of this illustration (or by means of another illustration more acceptable to you) construct more suitable terms and figures for understanding the different numbers of the different worlds. However, you know that the numbers in the upper world are ineffable in terms of the senses, since you know that they are intellectual numbers.

\textbf{41} So since you have now come to the point that you see surmisingly that all things are from oneness and otherness, conceive (1) that oneness is a certain formal light and is a likeness of the First Oneness but (2) that otherness is a shadow and is a withdrawing from the most simple First and is material grossness. And conceive of a pyramid-of-light as progressing into darkness and of a pyramid-of-darkness as progressing into light; and reduce to [that] figurative conception everything that can be investigated, so that by guidance from what is perceptible you can turn your surmise toward hidden [truths]. And in order that you may be aided by means of an example, consider the universe as reduced to the diagram here below.\footnote{116}

\textbf{42} Notice that God, who is Oneness, is as the base-of-light; but the base-of-darkness is as nothing.\footnote{117} Every creature, we surmise, lies between God and nothing. Hence, the uppermost world abounds with light, as you see visually [in the diagram]; yet, it is not free of darkness, although because of the upper-world’s simplicity the darkness is thought to be absorbed in light. By contrast, in the lowest world darkness reigns, although it is not the case that in that darkness there is no light at all. Yet, the diagram shows that the light is hidden in the darkness rather than shining forth. In the middle world the relationship [between light and darkness] is also a relationship that is in-between [the relationship of light to darkness in the other two worlds]. And if you want to know about the intervals that belong to the orders
I want you always to be aware of these often-repeated statements [of mine], lest by means of this symbolical diagram you are led to false representations, since you ought not to surmise that either light or darkness is present in the other worlds in the manner in which you see it to be present in the perceptible world. With this admonition in mind, use this diagram in all your investigations—a diagram which subsequently I will call $P$, because it is paradigmatic.

CHAPTER TEN
An explanation [of the previous diagram].

The entire power of our mind ought to focus on refining the concept of oneness, for the entire multitude of things knowable depends upon the knowledge of oneness; and in all knowledge oneness is whatever is known. Note that all of oneness’s many names are certain numbers of its name “oneness”. For the definition of “oneness” is “indivisibility in and of itself and separation from all else.” Hence, we say...
that oneness is called by the names of the many characteristics of its power. For whichever names indicate a certain indivisibility, distinctness, and union befit oneness. Now, the [foregoing] diagram includes, under [the label] “oneness,” all such [befitting] things; and under [the label] “otherness” it includes their opposites. Hence, for indivisibility to proceed into divisibility is nothing other than for oneness to descend into otherness. The case is similar [regarding the descent] from incorruptibility into corruptibility, from immortality into mortality, from immutability into mutability, from immobility into mobility, and so on. And, by like reasoning, the case is similar [regarding the descent] from form into what-is-formable (since form is distinct and, therefore, a oneness). And distinctness [descends] into what-is-not-distinct, i.e., into what-is-a-continuum; what-is-discrete [descends] into what-is-confused; light [descends] into darkness; the simple [descends into the composite; the fine descends] into the gross; spirit [descends] into body. And conceive [similarly] of things similar to these. Thus, actuality [descends] into potentiality; whole [descends] into part; universal, into particular; species, into individual; love, into what-is-lovable; art, into what-is-made-by-an-art; and so on as regards whatever unites or enfolds, in relation to what is enfolded. Moreover, it is not possible that there be opposites [such that] one of them is not like a oneness in relation to the other [of them].

Therefore, if you look at Diagram P, you will see—by reference to (1) the descent of oneness into otherness and (2) the return of otherness into oneness—that in the uppermost heaven whatever things are characterized by otherness return into oneness. For example, [you will see that] divisibility [returns] into indivisibility; darkness [returns] into light; the gross [returns] into the fine; the composite, into the simple; the mortal, into immortality; the mutable, into the immutable; femininity, into masculinity; potentiality, into actuality; the imperfect (or the part), into the whole; and so on. The contrary occurs in the lowest world, where indivisibility degenerates into divisibility. (For example, the oneness of the indivisible form accompanies the divisible nature, so that each part of water is water, each part of earth is earth.) In the lowest world stability is present in instability; immortality, in mortality; actuality, in potentiality; masculinity, in femininity; and so on. But in the middle world the relationship [between such opposites] is a relationship that is in-between [the respective relationships within the other two worlds].
But if you reflect on the foregoing with careful consideration, then you will see, by means of very bright light, [truths] that are very important and that are completely hidden to many. You will be led even to nature’s most hidden secrets—led also unto the variations of terms’ [meanings] as regards one world and another world.119 [You will see, for example,] how it is that in the lowest world stability is present in instability and how it is that, in general, oneness is present in otherness. For the lowest world’s oneness (which has passed into otherness) is such that it is not oneness but otherness. The contrary holds true of the uppermost world, whose otherness is such that it is not otherness but oneness. But Diagram P [also] shows that all things positable in a world are present there120 in different ways in the foregoing respect.121 Indeed, in one thing oneness is absorbed by otherness—or vice versa—to one degree, whereas in another thing it is absorbed to another degree. Accordingly, an unqualifiedly maximum or an unqualifiedly minimum is never reached.

Hence, the less that a form’s oneness passes into otherness, the more noble it is, because it is more one. The form of animal is more one than is the form of vegetable. Therefore, the form of an animal does not accompany the severing of the animal into parts,122 as the form [of a vegetable] accompanies some sectionings of the vegetable and as, even more, the form [of a mineral accompanies the splitting] of the mineral and as, most of all, the form [of elements accompanies] their [division]. You see, too, why in dividing a stone we can come, of necessity, to not-a-stone; and this [moment comes] sooner the more perfect the stone is. (A similar point holds true of all other things.) And you see it to be necessary that we come to those things that are called elements—unless there is to be an infinite progression [of divisions]. I will add some points [later] about elements.123

But as regards the oneness of each single thing to be investigated by means of Diagram P: you must conceive of it in its perfection; and in accordance with that oneness you must imagine that the intensity of light or the thickness of darkness is great or small. [You must do this] so that you can have a more singular knowledge [of it] in relation to each of all other things, according as each [of them] is situated in the universe. But from what you have heard, make a surmise about the degrees of onenesses, so that you may affirm to be greater that oneness which is the more indivisible and which unites the more things.124
Indeed, the oneness of a whole, which unites all its parts, is greater than is the oneness of a uniteable part. For the less oneness a thing actually has and the more oneness it potentially has, the more changeable that thing is; for the oneness that unites is more perfect than is the oneness that can be united. And the more conditions-of-oneness you see to concur in something’s oneness, the more perfect [is that oneness]. For “oneness” conveys the idea of a beginning and an end (finis) that unite with each other. Therefore, oneness-of-soul is more perfect than is oneness-of-body, because the purpose (finis) of oneness-of-body is oneness-of-soul. The corporeal depends upon oneness-of-soul as upon a certain beginning of the corporeal. For if the soul is removed, then the body’s oneness is dissolved and perishes.¹²⁵

However, we see that some onenesses are more in a potential state of being united, whereas others are more in a state of actual unitedness. Thus, in the case of things that admit of more and less we do not come to an unqualifiedly maximum or to an unqualifiedly minimum. We do not even arrive at determinate and perceptible elemental onenesses that are actually lowest and actually minimal, although reason believes there to be [such minimal elemental units] and believes them to be uniteable to one another and to exist only in continuous uniteability. In these [minimal elemental units, reason believes,] oneness is present amid continual change. Likewise, too, reason believes, we arrive at actually maximal onenesses, where the potential for uniteability is perfectly actualized and awaits no further union.

Notice, then, that you must form a conception by intellect alone—above reason¹²⁶—in order [justifiably] to claim both that there can be no progression¹²⁷ to the infinite and that we cannot come [by means of a progression] to an actually maximum or to an actually minimum.¹²⁸ For example, we could not recognize which sample-of-earth would be only elemental, since any givable sample-of-earth is distinct [in some measure] from every other sample-of-earth and is not an element. The situation is similar concerning water. For there is no sample-of-water that does not distinctly differ, in its degree of elementariness, from [every] other sample-of-water. Therefore, an actually minimum thing or an actually maximum thing is unknowable. Consider [this issue] in regard to quantity. If than any given number a greater number is positable, then we know both that there is no infinite number and that no given number is maximal. Similarly, even if every quantity were divisible into ever-further divisibles, we would
know that we could not arrive at an infinite number of parts or at a minimal part. Hence, although the senses [lead us to] think that some part is minimal, nevertheless reason tells us that that part is divisible and is not minimal. Similarly, too, that which reason thinks to be a minimum, intellect apprehends to be divisible. Therefore, everything positable is greater than the minimum and lesser than the maximum, without the progression [of greater and greater or of lesser and lesser] continuing on to the infinite [i.e., to the infinitely large or to the infinitely small]. Only this negative knowledge, viz., that preciseness is not attainable, teaches you these points. For although to our reason it necessarily seems true that a maximum is reached there where its gradual infinite ascent is impeded, nevertheless intelligence, through the denial of preciseness, sees it to be more truly the case that no givable thing—of the kind of things that admit of being greater—is precisely a maximum.

Therefore, the power of the simple intellectual nature is so great that it encompasses those things which reason separates as being opposites. For reason—which does not attain number that is without proportion and which allows that there is an actually maximum—surmises that it itself has a pathway from the known to things unknown. But intellect, noticing the frailty of reason, rejects these surmises and affirms that those numbers are both proportional and disproportionate, so that each and every thing’s Preciseness (which is the Blessed God) is concealed. Now, reason is the preciseness of the senses. For reason, by means of its preciseness, unites perceptible numbers; and things perceptible are measured by reason’s preciseness. But reason’s preciseness is not an unqualifiedly true measure but is a true measure [only] after the fashion of reason. Now, intellect, which is a true measure, is the preciseness of things rational. However, Truth itself, which is God, is the Supreme Preciseness of the intellect.

Pay most careful attention to the foregoing points. But if you want to behold, intellectually, oneness in otherness, then pay very careful attention also to the following: viz., that for oneness to proceed into otherness is, at the same time, for otherness to return into oneness. For example, for the soul to be in the body is for the soul to proceed into the body in such a way that the body’s oneness enters into the soul. Likewise as regards form: the more one and the more perfect each form is, the more its proceeding [into otherness] is otherness’s returning [into its oneness]. For by means of a simple act of under-
standing, conceive of proceeding as conjoined with returning, if you want to arrive at those hidden truths which are more truly attained above reason (which separates progression from returning) by intellect alone (which folds opposites into a single bond). Philosophers and rationalistic theologians have hitherto—in their affirming of a First Beginning—foreclosed for themselves the way to entering into these [hidden truths].

CHAPTER ELEVEN
Participation.

Since for oneness to be oneness is for it to exist precisely and as it is, you see adequately and very clearly that oneness is identity that is unimpartible, inexplicable, and—as it is [in itself]—unattainable. For just as in its own being every existent is present as it is, so in another being it is present in a manner other [than as it is in itself]. You will apprehend this fact readily, if you pay attention. A circle, for example, insofar as it is an entity of reason is attained—with respect to its own rational being—as it is. When you conceive of a figure from whose center to whose circumference all lines are equal, then by means of this rational conception you apprehend the circle insofar as it is an entity of reason; but insofar as the circle is something perceptible and exists outside of its own rational conception, then just as it exists in something other [than in the rational conception of it], so too it exists in a manner other than [as it is in the conception]. Therefore, the circle cannot possibly exist outside of the rational conception in the way that it exists in the rational conception. Therefore, a perceptible circle partakes, with a degree of otherness, of the oneness of the conceptual circle. Therefore, the preciseness that constitutes the [conceptual] circle remains unimpartible. For the [conceptual] circle is replicated only in otherness. For there cannot be a perceptible circle in which [all] the lines extending from the center to the circumference are precisely equal; indeed, there cannot be any [perceptible] line that in and of itself is in every respect equal to another [perceptible] line. Therefore, a circle that is seen is not so precise that there could not always be one that is a more precise circle than is it. And although the circle as it is [in itself] does not impart itself otherwise than as it is, nevertheless it can be partaken of by another only otherwise [than as it is in itself]. Therefore, the fact that it cannot be partaken of as it is [in itself] is not due to a defect
on its part but is due to the fact that it is partaken of by something other and, hence, is partaken of otherwise.

Pay full attention, so that you may begin to understand the variety of surmises. If you admit that your intellect is something other than is the thing that is intelligible, then you will see that you cannot understand any intelligible thing as it is. For what-is-intelligible is understood, as it is, only by its own intellect, from which it has being; but by all other intellects it is understood in a manner other [than as it is]. Therefore, a thing is attained, as it is, only in its own truth, through which it exists. Therefore, by the Divine Intellect alone, through which every being exists, is the truth of all things attained as it is;142 but by other intellects [that truth] is attained variously and otherwise [than as it is]. Moreover, the understanding of a thing as it is, is unattainable by other intellects—just as a circle as it exists in this perceptible floor cannot be reproduced elsewhere except otherwise [than as it is here].143 Therefore, inexplicable identity is unfolded variously and differently in otherness; and variety is enfolded concordantly in oneness-of-identity. For example, sight is partaken of differently by various acts-of-sight; and the variety of visible things is enfolded concordantly in the oneness of sight,144 just as, also, the diversity of the acts-of-sight is contained concordantly in the oneness of absolute sight.145 And since the Divine Mind is the most absolute preciseness of all things, it happens that all created minds partake of the Divine Mind differently and in terms of otherness-of-variation.147 However, [in and of itself] the ineffable Divine Mind remains unable to be partaken of, since the condition of the participants causes this [varied] result.

Created minds do not receive into themselves the ray of Divine Light as if by their nature they preceded their partaking [of the Divine Light].148 Rather, the intellect’s partaking of that unimpartible, most actual Light constitutes the [respective] quiddity of created minds. Therefore, the actuality of our intelligence consists in its partaking of the Divine Intellect. But since that most actual Power can be received only with a variety-of-otherness (a variety, that is, which is received somehow concurrently with the power), it happens that the participant-minds partake of the most actual Intellect with a degree of otherness—i.e., with that degree of actuality which (in relation to the Divine Intellect) is otherness or potency. Therefore, it is rather the case that our entire intelligence consists of participation in the Divine
Actuality with a degree of potency. For in this way the ability actually to understand truth, as it is, befits created minds—even as it is proper to our God that the Divine Actuality be partaken of with various degrees of potency by created minds. Therefore, the more Godlike an intelligence is, the nearer its potency is to Actuality; but the more obscure an intelligence is, the more distant [it is from Actuality]. Therefore, Actuality is partaken of differently and variously by near, by remote, and by very remote potency. Moreover, that Inaccessible Loftiness is not to be approached as if there could be no access at all to it. Nor, having been approached, is that Loftiness to be supposed actually to have been [perfectly] apprehended. Rather, [we are to believe] that it can always be approached more closely, while it remains ever unattainable as it is [in itself]. By way of comparison, time advances toward everlastingness, with which it can never attain equality, even though it approaches continually.

You now see that the positive assertions of the wise are surmises. For example, when with your very clear eyesight you, O Father, see before you the face of the Supreme Pontiff, our most holy lord, Pope Eugene IV, you form of it a positive assertion, which, in conformity with your sight, you maintain to be precise. But when you turn toward the root from whence the senses’ discrimination flows—when you turn toward reason, I mean—you understand that the sense of sight partakes of [reason’s] discriminating power with a degree-of-otherness that is contracted to the sense-organ. Consequently, you see the defect that characterizes the falling away from preciseness; for you contemplate the face not as it is [in itself] but in its otherness, according to your eye’s angle, which differs from [that of] all the eyes of other living beings. Therefore, a surmise is a positive assertion that partakes—with a degree of otherness—of truth as it is [in itself].

However, just as by means of the oneness-of-reason the senses experience their own otherness and make surmises by freeing from precise oneness assertions about perceptible objects, so reason, by means of its root-oneness, viz., by means of the light of intelligence, discovers its own otherness and its falling away from preciseness into surmise. Similarly, intelligence, insofar as it is a power near [to God], rejoices that by the aid of Divine Oneness it makes surmises in its own very clear way.

Let one who keeps in mind these statements make a surmise about participation in the following way. Since whatever can be partaken of
is partaken of only with a degree of otherness, it will have to be partaken of in fourfoldness; for oneness both goes forth from itself into otherness and exists in a fourfold way. Whatever is partaken of by something else cannot be received either maximally or minimally or equally. Moreover, since oneness’s simplicity is not partaken of insofar as it is simple but is partaken of otherwise, it is partaken of with a degree of compositeness, so to speak, or with a falling away from that simplicity—i.e., with a degree of difference from simplicity. Therefore, simplicity, since it is simplicity, is not partaken of in parts but in the way in which what-is-simple can be partaken of according to itself as a whole. However, since oneness’s simplicity is unimpartible maximally, minimally, and equally (for it is partaken of, as it is, [only] by means of a coincidence, as is shown in Learned Ignorance), it will have to be partaken of with a certain fourfoldness that falls short of maximality, minimality, and equality. Therefore, oneness is partaken of not insofar as it is an enfolding simplicity or insofar as it is unfolded in otherness but insofar as its changeable and unfolding power-to-be-partaken-of is understood (by means of a certain coincidence) as a mode-of-power of the enfolding, unpartakeable oneness.

I will explain [the foregoing] in accordance with the diagram appended below:

Simple, enfolding oneness, viz., a, cannot be partaken of as it is. Furthermore, it cannot be partaken of by mode b or by mode c—i.e., cannot be partaken of maximally or minimally (nor according to a higher degree, or to a lower degree, of its power). Moreover, it cannot be
partaken of by modes $d$, $e$, and $f$—i.e., cannot be partaken of maximally or minimally or equally (nor according to a higher degree or to a lower degree or to an intermediate degree). It also cannot be partaken of by modes $g$, $h$, $i$, and $k$, as if by four simple and differentiated modes-of-being, viz., by a higher mode, by a lower mode, and by two intermediate modes (i.e., it cannot be partaken of maximally or minimally or more nearly maximally or more nearly minimally).

For if in this way $a$ were partaken of discretely as if according to certain parts of its power, it would not be partaken of in the most perfect way in which the totality of its simple oneness could be partaken of but would be partaken of defectively. Therefore, $a$ cannot be partaken of according to any discrete degree, since it is undifferentiable simplicity. Moreover, $a$ cannot be partaken of insofar as, in reverse direction, these four things are three things—i.e., not insofar as $g$, $h$, $i$, $k$ are thought to be reduced from their quaternary otherness to the trine otherness $d$, $e$, $f$, or insofar as $g$, $h$, $i$, $k$ are thought of as still further united in the binary otherness $b$, $c$. Rather, [there is participation only] insofar as $a$, in its oneness, is considered as a fourfold power that exists in a oneness-of-substance. For only there does oneness-that-cannot-be-partaken-of so coincide with the power-to-be-partaken-of that only in a fourfold otherness can all things whatsoever that in differing ways partake of [oneness] attain the oneness-that-cannot-be-partaken-of-otherwise-than-in-fourfold-otherness. (These points will be made clearer in what is to be said below. In this way the great power of the art of surmising will be disclosed to you, if you take note of the denary unfolding\textsuperscript{156} of the enfolding\textsuperscript{157} [oneness]. For the art by which truth is investigated is very concise. Although that art can be depicted by three lines\textsuperscript{158} present in the enfoldedness of its simple oneness, nevertheless it cannot be either imparted or partaken of without the otherness-of-modes. Hence, please excuse me for my repeated mention of the otherness-of-modes.

61

CHAPTER TWELVE

The three worlds.

Subsequently now to these considerations, which have been advanced in the way that they have been, although rather ineptly, conceive that a certain loftiest world is constituted both by a theophanic descent of the Divine First Oneness into denary oneness\textsuperscript{159} and by a return of denary oneness into the First Oneness; let this world be called the third
heaven, if you please. And form the concept of another world, [constituted] by a similar descent of the second [i.e., the denary] oneness into a third oneness and by the ascent of the third oneness into the second; this world can be called the second heaven. And conceive surprisingly of a third world, [constituted] by the descent of the third oneness into a fourth oneness and by the return of the fourth into the third. In this way, then, the universe will be composed of (1) a very central, very immaterial world [viz., the third heaven, i.e., the intellectual world, or the first world], (2) of a very circumferential, very gross world [viz., the first heaven, i.e., the perceptible world, or the third world], and (3) of an intermediate world [viz., the second heaven, i.e., the rational world]. The Center of the first world [i.e., of the third heaven] is God; the center of the second world [i.e., of the second heaven] is intelligence; the center of the third world [i.e., of the first heaven] is reason. Perceptibility is as a very gross outer-layer of the third world and is only circumferential. Perceptibility always occupies the outer region, whereas the First Center—which is of Indivisible Being that, in all things, holds together all things—is everywhere central.

All things are present in the first world; all things are present in the second world; all things are present in the third world. In each [world each thing is present] in its own manner. The [First] Center, i.e., altogether absolute Oneness, is the Being of each thing. Therefore, since Oneness is the truth of each and every thing, every true thing is in the third heaven insofar as each thing flows forth immediately and unintermixedly from its own Truth—as a father is present in his sons. Every true thing is in the second heaven, being present there as in a quite remote likeness of what is true—as a father is present in his grandsons. Every true thing is in the lowest heaven, being present there as in a very remote shadowing, where [each true thing] is concealed amid what are only very remote signs—as a father is present in very distant blood-relatives who descend from him. Now, God is our Father and our Beginning. We bear the image of true sonship with Him only in the third heaven, whose Central Oneness is Truth itself. Only there will we be able to possess the kingdom of truth as true sons. Hence, the [third] heaven is the intellectual heaven, where truth, as it is [in itself], shines forth clearly. In the second, rational heaven, the light-of-this-truth, made less bright by rational inferences, is clothed with variation-of-opinion; and in the lowest heaven that
light is obscured by very thick grossness.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Three trine distinctions.166

By means of a surmise that is not without value, I reckon that each of the aforementioned worlds of the universe contains within itself a series of numbers, so that each world, in its own manner, is perfect. Yet, all the numbers of the first [world], i.e., of the loftiest heaven,167 are, in comparative relation to [the numbers] of the other [worlds], very simple and very formal—as if ten simple digits [viz., 1-10], were extended progressively unto 1,000. However, the second heaven’s numbers, retaining an intermediate status, are more gross and less lucid and less formal—as if ten articul numbers168 were hastening progressively unto 1,000. And the lowest heaven’s numbers are obscured by much darkness and are more material, so that the comparative relation of that heaven’s oneness (a) is to the first oneness169 as 100 is to 1 and (b) is to the second oneness170 as 100 is to 10.171

65 If you consider this relationship for each of the previously shown worlds,172 you will see that the orbit [of each of them] is distinguished three times by means of three numerical progressions,173 so that in this way there are in the universe nine graded onenesses that derive from the first, most simple oneness.174 But to the end that the quaternary distinction175 be perfected—the distinction which, alone, is the fulfillment of our inquiries—we are forced to surmise that the progressions by which176 one oneness passes into another oneness are to be numbered fourfoldly and disjunctively. In this way, then, we note, lastly, that in each world there are three trine distinctions;177 and so, in the universe we will arrive at the cube of three, as the diagram below will show you.

66 If, as the subject-matter requires, you look at the diagram with your mind’s eye, then mysteries that are surely important and that are hidden to many will be made known to you.

Every number is included in the number 10,178 and every progression is completed in the number 4.179 Now, 4 times 10 is 40. Hence, you will find, [in the diagram], 40 circles, all of them (the large ones as well as the small ones) being gathered into a single circle.180 Hence, since the progression 1, 3, 9, 27 adds up to 40, it is not unfittingly praised. For just as 1, 2, 3, 4 is the best-ordered progression of all numbers, than which there can be exhibited no better-ordered pro-
gression (for the replication of 2 makes 4, even as does the adding of 1 to 3; therefore, 4 proceeds from these [other numbers] in a best-ordered way; and in the case of any other four numbers no such [a best-ordered progression] can be found), so too with respect to the tenfold of 4, viz., 40, there can be exhibited no better-ordered progression than the following: viz., 1, 3, 9, 27. You will be able to experience this fact by virtue of the following consideration: through these four numbers’ being subtracted from one another and added to one another, all numbers up to 40 are attained individually,\textsuperscript{181} even as from the combinations of the four numbers of the first progression all numbers up to 10 are obtained\textsuperscript{182}—as you can verify by yourself in both cases. Moreover, except for these [four numbers] there are exhibitable no four numbers, of an ordered progression, that when added together make a given sum and that through being added to one another or subtracted from one another yield each number contained [in that sum].

Next, note that Simple Oneness, which here symbolizes God, has
contact with four circles: viz., the maximum circle of the universe, the circle of the loftiest world, the circle of the loftiest order, and the circle of the loftiest choir. Likewise, these four circles partake, by degrees, of God’s light and being: first the universe partakes; thereafter the loftiest world partakes; then the loftiest order; and lastly, in fourth place, the loftiest choir. You see that, successively, one choir imparts its received light to another choir, until the last choir is reached. Moreover, you must note more particularly that what is found to be present in the universe is also found to be present in each world and in each order, though in modes that differ in degree of absoluteness and contractedness. For example, denary oneness (which symbolizes intelligence), centenary oneness (which symbolizes soul), and millenary oneness (which symbolizes body) are present in one way in the loftiest world, in accordance with the lofty, simple, and noble nature of that world; they are present in another way in the intermediate world and in still another way in the lowest, shadowy world. And in that same loftiest world they are present differently in the loftiest order and in the subsequent orders; but you see that in regard to all [the orders] what is lowest in the higher [order] coincides with what is highest in a lower [order]. Now, the senses that belong to the loftiest world are simpler than is intelligence that belongs to the intermediate world; and the senses that belong to the loftiest order are more perfect than is intellect that belongs to a subsequent order.

Therefore, cause it to be the case that nine denary units and nine centenary units and, in addition, nine millenary units (all of which you will find in the twenty-seven smallest circles) are related to one another according to the numbers of a progression, starting always from absolute oneness; and then you will see how it is that in each world the progression is perfected. If the first 10 of the loftiest world is as 2 and the second 10 is as 3 and the third 10 is as 4, the progression is perfect. If in the second world the first 10 is as 20 and the second 10 is as 30 and the third 10 is as 40, the progression is perfect. Similarly, if in the third, lowest world the first 10 is as 200 and the second 10 is as 300 and the third 10 is as 400, the progression is perfect. Hence, when you view other onenesses in a similar manner, you will see that the oneness-of-intelligence in the lowest world is not of the nature [of oneness-of-intelligence] in the highest world or in the intermediate world; rather, it falls short of their respective simplicity—falls short in conformity with the proportion-of-numbers depicted [in the diagram]. Just as by one standard the school of grammar judges
someone to be intelligent and the school of mathematics judges by another standard and the school of theologians judges by still another standard, so too in accordance with the various standards-of-judgment of the different worlds we have to judge differently about these worlds. Indeed, the judgment of the lowest world is one thing when the lowest world considers itself in isolation and is another thing when the relation of the lowest world to the higher worlds is considered.

Therefore, he who desires to distinguish suitably the limitations of surmises must take account of the foregoing considerations, in order to know how to make the distinctions and know how to consider the distinct things now singularly, now in respective relation to one another, so that in accordance with these relations he may at one time deny and at another time affirm. For example, when the question is asked as to whether the nature of the lowest world has intelligence, you see that the reply must be: intelligence is found there as contracted in conformity with that world but is not found there according to the relation that characterizes a higher world. A similar point holds regarding other examples. For it is not the case that one world either numbers or discourses or does anything else in the way that another world does; rather, each world makes use of its own modes. For example, intelligences are not numbered in the way that stones or animals are numbered; nor do intelligences speak in the way that men do.

PART TWO

I have now explained, more lengthily than is necessary for your very acute genius, all the bases of my surmises. Nevertheless, because of slower minds that perhaps will one day read these words, I see the need to make my conception's simplicity and identity comprehensible in and through [the use of] a variety of many different illustrations. Hence, I will endeavor to explain, partly with the help of practical examples, the points that I have made. When you see in and through these practical examples that one and the same thing shines forth in different ways, you will easily be guided unto all things by the art of surmise. But since my entire effort is most fervent unto the following end, viz., that we experience in ourselves a knowledge of truth, I will set forth certain preliminary explanations of general items-of-knowledge, in order that, at length, you may be able to arrive at the art of
pursuing a knowledge of yourself—\textsuperscript{190}—the art of pursuing it surmisingly, since all preciseness remains hidden from us.\textsuperscript{191}

**CHAPTER ONE**

The deep root of all the sciences that are to be investigated.\textsuperscript{192}

By partaking of the One, all things are that which they are.\textsuperscript{193} Now, the One—a partaking of which constitutes the being of each and every thing—shines forth, in its own way, in each and every thing. Therefore, you have need of no other consideration than that you seek out the identity that is present in the diversity of the things which you are to investigate, i.e., that you seek out the oneness that is present in the otherness. For then you will see, in the otherness of contracted beings, the “modes,” as it were, of Absolute Oneness.\textsuperscript{194} Moreover, all the diagrams will serve, in the way indicated, for investigating all things.

But let variation-of-mode, which results from the diversity of beings, be conceived as if Absolute Oneness were a certain Mode of Absolute Necessity—a Mode received variously in things’ [respective] otherness, so that every being, or every oneness, is a certain mode of Necessity. Just as perceptual sight is a certain mode-of-Necessity of that [Absolute] Sight which is Absolute Necessity, so also rational sight is a certain mode thereof, and intellectual sight is a certain mode thereof. Now, the Divine Sight [i.e., the Absolute Sight] is the Mode that is partaken of variously—the Mode which is Absolute Necessity. But Absolute Sight is related identically to all sight. Therefore, there is [one and] the same Mode present in the investigatable true-nature [veritas]-of-all sight.

But when you propose to give heed rationally to the difference between one thing and another—a difference that comes from the otherness of the mode-of-partaking—you do not doubt that you ought to use the oneness-of-mode in different ways, so that by means of the diagrams you may investigate perceptual sight perceptibly, rational sight rationally, and intellectual sight intellectually. For example, the Diagram P will be of service to you for each and every [kind of] sight.\textsuperscript{195} It will be of service for perceptual sight if you make light [symbolize] perceptible oneness and make shade [symbolize] perceptible otherness. It will be of service for rational sight if you call light discursive light\textsuperscript{196} or rational oneness. Likewise, it will be of service for intellectual sight,
when you make light [symbolize] intellectual oneness. Moreover, if you want to form a surmise about participation, do so in the same way, viz., by postulating [the diagrammatic figure] a as the sight that you want.197

Something similar holds true in regard to the diagram of the universe.198 If you postulate that the circle of the universe is the absolute sight of all its participants,199 you will behold clearly all the varieties of intellectual sight, of rational sight, and of perceptual sight. If you care only about intellectual sight, then in making the largest circle to be the circle of all intellectual acts-of-sight, you will see the things that you are seeking. The case is similar as regards rational sight in a rational way and as regards perceptual sight in a perceptible way. Just as by means of this [surmising] art [you investigate] sight, so, in general, investigate all things by means of it, in such a way that in identity difference is observed and in difference identity is observed. Always be most alert to this [procedure], so that the deceitfulness of words that signify imprecisely may not mislead you; rather, use these suitable modes, as you have heard of them from the few things previously stated, and you will obtain no small benefit.

It is also necessary that again and again you reduce this fundamental doctrine-of-unattainable-preciseness200 to the following consideration: viz., that whenever there seems to you to be perceptible or rational or intellectual preciseness, you admit that that preciseness is indeed precise insofar as it is contracted in the way it is—whose otherness you will behold only when you ascend unto the contraction’s more absolute oneness.201 For example, although reason tells you that 2 + 3 is precisely 5 (because this fact cannot be denied by reason’s judgment), nevertheless when you look unto reason’s oneness,202 viz., unto intellect, the claim that 2 + 3 is 5 will not be true except within the domain of reason. (With regard to the intellect you will find that the number 5 is not greater than the number 2 or the number 3 and that one number is not even whereas another is odd and that one number is not large whereas another is small. For in the domain of intellect you will view reason’s every number as resolved into most simple oneness.)203 Therefore, in the domain of reason preciseness is found to be present only contractedly, viz., in a rational way—even as in the domain of the senses preciseness is present only in a perceptible way. Similarly, when you assert of one thing that another thing is maximally and diametrically opposed to it, you affirm a truth that is precise by the measure of reason but that, intellectual-
ly speaking, lacks preciseness. So too, when you assert that an intelligence’s act-of-understanding is one thing, its act-of-willing another thing, and so on, you state what is true in the intellectual domain but not what is true in God’s domain, where to understand and to will do not differ. Therefore, preciseness is not attained except insofar as it is other—as if all preciseness partook of Absolute Truth (which is God) with a degree of otherness, just as every being partakes of Absolute Being with a degree of otherness.

76 Pay attention, I ask, to the deep root of all the sciences that are to be investigated, since everything that is shown to be precise by reason’s measure is precise because of the fact that it is of the domain of reason. (A similar point holds as regards the senses and also as regards the intellect.) For since reason is the alterity that derives from intelligence’s enfolding-oneness, intelligence is present in reason only with respect to an altered partaking [of it by reason]. Therefore, reason denies that there is an enfolding of opposites, and it affirms the unattainability of enfolded opposites, even as the senses deny that there is a generic, rational oneness of a plurality of perceptible objects. (For example, sight cannot affirm that a sound or that something sweet is of the nature of things perceptible.) Therefore, the root of all rational assertions is the following: viz., that a coincidence of opposites is not attainable. Hence, [as regards reason], every number is either even or odd; hence, there is numerical order; hence, there is numerical progression; hence, there is numerical proportion. Hence, the proportion of the diameter [of a square] to the [square’s] side is an irrational number, because that number would have to be the coincidence of an even number and an odd number. Hence, too, the diameter of a circle is disproportional to the circumference, because reason does not attain the coincidence of such different things.

77 To state many points very briefly: nothing in mathematics can be known by means of any other root [than the root-belief that a coincidence of opposites is unattainable]. Whatever [in mathematics] is demonstrated to be true is [shown to be] true from a consideration of the fact that unless it were true a coincidence of opposites would be implied, and this result would constitute a going beyond reason. Likewise, everything that is shown by reason to be unattainable is unattainable on the basis of the fact that a knowledge of it would imply a coincidence of opposites. And since in mathematics there shines forth this principle [of unattainability], this principle’s manifestations are
most reasonable and, in conformity with reason, are most true; and in these manifestations reason takes delight as in the unfolding of its own power, wherein reason sees itself to partake of intelligence with a degree of otherness. Hence, these sciences are readily accessible, without a teacher, to certain individuals who have a rational capacity that is neither excessively absorbed in intelligence nor excessively contracted in perceptible shadows.

Since the otherness-of-reason is also the oneness-of-the-senses, it is evident that reason both enfold and unfolds perceptible differences. Hence, reason makes inferences—logically, or reasonably—from an enfold to an unfolding, doing so by investigating one and the same thing in terms of difference. For example, there is present in the conclusion of a syllogism the same thing that is present in the premises; but it is in the major premise in an enfolded way, is in the conclusion in an unfolded way, and is in the minor premise in an intermediate way. Hence, in a case where the conclusion enrolls, the major premise unfolds. Therefore, in reason there is (1) an enrolling power, inasmuch as reason is a oneness of perceptible differences, and, likewise, (2) an unfolding power, inasmuch as reason is both the otherness of intellectual oneness and the oneness of things perceptible. Therefore, the rational domain encompasses the coincidence of enrolling and unfolding. Consequently, this rational enrolling and this rational unfolding are not enfoldings and unfoldings of those opposites which coincide only in intellectual oneness. (In the Divine Enfolding all things coincide without difference; in intellectual enrolling contradictories are compatible; in rational enrolling contraries are compatible, insofar as opposed differences are present in a single genus.)

Hence, note that when you number, reason advances unto a coincidence of enrolling and unfolding; for in numbering you unfold oneness and you enfold a plurality into the oneness of some number. For example, when you have numbered up to ten, you have unfolded—ten times—the very well known enrolling-oneness and you have enfolded an unknown plurality into a denary oneness. Therefore, in reason there is a certain coincidence-of-opposites that cannot be attained in the case of things perceptible. Since the senses cannot attain (1) this coincidence of contraries and (2) this preciseness of reason, [then from the senses’ viewpoint] all things, insofar as they exist, exist perceptibly. If they existed in some other way, their existence would imply [for
CHAPTER TWO

The same topic continued, [viz., regarding the deep root of all the sciences that are to be investigated].

He who considers attentively the preceding remarks will have rich surmises. For when he discovers that reason is the sole cause operative in the unfolding of rational inventions, he will [surmisingly] expand upon reason’s powers of replicating [itself] in the varied otherness of its oneness. For example, when you apprehend, by means of reason, that every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, and when you see that the cause of the apprehending is none other than reason itself, you will have a pathway to the profundity of reason. For that [mathematical proposition] must be understood by you as follows: reason, because it is reason, judges in the foregoing way; for in the rational domain the foregoing [mathematical fact] must be the case. For if it be true that a triangle does not have three angles that are precisely equal to two right angles, then it is [true for one of two general reasons]: either (1) because of a coincidence of oneness and plurality, or a coincidence of trinity and oneness, or a coincidence of what is straight and what is not straight, or a coincidence of other diametrical opposites (and in that case, the claim belongs to the intellectual world) or (2) because there is not exhibitable a precisely right angle, or because no two things are precisely equal, or because no three things are precisely equal to two things (and so, the claim belongs to the perceptible world, which veers from rational equality into perceptible otherness). Hence, from these considerations you see very clearly that reason, in a rational way, enfolds within itself truths and that the only cause of reason’s apprehension is that reason is reason and is not intelligence or the senses.

Likewise, when it is said that every quantity [can] be divided, through proportional parts, into ever-further divisibles, reason must concede this. For if [this claim] were not true, reason would be conceding a coincidence of contradictories—something which is judged by reason to be impossible to occur. Therefore, consider that reason alone is, by itself, the cause of all rational arts, and you will see that the root-cause of all the things that are attained by reason is only reason itself. Suppose, then, that you are asked why two sides of any triangle, when joined together, are longer than the third side, or are asked
why the square of the diameter of a square is double the square of its side, or why the square of the side opposite a right angle is equal to [the sum of] the two squares of the other sides, and so on. You will answer that this [judgment] is necessary by reason’s measure because if it were not necessary, then a coincidence of contradiction would result. Similarly, if you happen to be asked why a portion of a circle—a portion constituted by a chord smaller than the diameter and by that chord’s arc—is disproportional to the circle, you will reply that otherwise a coincidence of contradiction would result. Therefore, knowing how to reduce all things to this principle of avoiding a coincidence of contradiction suffices to constitute all the arts that can be investigated by reason.

I once tried affirming that a comparative relation between the diameter and the circumference of a circle is unattainable and inadmissible because of the need to avoid the aforementioned coincidence [of contradictories]; and immediately I saw what had to be affirmed geometrically and what had to be denied. For in the [common] conceptions of our minds and in all the demonstrations of Euclid, or of whomever else, I found this unique rationale [to be applicable] in regard to a variety of figures. Who is it who fails to see—if the two sides of a triangle, when joined together, could be equal to the third side—that the foregoing comparative relation [viz., between the diameter and the circumference of a circle], could be attained? For if every chord is smaller than the arc that it subtends, and if the chord of a smaller arc is more like its own arc than the chord of a larger arc is like its arc, then if we were to admit that the two chords of the half-arcs were equal to the chord of the whole arc, it would be evident that a coincidence of chord and arc would be implied. Likewise, if it were not the case that every exhibitable arc is divisible in half, we would have to reach the same conclusion. So, then, if the oft-mentioned coincidence is to be avoided: the two sides of every triangle, when joined together, must be longer than the third side and every quantity must always be divisible into proportional parts. You will readily find the case to be similar as regards all geometrical demonstrations. I will try to explain one day, if I live long enough, this root of mathematics, in order by means of this explanation, to render the knowledge [of this root] more adequate.

Likewise, then, if you examine the causes of harmony, you will find that otherness cannot exist otherwise than in relation to oneness.
But since otherness is a falling away from oneness, harmony is a binding together of oneness and otherness. However, it is necessary that single oneness progress into a double [oneness] by means of replicating itself. Therefore, the binding together of a single and a double into one thing—by means of a descent of the single and an ascent of the double—is, necessarily, the first harmonic bond.\textsuperscript{229} Likewise, the binding together of a double and a triple is the second harmonic bond;\textsuperscript{230} and the binding together of a triple and a quadruple is the third harmonic bond.\textsuperscript{231} And since oneness is unfolded in four ways,\textsuperscript{232} so too is all harmony. Therefore, all harmony exists by means of the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and their combinations. Therefore, the cause of all harmony arises from the necessity of a rational progression. But why the preciseness of a semi-tone is hidden to reason is because reason cannot attain that preciseness apart from a coincidence of even number and odd number.\textsuperscript{233} You see that perceptible combinations are certain unfoldings of rational oneness. Hence, when rational, harmonic oneness is closely contracted in a combination of things perceptible, reason delights in that harmonic oneness as in its own work or as in its own close likeness. But because precise harmonic oneness cannot be unfolded, harmonic oneness is unfolded variously in a variety of things perceptible. Thus, that which cannot, in any thing, be unfolded precisely as it is, is unfolded variously in various things.

Likewise, the rational course of the science that is called dialectic\textsuperscript{234} arrives at a certain necessity of reasoning. For when enfolding-oneness, which is also a universality, is unfolded in otherness, then from that which is known-in-an-enfolded-way that which was [previously] unknown-in-an-unfolded-way is attained by means of rational inference. Otherwise, intelligence would not be present in reason rationally, and oneness would not be present in number numerically or be present in otherness alterably, and none of all things would exist. Therefore, by the route of reason [the following] are necessary: (1) that a plurality of things be present in one genus generically and be present in one species specifically and be present in a lower species still more specifically and (2) that a species be present in individuals individually and that individuals be present in a species universally. But reason unfolds this unique, deductive art in and through a fourfold otherness. For reason speaks of four quantities of propositions,\textsuperscript{235} four modalities [of propositions],\textsuperscript{236} four syllogistic figures,\textsuperscript{237} and so on. Moreover, logic is nothing other than an art in which the power of reason is unfolded. Therefore, those who naturally excel in power-of-rea-
An orator uses reason to change the minds of his audience if he wants to impress his conception upon them. For he knows it to be suitable to his idea’s reception that his speech be adorned with a suitable proportion. And in order that his speech be endowed with reason, he makes a quaternary of causes, and he contracts it into an all-embracing circle. He looks unto three regions: in the loftiest region he pleads his cause in accordance with the necessity of justice; in the second region he exhibits, for his audience’s similar consideration, the usefulness of his proposal; in the third, and lowest, region he demonstrates that honorableness concurs. And he finds argument-strategies suitable for proceeding—clearly and in an organized manner—from enfolding to unfolding.

If with the help of the aforementioned principles that govern surmises you would like to compose treatises that are more explanatory, then recur to the diagram of all things, and make the largest circle to symbolize reason, and elicit (1) the very lucid, clear, and abstract rational arts and (2) the lowest, more shadowy rational arts and (3) the intermediate rational arts. Do the same thing if you investigate mathematics, so that you make one kind of mathematics to be intellectual mathematics, another kind to be perceptible mathematics, and an intermediate kind to be rational mathematics. Do a similar thing regarding arithmetic, geometry, music. If you wish to become more instructed in music by itself, conceive of the all-encompassing circle as the concept of music, and you will behold one kind of music as intellectual and very abstract music, another kind as perceptible music, and another kind as rational music. In all these regions you will be able to accomplish wonderful things if you focus on these regions with diligent reflection. Do likewise, if you please, as regards perceptible logic, rational logic, and intellectual logic; and do likewise, if you please, regarding perceptible, rational, and intellectual rhetoric and regarding perceptible, rational, and intellectual grammar. You will see wonderful things. For although the rational power is partaken of by all the arts, nevertheless if you apply the higher part of reason to any rational art whatsoever, that part of reason will be—in relation to this same [partaking] art when the art is animated by the lower power of reason—like an intellectual power.
When the human mind investigates by means of reason, it casts out the infinite from the entire circle of its apprehension. And it says (1) that no positable thing differs infinitely from any other thing and (2) that all positable difference is less than infinite and (3) that infinite difference is no more difference than it is agreement. And the human mind conceives, in a similar way, of agreement. Therefore, each thing both agrees with and differs from each other thing; but things cannot agree or differ equally or precisely. For this preciseness exists only apart from the universe.

Therefore, if you understand the foregoing claims to hold true of the perceptible world in accordance with the nature of that world, you will see clearly that everything perceptible has a certain universal agreement with every other perceptible thing—a greater agreement with one thing than with another. Now, conceive of agreement as oneness, and conceive of difference as otherness; and in Diagram P note the mutual progression of the one into the other. Thus, the greater the agreement, the lesser the difference—and vice versa. But agreement proceeds into difference in a fourfold way. (And if you wish to extend these progressions all the way to the cube of 3, you will apprehend the distinctions more clearly.)

Therefore, every perceptible thing has with every other perceptible thing a certain very universal agreement and a certain very specific difference. And in-between that agreement and that difference there are two other things, one of which, because of its generality, is drawn toward the universal and the other of which is somewhat specifically contracted to that which is most specific. Therefore, (1) a union of all perceptible things is wholly common to them all by means of a certain universal nature; (2) another union, which is not so universal, but which is general, is [common] to many perceptible things; (3) another union is somewhat specific; and (4) the last union is most specific. Therefore, every perceptible thing, inasmuch as it is something uniquely particular, agrees with every other thing and with no other thing, and differs from every other thing and from no other thing.
Imagine the center of any one of the smallest circles to symbolize something singular. Insofar as this singular thing is a center, it differs from all the other centers. Insofar as it is a point within the circumference of the universe (i.e., of the largest circle’s content), it has universal agreement with all the points included within the universe’s orbit. And it has general agreement with the points which are enclosed within the next largest circle. And it has somewhat specific agreement with the points which the third largest circle includes; and it has very specific agreement with the points which a smallest circle binds together. Therefore, singularity singularizes all things; specificity specifies all things; generality generalizes all things; universality universalizes all things. For example, in you, O Julian, all things universal, all things general, and all things specific julianize (even as in a lute the harmony lutinizes, in a cithara the harmony citharizes, and so on). This [agreement] cannot be present in someone else in the way it is present in you. But that which julianizing is in you, O Julian, humanizing is in all men and animalizing is in all animals, and so on. But if you plan to proceed to agreements that are more discrete, make a smallest circle into a universal circle, and in this way you will view yourself (1) as agreeing universally with all men and (2) as agreeing generally with those men whom the fifth climatic zone singles out and (3) as agreeing somewhat specifically with those men who are situated in the West and (4) as agreeing most specifically with the Italians. Moreover, make this last smallest circle into a universal circle, and you will see yourself as agreeing (1) universally with the Italians, (2) generally with the Latins, (3) somewhat specifically with the Romans, and (4) most specifically with the Caesarini, from whom you originated.

Indeed, from the aforetaught principles you will obtain all these [same] results with regard to any individual things whatsoever—obtain them with a degree of difference and of agreement by means of a quite true surmise. See to it that you use the given rules proportionally—using them of perceptible things in a perceptible manner, of rational things in a rational manner, of intellectual things in an intellectual manner.

CHAPTER FOUR

Elements.

From the immediately foregoing considerations and from the things
learned earlier, you [can] form, clearly and evidently, a surmise about elements. For if a certain universal agreement of all things indicates that a common first and most universal nature is present in all things, then we surmise that this nature is universally elemental. But if it is shown that in the perceptible world all perceptible things come together in community by means of a most general nature, we surmise that that nature is a general element. Something similar holds true for things that are somewhat specific and for things that are most specific. But—with the proper relationship being preserved as regards all the domains that we are to discuss—I call an element [the following]: a oneness (of whichever region) absorbed in a continuous otherness (of the same region), so that that oneness cannot—because of the smallness of the oneness or of its actuality—exist simply in and of itself. Therefore, that which is composed of elements is not reducible into simple elements, since reduction cannot arrive at what is simple and since a simple element lacks the power of existing actually.

Infer the distinction of elements from the divisions of the general diagram. The community of elements is (1) trine, (2) quadratically trine, and (3) cubically trine. For some elements are more intellectual; others are more rational; but still others are perceptible. Those things which first the senses judge to be elements, reason shows to be composed of elements; and those things which seem to reason to be simple, intelligence understands as composite. Therefore, there is a difference between the gradations of elements, analogous to the difference between points, lines, and surfaces. The perceptible world arrives at nothing simpler than a surface. By contrast, the rational world posits a simple line prior to a surface, whereas the intellectual world posits an indivisible point prior to a line. Likewise, we view some elements as simple letters, others as syllables, still others as words; but what is composed of elements is a sentence. Now, we see that there are trinely distinctive differences between the letters; a similar thing holds true with regard to syllables and words. Therefore, note that by reason’s judgment every positable perceptible thing always remains composed of elements, even though one thing comes closer to an element’s simplicity than does another thing. Likewise, by intellect’s judgment reason does not arrive at a pure element; nor by the judgment of most simple Divinity does intellect arrive there.

Reason conceives of four primary elements as reciprocally uniteable to one another and analyzable into one another. For since the
progression of oneness into otherness occurs in a fourfold way, there
will be a fourfold descent of oneness and a fourfold return on the part
of otherness. For if we conceive of the elements as certain points, be-
cause of their irreducibility to earlier things, then we will easily be
led to know, by means of an infallible ascent, that three elements cannot suffice for constituting a solid. And we know that after the
number 4 the combination of any element with any other element is
not possible. We know this from the [analogous] fact (1) that each
line—whether it be long or short—[is able] to be divided into an ever-
further dividable line and (2) that the division cannot arrive at a point
and (3) that for this reason no more potential points are contained in
one line than in another. Therefore, it will be impossible for a point
to be disconnected from a line, since a point neither is a part of a line
nor does it contain a subsistent oneness. And for the same reason, a
simple line cannot exist separately from a surface, nor can a surface
be detached from a material object. For neither of these latter things
could happen without the separation of a point from a line.

Now, it is evident that a line is located between two points. There-
fore, two points are connected to each other by means of a line; and
three points are connected to one another by means of a very simple
surface that is enclosed by three lines. And by means of a three-
dimensional object four points are secured to one another in a mutual bond. This union—such that each point is connected to each
point—cannot obtain with regard to the number 5. You can experience this fact in the case of all geometrical figures. Therefore,
since a primary surface requires three points (which surface, nev-
evertheless, cannot exist in and of itself) and since four points suffice
for the four surfaces necessary for a primary, three-dimensional ob-
ject, it is evident that four elements are necessary for the com-
position of what is complete. For, as is evident, everything that ex-
ceeds a quaternary of points is not a primary, three-dimensional ob-
ject but is composed of primary, three-dimensional objects, even as a
quadrangular surface, which requires four points, is reducible to tri-
angular surfaces. But a triangular surface, which is primary and is
irreducible to a different and earlier surface, is the beginning of polyg-
onal figures.

Therefore, from the four elements, you will elicit no more than
six lines, from which you will elicit no more than four surfaces—even
as you will behold visually, if you wish to, all these facts in the case
of a triangular pyramid, which contains four points, six lines, and four
triangular surfaces. There are, then, four primary elements, from which [you may elicit] six things and, by means of them, four things. And you see that, necessarily, all these things come together for the composition of an actually existing complete, or three-dimensional, object—just as the [aforementioned] pyramid, which is the primary figure among three-dimensional figures, makes evident. The progression of the four primary elements into a first composite-of-elements constitutes such a very incomplete being (of its region) that that being’s oneness is situated in a flxible and continual mutability.

But since the [four] primary elements must be combinable with one another (so that, clearly, they are for this reason unequal and different), one being comes into existence when one [element] unites the other [three elements], and another being comes into existence when in another [element the other three] are united. Therefore, each of the [primary] elements can enfold within itself the three others (analogously to [the enfolding] cone of a triangular pyramid), so that the oneness of one of the elements is the actuality of the others and so that in this way there arises each element’s own [united] composite-of-elements. Therefore, there are four primary things that are “composites-of-elements.” In the simplest, brightest, and most unitary element the three other elements combined therein have, in the perceptible region, the name “fire.” In the grossest and darkest element the other elements contracted therein have, [in the perceptible region], the name “earth.” In the intermediate [element] that approaches brightness [the other three elements have the name] “air”. In the lower, more-dense [intermediate element the other three elements] have the name “water”. These [four] things, which are commonly called elements—viz., these four very general things that are the [ontologically] first to be composed of elements—enfold within themselves the somewhat specific combinations.

CHAPTER FIVE
How an element is present in that which is composed of elements.

In order to be helped to see, by means of a surmise, how it is that an element is present in that which is composed of elements, look at the previous diagram. If you imagine the entire largest circle to be fire (or air or water or earth), you will see (1) how it is that in it are contained the circles of the other three elements and also (2) how it is
that in the air [that is enfolded] in the fire the other three elements are present; and so on. But this process does not continue beyond four times. Therefore, there is advancement from the universal unto the specific by means of a fourfold progression. Hence, one element universally enfolds within itself three elements; but the three elements generally enfold within themselves nine elements; and the nine specifically enfold within themselves twenty-seven elements. Therefore, the cube of three is the specific unfolding of the oneness of each element. But the species enfolds its own specific elements, just as the specific Latin language has its own specific elemental letters.

Although these specific letters are few, they are of inexhaustible power. Hence, just as a Latin sentence consists of certain very universal letters, of general letters, of somewhat specific letters, and, lastly, of very specific letters—all contracted to the Latin sentence—so too every sensible-particular is like a complete sentence.

Therefore, the unfolding of individuals from any species is inexhaustible and incompletetable. For the potency of the power of the specific oneness encompasses a never-endable number [of individuals], (just as the oneness of the Latin language [encompasses an unendable] number of words that are unmentionable [in advance]). Now, you have heard that infinity coincides with oneness. Therefore, the [just-mentioned potential] infinity of individual things is a oneness of species. Hence, everything that is less than infinite is also less than the infinite’s power. Accordingly, no number can be as great as the power of a species’ oneness. Therefore, the universality of elements ascends into things that are most specific, as a point ascends into a material-object by means of a line and a surface, or as letters ascend into a sentence by means of syllables and words, [or] as potentiality ascends into actuality. And that which is most specifically composed of elements descends into the most universal elements—without which it cannot exist—as actuality descends into potentiality. What is individual is as the end of the outflow of elements and as the beginning of their return-flow; and what is most general is as the beginning of the outflow of elements and as the end of their return-flow. But the most specific power contracts the generality-of-elements within the scope of its own region; and, it makes once-contracted elements flow away, so that they return into generality. In accordance with that likeness the sea is called the universal mother of rivers. For through general passages it is, after a while, contracted very specifically in a spring, from which a stream originates; and, at length, the stream is returned into the sea. By
means of a certain likeness we must think of universal elements as we do of the sea and think of very specific elements as we do of a spring.

It is evident enough to you that no knowledge arrives at the precise composition of elements, since it is impossible that two elements partake equally of the nature-of-elements. Nor is the proportional difference between one [element] and another in any way knowable. Therefore, since knowledge does not arrive at a [geometrical] point, the knowledge of the gradations of elements is accompanied by ignorance, so that in more confused and more general knowledge there is less ignorance, but in more singular presumed-knowledge there is greater ignorance. In this way you see that the knowledge of medicines cannot escape surmise—as also cannot any other knowledge that relies on measurements.

CHAPTER SIX
A clarification.

In order for you intellectually to apprehend what is true, you must not neglect the assertions already made very often. Bear in mind that oneness both is not able to be partaken of and is able to be partaken of, and you will begin to understand the meaning of my assertions. Oneness, in its precise simplicity, cannot be partaken of. But since there is no plurality apart from a partaking of oneness, oneness can be partaken of—partaken of, indeed, as it is [in and of itself] but in terms of otherness. Therefore, reason sees that oneness can be partaken of with a degree of otherness. But when oneness proceeds into otherness, it stops at the number four. Therefore, the number four is a oneness that can be partaken of. Hence, everything that partakes of oneness must partake of it by means of the number four. Therefore, corporeal oneness cannot be partaken of otherwise than in quaternary otherness; exemplar-oneness cannot be partaken of otherwise than in quaternary exemplar-otherness; and color’s oneness cannot be partaken of otherwise than in quaternary otherness. The case is similar as regards truth’s oneness, which can be partaken of only in its quaternary otherness, which can be called a likeness or an unfolding.

Actuality is a oneness that can be partaken of only in otherness. Therefore, actuality is partaken of only with a degree of potentiality (potentia), since potentiality is its otherness. Divinity is Absolute Actuality, which, by the loftiest creatures, is partaken of with the lofti-
est degree of power (*potentia*), viz., *understanding*; by intermediate creatures Absolute Actuality is partaken of with an intermediate degree of power, viz., *living*; by the lowest creatures it is partaken of with the lowest degree of power, viz., *existing*. Moreover, the oneness of sound or of taste or of odor—or of any perceptible thing—cannot be partaken of otherwise than fourfoldly, in the manner explained in Part One. Therefore, the unfolding of oneness is analyzed into a fourfold unfolding. And, hence, we surmise that, as regards all the onenesses that are partaken of, there are four elements which are present differently in each participant. For example, every positable thing that partakes of color’s oneness partakes of it with a fourfold otherness. The case is similar as regards taste, odor, and all other [perceptible] things. Therefore, there can be no color except color with a fourfold otherness. But since no color is exhibitable in its simple oneness, every exhibitable color arises from a simple color in a fourfold way. The case is similar as regards all elements, since neither a simple mixture nor any of all things can be partaken of in their simplicity.

Now, oneness is a certain preciseness that can be partaken of only in terms of otherness. Hence, the preciseness of sight is unimpartible apart from otherness. Therefore, the certainty which there is by means of sight can in no way be partaken of apart from otherness. Therefore, the simplicity-of-certainty, which occurs by means of sight, cannot be partaken of by a diagram or by hearing or by another sense. For example, the preciseness-of-color that is perceived by sight cannot be communicated to a blind man by means of any words. Likewise, a view of the city of Rome or of any form is not communicable, in its preciseness, to him who has not seen it.

You recognize that the true cannot be partaken of otherwise than with a degree of otherness. Therefore, it is necessary that the one true name for each thing be [such as to be] unparticipable, and ineffable, as it is [in and of itself]. Therefore, effable names partake—with a degree of otherness—of the true intellectual name only by means of a rationale or a cause; for reason is the otherness of intellectual oneness. Therefore, in accordance with a cause or a rationale “*homo*” signifies *man*—e.g., in accordance with a material cause, because man comes from what is earthen [*humus*]. Yet, in this cause the three other elemental causes must be present in their own way for constituting a quaternary; nevertheless this cause, [viz., earth], is seen to stand
out. You sufficiently recognize from your own self that the following reason [or cause] is inadequate: “Because he comes from what is earthen [humus], he is a man [homo].” Therefore, participation in oneness originates because of a fourfold otherness.

It is evident that every oneness that can be partaken of in the foregoing way can be partaken of on this side of the infinite but beyond [every] positable number. For example, the oneness of your face, O Julian, can be partaken of in terms of the otherness of a likeness—partaken of beyond every positable number but, indeed, on this side of the infinite. For there is no givable number of [other people's] eyes that cannot [all] partake [visually] of your face—partake of it with a difference of respective likeness—although an [actually] infinite series [of such viewings] is ruled out. The case is similar as regards the oneness-of-your-voice, which you recognize to be partaken of by innumerable ears; and the case is similar as regards all [perceptible] things.

Therefore, on the basis of the plurality of things that partake of any oneness, we are investigating the general arrangement-of-elements that belongs to that oneness’s fourfold otherness. Since we know that a plurality of things partake of the one in different ways, we see that difference originates from fourfoldness. Therefore, all colored things must differ in color; but the differences are reducible to four elemental colors, which every [other color] partakes of in respectively different ways. The case is similar as regards all perceptible things and all natural things and all things pertaining to an art. For example, a partaking of the oneness of the art of grammar cannot occur without elemental differences. For every grammatical sentence partakes of the grammatical art’s oneness by means of that art’s elements. Therefore, every art has its own elements. Moreover, the variety of the many arts instructs us to investigate all the arts’ fourfold partaking [of oneness] by means of elements. Likewise, the variety of the many things perceptible, of the many things rational, and of the many things intelligible shows there to be four elements of a perceptible nature, four elements of a rational nature, and four of an intellectual nature.

Let the foregoing remarks together with my earlier ones, suffice for the art-of-surmise’s generalizing about [the topic of] the root of elements. But when you propose to enter into particular details about the elements, use rules that are proportional to the regions. For example, just as with regard to the perceptible world you surmise that the perceptible elements are fire, air, water, and earth, so with regard to rational nature conceive of rational elements [in such a way] that
reason is, as it were, fiery, aerial, aqueous, and earthen; and conceive that every instance of reason partakes of the oneness of reason by means of these rational elements. Likewise, as regards the intellectual region, conceive symbolically of intellectual elements. And in order that you may make surmises for yourself, conceive of the elements as four onenesses, viz., 1, 10, 100, 1000; for the onenesses of the elements of the one309 must differ [from one another]. But in my earlier statements310 I have said enough about how it is that the one is partaken of in fourfold oneness. For the oneness is partaken of differently and varyingly by all things that are composed of elements—partaken of as if with the simplicity (1) of simple oneness, (2) of denary oneness, (3) of centenary oneness, and (4) of millenary oneness. Thus, in this way, the simple participable [one] is partaken of as if by means of these [things composed of elements]. You now see, on the basis of the illustration of the onenesses, that a subtle element, a gross element, and two intermediate elements are to be surmised311—surmised perceptibly in regard to the perceptible world, rationally in regard to the rational world, and intellectually in regard to the intellectual world.

Pay full attention, O Julian; for Absolute Oneness, which is also Super-ineffable Truth, remains unable to be partaken of as it is [in and of itself]. Now, the nature of intelligence is to understand, i.e., to partake of Truth. But Truth as it is [in and of itself] cannot be partaken of [by intelligence]; rather, Truth remains eternal, and altogether absolute, Infinity. Moreover, Truth [as it is in and of itself] cannot be partaken of by the otherness of our reason, since our reason is the otherness of intelligence.312 Therefore, we partake of Truth [not as it is in and of itself but] in terms of intellectual otherness, above all reason. Therefore, in a certain ineffable manner, immaterial intelligences partake differently and varyingly of Absolute Truth313—partake of it in intellectual otherness by means of four intellectual elements. Likewise, the oneness of such a participating intelligence is partaken of [differently] by a variety of rational minds [rationes] by means of [four] rational elements; and the oneness of a rational ground [ratio] is partaken of varyingly by the otherness of perceptible objects by means of [four] perceptible elements, as, [by way of illustration], the form (ratio) of a trigon is partaken of by different perceptible triangles.

And since things that partake of oneness must partake of it vary-
ingly and in otherness, in such a way that some of them partake of it more perfectly and more proximally, whereas others of them partake of it less perfectly and less proximally, the following partaking will be beautiful: viz., that partaking in which the power of the oneness shines forth more unitedly and more concordantly in the otherness. By way of illustration: visible color in which a variety of colors shines forth in a oneness is the more pleasing to sight; and the sense of hearing rejoices to hear a variety of voices in unison, or in concordance. The case is similar as regards every sense, all reason, and all intelligence. Therefore, ineffable is that joy which is present when someone attains, amid a variety of intelligible truths, the Oneness of Infinite Truth. For in the otherness of intellectually visible things he sees the Oneness of all beauty, he hears intellectually the Oneness of all harmony, he tastes intellectually the Oneness of all delectable sweetness, he apprehends the Oneness of all causes and rationales, and he embraces, with intellectual joy, all things in Truth, which alone [is what] he loves.

CHAPTER SEVEN

[The numbers] six, seven, and ten.

A progression that turns back on itself circularly is numbered by the number six. But a progression that does not turn back on itself but proceeds unto something else that is similar is numbered after six and, indeed, by seven. There are, then, two necessary progressions, which are measured by the number ten. Consider these matters one by one.

You saw a little while ago that oneness coincides intellectually with infinity. Therefore, Absolute Oneness coincides with Absolute Infinity; intellectual oneness coincides with intellectual infinity; rational oneness coincides with rational infinity, even as perceptible oneness coincides with perceptible infinity. All oneness is indivisible, incorruptible, and incapable of being partaken of [as it is in and of itself]. Therefore, Absolute Oneness can be partaken of only in intellectual otherness; intellectual oneness can be partaken of only in rational otherness; and rational oneness can be partaken of only in perceptible otherness. Therefore, God, who is Absolute Oneness, is attained only intellectually; intelligence is attained only rationally; and reason is attained only perceptibly. And so, Absolute Oneness de-
scends unto intellectual infinity; [intellectual oneness descends unto rational infinity]; and rational oneness descends unto perceptible infinity. But perceptible oneness ascends unto rational infinity; rational oneness ascends unto intellectual infinity; intellectual oneness ascends unto Absolute, Super-divine Infinity.

With regard to this [descent and ascent] reason counts to six. For (1) the beginning of the outflow and the end of the return-flow coincide in Absolute Oneness, which is Absolute Infinity. And (2) the end of the outflow and the beginning of the return-flow coincide in perceptible oneness. And (3-6) the [two] intermediates are doubled. All together this makes six. Consider this circular course by means of a diagram.

Let $a$ be Absolute Oneness, $b$ intellectual oneness, $c$ rational oneness, $d$ perceptible oneness, $e$ rational oneness, and $f$ intellectual oneness. Just as the six radial chords of the subtended circumference turn back fully on themselves, so by means of the number six the descent and the ascent form a circle. However, if you want to embrace the truth, you must notice that light’s descending is nothing other than darkness’s ascending. And God’s being in the world is nothing other than the world’s being in God. And for actuality to proceed into potentiality is nothing other than for potentiality to arrive at actuality. And a point’s ascending into corporeality is nothing other than corporeality’s descending into a point. And for darkness to elevate itself into light is nothing other than for light to descend into darkness. Likewise, for the potentiality of matter to proceed into the actuality-of-form is nothing other than for form’s actuality to descend into matter’s potentiality. Therefore, with intellectual acumen conjoin the ascent and the descent, in order that you may surmise more truly. With this understanding, then, conceive of the perfection-like circularity of the
number six, so that you may be able to see that the measure of perpetuity is ascribed to the number six and that for what is most universal to proceed into what is most specific is for the most specific to return into the most universal.

108 But a sevenfold number of progressions arises from a sixfold number of progressions, as time and succession arise from perpetuity. You will experience this number of progressions in regard to things generable and corruptible. For example, when from a seed a tree arises, and from a tree a seed, then a sevenfold [number of progressions] includes them both. For a seed ascends first into a sprout, then into a bush, and afterwards into a tree; the tree descends into a branch, [then] into a twig, and [afterwards] into a fruit, or a seed. This last seed is, in number, other than the first seed. Therefore, since the end does not coincide in number with the starting-point but the end of the outflow does coincide with the beginning of the return-flow, a sevenfold [number of progressions] rightly arises, and from it comes a tenfold [number of progressions].

For if $a$ is as the seed, $d$ as the tree, $g$ as another seed, and $k$ as another tree, then $a$ arrives at $d$ by way of $b$ and $c$, and $d$ arrives at $g$ by way of $e$ and $f$, and the number seven is reached. But $g$ ascends to $k$ by way of $h$ and $i$; in this way the number ten is reached. The individual contraction of the species—the contraction that is present in $a$, the seed—is corruptible in and of itself but is incorruptible in the species. Striving to preserve itself by means of the power-of-species that is present contractedly in it, the individual contraction, while seeking to reduce itself [for a time] to the species, casts aside the individuation of the seed, in order to be able to elicit from itself—through the intermediary of the species—something similar [to itself].
Therefore, by means of a fourfold progression [the individual contraction, i.e., the seed], ascends into a tree; for without the interme-
diacy of a tree [the seed] cannot replicate itself in a likeness-of-
species. Therefore, a aims to produce g; and since it cannot accom-
plish this without an ascent unto d, it ascends unto d in order in this 
way to arrive at its goal. But d, being a tree and seeing that it can 
preserve itself only in a similar tree, aims at k. But d cannot arrive at 
k without g. Therefore, d descends unto g in order by means of g to 
be able to reach k. And so, in a two strivings are combined: a natur-
al striving, which comes to an end in g, and an accidental striving, 
which comes to an end in d. But, likewise, two strivings are combined 
in d: a natural striving, which comes to an end in k, and an acciden-
tal striving, which comes to an end in g. And so, in this way, in g there 
is a natural striving that is communicated to g from a, and there is 
an accidental striving that is impressed on g from d. In this way you 
see (1) that one [kind of] striving stimulates and guides another [kind], 
so that there is a continuation of generation and corruption, and (2) 
that the generation of the one thing is the corruption of the other. But 
you will notice that you can arrive at this knowledge only from [a 
knowledge of] two seeds and two trees—which make four. Therefore, 
in your intellect you must enfold both the progression a, d, g and the 
progression d, g, k, in order to bring into an unfailing succession the 
coincidences of the end of the one thing and the beginning of the other 
thing.

Consequently, notice that, according to the aforesaid, the oneness-
of-the-seed, which, [as it is] in itself cannot be partaken of, puts on 
participability in otherness, viz., in arboreal otherness. Moreover, the 
tree’s oneness, which, [as it is in itself], cannot be partaken of, puts 
on participability in the otherness of its seeds. Therefore, the oneness 
of the oneness of this seed, [viz.,] the species, is contracted individu-
ally in this seed. This specific oneness—freed from its contractedness 
in this seed and received in the tree—can be partaken of by many 
seeds, since it is an indeterminate power. And so, the general nour-
ishment is determined specifically in accordance with the specific 
power of the [original] seed; and the number of [produced] seeds, as 
well as their perfection, is determined specifically according to the 
nature of the tree, its location, and its circumstances.327

I have spoken about seeds and trees. But endeavor to elicit a uni-
versality, in order that in accordance with these examples you may 
make surmises in regard to minerals, vegetables, animals, and all other
perceptible things. Moreover, use these examples symbolically in regard to things rational and things intellectual. For example, from the seed of wonderment there arises a rational tree, which bears fruit similar to wonderment. And through the elicited wonderment the rational tree erects a similar rational tree. Similarly, from the seed-like beginning of demonstration there proceeds an intellectual tree that produces from itself seminal beginnings through which an intellectual tree ascends again.

CHAPTER EIGHT
Difference of individuals.

It is evident enough to you that among perceptible things there are individual seeds and, likewise, [individual] trees. Moreover, you see that among animals, which are as trees, some are male and others are female. Similarly, it is necessary that some seeds be male and that others be female. Therefore, if the Diagram $P^{330}$ is conceived of as a species, in which the descending light symbolizes actuality and the shadowy area symbolizes potentiality, it will be clear to you (1) that, with respect to the species, the actuality absorbs the potentiality and vice-versa and (2) that in accordance therewith individuals partake of the nature of the species. Moreover, if the actuality, in order to be determined more specifically, is analyzed as being the Diagram $P$, then the light will be the actuality’s maleness and the darkness will be its femaleness. The case is similar as regards potentiality.

Now, it is necessary both that things male differ from one another and that things female differ from one another. For example, no individual male can be found to agree precisely in maleness with any other male; nor is there positable a thing that is maximally male. Therefore, femaleness is absorbed differently within every instance of maleness. Hence, too, we see that in male animals there appear female traits, e.g., indications of breasts. Likewise, seeds are related [to one another] as opposites. Therefore, everything individual absorbs by its unique individuation other things, as femaleness is absorbed within your individual maleness. Just as a seed from which there has sprung forth into actuality that which comes from a male seed has prevailed over femaleness, so in its own manner femaleness absorbs maleness. The male seed also absorbs within itself what is female, and by its own power it encompasses both actual maleness and actual femaleness. The opposite holds true of a female seed.
We know that these individuals partake variously of the species. Certain individuals partake of the species more perfectly in terms of a seed; others partake of the species more perfectly in terms of a tree. The more base the species is and the more it is in a state of potentiality, the more the *seeds* partake of the nature of the species. But the more noble, perfect, formal, and actual the species is, the more [perfectly] the *trees* partake of its nature. And where *trees* partake [more perfectly of the species], those trees which are the more male partake the more perfectly; but where *seeds* partake more perfectly, those seeds which are more female partake the more perfectly. Hence, a pear-tree is more noble than is a pear,\(^3\) and the male lion is more noble than is the lioness and than is leonine seed; but the opposite is true in the case of wheat, where the seed is better than is the chaff. And so on. For where a *tree* partakes more [perfectly] of the condition of the incorruptible species (viz., because it yields from itself fruit, while retaining the power to yield more fruit), the tree partakes more of the perfection of the species. But where a *seed* contracts more [perfectly] the nature of the incorruptible species and where the tree’s power fails after its production [of the fruit]—fails because the entire [power of the tree] proceeds into the [produced] seed (as, for example, occurs in the case of grains of wheat, of winter wheat, of oats, and of other similar things)—then the grain, or seed, is more perfect [than is the "tree"], and in that case the seed that is more female is the more noble. But no seed can be found that is so female and so in a state of potentiality that there could not be a seed that is more in a state of potentiality. Likewise, no tree [can be found] that is so in a state of complete actuality that there could not be [a tree that is in a] greater [state of actuality]. Therefore, every positable individual thing partakes of these differences variously and differently. For in the sprout [from which a tree comes] the tree partakes more [perfectly] of the nature of the [original] seed, and in its trunk [it partakes of it] less [perfectly]. And an infant [tree] during its infancy partakes more [perfectly] of the nature of the seed than does [an adolescent tree] during its adolescence. But a full-grown tree—which partakes more perfectly of the nature of the species insofar as the tree has sprung forth into actuality from the potentiality of the seed and insofar as in this way it retains the unfolded nature of the seed—produces fruit in the likeness of the seed. And since the tree is as an unfolded conduit of the seminal power, it distributes within itself the moistness and determines it specifically according to the unfolded nature. Indeed, the tree perfectly
determines [the moistness] in a specific way if the power of the seed is both perfect and perfectly unfolded and if the nourishment is perfect and perfectly determinable in a specific way. Therefore, as is necessary, both [the nourishment and the power of the seed] should be taken account of.

Hence, we see that in fertile soil and as a result of excellent nourishment certain kinds of grain yield more perfect specimens than themselves, although this [more perfect yielding] happens successively, because in the first year [the yield] is not as perfect as it is in the subsequent years. And, conversely, we see that in a sterile field [even] the best kinds of grain bear poor-quality fruit; however, their quality is not as poor as is [that of] other, less excellent, specimens of grain. Hence, an excellent specimen of grain becomes successively like a poor quality of grain because of [its receiving] nourishment that is disproportionate to its excellence. Therefore, because of a difference of nourishment and of locations, individual [specimens of grain] must differ.

Note, too, that although the nourishment is determined in a specific way and although its potency is absorbed by the formal power of the species, nevertheless the nature of the nourishment cannot be completely and fully absorbed in every respect—as you see when a [branch of] a pear tree is grafted into an apple tree. The moistness that in the trunk of the apple tree has received the form of the apple tree (1) receives, in the ingrafted branch of the pear tree, the form of a pear tree and (2) becomes individuated into a pear. However, this pear is not free of the entire nature of the apple tree, although the nature of the apple tree is hidden in the pear and although [the apple tree’s power] is less great to the extent that the power of the [ingrafted] pear-shoot is more great; and, in subsequent times, as the specific power of the pear-branch becomes successively weakened, more of the nature of the apple tree is manifested. A similar phenomenon holds true of location. For example, a German in Italy acts more like a German during his first year than during his second year. For the location progressively imposes its character upon him who is located there, depending upon the strength of the location’s nature. We experience these matters not only perceptibly in the perceptible world but also rationally in the rational world—as in the case of mores and customs and rational doctrines, which are certain kinds of [rational] food. You ought also to take note of these matters intellectually in regard to the intellectual nature.
CHAPTER NINE

The different modes of being.

From the aforesaid you will infer sufficiently well what I mean; and, if you wish, you will conceive—by means of a certain general art—of the differences among surmises and also among surmisers. For just as some surmises are confused perceptible-surmises and other surmises are truthlike rational-surmises and still others are true intellectual-surmises, so also there are different surmisers. Accordingly, certain surmisers operate in the domain of the confused world of the senses; certain others make rational inferences from principles; and still others give attention to intellectual absolutes. For the unitary surmising that goes forth unto that which is surmised has its own four elements: viz., subtlety, grossness, and two intermediates. (1) Surmise goes forth, with very keen subtlety, upwardly as does fire; and it beholds things’ respective mode-of-being—beholds it in a certain Absolute Oneness, or Absolute Necessity. (2) But when surmise surmises grossly and in an earthly way, it conceives of a darkened mode-of-being in terms of possibility. And it effects two other modes-of-being. (3) One of these two modes approaches Absolute Necessity; and it is the mode without which the true thing cannot be understood; indeed, it is a mode of secondary necessity and secondary implication. For example, when true humanity is posited as existing necessarily, then following upon this true humanity there come, necessarily, those things without which it cannot exist. (4) But the second [intermediary] mode-of-being is closer to possibility and originates above possibility but below that which was just spoken of, [viz., the mode of secondary necessity]. Insofar as it is an actual mode-of-being, it has little necessity but has much possibility.

You will see the foregoing points by means of the Diagram $P$, in which oneness is necessity and in which otherness is possibility. All things return into one and the same thing, in accordance with what you have already heard. Therefore, one who is surmising pursues the various modes-of-being most easily by means of the art of depiction, so that he sees how it is that one mode is received and absorbed by another mode. And he distinguishes, and makes inferences about, the variety of partakers of these modes-of-being, so that in accordance with one mode-of-being he conceives of a thing in its darkened possibility and in accordance with another mode-of-being he conceives of this same thing in its actuality. Similarly, he attains both the modes-
of-surmising and the variety of surmisers who partake of these modes. Moreover, [he attains] the modes of duration, so that there is one mode of duration as regards the mode-of-being of Absolute Necessity and there is another mode [of duration] as regards [the mode-of-being] of possibility. (1) For infinite duration is characteristic of Absolute Necessity, for that which is unqualifiedly Necessary cannot exist otherwise [than as it does exist]. Therefore, it does not go forth into otherness. Hence, it is Absolute Eternity. (2) However, the mode of possible being is present only in a state of otherness. (3) But [the mode] of actual [being] has some stability and much possibility. (4) [And the mode] of secondary necessity has much stability and little otherness.

Similarly, [a surmiser] distinguishes the modes-of-being of motion, and thereafter he contracts these and similar modes-of-being, so that with regard to the perceptible world he surmises perceptibly about them, with regard to the rational world he surmises rationally about them, and with regard to the intellectual world he surmises intellectually about them. He surmises that these modes-of-being of the three regions are connected to one another, so that there is a single universe. Hence, he acknowledges that supreme perceptible necessity is rational possibility, and he affirms that supreme rational necessity is intellectual possibility. In this way he sees that the four modes-of-being are resolved into the number ten, which is the universal number.

CHAPTER TEN

Differences among things composed of soul and body.

Examine the Diagram P, and construe oneness as soul but otherness as body. Corporeality passes upward into immateriality; spirit passes downward into corporeality. But since spirit’s descending is body’s ascending, you must combine them both, in order so to infer a difference among bodies from a difference among souls that, likewise, you may infer a difference among those souls from [a consideration of their respective] body. That a human soul causes its body to differ from the bodies of other [men and] animals occurs also because of the fact that such a body demands a distinctive spirit. For example, Plato’s being Plato makes him different from all other men, and this difference arises both because of the oneness of his soul and the otherness of his body. Therefore, those such as the physiognomists, who by means of perceptible objects investigate the disposition of souls, ob-
serve a body; and from the differences and the agreements of that body with [the bodies of] other men and animals they seek to detect a difference of spirit. Hence, it is that we know from experience that those who are supple in body are agile in mind.\textsuperscript{351}

Moreover, animals’ movements from place to place—in accordance with which movements animals differ from plants—ought to be traced back not only to the body’s needs but also to the soul’s. For an animal changes its location not only in order to gather required food but also in order to perfect the operations of its soul. One animal excels another in swiftness, in hunting, in industriousness not only because it needs these traits for preserving its bodily constitution but also because its spirit requires these traits. Likewise, man is endowed with quite great power of reason not in order, on account of his body’s needs, to know how to sow, to plant, to engage in commerce, to build, to weave, to cook, and so on. Rather, the Supreme Artificer caused this rational nature to descend unto the body in order for the body to ascend unto a rational nature; for the perceptible body is subject to reason, and the body is made to engage in the foregoing tasks only for the sake of its spirit. For just as the body because of its own needs is seen to seek such a rational nature, so this subtle spirit\textsuperscript{352} requires the kind of noble body which has these needs.\textsuperscript{353} The spirit exists for the sake of the body for no other reason than that the body exists for the sake of the spirit. For the spirit turns back on itself. Therefore, each perceptible animal differs from each [other perceptible animal] by means of a joint-difference that proceeds from the difference between its spirit and its body.

It is necessary that every spirit differ from every other spirit and that every body differ from every other body. However, there is no difference without agreement. Therefore, it is necessary that every spirit both agree with and differ from every other spirit. But this [agreement or disagreement] cannot occur in equal measure. [One spirit] agrees more with a second spirit, less with a third; and with no other spirit does it agree in any respect maximally or in any respect minimally. Therefore, since a given spirit differs from any other given spirit in such a way that it could always differ less (by means of a difference that could always be lesser, but without this progression’s continuing on unto infinity), it differs by a disproportional comparative relation, in such a way that the comparative relation between one spirit’s nature and another’s could always be closer, but
without there being a progression unto infinity. Therefore, a precise
difference of comparative relation is unattainable. Therefore, one spir-
it agrees with another spirit in terms of a concordant difference.

Hence, a more darkened spirit is related to a more illumined spir-
it in accordance with Diagram P. For oneness-of-spirit goes forth into
otherness, and otherness-of-spirit returns into oneness. However, in the
case of supreme, most noble spirits the perceptible but darkened oth-
erness is absorbed by the intellectual brightness, whereas in the case
of lower spirits the oneness-of-spirit (which can be called intellectual
oneness) is absorbed by the otherness-of-spirit. Hence, a vegeta-
tive spirit conceals in its darkness an intellectual spirit, but cer-
tain signs of the intellectual spirit appear in the branches for support-
ing the fruit and in the leaves and coverings for protecting the fruit.
However, we experience more numerous intellectual signs in animals,
where the intellectual spirit is more visible. For we experience more
clearly and more closely signs of intellectual activity [first] in animals’
powers-of-sense, then to a greater degree in their power-of-imagina-
tion, and to a still greater degree in their power-of-reason. Moreover,
among animals with reasoning powers there are more fully vis-
ible signs of foresight in the case of men than in the case of other an-
imals. From these signs we infer that, in the case of men, there is
brighter intelligence. Similarly, in the case of intelligences we
affirm that the perceptible nature is concealed in, and absorbed by,
the intellectual light. But the [human] soul’s reason we conceive of
as intermediate between its lowest and its highest [operation] and,
therefore, as partaking more of the higher nature of intellectual one-
ness in the case of some men but as partaking more of the lower [spir-
it-of-]otherness in the case of other men.

Hence, we say that in the lower world all things are present in ac-
cordance with the nature of that world, in the intermediate world they
are present in an intermediate way, and in the highest world they are
present in the highest way, i.e., in the manner of that world’s nature.
For example, the power-of-sense that is present in things that vege-
tate, by means of which power these things sense very intense cold
and extreme heat, is of a vegetative nature; the power-of-sense in an-
imals is of an animal nature; the power-of-sense in intelligences is of
an intellectual nature. A similar point holds true regarding the power-
of-reason and the power-of-intellect. For example, the intellectual sub-
tlety in things that vegetate, through which subtlety [a plant or a tree]
sends forth [supporting] branches on account of the heaviness that results from its suspended fruit.\textsuperscript{360} is of a vegetative nature. But the intellectual subtlety in animals, by means of which animals hunt and safeguard for future need that which is sought, is of an animal nature. And in the highest beings the intellectual subtlety is wisdom, which leads to truth. Therefore, in its own way each spirit partakes of the elements of the nature of spirit, even as [in its own way each] body [partakes of the elements] of corporeal [nature]. These [truths] are most evident to you from what I have often said, since there is but a single procedure for all the progressions.

125 But, as regards every animal: when you construe its soul as \textit{oneness} and construe its body as \textit{otherness}, then those things which you behold as present in the body in a corporeal and unfolded way\textsuperscript{361} as present in the soul (as in an enfolding power) in a soulish way, i.e., as present in the power-of-oneness of that same unfolded corporeal nature.\textsuperscript{362} In regard to your body you see that your head, hands, and feet differ in function according to their degree of nobility. Likewise, in the case of your soul, make the intellect to be, metaphorically, the head, reason to be the hands, and the senses to be the feet. For just as the body walks and is conveyed in a bodily way by the feet, so also the soul, by means of the senses, goes forth in a soulish way unto perceptible objects; and the soul uses reason as its hands; and it uses intellect as the power that unifies the senses, so that in the soul the intellect is the head and is the more noble part. In the ambit of intellectual power the intellect is analogous to the eye in the head.

126 By means of such symbolical pursuits ascend from the unfoldedness of corporeal nature unto the power-of-soul; and conceive of each animal’s power-of-soul as contractedly enfolded in the way that you surmise to be unfolded its variety of body. For example, conceive of a lion’s soul as having, metaphorically, an intellectual head, perceptual feet, and rational hands in accordance with the contraction of its oneness, viz., its leonineness—even as we affirm these things to be present in a man in a human way. And so on.\textsuperscript{363}

127 Now, by means of the reasoning by which [you have already inferred] all [previous points] infer from our diagrams all the distinctions between bodies. For if you construe corporeal subtlety as \textit{oneness of light} and construe corporeal grossness as \textit{otherness}, then you will readily behold the solutions that are being sought. Likewise, indeed, if you propose to pursue [the issue of why there is] a variety of phys-
tical constitutions, conceive of a well-harmonized, perfectly compact,
and perfectly united oneness of light; but take otherness to be alter-
able and incompact and to be discordance rather than concordance.

So too, if you wish to investigate (a) the immaterial body or (b)
the corporeal spirit, you will notice that in between (1) the bright spir-
it that descends into the darkened body and (2) the returning corpo-
real grossness two means-of-union intervene—(3a) one that is more
immaterial and (3b) another that is more corporeal. Now, the one
which more approximates spirit does not escape the entire bodily do-
main; hence, it can be called an immaterial body. But let the other one,
being lower and closer to corporeal grossness but not escaping the
entire domain of spirit, be called a corporeal spirit. In this way con-
sider there to be three gradations of the descending spirit and three
gradations of the ascending body, from which gradations there
exist, in their own way, the universe and everything that is in it. For
(1) we experience that in animals there is a soul, or a certain im-
material nature. (2) We experience that a corporeal spirit, enclosed in
the arteries, is the soul’s means of union [with the body]. (3) We
experience that there is a certain light, or an immaterial body,
through which the power of the soul operates on the body and on what
is perceptible. Consequently, in the foregoing [two] ways the power
of the soul is united to the body by these [two] intermediaries—unit-
ed in order to exercise its operations. And this descent of the soul’s
union [with the body] is also the ascent of the body’s union [with the
soul], since [the body] is made to be so subtle that it is united quite
suitably to the spirit, [or soul]. But in their own manner all percepti-
ble things partake of these [ascendings and descendings], which are
found in a perceptible thing more clearly or more obscurely, more cor-
ruptibly or more incorruptibly in accordance with general and specif-
ic differences and agreements.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Life.

Moreover, if you wish to view in terms of its differences a life, for
example, of form or of spirit or of anything else, then first of all an-
alyze it in terms of the Diagram P in accordance with the oneness
of light and the otherness of darkness. In this way you will behold that
noble life in the brightness of whose oneness all otherness is absorbed.
And, on the other hand, you will behold another life, whose oneness
is enveloped in the otherness of fleeting and inconstant darkness. And if in the universal Diagram [U] you construe life itself as the universe, then you will distinguish, quadratically and cubically, three lives. Hence, by this procedure you will arrive, surmisingly, (1) at incorruptible life and (2) at alterable life, as well as (3a) at more nearly incorruptible life and (3b) at more nearly alterable life—and at subdivisions of these. But in between the life [viz., 2] in which the triumph of otherness brings corruptibility of the oneness (or destruction of the oneness) and the life [viz., 1] in which the triumph of the oneness brings incorruptibility, there cannot be (as I have stated very often) any exact middle-point such that [that exactly middle life] is neither corruptible nor incorruptible and yet is of the nature of the aforementioned differences [of life]. Hence, in order that lower life be united to higher life within one single universe, higher life must also be united to lower life. Therefore, [as regards] this one composite [of higher and lower life], a composite which exists both from life wherein oneness triumphs and from life wherein otherness triumphs: in accordance with the condition of lower life [this composite life] advances toward otherness and is enveloped in corruptibility; but in accordance with the nature of higher life it approaches the oneness of incorruptibility.

Therefore, as is evident: such [a composite of higher and lower life] is [a composite] of a corruptible and of an incorruptible life; and this [combining] occurs in respectively different ways for those partaking of this union. Therefore, the death of such [composite] beings is not different from the death of other mortal beings, for [such a composite being] tends toward dissolution because of its flux-of-otherness. Therefore, the oneness of its incorruptible life remains stable, although its alterable oneness veers away from the harmonic root of its oneness. However, intellectual life, raised upward toward incorruptible truth, cannot be moved toward corruptible otherness. Therefore, the lowest specific gradation of this [incorruptible] nature, being only slightly actual and being almost completely, as it were, in potentiality, possesses a certain capability of union with transitory life. [It possesses this capability] not in order to furnish to its transitory life the vigor of stability; rather, [it possesses it] in order that by means also of this union it might be rationally moved through a wondering at perceptible things and might, while in its state of drowsy potentiality, be aroused unto, and awakened unto, a state of actuality. It is not possible that this specific gradation of the union of both
[kinds of] life, [viz., corruptible and incorruptible], be replicated\textsuperscript{381} so that there would be a plurality of species of this union, although it is necessary that individuals partake in different ways of this species.

Therefore, (1) indissoluble life is intellectual life, whereas (2) dissolvable life is perceptual life. But (3a) that middle life which is nearer to intellectual life is a rational, noble, and intellectual life—a life which can also be called a life of intellectual perceiving. On the other hand, (3b) that middle life which is nearer to the senses is rational, is less than noble, and is imaginative—or can be called a life of perceptual understanding. Therefore, in the human species, a higher power-of-reason that partakes of intellect is joined with a lower power-of-reason that is of a perceiving nature.

By means of such a surmise you will be able to attain those [truths] which our discussion about life can investigate.

CHAPTER TWELVE
Nature and art.

Nature is oneness; art is otherness, because art is a likeness of nature. In accordance with the intellectual mode of discourse God is both Absolute Nature and Absolute Art, although the truth is that He is neither Art nor Nature nor both [Art and Nature]. Now, since preciseness is unattainable, [its unattainability] cautions us that there is not to be believed to be positable anything that is only nature or only art; for everything, in its own way, partakes of them both. For it is easy to conceive that intelligence, insofar as it emanates from Divine Reason, partakes of an art;\textsuperscript{382} but insofar as intelligence brings forth from itself an art, we see intelligence to be a nature.\textsuperscript{383} For art is a certain imitation of nature.\textsuperscript{384} It is evident that some perceptible things are natural, whereas others are products of an art. But it is not possible that perceptible things that are natural be devoid of art; likewise, perceptible things that are products of an art cannot lack a nature. For example, speech proceeds from an art, on which its nature is dependent. Thus, one pattern of speech is more natural for one man, whereas another pattern of speech is less natural for him. Moreover, it is natural to man to make rational inferences, though not [to do so] without [the help of] an art. Hence, it is certain that in the art of reasoning one man is more able than is another man. For just as with regard to speech (which cannot occur without an art) a natural oneness-of-reason shines forth, so that from someone’s speech we know who he is
and what kind of man he is in regard to his reason and his nature, so
too the art of the one who is reasoning is manifested in his reasoning.

Therefore, if you wish to investigate the differences of nature and
of art and of their union, recur to the [already] oft-disclosed guidance
from diagrams. Masculine nature comes from oneness, whereas fem-
inine nature comes from otherness. Now, in intellectual masculinity,
femininity is absorbed; therefore, [the intellect] is impregnated uni-
tively within itself. In vegetable femininity otherness retains the
masculine nature within itself; therefore [plants and trees] bear fruit
outside themselves. But nature distinguishes the sex of animals: a man
begets in a woman; a woman gives birth by expelling. Now, in intel-
ligences nature bears intellectual fruit; in animals, animal fruit; in vege-
tables, vegetable fruit. Perceptible nature obeys rational nature; ra-
tional nature obeys intellectual nature; intellectual nature obeys the Di-
vine Nature. What is perceptibly makeable obeys a rational art; a ra-
tional art obeys an intellectual art; an intellectual art obeys the Divine
Art. Just as in what-is-perceptible every nature is contracted percep-
tibly, so also in what-is-perceptible makeability is contracted per-
ceptibly and in what-is-rational makeability is contracted rationally.

Reason is the oneness of perceptible nature and of perceptible art.
Through a oneness-of-rationale a perceptible multitude of individuals
is determined specifically. So too, through a oneness-of-rationale
that is in one art—for example, in the art of cobblerynumerous
shoes are made. Therefore, oneness-of-reason enfolds within itself the
multitude of all perceptible things, both things natural and things pro-
duced by an art. Therefore, it brings forth from itself the forms of
things natural and of things produced by an art. But the forms of things
produced by an art are ordered toward the goal of natural things. For
nature is the source and the goal of things produced by an art. There-
fore, a rational art—e.g., speaking, weaving, planting, or cooking, and
so on—is ordered toward the goal of perceptible nature, even as the
art of intelligence is ordered toward the goal of rational nature.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Universal nature—like the circle of the universe [in Diagram U]—
enfolds within itself, first of all, the three spheres of (1) the intel-
lectual regions and natures, (2) the rational regions and natures, and
(3) the perceptible\textsuperscript{392} regions and natures. The intellectual nature, which absorbs into itself alterable areas of darkness, is masculine, subtle, very highly unified, and very noble. Yet, the nature of intelligence is not quantitative; and intellectual motion is only intellectually and metaphorically of a quantitative sort—a sort that is not at odds with simplicity, indivisibility, etc., which are characteristic of intellectual oneness. For the movement of the intellect unto otherness occurs in no other way than that otherness proceeds, quite absolutely, unto oneness. For intellect’s oneness\textsuperscript{395} descends unto the rational-intelligible, so that the rational-intelligible ascends unto intellect’s oneness. For intellect is the beginning and the end of the rational-intelligible, even as intellect’s Beginning and End is Absolute Oneness.\textsuperscript{394} Intellect’s proceeding toward union with Absolute Oneness is (1) its moving upwards, in accordance with its intellectual nature, and (2) its finding rest in this movement—even as reason finds rest in intelligence, unto which it can ascend only by means of (a) a descent of intelligence and (b) a receiving, by way of participation, of intelligence’s light.

Likewise, do not conceive of [reason] as a rational quality of intellect’s nature; but, rather, conceive of [reason] as a rational, altered likeness [of intellect’s nature]. For intellect has no accident and is not a subject for reason or the senses; nor does intelligible nature have location otherwise than intellectually; indeed, it has [intellectual] location in such a way that it is its location. And this [state of having intellectual location] does not consist in intellect’s being in a place that is observable by reason or by the senses. Nor does it follow that intellect is absolutely everywhere and absolutely nowhere, as is God. Rather, intellect is everywhere and nowhere in an intellectually contracted way. Just as humanity,\textsuperscript{395} which is contracted as a species, is present both everywhere and nowhere in that regional species, so too our soul is present everywhere and nowhere in accordance with the body’s contractedness. For our soul is both present in each part of that region of its own and present nowhere. For in no part of the body is it present as in one place rather than in another. For just as universals are in the intellect\textsuperscript{396} and just as their locus is said to be the intellect, so this statement must be understood in accordance with our oft-mentioned rules, i.e., [must be understood as follows]: that the intellect is in universals in such a way that they are in it—just as, for example, a ruler is in his kingdom in such a way that his kingdom is in him.

Therefore, an intelligence is a nature that can move from place to
place only in the way that it can be present in a place. Therefore, intellectual nature is moved intellectually within its own prescribed kingdom. And this moving is a moving with which rest concurs, since [intellect’s moving] is a conforming to truth (as, for example, the motion of a ruler’s [issuing a] command is compatible with the ruler’s remaining seated on his throne). For intelligences are moved qua beings that stay at the center of their contractedness (i.e., of their kingdom). And we conceive of this movement as the movement of one who makes judgments. For intelligence is the judge of reasons and is said to be moved when on the basis of what-is-truer it selects one reason and rejects another and when it illumines and guides those who engage in reasoning.

Therefore, intelligences ought to be conceived as universal powers and as powers governing over contracted rational-entities. It is as if in their own regions they held the place of a sun, so that just as in this present perceptible world the eyes proceed perceptually, with the help of the brightness of the perceptible sun, to a judgment about the beautiful and the ugly, so in the rational world an intelligence contributes brightness for a knowledge of the true. But God Himself is the “Infinite Sun” for intelligences, whereas intelligences are as various more greatly contracted lights for rational minds. But we see reason as contracted in different ways in plants and in animals, according to the different genera and species; and herefrom we surmise that the intelligences are diverse governing powers.

Intelligences are not numerable by reason’s number, as are these perceptible objects. Rather, intellectual number, which is undesignatable by reason and undepictable by reason serves as a light for reason and for rational number. For just as oneness is not numerable by any number, but itself numbers every number, so too intelligences are not at all distinguishable [from one another] by reason but are distinguishable only by most absolute and most divine Oneness. For where being numbered tends toward coincidence with numbering, and distinctness with indistinctness, access is denied to reason. Now, in the likeness of the points already often made and on the basis of our diagrams, make a surmise about the variety of intelligences that partake—variously, theophantically, and with a difference of intermedia—of most singular Truth. For example, certain intelligences partake more immediately qua intellectible spirits and are very highly elevated away from all potentiality unto actuality; other intelligences par-
take qua intelligible [spirits] and are closer to having master-knowledge; others partake qua [spirits] that more closely approximate rational powers, so that they need edifying instruction.

You may wish to make a surmise also about the intellectual region’s darker spirits, whose understanding is afflicted with the dulled otherness of darkened ignorance. These spirits succumb to abject observances, and they convey to perceptibly submerged reason the deceitful inducements of their own entangled understanding, so that that which is perpetual is absorbed by that which is corruptible and so that light is absorbed by darkness. [If you wish to make the foregoing surmise and also a surmise] about the different natures of those more demonic spirits, then on the basis of the aforesaid and with [the making of corresponding] adjustments in the symbolism, you will learn by yourself that in the intellectual region these spirits are like the more perceptible spirits that live amid perceptible temptations and that intermingle with lower things. [And you will learn] that still other spirits, in an in-between location, are as rational intelligences that are governing powers over orbits and movements and that do not deviate from the command of their superiors, who are more highly motivated because of [their receiving] divine illuminations.

I want you always to be very careful not to suppose that only for our sake have these spirits assumed their overseeing, spirit-related administrations, which they (as legates from the supreme, maximal Emperor of all things) exercise skillfully with respect to species, nations, language-groups, congregations, kingdoms, and churches. Rather, [you should believe] that for our sake (and for the sake of others over whom they have authority) they do this, [viz., assume these administrations], in such a way as to constitute themselves as ends. Thus, angelic spirits exist for our sake in such a way that we exist for their sakes. For example, although to certain inhabitants of a kingdom it seems that the king’s concern is [only] for them, nevertheless the king, turning his concern back on itself, constitutes himself as the end both of his concern for himself and of his concern for the welfare of his people. There would not be voluntary obedience of the people or voluntary efforts on the part of their ruler if it were not the case both that the people presumed they would receive the rewards of their submission and that the ruler presumed he would receive the rewards of his labors. Therefore, a natural ruler, who walks in the laws of truth, unites together, as best he can, [both of] these interests, so that he deems his
own welfare to reside in the welfare of his people.

Let these statements—made briefly (to the extent permitted at this time) regarding the nature of intellectual spirits—be sufficient.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Man.

By means of our usual procedure conceive of man as constituted both from the oneness of the light of human nature and from the otherness of corporeal darkness. And analyze man in terms of our earlier Diagram, so that you may elucidate him more distinctly. You will see plainly man’s three regions (viz., a lowest region, a middle region, and a highest region); and you will see [each of] these regions to be trinely distinct three times. (A) Make a surmise, in a gradational way, (1) about the less noble corporeal parts and (2) about other bodily parts that are continually transitory, and (3) about others that are more stable and more form-related and very noble. (B) Thereafter, conceive—by means of a corresponding ascent—of the more spirit-related natures of the body, with which the perceptual power is intermingled; and divide these through gradations, so that from the more obtuse natures you may arrive at the more subtle natures. (C) Moreover, add the nine distinctions of the noble soul.

Therefore, as regards the three corporeal orders (A) you see man’s nine corporeal differences, which absorb into themselves the perceptual light, so that they are content with causing growth. (B) You see, as well, nine mixed differences, where perceptual power flourishes, being mixed both with what is perceptual and with what is corporeal. (C) Finally, [you see] nine nobler differences, where corporeal shadows are absorbed by the spirit that discriminates.

Now, corporeal nature advances progressively upward into perceptual nature, in such a way that its highest order coincides closely with the perceptual nature. Likewise, the perceptual nature becomes refined into the nature that discriminates.

Now, all perception arises as a result of encountering an obstacle. Hence, just as certain perceptions are caused by resistance encountered on the part of those who are touching, so certain perceptions are produced, in greater or lesser degree, from more distant objects. Therefore, the sense of smell, which is perfected within its own corporeal instrument, is (because of its quite noble nature) impeded even by remote objects, so that a perception arises. Moreover, the sense of
hearing is impeded by more remote objects. But the sense of sight excels all the other senses, so that it is stimulated to perception by still more distant objects. However, imagination proceeds, with a more absolute freedom, beyond the contractedness of the senses with respect to quantity of mass, of times, of shape, and of place. And it embraces more and less than is apprehended by the senses; and it embraces what is nearer and what is farther and what is absent, although it does not pass beyond the genus of perceptible objects. Reason, however, surpasses the imagination, so that it sees that people on the end of the earth opposite to us cannot fall off, any more than can we, since what is heavy is moved toward the center, which is in between them and us. But imagination cannot arrive at these conclusions. Likewise, it is evident that reason is conveyed above the imagination and proceeds more truly and less restrictedly unto all things. Now, the intellect is to reason as the power of oneness is to finite number, so that nothing at all can escape intellect’s power.

Marvelous is this work of God in which the discriminating power is conducted, progressively, from the center of the senses upwards unto the very lofty intellectual nature! It is conducted by means of certain gradations and certain instrumental channels in which its ties with the very refined corporeal spirit are continuously made clearer and more simplified, on account of the triumph of the soul’s power; these ties are lucidified and simplified until they arrive at the repository of rational power. Afterwards, [the discriminating power] arrives at the very lofty order of intellectual power (as if arriving at the boundless sea by means of a stream), where there are surmised to be choirs of learning, of intelligence, and of most simple intellectuality.

Therefore, since the oneness of humanity is contracted in a human way, it is seen to enfold all things in accordance with the nature of its contractedness. For the power of its oneness encompasses all things, and it keeps them within the bounds of its own region to such an extent that none of them escape its power. Since [man] surmises that all things are attained by the senses or by reason or by intellect, and since he sees that these powers of his are enfolded within his oneness, he supposes that he can proceed unto all things in a human way. For man is god, but not unqualifiedly, since he is man; therefore, he is a human god. Man is also world but is not contractedly all things, since he is man; therefore, man is a microcosm, or a human world. Therefore, the region of humanity encompasses,
by means of its human power, God and the entire world. Therefore, man can be a human god; and just as he can be a god humanly, so he can be a human angel, a human beast, a human lion, or a human bear, or any other such thing. For within the power of humanity all things exist in their own way. Therefore, just as in the universe all things are unfolded after the fashion of the universe, so in humanity all things are unfolded in a human way, since [man] is a human world. Finally, in humanity all things are enfolded in a human way, since [man] is a human god. For humanity is a oneness that is also a humanly contracted infinity.424

But since it is a condition of oneness to unfold beings from itself (for oneness is being, which enfold beings within its simplicity),425 the power of humanity is such as to unfold all things from itself within the circle of its own region and to bring forth all things from out of the power of its center. But it is [also] a condition of oneness that it constitute itself as the goal of its unfoldings, since oneness is infinity.426 Therefore, there is no other goal of humanity’s action of creating than humanity itself.427 For when humanity creates, it does not pass beyond itself; rather, when it unfolds its power, it arrives at itself.428 Nor does humanity create anything new; rather, whatever it creates in unfolding, it finds already to have been present within itself.429 For I stated already430 that in humanity all things exist, in a human way. For just as humanity’s power is able to proceed unto all things in a human way, so all things are able to proceed unto humanity. Moreover, for humanity’s marvelous power to go forth unto all the things that are to be surveyed is nothing other than for its power to enfold all things within itself in a human way.

You have heard, Father Julian, the following about the triune Absolute Beginning, the Creator of all things: viz., that (1) because He is Absolute Oneness, or Absolute Being, in which are present Infinite Equality and Infinite Union,431 He is the Omnipotent Creator; and (2) because He is Infinite Equality in which are present [Infinite] Oneness and [Infinite] Union, He is the Director, Ordainer, and Governor of all things; and (3) because He is Infinite Union in which are present [Infinite] Oneness and [Infinite] Equality, He is the Conserver of all things.

Likewise, affirm to be true that which is to be surmised in a contracted way about humanity. For humanity is the contracted beginning of the creating, governing, and conserving of its own order; for it is a oneness in which are present equality and union, it is an equality in
which are present oneness and union, and it is a union in which are present oneness and equality—these terms being reduced to their signification within the contracted region of humanity. Therefore, by means of humanity’s power, man in his higher perceptual part, viz., the imagination, creates likenesses or images of perceptible objects, because he is a oneness in which there are equality and union. But he orders and situates these created images, because he is an equality in which there are oneness and union. Thereafter, he conserves them in his memory, because he is a union in which there are oneness and equality. Similarly, in the region of things intellectual, man acts by intellectually creating, ordering, and conserving; and in the rational, middle region he does likewise. However, he directs these actions straight back toward himself, in order to be able to understand, govern, and conserve himself And in this way man can approach a state of likeness-to-God where all things are at rest in eternal peace.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN
A continuation of the same topic [viz., on man].

When you plan to take up, in your surmises, the topic of the agreements and the differences among all men, you must take account of the Diagram of all things by construing the human species as contracted within the largest circle. Thereupon you will see, as regards the species of humanity, that (A) certain contemplative and more detached men—being, as it were, in the supreme heaven of humanity—are principally engaged in a certain conversance with intellectual and eternal things. And being, as it were, the intellect of the species, they devote themselves to contemplating truth. (B) There are others, too, who, being the species’ reason, as it were, have authority over (C) men who are lower down at the level of the senses, so to speak. The first [group of these men]—being wise, as if they were very bright, and very pure, lights—bear the image of the incorruptible, immaterial world. The last group, who are at the level of the senses, pursue concupiscence and pleasure, as if they were brutes. The middle group of men both partake of the bright influence of the higher group and exercise authority over the lower group. And so, it is fitting that these three divisions of men, within the oneness of the [human] species, partake of multitude in a general way within their entire species.
to do with the multitude of men who partake of contemplation loftily and nobly, above all reason and all the senses; (A2) but another divisional area contracts contemplation into a kind of rationality; and (A3) the lowest divisional area contracts contemplation into perceptuality, as it were. And as you see by means of our [diagrammatic] procedure, there is present in all men by means of their specific nature a certain religion\textsuperscript{439} that promises them a higher, immortal end and that is partaken of variously (as you recognize in general) by the inhabitants of this world. Consequently, (A1) the first and more detached [group of men], who partake of religion more intellectually and beyond all reason and all the senses, look forward to a life that transcends, in its excellence, the entire capability of both reason and the senses. But (A2) other men, who reduce happiness to something within the bounds of reason, place the [immortal] end in the knowledge and enjoyment of things. (A3) The third group of men most absurdly place the [immortal] end in the delights of the senses. In addition, the first group is distinguished in a threefold way,\textsuperscript{440} as are also the second group\textsuperscript{441} and the third group.\textsuperscript{442}

By means of this procedure [of ours] inspect, through gradations, the most general agreements and differences among all men: in the third heaven\textsuperscript{443} [there are] agreements and differences with respect to [men’s] religion; in the second heaven\textsuperscript{444} [there are] agreements and differences with respect to [men’s] nature as presiders; in the lowest heaven\textsuperscript{445} [there are] agreements and differences with respect to [men] as presided-over. Now, although these divisions, which are derived from the species, persist in their generality everywhere and unceasingly, nevertheless in their specificity they admit of change, since preciseness of truth can be pursued by us only by way of surmise.\textsuperscript{446} Therefore, the intellectual oneness \textsuperscript{447}of that [third heaven’s] religion is received with various degrees of otherness—and is received changeably with changeable multitude—on the part of the directors of the second heaven. So too, presiding oneness, which is said to be oneness of rational species, dwells persistently—though inconstantly and with various degrees of otherness-of-mode—in the changeable multitude of subjects who are at the level of the senses.

Notice, too, that although either religion or governance be seen to be stable for awhile in some nation or other of this world, nevertheless it is not stable in a precise way. For example, the Rhein river is seen to flow constantly for awhile; but it never remains in one and
the same state, since it is now more turbulent, now more clear, now rising, now receding. So too, it is the case that although it is true to say that the Rhein was larger and smaller and that it passed gradually from largeness to smallness, nevertheless it is evident that the Rhein was never before exactly as it now is. So too, religion fluctuates inconstantly between spirituality and temporality. And the situation is similar regarding governance: it persists while fluctuating between greater and lesser obedience.

150 You can investigate, surmisingly, the variety of all the inhabitants of our world with respect to their temperament, shapes, vices and morals, subtlety and grossness. [You can do so] (1) by construing the circle of all inhabitants as the horizon that intercepts the North, the South, the East, and the West and (2) by construing, in the diagram, the South as the upper circle, the North as the lower circle, and the middle of the world as the middle circle. Therefore, the ascent of the human species is from north to south; and the descent of the human species is from south to north. Thus, all men who partake of the horizon in the highest heaven are more lively in intellect; those of the middle heaven who partake thereof are more lively with regard to reason; those of the lowest heaven who partake thereof are more lively with regard to the senses. Therefore, in these northern regions the intellect is more immersed in possibility and perceptibility, as if the men were at the level of the senses; in the middle region the intellect flourishes in and through reason; in the third region it flourishes more detachedly. Hence, too, in the regions of India and of Egypt intellectual religion and the abstract mathematical arts prevail. In Greece and among the North Africans and the Romans dialectic, rhetoric, and legal studies have flourished. In the other, more northern regions, the mechanical arts, which have to do with the senses, have flourished. Nevertheless, it is necessary that all regions have individuals who are skilled, in their own way, in all these disciplines. Consequently, there is [but] a single nature of a single species—a nature partaken of in different ways by all men.

151 Similarly, when you turn your investigation toward the corporeal dispositions of men, pay attention to Diagram P. If you are inquiring about the color of men, construe the northern point as oneness of light and the southern point as oneness of darkness; and you will see that the northerners are of the white region, that the southerners are of the black region, and that those in the middle have in-
If by means of our [diagrammatic] procedure you inquire about temperaments, you will see that inhabitants of the middle region are better tempered, since in that region the extremes are more harmoniously and concordantly brought into a certain combination of oneness. But in the northern regions you see an excess of cold and of disordered fluids. In the southern regions you see (1) a defect in those respects and (2) an excess of dryness. And in the in-between regions you see that in the colder [parts of these] regions heat thrives more by being contracted toward the center, and in the warmer [parts of these regions] it thrives more in the extremities. On the basis of these factors you will be able to make surmises about food and clothing, about dwellings and customs, about physical strengths, weaknesses, and defects, about varieties of shapes and of heights—in accordance with the difference of locations.

Similarly, if you inquire, surmisingly, about the vices and virtues of the [different] peoples, you will see the same [phenomenon as mentioned above]. For humanity, making at the arctic pole a beginning of its ascent toward the antarctic pole, reaches at the equator its altitude and the end of its ascent. Therefore, it proceeds like a man, who at first is in a period of growth, then is in a stationary period, and next is in a period of decline. Therefore, the relationship of men occupying the lower grade (i.e., of those inhabiting the first third of the world’s ascent) is to other men as is a man’s relation during the period when he still brings forth the powers of his body from potentiality to actuality (viz., between infancy and manhood). Therefore, the northern regions partake variously of the vices that are proper to that time-period and, likewise, partake differently of the virtues of that time-period. For some peoples are nearer to manhood; others are nearer to infancy. In these respects some people (e.g., those who are more eastern) are more somber, more masculine, and more skillful; others (e.g., those who are more western) are more feminine, more talkative, more light-minded, more pious, more fickle. Likewise, the middle peoples, who are in between manhood and old age, partake—variously and differently, in an eastern manner an in a western manner—of the vices and virtues of that age. But the more southern peoples, who are between old age and decrepitude, have [their own] vices and virtues.

It suffices that I have said this much about these comparisons. On
In accordance with what has often already been said, conceive, first of all, of the universe as constituted from oneness and otherness, and analyze the one universe into three regions, according as the earlier diagram shows you. Stipulate, then, that the simple intelligences belong to the first region, where the otherness of darkness is absorbed by the splendor of light. And conceive of the natures that alter light by their corporeality as belonging to the lowest region. And, if you like, call the in-between natures souls, for souls occupy a middle position, so that through them there is a descent of intelligence unto lower things and a return-flow of lower things unto higher things. Now, the earlier paradigmatic diagram shows you that the extremes come together as one—in particular, that the highest nature of the soul coincides with the lowest nature of intellectual being and that the lowest nature of the soul coincides with the highest nature of corporeal being.

Well, then, if you desire to inquire more individually about the differences of souls, imagine right now a large circle of all souls; and, within the whole of the circle, view there to be three divisions: root divisions, square divisions, and cubic divisions. But conceive of intelligence as a simple oneness of this universe, even as God is, in a universal way, the Oneness of all things. You will see very clearly that intelligence is united to all souls by means of a certain universal union, which is symbolized by the largest circle. Next, intelligence is united to the first region of souls in a general way but is united to the highest order of souls in a more specific way and is united in a most specific way to the highest choir of souls, which is called the human species. Therefore, every soul partakes of the oneness of intelligence with a degree of otherness; some souls partake more manifestly, others partake more obscurely, but only the highest souls are united with intelligence by means of a very specific union. And this is the partaking by means of which the highest of the lower passes into a coincidence with the lowest of the higher.

Now, through the intermediacy of the soul it happens that animals partake more manifestly of intelligences than do plants. But, qua
genus, *animal* has a plurality of species that go forth—in an ordered way as do numbers—from the oneness of the genus. Of these species, *that* one is nobler and higher which is nearer to oneness. Therefore, when the soul of the most perfect species of *animal* passes into oneness with the intellectual nature, it enfolds within itself, potentially, the other powers of all souls. By way of illustration: with regard to the genus of metals the species of gold—the species most perfect in value—encompasses all the other species of metals; and in the genus of rulers the authority of the king unites within itself the authorities of the other dukes, of the counts, and of the lower rulers. Therefore, the respective species of all [non-human] animals unfold, in a numerical way, the unified power of the human soul; and they contract the human soul’s nature with varying degrees of difference: one species contracts it with clearer reason, another with more darkened reason. Nevertheless, no species is able to attain precise equality [either with the human species or with another species].

Since the human soul is the lowest intellectual nature, it exists intellectually as in potentiality. But intellectual potentiality is reason’s light. Therefore, conceive of the human soul according to Diagram P, [i.e., as constituted] from intellectual oneness and perceptual otherness. Therefore, when through three gradations the light of intelligence descends unto perceptual shadows and when through three gradations the senses ascend unto the intellect, then in the middle there arise two things which I take to have the name “reason”. This reason’s superior part, which is prior to the intellect, is the apprehension; but its inferior part is the imagination. (Let these parts be called by these names or by other names, as you please.) These [powers] are, as it were, the four “elements” of the human soul.

Now, this intellect in our soul descends unto the senses because what-is-perceptual ascends unto the intellect; and what-is-perceptual ascends unto the intellect because the intellect descends unto it. For the intellect’s descending unto the perceptual is the perceptual’s ascending unto the intellect. For example, that which is visible is not attained by the sense of sight in the absence of the intellectual power’s endeavor. Indeed, we experience this fact when, being intent on other matters, we do not distinctly notice a passerby. For the senses take-in, confusedly, that-which-is-perceptible as it ascends unto them; but that perception is unformed and indistinct unless, in us, intellect descends through the intermediacy of reason. Nor apart from the senses do we attain that-which-is-perceptible as such. For example, a blind
man\textsuperscript{478} does not attain perceptible color. However, the intellect, which is in potentiality in accordance with the intellectual region, is more in actuality in accordance with the lower regions. Hence, the intellect is in actuality in the perceptual world; for example, in sight the intellect actually apprehends that which is visible, and in hearing it actually apprehends that which is audible. But in the senses the intellect is the senses; in the imagination it is imagination; in reason it is reason.\textsuperscript{479}

The soul is nothing other than a certain noble and simple unified-power. Now, each part of a [unified-]power is predicated truly of the whole. For example, since our soul’s perceptual power or imaginative power is in the soul, it is the soul, just as the power of a duke or of a count is, in the king, the regal power—even as the regal power is, in a duke, the ducal power. Moreover, since the soul is the enlivenment of the body, the soul is, in the foot, the enlivenment of the foot; in the hand it is the enlivenment of the hand. And since the enlivenment of the soul is the soul, the soul is the oneness of the living corporeal-otherness; and, consequently, the soul is present in each part [of the body] as oneness is present in a number. For just as the power of someone who throws a stone upwards lifts the heavy stone in such a way that when the power ceases, the stone hastens downward, so the power of the soul moves the body, and dying is nothing other than the enlivening power’s ceasing. Therefore, in sight, the soul is sight; in hearing, it is hearing.

Therefore, because of the fact that in the senses the intellect is present actually, somnolent reason is awakened\textsuperscript{480} through wondering, so that it hastens toward that which is a likeness of the true object.\textsuperscript{481} Next, intelligence is stimulated, so that it is raised up more alertly and more abstractly from a slumbering power to a knowledge of the true object. For the intelligence makes representations, in the imagination, of those things which are perceived; and when it inquires about their form [\textit{ratio}], it proceeds unto an act of understanding and unto a knowledge of the true object. For it unites—in the imagination—the differences of the things perceived. It unites—in reason—the variety of differences among images. It unites—in its own simple intellectual oneness—the various differences of forms.\textsuperscript{482} The oneness of the intellect descends unto the otherness of reason; the oneness of reason\textsuperscript{483} descends unto the otherness of imagination; the oneness of imagination descends unto the otherness of the senses. Therefore, enfold intellectually the ascent together with the descent, in order that
you may apprehend. The intellect’s aim is not to become the senses but to become an intellect perfect even in actuality. But since the intellect cannot be constituted in actuality in some other way, it does become the senses, in order in this way and by this means to be able to pass from potentiality into actuality. Likewise, the intellect turns back on itself in a complete, circular return. The situation is as if a nobleman—who was potentially engaged in warfare, which for lack of funds, he could not actually wage—were to subject himself for a time, in order in this way to acquire the wherewithal by which to constitute himself actually at war.

The rich, very noble intelligences\(^{484}\) do not need the senses, for the intelligences are like blazing, unconsumable and ever-growing fires: in order to blaze, the intelligences do not need an external, arousing wind bellowing out from a perceptible bellows. For they exist in actuality, although in differing ways. But since our intellectual part is like a flickering fire concealed between kindle-wood that is green, it has need of these aids. You do not think that we men, who flourish by means of the senses, attain anything that is hidden from the intelligences.\(^{485}\) Indeed, the intelligences attain intellectually that which we, by means of the senses, attain perceptually. For example, when someone speaks the French language,\(^{486}\) I, through hearing, attain the voice\(^{487}\) but you attain, by means of the voice, also the mind’s meaning. By contrast, an intelligence views [that] mind without [the need for] words. I [view that mind] non-rationally; you [view it] rationally; an angel\(^{488}\) [views it] intellectually. Therefore, what is sought is attained more truly and more perfectly by means of intellectual insight than by means of perceptual hearing.

Moreover, take account of the following: just as you have heard that the intellect, for the sake of its perfection, descends and returns unto itself by means of a complete return, conceive in a similar way as regards the senses; for for the sake of the perfection of the perceptual life, the senses proceed upward unto the intellect. Therefore, two appetites—one natural and one accidental\(^{489}\)—are united; they are filled up by way of a mutual circle of return. Now, since the perfection of the intellect is its actually understanding (for when the ability to understand passes into actuality, it is perfected), the intellect is its own fecundity: it makes intelligible (by means of its own resources) that which comes into it. The intellect’s descending unto perceptual images is the perceptual images’ ascending from the conditions of their
contractedness unto less contracted simplicities. Therefore, the more deeply the intellect enters into these images, the more they are absorbed by its light, so that, at length, the intellectual otherness,\(^{490}\) having been resolved into the intellect’s oneness,\(^{491}\) finds rest as in its own goal. Therefore, the oneness of the intellect is made more perfect the more it proceeds from potentiality into actuality. And the more powerful a fire is in actuality, the more quickly it causes what is igniteable to pass from potentiality into actuality. Nor is causing the igniteable to be on fire anything other than the fire’s deepening itself in the igniteable.

The intellect is present in us as a seed of intellectual fire and is placed in the rational-igniteable, its “material,” so to speak. Hence, just as color is visible only by means of light’s oneness (because color is otherness-of-light, and otherness is attainable only by means of oneness), so images are intelligible only by means of reason’s light;\(^{492}\) for images are alterities of reason’s oneness.\(^{493}\) Therefore, the closer the images are to reason’s oneness, the more intelligible they are—just as a color that is closer to the light is more visible. Hence, just as a flame, because it is absorbed by light, is visible through itself, and just as by means of its light we see alterations-of-light, viz., colors: so, too, concepts are absorbed by reason’s light, so that they are understood through themselves and so that they make intelligible other, more obscure, things—as is evident in the case of principles known through themselves.\(^{494}\) Therefore, through itself reason betakes itself to the intellect, just as through itself light presents itself to sight; and through itself the intellect descends unto reason, just as sight goes forth unto light. For reason’s being intelligible through itself is intellect’s descending unto it. But just as through itself oneness goes forth unto number, so through itself reason goes forth unto images; and just as number is attained only by means of oneness, so the intellect apprehends images only by means of reason.

**Note,** then, that through itself oneness is unattainable. Otherwise, preciseness (something infinite and unattainable) would be attained by reason—a result that is impossible.\(^{495}\) Therefore, oneness is attained only by way of otherness; for example, a oneness of species is attained by way of the otherness of individuals, and a oneness of genus\(^{496}\) is attained by way of the difference of species. By the same basic consideration,\(^{497}\) otherness, too, is not attained through itself; hence, otherness is attained only by way of oneness. The individual is attained only by way of its species, and its species is attained only by way of
its genus. Color is attained only by way of light; and sound is attained only by way of air, since sound is the otherness of air-at-rest. Moreover, pain, which is otherness, is felt only by means of a oneness of continuity or of temperament. For when the oneness of the continuity is dissolved and altered, or when the harmonic oneness-of-temperament is affected by a certain otherness, then a disturbance in the [harmonic] oneness is felt.

And since it is evident that the intellect is the oneness of reason (with reason partaking of intellect with a degree of otherness), then intellect, which precedes the otherness [of reason], is not subjected either to time (which springs forth from reason) or to corruptibility; for intellect is the more absolute oneness of the otherness that characterizes reason. Therefore, the intellect’s nature is not corruptible, since it precedes reason. Now, where oneness absorbs otherness, there immortality is found. Therefore, the higher rational nature, which absorbs the otherness of images by the light of its oneness and which is hidden in the light of the immortal intellect, is immortal, even as light is undarkenable. For just as light as it is in itself cannot fail to be visible, so pure reason cannot fail to be understood. And its being understood is pure reason’s life and perfection. And you can investigate the difference between human reason and a beast’s reason with respect to human reason’s being absorbed by the immortality of the intellectual life (which is always engaged in understanding)—absorbed because reason is always intelligible through itself, even as light is always visible through itself. However, the alterities-of-light, viz., colors, are not [intelligible through themselves]. Likewise, the alterities-of-reason that are present in the other species of animals are not [intelligible through themselves]. Therefore, they are alterable and corruptible.

But when a man who has been blind for a long time begins to see, he is first aware of this fact while in the light. Consequently, light is the otherness of the visual spirit, and sight does not apprehend its own oneness except by means of otherness. Therefore, that light which imposes itself on the eye—by means of which light the eye is aware that it sees—is a light other than the light of the visual spirit. Therefore, when the power of the visual spirit’s light absorbs into itself the visible light, the visible light passes into sight. But when the otherness of the visible light absorbs, because of its power, the weakness of the visual spirit, the oneness of the visual power passes into
We must make surmises in a similar way, it seems to me, regarding intellectual power and the light of reason. For reason is the otherness of intellectual oneness; and unless [the intellect’s] power is strong, it is oftentimes absorbed by the otherness of reason, so that [a man mistakenly] deems true opinion to be [true] understanding. Likewise, too, the otherness of images oftentimes absorbs reason, so that that which a man [only] imagines, he [mistakenly] judges to be shown by reason. Likewise, too, the otherness of the senses sometimes absorbs the oneness of imagination’s power, so that that which a man attains by the senses he [mistakenly] judges to be that which he imagines—as, for example, an infant, still having an unformed power of imagination, judges the woman-whom-he-sees to be the mother whom he imagines. Something similar is accustomed to happen also to others who are weak in regard to this imaginative power.

Therefore, the intellect, which is the oneness of reason, is united to the body by the intermediary of reason. For the corporeal nature can partake of the intellectual nature only with a degree of otherness. Since the corporeal nature is maximally different from the intellectual nature, it has need of intermediate steps. Therefore, by means of the otherness that belongs to reason’s light and by means of a vegetative and a perceptual intermediate, the corporeal nature partakes of the intellectual nature. Now, the perceptual [intermediate] ascends, by means of the bodily instruments, all the way to reason, which adheres to a very subtle and very immaterial spirit of the brain. But the otherness that is received by reason is—by way of the oneness of reason, which is the otherness of the intellect—taken into the intellect, which is free from all [bodily] instruments. And since reason’s ascent here is intellect’s descent: when absolute intellect searches amid reason’s otherness, it embraces truths insofar as they have been elevated upward from images.

Therefore, since, in the foregoing way, intellect takes its starting-point from things perceptual, it cannot be unqualifiedly true but is true in some respect. For example, in reason intellect is true in accordance with reason; in imagination intellect is true in accordance with imagination; in the senses it is true in accordance with the senses. But when the intellect views things more abstractly and apart from all otherness-of-reason and in its own simple intellectual-nature, it embraces them apart from images and in the brightness of truth. For the
intellect is the otherness of Infinite Oneness. Therefore, the more highly the intellect frees itself from its own otherness in order to be able to ascend more highly unto Most Simple Oneness, the more perfect and more lofty it is. For since all otherness is attainable only by means of oneness, the intellect (which is otherness, since it is not the divine, most absolute Intellect but is a human intellect) can view itself, as it is, only in Most Divine Oneness. For only in that Truth which is the Infinite Oneness of all things can the intellect attain either itself as it is or any other intelligible thing as it is. But the intellect can view Infinite Oneness only in terms of intellectual otherness. Therefore, within its own self the intellect beholds that Oneness not as it is [in and of itself] but [only] as it is humanly understood. And by means of the oneness that the intellect thus understands in terms of otherness, the intellect elevates itself in order to proceed more absolutely unto Oneness as it is [in and of itself]—elevates itself from the true unto Truth, Eternity, and Infinity. And this is the ultimate perfection of the intellect: viz., that by means of a theophany that descends unto it, it continually ascends toward a nearer likeness to divine and infinite Oneness, which is, for the intellect, Infinite Life, Infinite Truth, and Infinite Rest.

The intellect is of so subtle a nature that it views a sphere as present in the indivisible center-point. When the intellect is contracted in reason, it views a sphere by means of that rational definition which holds that all the lines from the center to the circumference are equal. When the intellect views a sphere by means of the imagination, it imagines it as round and corporeal. But the sense of sight cannot view the [entire] sphere [at once] but can view only a part of it; yet, by means of reason’s adding part to part, [the whole sphere] is attained. Hence, just as intellectual truth, in its preciseness, is unattainable by reason, so also rational truth is not contractible by the senses. For in regard to otherness there must always be a deficiency. For oneness is discoverable to be in otherness in no other way than by means of a falling away from preciseness and equality. For otherwise—i.e., if otherness were precise equality—otherness would not be otherness.

Therefore, not even the rational definition of a circle describes a true intellectual circle. For, intellectually speaking, a circle is not judged to be a true circle by virtue of the fact that the lines from its center to its circumference are equal. Rather, this rational definition
of an intellectual circle is to a true circle as a sign is to what is signified [by it] and as otherness is to its own oneness or as a composite is to what is simple or as an unfolding is to an enfolding or as what is contracted is to what is absolute. For by means of the procedures of reason a circle cannot [be conceived to] exist, in its contracted being, otherwise [than in accordance with its rational definition]; but in the circle’s own less-contracted oneness the circle exists intelligibly without the otherness of lines and of circumference.

But just as reason, in the oneness of intellect, makes inferences demonstratively and a priori, so if [the following were the case], our intellectual knowledge could not be any truer: in Absolute Oneness, which is Truth, all otherness were viewed not as otherness but as Oneness [and were viewed there] in as absolute and precise a way as this viewing is granted [to us] by the gift of God. This [viewing of otherness as oneness] can be done very precisely only by the Divine Intellect, which is Absolute Preciseness. For the Divine Intellect alone is all that which understands in every act of understanding and is all that which is understood in everything understandable.

Therefore, with regard to its actual perfection the foregoing intellectual knowledge is to the [perfection of] other [forms of knowledge] as a solid is to a surface, to a line, and to a point; but with regard to intellectual knowledge’s subtlety, intellectual knowledge is [to other forms of knowledge] as a point is to a line, a surface, and a solid. Indeed, intellectual knowledge embraces—at once perfectly, subtly, and pointedly—that which is true. By contrast, rational knowledge is more contracted; and it is fairly perfect, as is a surface, and is subtle as is a line. But imaginative knowledge is more greatly contracted; and it is perfect as is a line but is gross as is a surface. And perceptual knowledge is individually the most contracted; and it is very imperfect, as is a point, and is very gross, as is a solid.

The foregoing forms of knowledge vary in different ways depending upon the variety of the [bodily] instruments, the power of the conducting spirits, and the variety of the oneness through which otherness is reached. For example, if the transparent medium through which the otherness of light ascends unto sight is altered by the color red or by some other color, then the thing seen appears to be of that color. For the thing seen is attained not in a simple oneness (i.e., in pure light) but in light that has been altered in the transparent medium (e.g., altered by a beryl-stone or by a piece of glass or by a
flame or by a colored, or an altered, ray). Likewise, the intellect does not attain pure images unless reason is pure and free, for reason is the oneness of the otherness of images. Now, in the case of corrupted and altered reason, reason’s judgment is corrupted, as we recognize when reason is bound to an authority. For in that case reason is altered and contracted away from its purity, and its judgment is corrupted in accordance with the authority. Therefore, those who are filled with passion lack right judgment, since in them the light of reason is contracted and altered—just as when the sense of taste is corrupted by a salivary moistness, it corruptly makes a judgment about what is sweet, i.e., judges it to be bitter. And so on.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Self-Knowledge.

From the aforesaid you will easily elicit a concise and surmising knowledge of yourself, as I will now show you from what remains [to be said].

First of all, Father Julian, you do not doubt that you are a man, and you do not doubt that someone is called a man because of his humanity, just as something is called white because of its whiteness. Now, when you see that I too am a man and am another man than are you and than is every other individual man, then you see clearly that humanity is a certain oneness that can be partaken of with a degree of otherness. But you notice that humanity, which is individually contractible with a degree of otherness, is, in comparison with the otherness of lionness and of horseness, itself the otherness of a more absolute oneness.

Therefore, you conceive the First Oneness, or First Being, to be most absolute and to be altogether incontractible; it is partaken of incontractedly with various degrees of otherness. In order that you may be helped by means of a visible illustration, imagine light to be the very simple incontractible oneness of our visible world; by means of the otherness of participation in incontractible light all visible things are that which they are. Therefore, color is an altered partaking of this light. Therefore, let the circle of the universe [in Diagram U] be the orbit of color. Now, color can exist only contractedly, since its oneness, which falls short of absolute oneness, is contracted with a degree of otherness. Therefore, note the three regions of the contractedness of color with their nine final differences. The contraction of the high-
est region’s color will be such that in it the partaking of quite absolute light hides in its bright splendor the shadowy alterities. But the condition of the lowest region will run counter to this, for [there] the initial partaking of light is absorbed by darkness. And the middle region behaves in an in-between way. Look at these regions more particularly by means of the three trine distinctions.

Likewise, Julian—provided that in a corresponding way you make light to symbolize divinity and make color to symbolize humanity and make the visible world to symbolize humanity’s universe—investigate yourself by means of the diagram, and see whether you are of the highest region, the middle region, or the lowest region. For it seems to me that you contract humanity in the highest region and in a noble species of the highest region and by means of a partaking of the very bright Divine Light. By means of our disclosed procedure, each man can make a surmise about himself in comparison with other men. And after you have found yourself to be situated in the order of those who contract humanity by means of their partaking of Most Absolute Oneness, note that your humanity encircles your entire being and that you partake of Divinity in and through the contractedness of your humanity. But Divinity is Infinite Oneness, Infinite Equality, and Infinite Union—in such a way that in the Oneness there are Equality and Union, in the Equality there are Oneness and Union, and in the Union there are Oneness and Equality.

Conceive, then, of your contracted humanity (by means of which you partake of the Divinity) as the circle of all things; and in an ordered way take note—as regards the regions and the divisions of regions—of how it is that by means of the highest nature of your humanity you partake most highly of the Divinity but that by means of the lowest nature of your humanity you partake of the Divinity in a most lowly way, and that by means of the middle nature of your humanity you partake of the Divinity in an in-between way. For, indeed, by means of your most noble nature you partake of the Divinity in accordance with the condition of that region, viz., in an intellectual way; by means of your middle nature you partake of the Divinity in a rational way; by means of your lowest nature you partake of it in a perceptual way—according as these regions are situated within the circle of your contracted humanity.

Now, to partake intellectually of the Light of Divinity is to partake of a oneness in which equality and union are present. But to be some-
thing intellectual is to understand. Therefore, you partake of Divinity by means of the light of intelligence, so that you know (1) that by the gift of God you have intelligence\textsuperscript{545} and (2) that intelligence is intellectually greater the more greatly it is one—indeed, one with respect to a oneness such that in it equality and union are present. Therefore, in oneness great intelligence is present, just as it is also present in equality-of-oneness and in the union of both [oneness and equality-of-oneness]. But in oneness itself, in which equality and union are present, there maximal intelligence is present. You partake of Divinity intellectually by means of an equality in which oneness and union are present; and this [triune equality] is the light of justice. Therefore, the more you partake intellectually of absolute equality, in which oneness and union are present, the more Godlike you are. You also partake of Divinity by means of a union in which oneness and equality are present; and this [triune union] is the light of love. Therefore, the more you partake intellectually of the love in which oneness and equality are present, the more divine you will be, in accordance with the intellectual and loftiest nature of your humanity.

\textsuperscript{175 } In all these matters be attentive to using terms according to the rules I have given. For example, after I have spoken about the Divinity by means of words, apply their [meanings], in a transferred way, to the Divinity’s nature. Likewise, after I have disclosed to you my conception of the intellectual region, restrict [the meaning of] my conception’s terms to the laws of that region. Thereafter, in like manner, turn your attention to the other regions, in order to be able to see, with respect to your rational part, how it is that your reason partakes of Divinity in its own way.\textsuperscript{546} For those things of which the intellect partakes intellectually are partaken of also by reason in its own way, as well as by the senses according to the conditions of their nature.

\textsuperscript{176 } You see now, O Julian, how it is that in the three regions the oneness that is in your contracted humanity partakes variously of Triune Light. And you see how it is that in the supreme nobility of your nature you (1) partake supremely (i.e., partake intellectually) of Supreme Oneness, or Supreme Being, which is Intellective Power, and (2) partake supremely of Supreme Equality, which is the Power of equalizing, or of justifying, and (3) also partake supremely of Supreme Union, which is the Power of uniting, or of loving. Likewise, you partake of this Triune Power in an intermediate way in the middle region. Therefore, you see that you partake contractedly (1) of the power
of existing rationally, i.e., of discriminating, and (2) of the power of equalizing, or justifying, rationally, and (3) of the power of uniting, or loving, [rationally]. Similarly, in accordance with the lowest region, you partake [contractedly] (1) of the power of existing at the level of the senses, i.e., of perceiving, and (2) of the power of equalizing, or justifying, at the level of the senses, and (3) of the power of uniting, or loving, at the level of the senses.

The foregoing powers, which are powers by participation, are enfolded in the power of your humanity. But in the partaking of oneness, or of being, there is at the same time a partaking of equality and of union, which are present in oneness. Consequently, in your intellect’s oneness-by-participation there is present a power of equality-of-intellectual-being\textsuperscript{547} (i.e., a power of understanding) as well as a power of unifying (or of loving), which proceeds from the intellect and its acts of understanding; for the intellect loves its own acts of understanding. For intellectual love presupposes both that-which-is-understood and that-which-understands. Something similar must be said, in its own way, of reason and of the senses.

177 You know, then, Father Julian, that you partake of the power-of-oneness (which carries within itself the nature of equality and of union) in order that your intellect (which partakes in its own way of Divine Being) can understand and embrace what-is-understood (doing so by means of an equality with what-is-understood) in such a way that your act of understanding is nothing other than an equality that belongs to your intellect’s oneness-by-participation.\textsuperscript{548} Know, then, that you have obtained the power-of-understanding by means of an equality with, or a likeness to, the Divine Light [insofar as the Divine Light has been] partaken of intellectually. A similar thing holds true regarding the power of reasoning and the power of perceiving. But since oneness is partaken of more perfectly in proportion to the greater equality and greater union that are present in it, the act of understanding and the act of uniting cannot be increased apart from a perfecting of the intellect’s oneness. Therefore, the intellect is disposed to understand and to love, in order that the nature of its oneness may be perfected. Likewise, reason [is disposed] to make inferences, and the senses [are disposed] to perceive, [in order that their respective natures may be perfected].

178 From the foregoing it is evident that the intellect endeavors to devise for itself—for the sake of its own nourishment, conservation, per-
fection, and adornment—intellectual arts (which are speculative endeavors) by which it can be aided. And just as the intellect brings forth these [speculative arts or] speculative branches of knowledge from Light that has been partaken of intellectually, so reason elicits the arts-of-inferring from Light that has been partaken of rationally. And the senses—for the sake of the nourishment, conservation, perfection, and adornment of the perceptual nature—draw forth the perceptual arts from Light that has been partaken of perceptually. Do not ignore these points (which you have often heard), in order that, [by not neglecting them], you may conceive of the partaking of the Divine Light by reason as occurring subsequently to intellect and by means of intellect, just as also [the partaking of the Divine Light] by the senses [occurs subsequently to reason and] by means of reason.

Now, you see, Father Julian, that you are a likeness of God. For humanity as contracted in you is triune. For it is oneness, or being, that has been contracted individually and in which equality and union are present. Through the being of humanity you are a man in such a way that in your being there are (1) equality-of-being and (2) justice, or order, and (3) union, or love. Whatever is in you is, in accordance with equality of oneness, ordered most justly in oneness. For example, it is evident that all your members have justice and have an ordered-relation to the equality of your one being. In particular, your bodily members [are ordered] to your body; your body is ordered to your vital soul; your vital soul is ordered to your perceptive soul, which is ordered to your rational soul, which is ordered to your intellectual soul; and all of these are ordered to your humanity’s oneness. And in the way in which this just ordering is present in the oneness, so also is loving union present in the oneness. For union is present in the oneness to the end that all the members be one man. For after the union ceases to be present in the oneness, then your one human being must, likewise, cease to exist.

Now, the following is known to you in your own instance: viz., that no contracted being whatsoever can exist otherwise than through a oneness in which equality and union are present. Therefore, by [observing] your own case you come to a knowledge of all things, so that you know that all things partake variously of Most Absolute Triunity. Moreover, you infer from your own case that there is an ordering of all things in a oneness, so that you behold justice only with respect to that order which is present in oneness. For example, it is not un-
just—indeed, it is most equitable—(1) that your head is on top and that in it are, in ordered fashion, a brain, eyes, ears, and other members and (2) that your feet are at the bottom. For top and bottom and this entire ordering of the members to a oneness can be analyzed only as most equitable. Therefore, that ordering which exists in a oneness is the most equitable and the most just; but that ordering which tends toward division and otherness is most unjust and is contrary to the Divine Nature.

You infer from your own case that that union of love which exists in oneness is the most steadfast. For you see that love and union indicate oneness. For love unites the lover with the beloved. However, the love, or natural union, by which your head is united to your body is not a love other than the love that proceeds from oneness and equality-[of-oneness]. Therefore, [head and body] are united by means of the root of your being and by means of the equality of head and body’s ordered-relation to oneness. You see, then, that a love which exists apart from something one and apart from an ordered-relation to something one is not a love which partakes of Divine Union. Therefore, whatever belongs to the universe is to be loved only with respect to the universe’s oneness and in an ordered-relation to the universe. No man is to be loved except with respect to humanity’s oneness and in an ordered-relation to humanity. Moreover, no man is to be loved generically except with respect to animality’s oneness and in ordered-relation to animality. And so on.

Therefore, you will be able to see, from a consideration of yourself, that the elect 552 are Godlike. For you see that God, who is Infinite Union, is to be loved not as some lovable contracted thing is to be loved but as is infinite and most absolute Love. 553 Therefore, in the love by which God is loved there ought to be Most Simple Oneness and Infinite Justice. Accordingly, and of necessity, all the [finite] love by which God is loved is less than the love by which He is [infinitely] lovable. You know, too, that to love God is to be loved by God, since God is Love. 554 Therefore, the more someone loves God, the more he partakes of Divinity.

Likewise, too, because of your partaking of the Divine Light, you see that that which contains within itself oneness and union is just and equitable. Whenever the law departs from oneness and union, it cannot be just. The law [that says] “that which you wish to be done unto you, do unto others” 555 represents an equality-of-oneness. If you wish
to be just, you must do none other than not depart from that equality in which there is oneness and union. Then you will bear—equally in oneness and in love—things adverse and things propitious, poverty and wealth, honors and calumnies; you will deviate neither toward the right nor toward the left but will be most secure amidst equality. Nothing grave or adverse will be able to befall you, provided that whatever seems to the senses to be adverse, you understand, and so esteem, as something to be borne with an equality of the oneness of being and of loving. For [to do] that is to partake of the Divinity in a noble and happy way. But you see that all moral virtue is enfolded in the just-mentioned equality and that there cannot be any virtue unless it exists through partaking of this equality.

Much more fully than I, you will be able to contemplate in yourself the Triune Light-of-Divinity that is partaken of [by you], who long ago, by means of an equal life, transferred yourself from worldly distractions to cherishing justice. I would not have presumed to show you these naive surmisings of mine if I had not known that because of the oft-mentioned law of equality you would accept them in oneness-of-love.
ABBREVIATIONS

Ap Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae [Vol. II (edited by Raymond Klibansky) of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Leipzig/Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1932)].

CA Cribratio Alkorani [Vol. VIII (edited by Ludwig Hagemann) of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1986)].


DC De Coniecturis [Vol. III (edited by Josef Koch and Karl Bornmann) of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1972)].


DM Idiota de Mente [Latin text contained in J. Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge (Minneapolis: Banning, 1986)].

DP De Possess [Latin text as contained in J. Hopkins, A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa (Minneapolis: Banning, 3rd ed. 1986)].

DVD De Visione Dei [Latin text as contained in J. Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa’s Dialectical Mysticism: Text, Translation, and Interpretive Study of De Visione Dei (Minneapolis: Banning, 2nd ed. 1988)].

LG De Ludo Globi [Vol. IX (edited by Hans G. Senger) of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1998)].


NA De Li Non Aliud [Latin text as contained in J. Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-other: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Li Non Aliud (Minneapolis: Banning, 3rd ed. 1987)].
**Abbreviations**

\( p \)  
*Nicolaus Cusa* *Cardinalis Opera* (Paris edition, 1514). [Reprinted Minerva Verlag (Frankfurt am Main, 1962)].

\( PF \)  
*De Pace Fidei* [Vol. VII (edited by Raymond Klibansky and Hildebrand Bascour) of *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1970)].

\( PL \)  

\( S \)  

\( SCG \)  

\( ST \)  

\( VS \)  
*De Venatione Sapientiae* [Vol. XII (edited by Raymond Klibansky and Hans G. Senger) of *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1982)].
PRAENOTANDA

1. (a) In the English translations brackets are used to indicate words supplied by the translator to complete the meaning of a Latin phrase, clause, or sentence. (b) When a clarifying Latin word is inserted into the translation, brackets are used if the case ending or the verb-form has been modified; otherwise, parentheses are used.

2. All references to Nicholas of Cusa’s works are to the Latin texts in the following editions (unless explicitly indicated otherwise):

A. Heidelberg Academy edition of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Felix Meiner Verlag: Hamburg): De Concordantia Catholica; De Coniecturis; De Deo Abscondito; De Quaerendo Deum; De Filiatione Dei; De Dato Patris Luminum; Coniectura de Ultimis Diebus; De Genesi; Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae; De Pace Fidei; De Theologicis Complementis; De Berylo (1988 edition); De Principio; Cribratio Alkorani; De Ludo Globi; De Venatione Sapientiae; De Apice Theoriae; Sermones (Haubst’s numbering of the sermons is given in roman numerals; margin number and line numbers are given in parentheses.)

B. Texts authorized by the Heidelberg Academy and published in the Latin-German editions of Felix Meiner Verlag’s series Philosophische Bibliothek: De Docta Ignorantia.

C. Editions by J. Hopkins: De Aequalitate [in Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: Volume One]; Idiotae de Sapientia, de Mente, de Staticis Experimentis [in Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge]; De Visione Dei [in: Nicholas of Cusa’s Dialectical Mysticism (2nd ed.)]; De Possest [in A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa (3rd ed.)]; De Li Non Aliud [in Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-other (3rd ed.); Compendium [in Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge]. Except in the case of De Aequalitate, the left-hand margin numbers correspond to the margin numbers in the Heidelberg Academy editions; line numbers and some paragraph-breaks differ.


The references given for some of these treatises indicate book and chapter, for others margin number and line, and for still others page and line. Readers should have no difficulty determining which is which when they consult the particular Latin text. E.g., ‘DI II, 6 (125:19-20)’ indicates De Docta Ignorantia, Book II, Chapter 6, margin number 125, lines 19-20 of the edition in the series Philosophische Bibliothek (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag).

3. References to the Bible are given in terms of the Douay version. References to chapters and verses of the Psalms include, in parentheses, the King James’ locations.

4. Italics are used sparingly, so that, as a rule, foreign expressions are italicized only when they are short. All translations are mine unless otherwise specifically indicated.

5. Citations of Nicholas’s sermons are given in terms of the sermon numbers as-
signed by Rudolf Haubst in fascicle 0 [=zero], Vol. XVI of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1991), pp. XLVII-LV. These numbers revise Josef Koch’s earlier numbers. Haubst’s dates are also used. [For Josef Koch’s earlier numbers and dates, see Koch, Cusanus-Texte. I. Predigten. 7. Untersuchungen über Datierung, Form, Sprache und Quellen. Kritisches Verzeichnis sämtlicher Predigten [Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse (1941-1942, Abhandlung 1)].

A reference such as “Sermo XX (6:26-29)” indicates Sermon XX [Haubst number], margin number 6, lines 26-29.

NOTES TO DE CONJECTURIS

1. Unlike in the case of DI Nicholas nowhere tells us either where or when he completed the composition of DC. Rudolf Haubst agrees with Paul Wilpert that the first recension of DC was completed around the end of 1441 or the beginning of 1442. [See p. 235 of Haubst’s review in MFCG 10 (1973).] Wilpert (“Kontinuum oder Quantensprung bei Nikolaus von Kues,” Wissenschaft und Weltbild, 16 (June 1963), 102-112] maintains, in addition, that Nicholas did not release this initial recension for copying but, rather, kept it lying around in his desk as he thought further about the problem of “squaring the circle.” Only after he concluded that such a geometrical feat is possible and only after he explained—in De Geometricis Transmutationibus how he thought it possible—did he revise his recension and release the revision for dissemination. Since De Geometricis Transmutationibus was finished by Nicholas in Koblenz on September 25, 1445, Wilpert infers that the revision of DC occurred shortly thereafter, viz., during the last months of 1445. This revision is the text that entered into the main manuscript-tradition, to which Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 belongs. Wilpert asserts that the 1445-revision was published by Nicholas without Nicholas’s having altered the original dedication to Cardinal Julian Cesarini, who was then dead, having been slain (by the Turks) in a military rout on October 11, 1444. By contrast with Wilpert, Josef Koch (“Über eine aus nächster Umgebung des Nikolaus von Kues stammende Handschrift der Trierer Stadtbibliothek (1927/1426),” pp. 117-135 in Josef Engel and Hans M. Klinkenberg, editors, Aus Mittelalter und Neuzeit (Festschrift für Gerhard Kallen). Bonn: Hanstein, 1957] argues that Nicholas’s revision of DC was completed before Cesarini’s death—indeed, was completed soon after the composition of the initial version of DC, which Koch dates simply as 1441 or 1442. A copy of the initial recension is contained in Latin ms. 1927/1426 of the Stadtbibliothek in Trier. Although this ms. is a copy and not an autograph, it does contain corrections by Nicholas’s own hand. (The autograph is not extant.)

2. DI is also addressed to Cardinal Julian Cesarini (1398-1444), whom Nicholas calls his instructor. Cesarini may have been one of Nicholas’s instructors at the University of Padua. Nicholas also had contact with him at the Council of Basel, over which Cesarini presided.

Note Josef Koch and Karl Bormann’s reminder that the title “praecceptor” (“instructor”) was sometimes used in a merely honorific way, as could also be the case with Nicholas’s use of it here. [See p. 186 of Josef Koch and Karl Bormann’s edition of De Coniecturis, Vol. III in the series Nicolai de Casa Opera Omnia (Ham-

Only God knows each and every thing precisely and is Absolute Preciseness.

DC I, 10 (52). De Sapientia II (29:1-4).

Just as Nicholas (here in the Prologue to DC I) refers to DI, so in DI he antici-


6. “… a certain rational progression”: viz., the progression 1, 2, 3, 4. See DC I, 3.

7. “… adding illustrative diagrams”: In the phrase “applicatoriam praxim … adi-
ciens,” the word “praxim” has the force of the English plural, as does also the phrase “in praxi” at II, Prologue (70:6).

8. “The Divine Mind creates by conceiving; our mind assimilates by conceiv-
ing—i.e., by making concepts, or intellectual viewings. The Divine Mind is a reifying power; our mind is an assimilative power.” DM 7 (99:7-10).

9. “If all things are present in the Divine Mind as in their precise and proper Truth, then all things are present in our mind as in an image, or a likeness, of their proper Truth. That is, they are present conceptually, for knowledge comes about on the basis of [conceptual] likeness. All things are present in God, but in God they are exemplars of things; all things are present in our mind, but in our mind they are likenesses of things.” DM 3 (72:13 - 73:3).

10. Here at 5:7-8 I am reading “existit” (as does the Paris edition) in place of “exitit”.


The human mind is the form of a surmised world in that the human mind forms—through abstracting from perceptual images—empirical concepts, which are “like-
nesses” of empirical objects.

12. As God is the Form of all forms, so He is the Being of all beings. That is, He is the Ultimate Ground-of-Being of all beings. DI I, 8 (22). Ap. 17. DP 14. NA

13. That is, all things tend toward God as toward their Ultimate Goal. DI III, 10 (240).


15. That is, all things tend toward God as toward their Ultimate Goal.


17. The human mind partakes of the Divine Mind, teaches Nicholas [DC I, 11 (55:16-18)]; and God is present in each thing as its ultimate Ground-of-Being. See the qualifications that are stated in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]: viz., in n. 81 of Notes to De Beryllo and in n. 40 of Notes to De Ver natione Sapientiae. See also De Quaerendo Deum 2 (37:13-14).

18. See n. 26 below.


20. That is, our mind is a distinguishing, a proportioning, and a combining beginning in accordance with multitude, magnitude, and composition. Cf. LG II (90:10-13).

21. Among the other passages in which Nicholas discusses or mentions numbers

22. See DM 6 (90): “Number is a composite and is composed of itself. For every number is composed of even number and odd number. So number is composed of number. If you say [merely] that the number three is a composite of three units, then you are speaking as if someone were to say that the walls and the roof, separately, make a house. For if the walls exist separately and so too does the roof, then a house is not composed of them. Likewise, three separate units do not constitute the number three. Therefore, if you consider the units according as they constitute the number three, you consider them as united. And what, then, are three united units other than the number three? And so, the number three is composed of itself, [that is, is composed of numerical units]—and similarly regarding all [other] numbers.” Cf. LG II (109) and Sermones, p, Vol. II, f. 119v, lines 18-32.


Although oneness (unitas) is not a number but is, rather, the source of all numbers [DI I, 5 (14). De Principio 32], nevertheless for purposes of calculation the unit (unitas) is considered as belonging to the number series and as being a number. For Nicholas, as for the ancients, number in the strict sense is always plural, because a number (of things) is always more than one.

23. Boethius, De Institutione Arithmetica I, 2 (Friedlein edition, op. cit. [n. 22 above], p. 13, lines 4-5; Masi translation, op. cit., p. 76). See, below, especially n. 333 of Notes to De Ludo Globi.


24. Nicholas does not here mean anything technical by “rational numbers” and by “real numbers”. He is referring, respectively, to numbers insofar as they originate in the human mind and insofar as they are present eternally in the Divine Mind. See the first sentences of DC I, 1. Cf. DM 6 (88:19-22). DM 7 (98:12-15).


One].


27. After the number 10, i.e., with the number 11, a reversion is made to oneness, because 11 is 10 and 1. Similarly, after 1000 comes 1000 and 1. The Latins had no single word for numbers greater than 1000, just as English has no single word for 10,000 or for 100,000, although it does have single words for 1,000,000 (a million) and for 1,000,000,000 (a billion), etc.

28. “. . . figure of nullity”: i.e., a zero.

29. See the discussion of “mens” and “mens ipsa” on pp. 97-99 of the Orienting Study of this present book. In *DC* I, 4 (12-14) Nicholas is speaking primarily of the human mind (and its reflections). Of course, that which is true of the human mind qua mind also is true, eminently and metaphorically, of the Divine Mind and is true, eminently and non-metaphorically, of celestial minds (i.e., of angels).


31. Although Nicholas holds that every finite mind’s knowledge of things in the universe is imprecise (see n. 3 above), he nonetheless does not consider any finite object (or finite mind) to be altogether unknowable by, and in principle inaccessible to, each and every finite mind. Only God’s Quiddity, because it is infinite, is altogether unknowable to finite minds (including angelic minds). Nicholas’s epistemology must not be mistaken either for Locke’s or for Kant’s.

32. The human mind has recourse to numbers that it brings forth from its own mind in the image of numbers in God’s Mind. See n. 21 above. According to Nicholas “mind is a certain living divine-number . . .” *DM* 7 (98:3-5). Cf. *DM* 15 (157:1-6).


34. “Oneness,” “Equality of Oneness,” and “Union of Oneness and Equality-of-Oneness” are names for the members of the Trinity. See n. 19 above.

35. “. . . these mental onenesses”: i.e., these concepts. A concept is itself a men-
tal oneness, or mental unity, that signifies the “object” of which it is a concept.

36. Throughout DC, as also elsewhere, Nicholas interchanges “intelligentia” and “intellectus”. (See n. 471 below.) Although in DC I have usually translated them by two different English words (viz., “intelligence” and “intellect”), the reader is cautioned that they often mean the same thing. “Intellectus” does not always signify the human intellect (as opposed to an angel’s intellect); nor does “intelligentia” always signify an angelic mind (as opposed to a human mind). The word “intelligentia” usually does not convey the meaning that corresponds to the English expression “someone of great (or of little) intelligence.” To indicate intelligence in that sense, the Latins often used “ingenium”, as does Nicholas in the Prologue to VS (1:13).

The domain of intelligentiae (intelligences) is constituted by the hierarchy of angels [LG II (77-78)]. In a secondary way, the highest part of the human mind, viz., human intellect, partakes of the domain of the intelligences [DC II, 16 (157:1-2)].

37. The domain of souls includes the rational soul, present only in man, as well as souls of the non-rational animals and of plants. By virtue of possessing a rational soul man is the highest of all beings that have a soul; yet, he is the lowest among beings who have intellect [DC II, 16 (155:10-13)]. See n. 470 below. Nicholas distinguishes ratio (reason) from intellectus (intellect) by identifying the latter as a higher power than the former. Reason makes inferences in accordance with the principle of non-contradiction, whereas intellect intuits in accordance with a coincidence of opposites. See DC II, 16 (168). DC II, 2. See also my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One], n. 37 of Notes to De Theologicis Complementis.

38. By “body” (“corpus”) Nicholas means to include not only the human body but also the entire realm of corporeal objects.


40. “… in an intelligence”: i.e., in a mind or in an intellect. See n. 36 above.

41. Here at 16:1 I am reading (together with the Paris edition) “existit” in place of “exstitit”.

42. DM 6 (94:14-16).


44. See the second paragraph of n. 17 above.

45. See n. 26 above.

46. See n. 34 above.

47. DI I, 5 (14:1-8).

Notes to De Coniecturis

51. “… in its Absolute Oneness”; i.e., in God.
52. Cf. De Filiatione Dei 3 (70:3-7).
53. Cf. DC I, 6 (24:24-26). See also De Sapientia II (29:3-4).
55. Here at 19:12 I am reading (together with the Paris edition) “ipsam” in place of “ipsum”.
56. “… the theology that is inexpressible in words”: as opposed to theologia sermocinalis (locutional theology = affirmative theology). See De Sapientia II (33).
58. Cf. DI I, 6 (16:8-12). De Deo Abscondito 10-15. De Principio 19. Although Nicholas does hold that the via negativa is more reliable than is the via affirmativa [see DI I, 26 (89:1-2). DP 62:7-8. Sermo XXII (10:25-31); cf. Sermo CCXVI (16)], nonetheless he also maintains that the via negativa gives no knowledge of God’s Quiddity. (See n. 103 below.) Nicholas wants to go beyond the via negativa insofar as the via negativa accepts as true of God a statement that is opposed to an affirmation. According to the via affirmativa, for example, God is powerful. Yet, Nicholas prefers to say, by way of negation, that God is not powerless. But he prefers even more pointing out that God is beyond the very distinction between powerful and not-powerful, in any sense in which this distinction can be understood by us. Of course, the transcending of this distinction is what many people always meant by the via negativa.
59. The foregoing response suffices for all questions when “exists” is changed to “is” and when a predicate is added. For example, to the question whether God is good the answer may be given, according to Nicholas: ‘(1) it is not the case that He either is good or is not good and (2) it is not the case that He both is good and is not good.” For the sense in which God is good is altogether other than any sense of “good” that finite minds can grasp.
60. Here again Nicholas shows that a surmise is to be contrasted with precise knowledge (not with knowledge). Sometimes, as with our surmising knowledge of God’s nature, a surmise is but a kind of learned ignorance. At other times a surmise is knowledge in the more ordinary sense—e.g., knowledge of a perceptible object, whose characteristics are always further specifiable by us. See n. 4 above.
61. See n. 37 above.
63. “… irreducibly”: i.e., the opposites, as they are present in intellect, are not reducible to each other, even though in intellect they are harmoniously conjoined.
64. Nicholas here symbolizes God by Oneness; symbolizes intelligence, by the number 10; the soul, by the number 100; and body, by the number 1000. The number 100 has the square-root of 10; but 10 [which Nicholas calls denary oneness and the root-oneness of 100 and the second oneness (in the series 1, 10, 100, 1000)], has no simple square-root.

65. “... at the rational level”: i.e., at the level of the third oneness, viz., centenary oneness, or 100, which symbolizes the rational soul, i.e., the human soul. The rational level is lower than the intellectual level: intellectual beings (angels) are ontologically more perfect beings than are rational beings. See n. 217 below.

66. In God, who is First Oneness, all opposites coincide. [DI III, Letter to Cardinal Julian (264:1-3). Thus, God ontologically precedes all oppositeness. See n. 57 above.

67. The “very close likeness of the First” is intelligence.


71. Nicholas rejects the Albertistic-Thomistic doctrine of analo gia, according to which the human mind knows analogically what God is like. See my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One], n. 114 of Notes to De Theologicis Complementis.

72. Cf. DC I, 5 (19) and De Sapientia II (30).

73. “… root-oneness”: i.e., intelligence. See n. 64 above.

74. Cf. DC I, 5 (19:3-4).

75. A comparison of Nicholas’s words at 25:10 (“verbum intellectuale ratio est”) with his words at 25:15 (“ratio sermo est intelligentiae”) shows the ease with which Nicholas interchanges not only “intellectus” and “intelligentia” but also “verbum” and “sermo”.

76. “… reason’s oneness”: Here Nicholas is referring to the oneness that is reason itself. In another context “reason’s oneness” is said to be intelligence, or intellect, from which reason is said ontologically to derive. See DC II, 1 (75:7).

77. An intelligence, Nicholas has stated at 25:5-6 above, does not have a location. But as intelligence is spoken of by human reason, it is (and must be) conceived as if it had a kind of location.

78. Intelligence is in many respects ineffable, though only God is absolutely ineffable, according to Nicholas.

79. “… which intelligence unfolds quadratically”: i.e., intelligence, symbolized by the number 10, unfolds the soul, symbolized by the number 100, which is the square of 10.

80. Although intelligence is the soul’s oneness, or unity, the soul is the body’s oneness, or unity. Corporeal forms (mentioned by Nicholas also at 31:6) are numerical-unfoldings of the soul’s oneness. Cf. Nicholas’s tacit sanctioning of physiognomy at DC 120:14.

81. DC I, 10 (49:6-9). See n. 38 above. See also Nicholas’s discussion, below, in the second half of the passage marked by margin number 28.

82. “… cubic body”: what is bodily, or corporeal, or three-dimensional, or solid, is called cubic because it is symbolized by the number 1000, the cube of the root 10,
which itself symbolizes intelligences, or intellectual beings.

83. “... as an instrumental-root”: i.e., soul is the root and form of the corporeal; but soul is itself the instrument of intelligence, or intellect.

84. That is, every remark bears the imprint of the speaker’s soul.

85. “... presuppose the soul’s reason”: i.e., presuppose the rational soul.

86. Nicholas’s point about the indubitability of the rational soul’s existence parallels his earlier points about the indubitable existence of God (margin-number 19) and of intelligence (margin-number 24).

87. In knowing perceptible objects the soul unifies them both in the act of perceiving them and in the act of conceiving them. (Cf. n. 390 below.)

88. Quantity and quality come forth from the soul’s reason in the sense that the rational soul has as its operation measuring, discriminating, comparing, and com- pounded. See the references in n. 26 above.

89. See n. 88 above. Cf. DI II, 3 (108:1-6).

90. See DC I, 3 (10:end).

91. What is corporeal is solid, or cubic, i.e., three-dimensional—as the number 1000 is also cubic, viz., is $10^3$.

92. See the reference in n. 68 above.


94. That is, a plurality of things come together in a rational conception. Through concepts reason unifies, even though through discrimination, or discernment, reason also divides.

95. DI I, 26.

96. That is, in the domain of intelligence a coincidence of opposites occurs—whereas in reason’s conceptions only an enfolding of opposites occurs. See DC I, 6 (23 and 25). See also my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One], n. 43 of Notes to De Theologicis Complementis.

97. That is, actually perceiving takes place only with regard to the present. Imagining and conceiving go beyond the present.


99. Intelligences are said to come close to Eternity. Cf. DC I, 6 (23:10-12). LG I (17-19). However, this “coming close” and “being like” is nonetheless disproportional (DC I, 6 (24:9)) and metaphorical. For between the Infinite and the finite there is an infinite distance. DI I, 3 (9:4-5). DI I, 16 (46). DI II, 8 (140:5-8). DI II, 9 (150:8-10). Cf. DP 67:8 and NA 14 (68:15-16).

Intelligences are called eternal only in the reduced sense that they are perpetual, i.e., have a created beginning but have no end. LG II (77:14-15).

100. DI I, 24 (76-77).

101. DM 10.

102. A triangle is the first polygonal figure. DI I, 20 (60). Nicholas borrows from Proclus the doctrine that oneness is the beginning of multitude. Cf. VS 39 (120:7-8) with VS 21 (59:10 and 61:1). See the references in n. 165 of Notes to De Venatione Sapientiae, in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One].


104. “... reduce it to Infinite Simplicity”: i.e., when we conceive of a stone as in its ultimate Ground-of-Being, viz., God, we conceive of it no longer as a stone but as God, since in God all things are God. See the references in n. 39 above. Cf. *DI* I, 17 (51:4-14) and *NA* 10 (39).


106. “Soul, or reason” (“*anima seu ratio*”): This passage attests that the third oneness, or unity, of which Nicholas is speaking throughout this treatise is the rational soul.


108. See the references in n. 3 above.

109. The uppermost heaven is the realm of intelligences, or intellects. The lowest heaven is the realm of things perceptible, or corporeal. The middle heaven is the realm of rational souls, which partake of intellect and which have sensory powers that operate by means of a body.

110. “... exist ... cubically”: see n. 82 above.

111. Intellectual numbers, as Nicholas calls them, include numbers such as the pi and the square root of two, which escape proportionality. (We call them transcendental numbers and irrational numbers, respectively.) See *DC* II, 1 (75 and 76:13-18) and *DC* II, 2 (82). *DM* 6 (91). *DP* 42. Note what Nicholas says about the coincidence, for intellect, of a circle’s center and circumference: *DC* II, 16 (168). Ap. 15.

Intellectual oneness is also threeness [*DI* I, 10 (27)].

At *DC* II, 2 (86:5-7) Nicholas distinguishes intellectual mathematics, rational mathematics, and perceptible mathematics. The infinite number is an intellectual number. See, above, n. 556 of Notes to the Orienting Study.

112. See the reference in the second paragraph of n. 111 above.

113. What is triple can have many triple ratios (e.g., 3:1 or 9:3 or 27:9 or 81:27, and so on), and these triple ratios can be applied to the perceptible world.

114. Intellectual threeness, which is also oneness, enfolds not only triple proportion (which falls within the domain of rational number) but also the non-proportionally trine. See n. 115 below.

115. That is, I am unfolding from the number 3 what is trine (but not what is triple). If the number 3, which is here being unfolded, were only a *triple* number, then from it there would be unfolded only that which is a triple. Yet, *a, b, and c*, which are unfolded from it, are not a triple.

Note also *De Aequalitate* 36:14-15: “The things which we number by three we call three, and the number by which we number three things we call three. The number does not depend on the things numbered.”

116. The following are translations of the Latin labels on the diagram (from top
to bottom and from left to right): *unitas*: oneness; *basis pyramis lucis*: base of the pyramid of light; *tertium caelum*: third heaven; *supremus mundus*: uppermost world; *secundum caelum*: second heaven; *medius mundus*: middle world; *primum caelum*: first heaven; *infimus mundus*: lowest world; *basis pyramis tenebrae*: base of the pyramid of darkness; *alteritas*: otherness.

In *Codex Latinus Cusanus* 218 the diagram is situated horizontally (as below) rather than vertically; the label “*unitas*” is on the left, and the label “*alteritas*” is on the right. And the other labeling is placed as indicated above. Moreover, the *alteritas*-triangle is shaded all the way to its tip, though it should not be. Herbert Wackerzapp rightly sees that the correct orientation of the diagram is the vertical orientation. See p. 59 of his *Der Einfluss Meister Eckharts auf die ersten philosophischen Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues (1440-1450)* [Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Vol. 39, Heft 3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1962)].


Meister Eckhart also cites this same Pseudo-Hermetic text. See Eckhart’s *Expositio Libri Sapientiae* v. 7, c. 8 (margin-number 90) [p. 424, line 2 of Vol. II, Fascicle 7-8 (op. cit., n. 48 above)]. *Expositio Sancti Evangelii secundum Iohannem* c. 1, v.38 (margin-number 220) [p. 185, lines 5-6 of Vol. III, Fascicle 3 (edited by Karl Christ and Josef Koch, 1940, in the series *Meister Eckhart. Die lateinischen Werke* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer)].

118. VS 21-22.

119. In translating these first two English sentences I have repunctuated the Latin text, in accordance with *Codex Latinus Cusanus* 218.

120. Here, at 46:8, I am reading not “*tibi*” but “*ibi*”, the word which all the manuscripts have.

121. “… in the foregoing respect”’: i.e., in respect to oneness and otherness.

122. That is, the severed limb of an animal is not an animal.

123. *DC* II, 4-6.

124. See the references in n. 48 above.

125. *DC* I, 7 (27:15-17).

126. See n. 37 above.
127. In this sentence (viz., 50:1-3 of the Latin text) I am reading (together with all the mss.) “progressionem” in place of “progressione”.

128. *DI* I, 5 (13). According to Cusa the only real actually Maximum is God, who is Infinity itself and who is also the actually Minimum. Whatever is actually maximal or actually minimal does not admit of degrees. Accordingly, since an element is supposed to be something that is actually a minimum, it could not differ from anything else by some degree. Yet, any sample of earth (or water or air or fire) differs in some degree from any other sample of earth. And so, no sample that we arrive at, through perception, is elemental. See *DC* II, 4 (90).

129. A simple element is a minimal, unmixed corporeal entity that, in principle, is not further reducible or further divisible. In this sense there are no actual simple-elements, both because the four “elements” (fire, air, water, earth) are always actually intermixed and because any portion of any one of the four is always further divisible in principle. Speaking more generally, we may note that Nicholas regards any physical thing as always further divisible in principle, for any progression by degrees never reaches either a maximum or a minimum. Conversely, that which is absolutely maximal does not at all admit of degrees. (Only God is absolutely Maximal.)

Regarding Nicholas’s view of simple elements see especially *DC* II, 4 (90). What the ancients usually called an element Nicholas considers to be something composed of elements. His view is, at the level of the four elements, a variant of Anaxagoras’s doctrine of homoiomeries. Cf. *DI* II, 5.

130. See n. 3 above.

131. That is, reason does not comprehend (what we call) irrational or transcendental numbers.

132. “… numbers [that] are both proportional and disproportional”: i.e., irrational numbers, which Nicholas calls intellectual numbers (e.g., the square root of two). See n. 111 above and n. 203 below, as well as *DC* II, 1 (75).


134. The title “De Participatione” is supplied by the editors of the printed Latin text.

135. *De Genesi* 1 (150).


138. See n. 136 above.


140. “… the circle as it is [in itself]”: i.e., the rational circle, the circle as an entity of reason, the circle as defined by reason.

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143. See the references in n. 139 above.

144. "... the variety of visible things is enfolded concordantly in the oneness of sight": i.e., a single act of vision unites many perceived objects into a single perceptual image.

145. "... absolute sight": i.e., sight considered in and of itself.

146. Here at 55:17 I am reading (together with the Paris edition) "created" in place of "createae".

147. See n. 17 above.


149. "... of our intelligence": i.e., of our [respective] intellect. See n. 36 above. Re "partaking of that unimpartible, most actual Light" see the following: *DC* II, 6 (104). *De Quaerendo Deum* 2 (37:13-14). *De Filiatione Dei* 4 (78:5-6) and 5 (80:3-4). *NA* 16 (79:4-6). *VS* 7 (16:3-7). *VS* 22 (65:23-24). Sermo "Verbum caro factum est," [as edited by Josef Koch in *Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse* (Jahrgang 1936/37. Zweite Abhandlung)], p. 80, lines 22-25. (This sermon corresponds to Haubst number CXLI.)

150. See n. 149 above.

151. Here at 57:10 I am reading (together with the Paris edition) "contemplaris" in place of "contemplar".

152. This sentence is the closest that Nicholas comes to a definition of "coniecturae". It indicates that truth as it is in and of itself cannot be partaken of precisely; i.e., human beings cannot know the precise truth. Yet, the sentence also shows that coniecturae contain some measure of truth. Nicholas emphasizes that all empirical knowledge is perspectival. In this way, even the making of reliable empirical inferences is but a form of "surmising"—as, in another way, is also the making of a priori and self-evident judgments. For example, reason judges that a whole is greater than is any one of its parts and that the circumference of a circle is greater than is the circle's center. But intellect judges that the circle's circumference and center coincide. Regarding all these assertions, see *DC* II, 16 (168). *DC* I, 11 (57:11-17). *DC* II, 1 (75). *DC* II, 2 (80-81). Sermo CXXX (5).


154. Nicholas is referring to his composite position in *DI*, not to a particular passage. But cf. *DI* II, 3 (107) with *DI* I, 17 (49) and *DI* II, 2 (104). No thing can partake of another thing as that other thing is in and of itself. For all partaking occurs with a degree of otherness. Where there is no otherness the "partaking" is a coincidence. See the last sentence of *DC* II, 1 (75).

155. Just as oneness is partaken of not *per se* but through its modes, so God is partaken of not *per se* but only through likenesses. See the references in n. 17 above. See also *De Filiatione Dei* 3 (63).

156. "... of the denary unfolding": i.e., of the tenfold unfolding as it is illustrated in the immediately preceding diagram.

157. Here at 60:2 I am surmising "complicatoria" in place of "complicatoriae".
158. “... that art can be depicted by three lines”: viz., the three lines of the diagram: $b \ c$ and $d \ e \ f$ and $g \ h \ i \ k$.

159. “Denary oneness” refers to the realm of intellects, or intelligences. See n. 64 above.

160. The third heaven is the intellectual world, i.e., the first world, the realm of intellects, or intelligences. (The expression “third heaven” is borrowed from II Corinthians 12:2.) The intellectual world’s Center is said by Nicholas to be God.

161. The second heaven is the rational world, i.e., the second world, the realm of the rational soul. Its center is said by Nicholas to be intellect.

162. The third world, or first heaven, is the world of perceptible objects, i.e., the visible world. Its center is said by Nicholas to be reason.

163. The First Center, viz., God, is the Center of the intellectual world. By Him all things are held together. Colossians 1:17.


165. See the treatise De Filiatione Dei.

166. I am following the Latin title in Codex Latinus Cusanus 218. Cf. DC I, 13 (65:7).

167. “... of the loftiest heaven”: i.e., of the third heaven.

168. “... as if ten articular numbers”: viz., 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100.

169. “... the first oneness”: i.e., the oneness of the uppermost, or first, world. This is a “first oneness” only in the sense of being the first-mentioned oneness in this passage. This first-mentioned oneness is really a second oneness (or a denary oneness), viz., the intellectual world, or domain. See DC I, 13 (67). Cf. DC II, 16 (156:4-5).

170. “... the second oneness”: i.e., the oneness of the intermediate, or second, world. This is a “second oneness” only in the sense of being the second-mentioned oneness in the passage. This second-mentioned oneness is really a third oneness (or a centenary oneness), viz., the rational world, or domain. See DC I, 13 (67).

171. The numbers of the uppermost heaven are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. The numbers of the intermediate heaven are 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100. The numbers of the lowest heaven are 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000. Thus, the oneness of the lowest heaven is 100; and the oneness of the intermediate heaven is 10. Notice that apropos of the present diagram—which Nicholas will call Diagram $U$—the number-symbolism differs from the number-symbolism used in DC I, 4-8. For example, in the earlier section the number ten (which Nicholas refers to as a denary oneness and as a second oneness) symbolizes the domain of intelligences. But in the present diagram the uppermost world, which can be used to symbolize the
region of intelligences, is called a first oneness. [See DC I, 13 (64: end).] It is important to recognize that Diagram U can be used to symbolize different things, depending upon what the largest circle is made to represent (e.g., the universe or intellect or human nature or color, etc.).

172. “... each of the previously shown worlds”: i.e., each of the worlds, or heavens, described in DC I, 12. The diagram that is referred to at the end of DC I, 13 (65)—which Nicholas later calls Diagram U—is a further specification of the diagram that is implicit in the description (of the three worlds) in I, 12. (It is not a separate diagram.) This fact means that the three worlds—as they are diagrammed in DC I, 13 of Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 (and as this diagram is reproduced in the present translation)—are to be thought of as the intellectual world, the rational world, and the perceptible world. God is the Center of the intellectual world; intellect is the center of the rational world; reason is the center of the perceptible world. [DC I, 12 (62)]. Ultimately speaking, of course, God is the Ultimate Center of each of these worlds, just as He is also their Ultimate Circumference [cf. DI II, 11 (157:23-26) and DI III, 1 (185:1-3)]. However, speaking more immediately, He is more central to the intellectual world, according to Nicholas. Diagram U does not illustrate either Nicholas’s claim that the third world is very circumferential or his claim that the first world is very central. By the former claim he means that the material world is something outward, at least insofar as it is accessible by means of the five outer senses; by the latter claim he means that intellects are a close symbolical likenesses of the invisible God and, for this reason, may be said to be close to the Center. It is important to keep in mind that these three worlds exist on three different ontological levels and that perceptibility exists on the periphery only of the third world, not of the universe as a whole. For the universe as a whole is constituted also by intelligences, or angels, who are immaterial beings, i.e., who are minds, without peripheral “outer-layers.”

In sum, the one universe is constituted by three major domains, or dimensions, or worlds, or heavens, or regions. These differ from one another in their degree of ontological excellence, so that one world can be called ontologically higher than another world. The most excellent world, or domain, is that of intellect; the least excellent domain is that of things visible. A further reason that the intellectual domain is said by Nicholas to be very central is that the other two domains are thought of as descending from it (i.e., as being derived through it). Similarly, a further reason that the perceptible domain is said to be “outermost” is that no further domain descends, or derives, from it or through it. Ontologically speaking, the metaphors “outermost” and “lowest” amount to the same thing insofar as they signify a comparative degree of excellence, just as the metaphors “innermost” and “highest” also amount to the same thing. God, who escapes all comparative relation, also escapes all degrees. In Him outermost and innermost, highest and lowest, maximum and minimum coincide.

We should not suppose that in DC I, 12 the three domains of the one universe are to be diagramed as concentric circles and, accordingly, are to be diagrammed altogether differently from Nicholas’s own diagram in I, 13. Thus, we ought not to accept Herbert Wackerzapp’s depiction on p. 150 of his Der Einfluss Meister Eckharts auf die ersten philosophischen Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues (1440-1450) [Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Vol. 39, Heft 3 (Mün-
Aschendorff, 1962). All things exist in each of the three worlds in the way that Nicholas explains in DC II, 10 (124).

Finally, in Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 Diagram U is shaded as below. I have not here included the lettering on the diagram, since it does not show-through well on the shaded printed-surface (although it shows clearly on the manuscript). Similarly, in the translation itself I have not reproduced the shading, since it obscures some of the lettering. A translation of the lettering (from top to bottom and from outer to inner) is as follows: *circulus universorum*: circle of all things; *circulus supremae regionis*: circle of the uppermost region; *circulus primi ordinis*: circle of the first order; *circulus medi i ordinis*: circle of the middle order; *circulus infimi ordinis*: circle of the lowest order; *circulus mediæ regionis*: circle of the middle region; *circulus primi ordinis*: circle of the first order; *circulus medi i ordinis*: circle of the middle order; *circulus infimi ordinis*: circle of the lowest order; *circulus infimæ regionis*: circle of the lowest region; *circulus primi ordinis*: circle of the first order; *circulus medi i ordinis*: circle of the middle order; *circulus infimi ordinis*: circle of the lowest order. For practical reasons the smallest circles on the diagram have no labeling. They are, however, circles of the first, the middle, and the lowest choirs. See DC II, 16 (156), as well as DC I, 13 (67:1-6).

173. “… is distinguished three times by means of three numerical progressions”: i.e., each of the regions contains three orders within itself (primus ordo, medius ordo, and infimus ordo), so that altogether there are nine orders in the universe (the single largest circle symbolizing the universe).

174. “… the first, most simple oneness”: in the diagram the first oneness is represented by the largest circle; this largest circle, or first oneness, symbolizes the universe. We must not confuse the universe’s being a first oneness (in terms of this diagram, where the largest circle represents the universe) with God’s being Absolute First One- ness [DC I, 5, DC I, 13 (67:1)]. At times, Nicholas’s terminology can be confusing.

175. “… the quaternary distinction”: see DC I, 3 (10).

176. Here at 65:6 I am reading (together with the Paris edition) “quibus” in place
of “qua”.

177. “… in each world there are three trine distinctions”: i.e., in each of the three worlds, or regions, there are three orders; and within each order there are three choirs (as represented by the smallest circles). Thus, within the one largest circle there are three sets of increasingly smaller circles: viz., the set of three regions; the set of three orders within each region; the set of three choirs within each order. Accordingly, there are three sizes of circles—each size repeated three times within the larger circle that immediately contains it.

178. The names of all numbers are formed by an ordered-repeating of the numerals 1 through 10. DC I, 3 (10:11-15).

179. The reason is given in DC I, 3 (10). Cf. LG II (79).

180. That is, there are 39 circles included within the one largest circle, making 40 circles.

181. Josef Koch and Winfried Happ have displayed these calculations on pages 222-223 of the German translation Nikolaus von Kues. Mutmaßungen (Hamburg: Meiner, 1971):

1 =  (9 + 1)
2 = (9 + 3 - 1)
3 = (9 + 3)
4 = (9 + 3 + 1)
5 = (9 - 3 - 1)
6 = (9 - 3)
7 = (9 - 3 + 1)
8 = (9 - 1)
9 =  (27 + 1)
10 = (9 + 1)
11 = (9 + 3 - 1)
12 = (9 + 3)
13 = (9 + 3 + 1)
14 = (27 - 9 - 3 - 1)
15 = (27 - 9 - 3)
16 = (27 - 9 - 3 + 1)
17 = (27 - 9 - 1)
18 = (27 - 9)
19 = (27 - 9 + 1)
20 = (27 - 9 + 3 - 1)
21 = (27 - 9 + 3)
22 = (27 - 9 + 3 + 1)
23 = (27 - 3 - 1)
24 = (27 - 3)
25 = (27 - 3 + 1)
26 = (27 - 1)
27 =  (27 + 1)
28 = (27 + 3)
29 = (27 + 3 - 1)
30 = (27 + 3)
31 = (27 + 3 + 1)
32 = (27 + 9 - 3 - 1)
33 = (27 + 9 - 3)
34 = (27 + 9 - 3 + 1)
35 = (27 + 9 - 1)
36 = (27 + 9)
37 = (27 + 9 + 1)
38 = (27 + 9 + 3 - 1)
39 = (27 + 9 + 3)
40 = (27 + 9 + 3 + 1)

182. For example,

1 = (4 + 2)
2 = (4 + 3)
3 = (4 + 3 + 1)
4 = (4 + 3 + 2)
5 = (4 + 1)
6 = (4 + 2)
7 = (4 + 3)
8 = (4 + 3 + 1)
9 = (4 + 3 + 2)
10 = (4 + 3 + 2 + 1)

183. Simple Oneness, or God, is not represented in the diagram, which symbolizes everything-that-is-other-than-God, viz., the universe.

Although God, as Ground-of-Being, is equally near to all things [DI II, 11
184. The ordering here is ontological, not chronological.
185. “... which symbolizes soul”: i.e., which symbolizes the rational soul.
186. See the reminder in n. 38 above.
187. DI III, 1 (185-188).
188. The Latin word “Prologus” is not found in the manuscripts but is added by the editors of the Heidelberg Academy’s printed Latin edition.
189. “... with the help of practical examples”: See n. 7 above. Some of these examples and illustrations have already been given in Book I and will be enlarged upon in Book II, which also furnishes additional examples and illustrations.
191. See n. 3 above.
192. This chapter-title is supplied by the editors of the Heidelberg Academy’s printed edition of the Latin text of DC. It is appropriated from 76:1-2.
194. Strictly speaking, Absolute Oneness (viz., God) admits of no modes, for Absolute Oneness is beyond all affirmation and all negation. DI I, 4 (12:4-7). De Filiatione Dei 4 (78) and 6 (84:14). PF 7 (lines 1-4 of section 21). See the translated text marked by, and the references included in, n. 40 of Notes to De Theologicis Complementis, in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]. N. B. DC II, 7 (106:9): “Absolute Oneness coincides with Absolute Infinity....”
195. The Diagram P is the paradigmatic figure described at DC I, 9 (41).
196. At 73:7 I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218) “lucem lucem” in place of “lucem” in the Heidelberg Academy’s printed edition.
197. “... [the diagrammatic figure] a”: viz., the diagram at DC I, 11 (59).
198. The diagram of the universe, or Diagram U, is the diagram in DC I, 13 (66).
199. “... the circle of the universe”: viz., the largest circle in Diagram U. In the present sentence of the text, I am taking “absolute sight” to refer to ‘sight considered in and of itself’ and not to refer to God.
200. See n. 3 above.
201. “... more absolute oneness”: i.e., less-contracted oneness.
202. “... reason’s oneness”: The reader is cautioned that although, as here, intellect is said to be the rational soul’s oneness, or unity [cf. DC I, 7 (27:9)], Nicholas also sometimes uses “reason’s oneness” to refer to reason’s own oneness, i.e., to the oneness that reason is. See, for example, DC I, 6 (25:11-17). Cf. n. 393 below. See also the passage, in the English translation, marked by n. 483.
203. At the level of intellect there is a coincidence of numbers, as well as a co-
incidence of a circle’s center and its circumference. See the references in n. 111 above.
204. See n. 4 above.
206. “… that are to be investigated”: to be investigated, that is, by reason.
207. The senses partake of reason; reason partakes of intellect; intellect partakes
of God’s (symbolical) likeness. See the translated passage marked by n. 211 below.
See also DC II, 17 (178:7-10).
208. “… generic … oneness”: i.e., a oneness, or unity, such as belongs to a
genius. A concept, whether of the species or of the genus, unifies into a single repre-
sentation the manifold data from the senses. At a lower level, the communal sense
also unifies. Compendium 6 (17:10).
209. See the references in n. 111 above. See also n. 126 of Notes to De Theologi-
cis Complementis in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One].
210. DC II, 2 (81-82). See n. 33 of Notes to De Theologicis Complementis in my
Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One].
211. See n. 207 above.
212. “… these sciences”: viz., mathematics and the other disciplines that do not
imply a coincidence of opposites.
213. DC I, 7.
214. In a syllogism the major premise is the premise that contains the term found
in the predicate of the conclusion. For example, in the syllogism “(1) All men are mor-
tal; (2) Socrates is a man; therefore, (3) Socrates is mortal” the major premise is the
first premise. The concluding idea that Socrates is mortal is contained implicitly in
the idea (of the first premise) that all men are mortal—given that Socrates is a man
(minor premise).
215. Such a syllogism would not be valid.
216. DC I, 7.
217. Here Nicholas summarizes a crucial distinction between intellect and rea-
son. [See also De Theologicis Complementis 4:24-28 and DC I, 6 (23).] Human be-
ings are primarily creatures of reason, in that they have a rational soul. However,
Nicholas allows that the rational soul partakes in some degree of the domain-of-intel-
clect, to which, primarily, angelic minds belong [DC I, 7 (27)]. Thus, at DC I, 1 (6:6-
7) the allusion to intellectualis natura includes a reference to the human mind. [Re-
218. “… the unfolding of rational inventions”: i.e., the producing of the arts and
the sciences and the other products of reason.
219. That is, although from reason’s viewpoint the sum of the angles of a tri-
gle sum up exactly to 180°, this fact is not the case from the viewpoint either of
intellect or of the senses. Cf. DC II, 1 (76).
220. DC II, 16 (168).
221. DI I, 17 (49). DI II, 1 (91-92).
222. The example of the diagonal of a square and of the hypotenuse of the tri-
gle illustrate the Pythagorean theorem.
223. "... [the sum of] the two squares of the other sides": i.e., the sum of the squares of the other two sides.

224. Here at 81:13 "a te" is to be understood. Cf. 81:7.

225. "... this unique rationale": i.e., the principle which Nicholas at DC II, 1 (76:9-11) calls the root of all rational assertions: viz., the principle that a coincidence of opposites is not attainable.

226. Here we may borrow Koch and Happ's diagram [from p. 224 of the notes to the German translation: Nikolaus von Kues. Mutmaßungen (Hamburg: Meiner, 1971)].

227. "... the same conclusion": viz., the conclusion that there would be a coincidence of chord and arc.

228. "... this root of mathematics": see n. 225 above.

229. "... the first harmonic bond..." viz., the musical interval called an octave.

230. "... the second harmonic bond": viz., the musical interval called a fifth.

231. "the third harmonic bond" viz., the musical interval called a fourth.

232. DC I, 3.

233. At DM 6 (91:5-11) and at De Staticis Experimentis 192 Nicholas also uses the example of harmonic relations.

234. The art of dialectic is the art of reasoning and of making inferences; it is the art of logic.

235. According to Boethius and to Aristotle propositions may have one of four quantities: they may be either universal or particular or indefinite or singular. Likewise, propositions may have one of two qualities: they may be either affirmative or negative. Examples of such propositions are (1) "All men are mortal" (universal affirmative); "No men are mortal" (universal negative); (2) "Some men are mortal" (particular affirmative); "Some men are not mortal" (particular negative); (3) "Man is mortal" (indefinite affirmative); "Man is not mortal" (indefinite negative); (4) "Socrates is mortal" (singular affirmative); "Socrates is not mortal" (singular negative).

Indefinite propositions, as they appear in syllogisms, may be regarded as quantified by "some" and, thus, as being particular propositions. As regards the medieval doctrine of a term's distribution, singular propositions may be treated as if they were a sub-variety of universal propositions.

236. "... four modalities": "quattuor modificationes". Presumably, Nicholas here means by "modificationes" the four modalities of a proposition (viz., to be, to be contingent, to be possible, to be necessary) rather than the four modes, or kinds, of proposition (viz., universal affirmative = A; universal negative = E; particular affirmative = I; particular negative = O) or rather than the four valid moods of a syllogism of the first figure (viz., the moods AAA, EAE, AII, and EIO). However, his main point is compatible with any of these three understandings. Regarding the first interpreta-
tion, note Book V of Boethius’s second commentary on Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione* (*PL* 64:582D and 584 CD).

237. Here Nicholas speaks of four syllogistic figures, whereas in VS 4 he speaks only of three. According to Boethius, influenced by Aristotle, the four syllogistic figures are distinguished from one another by the role of their respective middle term: Figure I is defined as the syllogistic form in which the middle term serves as subject in the one premise and as predicate in the other premise. Figure II is defined as the syllogistic form in which the middle term is in the predicate position in each of the two premises. Figure III is defined as the syllogistic form in which the middle term is in the subject position in both premises. A fourth figure results from distinguishing Figure I into two figures: a figure in which the middle term occurs as the subject of the major premise and as the predicate of the minor premise (this now being called Figure I) and another figure in which the middle term appears as the subject of the minor premise and as the predicate of the major premise (this now being called Figure IV). See Boethius, *De Syllogismo Categorico* Book I (*PL* 64:798CD) and Book II (*PL* 64:811-812).

238. Nicholas here refers again to Diagram U at I, 13 (66).

239. See n. 238 above.

240. The lower intellectual power approximates the higher rational power. In *DM* 14 (154) Nicholas calls the lower intellectual (angelic) power rational; and he elsewhere calls the higher rational (human) power intellectual, if only because it partakes of the domain of intellectual power and understands. See *DM* 12 (142:15). Cf. *DM* 11 (141:3-4).


242. See n. 3 above.

243. Diagram P is the diagram at *DC* I, 9 (41).

244. “... all the way to the cube of 3”: i.e., all the way to the singularity symbolized by the 27 smallest circles in Diagram U at *DC* I, 13 (66).

245. Here at 88:15 I am reading “communis” (with all the mss.) in place of “communi”.

246. This union is symbolized by the largest circle in Diagram U. Note the hierarchy in *DI* III, 1 (184).

247. “... is general”... i.e., in the sense of generic and of a genus.

248. This union is symbolized by any one of the three regional circles in Diagram U. (See n. 177 above.)

249. “... is somewhat more specific”: i.e., specific in the sense that relates to species. This union is symbolized by any of the nine circles-of-order in Diagram U. (See n. 177 above.)

250. This union of those things which are most specific is symbolized by any one of the smallest circles in Diagram U.

251. Each individual thing agrees with each other individual thing insofar as both it and the others are individual things. Each individual thing differs from each other individual thing in that it is itself and is not that other thing. [See VS 22 (67).] No two individual things differ in number alone. *DI* II, 1. *Sermo* XXII (24:4-6).

252. “... the diagram of all things”: i.e., Diagram U at *DC* I, 13 (66).

253. “... general agreement”: i.e., agreement in genus.

254. “... in you ... all things ... julianize”: i.e., they come together in such a
way as to constitute Julian as Julian, even as in a lute harmonic principles come together in such a way as to produce a harmony that is characteristic of the lute.

255. Humanizing is a making to be human; animalizing is a making to be animal, etc.

256. “... make a smallest circle into a universal circle”: i.e., take what is symbolized by a smallest circle in Diagram U and begin a new instance of Diagram U in which what was symbolized by the smallest circle is now symbolized by the largest circle.

257. “... of a quite true surmise”: This expression reminds us that what Nicholas terms a surmise is often, in common parlance, termed knowledge. Yet, a surmise is never precisely true, since only Infinite Mind knows precise truth. *De Theologicis Complementis* 4:28-30.

258. Nicholas’s point can be re-expressed as follows: ‘But if it is shown that in the perceptible world all perceptible things have in common a most general nature, then we surmise that that nature is a general element.’

259. ‘Something similar holds true ...’: viz., (1) that if things more specific have in common a quite specific nature, then that nature is a quite specific element and (2) that if things very specific have in common a very specific nature, then that nature is a very specific element.

260. Regarding elements, see *DC* I, 10 (49:9-15) and I, 10 (50), *LG* I (15:6-9).

261. According to Nicholas, whatever admits of degrees will be such that, in principle, it is infinitely divisible, so that through division of that thing one will never arrive at a minimum, except in the practical sense that one does not have the technical means for further dividing the thing, so that to the senses that thing may seem indivisible. [Cf. *DC* II, 4 (91); see n. 128 and n. 129 above.] Indeed, according to Nicholas there are no actually existent simple (i.e., pure, or unmixed) elements. Only God is absolutely Simple. Whatever is material is extended and is, therefore, in principle, ever-further divisible. Fire, air, water, earth—the four “elements,” according to the ancients and according to Nicholas—are regarded by Nicholas as composites. [See *DC* II, 4 (94).] He calls them primary perceptible elements.

Cf. Hugo of Straßburg, *Compendium Theologicae Veritatis* II.2 (Straßburg edition, 1489). Regarding the transformation of elements into one another, see n. 341 of Notes to *De Venatione Sapientiae*, in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]*.

262. “...the general diagram”... i.e., Diagram U.

263. Here at 91:2 I am reading (together with *Codex Latinus Cusanus* 218 and certain other mss.) “universalitas” in place of “universitas”.

264. “... trine, quadratically trine, and cubically trine”: These numbers correspond to the number of different-sized circles in Diagram U: viz., 3 major circles, 9 smaller circles, and 27 smallest circles. See *DC* I, 13 (66) and II, 5 (95:5-15).

265. See n. 264 above. The three major circles are here used in order to symbolize, from top to bottom, the domains of intellectual elementariness, rational elementariness, and perceptible elementariness, respectively. Each of these domains, or regions, is further sub-dividable into 9 smaller circles and, then, 27 smallest circles.

Although, according to Nicholas, there are at the perceptual level only four primary, or basic, elements (viz., fire, air, water, earth), no one of these primary elements is a pure or simple element; rather, each one is composed of itself and the other three.
That is, each primary element (at the perceptual level or at whatever level) contains the other three (at the corresponding level) and is contained by the other three. See DC II, 5 (95:5-13): “If you imagine the entire largest circle to be fire (or air or water or earth), you will see (1) how it is that in it are contained the circles of the other three elements and also (2) how it is that in the air [that is enfolded] in the fire the other three elements are present; and so on. But this process does not continue beyond four times. Therefore, there is an advancement from the universal unto the specific by means of a fourfold progression. Hence, one element universally enfolds within itself three elements; but the three elements generally enfold within themselves nine elements; and the nine specifically enfold within themselves twenty-seven elements. Therefore, the cube of three is the specific unfolding of the oneness of each element.” See also DC II, 4 (94).

266. Here at 91:6 I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 and certain other mss.) “comprehendit” in place of “apprehendit”.

267. E.g., (1) some letters are vowels, (2) others are consonants, (3) others are not pronounced.

268. The primary rational elements are not simple elements but are elements that are composed of one another. See n. 261 and n. 265 above.

269. At DC 92:6 I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 and certain other mss.) “tria” in place of “trina”.

270. On the analogy between element and point: just as three points do not suffice, geometrically, to determine a three-dimensional geometrical figure, so three elements do not suffice for constituting a real three-dimensional object.

271. At each level—perceptual, rational, and intellectual—there are four primary elements [DC II, 6 (103)]. At the perceptual level these are fire, air, water, and earth. As indicated in n. 265 above, these elements are not simple, unmixed elements; rather, each contains, and is contained by, the others several times over. Accordingly, the world contains no simple elements. (Indeed, only God is absolutely Simple.) The four perceptible elements seem to the senses to be simple and to be indivisible; but they do not seem to reason to be simple and indivisible. The four rational elements seem to reason to be simple and indivisible; but to intellect they do not seem so. The four intellectual elements seem to intellect to be simple and indivisible; but the Divine Mind knows that they are not so. Nicholas nowhere identifies for us either the four rational elements or the four intellectual elements—except for what he says about the rational soul. (See n. 474 below.)

All things perceptible by the senses are material objects. All material objects are composed in differing proportions, of fire, air, water, and earth—each of which, as was said, is a composite of itself and the other three.

Nicholas uses the analogy between a simple element and a geometrical point (neither of which actually exists): elements are like points in that (on their own level, whether perceptual, rational, or intellectual) they are simple and irreducible. Now, from a geometrical point are generated a geometrical line, a geometrical surface, and a geometrical solid. For a line is determined by two points; a surface (viz., a triangular surface, which Nicholas calls the first geometrical surface) is determined by three points; and a geometrical three-dimensional figure or geometrical solid (viz., a tetrahedron, which Nicholas calls the first geometrical solid) is determined by four points. Just as any polygon is reducible to a triangle and, therefore, to three points,
so any polyhedron is reducible to a tetrahedron and, therefore, to four points. However, in generating, or drawing, a tetrahedron from four points, one uses six lines and thereby creates four surfaces \([DC \ II, \ 4 (93)]\). Each of these six lines contains an infinite number of points. According to the analogy between the geometrical domain and the perceptual domain: a material object is a real solid, as a tetrahedron is a geometrical solid; and as the latter is determined by four points, so the former consists of four elements (fire, air, water, earth), these four being regarded by the senses as simple elements (though regarded by reason and intellect as composites).

In the passage presently under consideration Nicholas seems to be emphasizing both (1) the comparison between a geometrical point and a primary physical element and (2) the comparison between four geometrical points’ determining a geometrical solid and four primary physical elements’ determining a material object. Furthermore, he seems to be suggesting that if we were to commence speaking of a material object as consisting of elements-within-elements beyond the number four (which corresponds to the number of different-sized circles in Diagram U), then the analogy would have shifted—shifted from a comparison between the number of points that determine a geometrical solid and the number of primary physical elements that determine a material object to an attempted comparison between the number of points in a line and the number of actual elements-within-elements in a material object. But this new comparison would not work. For a line does not contain just five points or just six points or just ten thousand points, etc. Rather, a line can only rightly be said to contain a potential infinity of points, no one of which is detachable from the line. Similarly, by analogy, an existent material object would not consist of just five unfoldings of elements or of just six unfoldings of elements, or of just ten thousand unfoldings of elements, etc. Rather, a material object would consist of an infinite number of simultaneous unfoldings of the four primary elements. Yet, no element would be detachable from the material object of which it was a part, so that corruption and substantial change would be impossible. (Here Nicholas is disagreeing with Anaxagoras, to whom he seemed closer in \(DI \ II, \ 5\).)

272. Three points are connected to one another in a triangle, which is the minimal polygonal figure. All polygons, says Nicholas, are reducible to a triangle. \(DI \ I, \ 20 (60)\). Sermo XXII (19:15-16). Boethius, \(De \ Institutione \ Arithmetica \ II, \ 19\) \([p. \ 104, \ lines \ 11-13 \ of \ G. \ Friedlein’s \ edition (Leipzig: Teubner, 1867) = M. Masi’s translation, \(op. \ cit.\) (n. 22 above), p. 142, lines 16-17\]. For example, the diagonal of a rectangle divides the rectangle into two triangles.

273. A tetrahedron, or triangular pyramid, is a solid figure determined by four points. See Nicholas’s statements at \(DC \ II, \ 4 (93)\).

274. Here at 92:21 I am reading (together with \(Codex \ Latimus \ Casanus \ 218\) and certain other mss.) “hoc” in place of “ut”.

275. That is, a solid geometrical figure cannot be drawn from exactly five points.

276. “... a primary surface”: viz., a triangular surface.

277. “... a primary, three-dimensional object”: viz., a tetrahedron.

278. That is, it is evident on the basis of the analogy between point and an element.

279. See n. 272 above.

280. Just as Nicholas earlier likened elements to points, so he here refers to points as elements.
281. A tetrahedron has four angles, six edges, and four triangular surfaces.
282. “… a first composite-of-elements”: What this first material thing is that is composed of primary elements is so incomplete that it is not identifiable.
283. Here at 94:5 I am reading “pyramidis” (together with the Paris edition), in place of “pyramis”.
284. “… composites-of-elements”: These four primary things composed of elements are what were traditionally called elements: viz., fire, air, water, earth. (These composites-of-elements, or elements, should not be confused with the first composite-of-elements alluded to in n. 282 above.) Cf. DI II, 13 (175:23-25). DI II, 13 (176).
285. The previous diagram is Diagram U at I, 13 (66).
286. Cf. n. 264 above.
287. “… has its own specific elemental letters”: i.e., has its own alphabet.
288. Nicholas may mean to call attention to something like the following fact: The Latin alphabet consists of letters that are either vowels or consonants or double consonants or diphthongs. Vowels are most universal in the sense (1) that every word has to contain one or more of them and (2) that some of them can stand alone as Latin words (viz., “a” and “e”). He does not seem to have in mind the phenomenon that he mentions in DC II, 5 (96): viz., the fact that sentences are composed of groups of words, of syllables, and of letters. Cf. Compendium 9 (25).
289. Here at 95:16 I am surmising “Latinae” in place of “Latine”.
290. DI I, 5 (14).
292. Here at 96:20 I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 and certain other mss.) “demum” in place of “deinde”.
293. Re no precise knowledge, see the references in n. 3 above.
294. “… since it is impossible that two [elements] partake equally of the nature-of-elements”: i.e., since no two elements can be exactly alike in nature.
295. “… nor is the proportional difference … in any way knowable”: i.e., it is not in any way knowable by us, although it is knowable to God.
296. Nicholas here draws, once again, on the analogy between physical elements and geometrical points.
297. Nicholas discusses measurement-of-weights in his De Staticis Experimentis.
298. VS 21 (61).
299. DC I, 3 (10).
300. Nicholas often refers to the hierarchy of things that exist, things that live, and things that understand. VS 16 (48). VS 21 (60). VS 31 (93). VS 38 (112). See also (in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]) n. 274 of Notes to De Venatione Sapientiae.
301. DC I, 11 (58-59).
302. According to Leon Battista Alberti, in De Pictura Praestantissima I [Basel edition, 1540, p. 20 (reprinted in Portland, Oregon: Collegium Graphicum, 1972, in the series The Printed Sources of Western Art, edited by Theodore Besterman)], the four basic, or general, colors are fiery color (red), aerial color (blue), aqueous color (green), and earthen color (grey). From these basis colors innumerable others can be made by means of mixing them with one another and with white or black. Nicholas himself makes clear that these four basic colors are not simple colors, since
each one of them contains a (perceptually undetectable) mixture of the other three.

303. See n. 478 below.


305. "... unparticipatable": i.e., incapable of being partaken of.

306. See n. 76 above. See also the passage (in the English translation) marked by n. 312 below.

307. "... the three other elemental causes": viz., efficient cause, formal cause, final cause.

308. See n. 302 above.

309. "... the onenesses of the elements of the one": i.e., the onenesses of the elements of the monad. *De Principio* 32.


311. The subtle element is fire; the gross element is earth; the intermediate elements are air (which is closer to fire) and water (which is closer to earth).

312. See n. 76 above. See also the passage (in the English translation) marked by n. 306 above.

313. See above [in *DC* I, 11 (55)] the passage marked by n. 147. See also (in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]*) n. 40 of Notes to *De Venatione Sapientiae*. Note also *De Quaerendo Deum* 2 (37:13-14).


316. See the references in n. 313 above.

317. See the references in n. 103 above.

318. The two intermediates—viz., intellectual oneness and rational oneness—are doubled because each both ascends and descends.

319. In *Codex Latinus Cusanus* 218 the diagram is labeled as follows:

320. "... turn back fully on themselves": i.e., return fully to their respective starting-point.

321. "... the descent and the ascent form a circle": i.e., they form a circle by means of the six arcs.

322. Regarding perpetuity see (in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]*) n. 80 of Notes to *De Venatione Sapientiae*. See also the references in n. 48 and n. 51 of Notes to *De Aequalitate*.

323. "... the end of the outflow does coincide with the beginning of the return-flow": i.e., in the immediately preceding example and in the corresponding diagram.
324. Viz., the sevenfold progression: seed, sprout, bush, tree, branch, twig, seed.
325. Viz., the tenfold progression: seed, sprout, bush, tree, branch, twig, seed, sprout, bush, tree. (In the corresponding diagram there is no letter ‘j’ because it is not found in the Latin alphabet.)
326. Here at 109:11 I am reading, with all the mss., “ipsea” in place of the printed edition’s “ipso”.
328. “… which are as trees”: i.e., animals are individual things, just as are also trees; and they come from individual seeds, just as do trees.
329. The distinction between male seeds and female seeds applies to human seeds, animal seeds, and plant seeds. Regarding the sex of plants, see Albertus Magnus, De Vegetabilibus et Plantis, op. cit. [n. 327 above], Book I, Tractate I, Chap. 7.
330. DC I, 9 (41)
331. Regarding the translation of this passage cf. DC 114:1-4.
332. “… related [to one another] as opposites”: i.e., are related to one another as male and female.
333. Here at 113:9 I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218) “masculini” in place of “masculum”.
334. Here at 113:11 I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 and certain other mss.) “absorbet” in place of “contrahit”.
335. That is, a female seed absorbs within itself what is male (and by its own power it encompasses actual femaleness and actual maleness).
336. At 114:6 “illa” stands for “illa arbor,” which here is better rendered in English by the plural.
337. A pear is a [produced] seed or fruit. Regarding Nicholas’s example of grafting [in DC II, 10 (116)], note also Albertus Magnus, De Vegetabilibus et Plantis, op. cit. [n. 327 above], Book V, Tractate 1, Chap. 7 [p. 146A in Borgnet’s edition, op. cit. (n. 327 above)].
338. “… perceptible-surmises”: i.e., surmises about perceptible things.
339. DC II, 15 (146).
340. “… the true thing”: i.e., the real thing.
341. “… true humanity”: i.e., the form of human nature, universal human nature.
342. That is, if human nature is posited, then so too are, for example, reason, will, the senses, and a body. For human nature consists of a rational soul and a body.
343. DC I, 9 (41).
345. Here Nicholas reverses his previous order-of-mentioning the two intermediate modes. Cf. the end of section 117.
346. DC I, 7 (29).
347. DC I, 9 (41).
348. “… such a body”: i.e., a human body.
349. “... a distinctive spirit”: i.e., a distinctive soul.
350. Physiognomists purport to be able to infer one’s character from one’s physical features.
352. “... this subtle spirit”: viz., the rational spirit, or soul.
353. Nicholas emphasizes, here and elsewhere, the close union of body and soul. Cf. DC II, 11 (128).
354. See n. 29 above.
355. Nicholas ascribes to certain animals a low-level “power of reason” that enables them to discriminate between perceptual objects, to remember what they have perceived, and to make inferences that are based on their perceptual memories. In short, what Augustine refers to as sensus interior Nicholas sometimes refers to as a form of ratio. But at the perceptual level ratio—which Nicholas sometimes calls (at the perceptual level) astutia—is much different from ratio at the rational level. See also DI II, 3 (108:2-4). DC II, 16 (163). Ap. 14-15. De Sapientia I (5:9-11). DM 5 (82-83). Compendium 7 (20:9-11). Sermo CXXVII (4:6-10). Sermo CXXVIII (5:3-8). Nicholas denies that animals have ratio insofar as it is conceived of as the operation of a mind (mens). For animals do not have minds, which Nicholas understands to be rational minds. See, below, n. 87 of Notes to De Ludo Globi. See also DC II, 16 (163:11-12) and VS 1 (4:1-4).
356. “... there is brighter intelligence”: i.e., the intellects of men are stronger than is the rational capability of non-human animals. (See the last two sentences in the first paragraph of n. 36 above.)
357. The intelligences are the angels.
358. As concerns the order of perfection, the human soul’s rational operation lies in between the intellectual operation and the perceptual operation.
359. “... in things that vegetate”: i.e., in plant and trees.
360. Cf. DC II, 10 (123:8-9). See both DC II, 13 (136:7-9) and n. 29 above.
361. Here at 125:3 I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 and certain other mss.) “conspice” in place of “concipe”.
362. The soul is the power-of-oneness of the body. See n. 80 above. All animals have sensitive souls; however, only the human being has a rational soul, i.e., has a mind. Note DC II, 10 (128:11-12).
363. That is, as regards each other kind of soul, each of which has “head,” “feet,” and “hands”.
365. The three descending gradations are (1) from rational soul, or rational spirit, to the immaterial body, (2) from the immaterial body to the corporeal spirit, (3) from the corporeal spirit to the body.
366. The three ascending gradations are (1) from the body to the corporeal spirit, (2) from the corporeal spirit to the immaterial body, (3) from the immaterial body to the rational soul, or rational spirit.
367. See n. 362 and n. 355 above.
369. Here at 128:14 I am reading “spirituale corpus” for “spiritum corporalem”, as do the editors of the Heidelberg Academy’s printed Latin text on their p. 219.
370. “... in the foregoing [two] ways”... i.e., by the foregoing descent and ascent.

371. Here at 128:16 I am reading (together with the Paris edition) “hic” in place of “haec”.

372. DC I, 9 (41).

373. DC I, 13 (66).

374. That is, if you construe the largest circle in Diagram U as symbolizing life.

375. The three lives will be symbolized by the three major circles within the one largest circle. Further symbolisms will be quadric ($3^2 = 9$) or cubic ($3^3 = 27$) in accordance with the symbolism of the twenty-seven smallest circles in the diagram and in accordance with the nine next larger circles. See n. 244, n. 177, and n. 174 above.

376. These three lives are symbolized by the three major circles within the one largest circle. The highest of these circles symbolizes incorruptible life (viz., the life of the intellect); the lowest circle symbolizes corruptible life (viz., the life of the senses); the middle circle symbolizes the composite life (viz., the life of the rational component, which is sub-divided into a part that is closer to intellect and a part that is closer to the senses).

In line 129:11 of the printed Latin text I am omitting “et corruptibilem”, as do Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 and certain other mss.

377. “… at subdivisions of these”: i.e., at subdivisions of the three kinds of lives (lives 1-3), not at subdivisions of lives 3a and 3b.

378. “… [such a composite being]”: viz. the human being, whose life is a composite of intellect, reason, and the senses. DC II, 10 discussed the human being insofar as he is a composite of body and soul. DC II, 11 deals only with the life of spirit, as the opening sentence indicates.

379. “… of this [incorruptible] nature”: i.e., of the intellectual nature.


381. Here at 130:7 I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 and certain other mss.) “multiplicari” in place of “multiplicare”.

382. In partaking of the Divine Art, intelligence is Divine Reason’s art-product.

383. Intelligence is a nature insofar as its own products of art imitate the intelligence.


385. For example, a woman is a man manqué—i.e., is someone who has fallen short of being a man and therefore is other. DI II, 2 (104:4).

386. “… is impregnated unitively”: i.e., is impregnated (within itself) by itself alone.

387. DC II, 8 (112-113).

388. “… in vegetables”: i.e., in the case of plants and trees.


390. Reason organizes a multiplicity of perceptions into a oneness-of-concept, which captures the species. (Cf. n. 87 above.) Nicholas does not, however, deny that there are natural kinds that correspond to thoughts or forms in the Mind of God. DM 6 (93-94). DM 9 (117:5-9). DM 11 (134-136). DM 12 (143:10-12).

391. DC I, 13 (66).
392. Here at 134:4-5 I am reading (together with *Codex Latinus Casanus* 218 and certain other mss.) “sensibilium” in place of “sensitivarum”.

393. “... intellect’s oneness”: Here, as is clear, this expression has reference to the intellect itself and not to God, who is also called the intellect’s Oneness. See *DC* I, 7 (27:8). Cf. n. 202 above and n. 491 below.


395. “... humanity”: i.e., human nature.

396. *DI* II, 6 (126). Cf. *DI* III, 10 (240). Although universals exist in the mind as concepts, they correspond to specific natures, or species, which exist in particulars. Nicholas is a moderate realist as regards the theory of universals. He does not abandon this theory in *DC*.

397. Here at 135:3 Nicholas uses the expression “natura intelligentialis” or “natura intelligibilis” (depending upon which mss.-tradition one follows). In general, his terminology is very loose. (See n. 36 above.) I here (though not everywhere) use the translation “intellectual nature”. The intelligences, or intellectual natures, are the angels. See n. 488 below.


399. “... more greatly contracted”: i.e., more greatly contracted than is the Infinite Sun. God, insofar as He is not considered metaphorically as Sun, is not contracted. Infinite Sun qua Sun is considered as if contracted; but qua Infinite it is neither Sun nor contracted. See *DVD* 13 (58:9-12). See also *DB* 5.

400. See n. 29 above.

401. See n. 111 above.

402. A comparison with *DM* 14 (154) shows that for the second order of angels, or intelligences, Nicholas there uses the expression “angelos intelligentialis”, although here (at 137:12) he speaks of “intelligentiae intelligibiles” and at *LG* II (77:16) he says simply “intelligentiae”. However, in *LG* II (104) he again refers to the second order as that of intelligential powers. See the string of references that begin with n. 397 above.

403. Here at 138:2 I am reading (together with *Codex Latinus Casanus* 218 and certain other mss.) “tenebrosae” in place of “tenebrosa”. Cf. *DC* II, 14 (140:3-4). These “darker” spirits are demons.

404. See the references in n. 322 above.

405. Angels minister unto us for our sake but not for our sake only. We are guided by them and look unto them as ends.

406. *DC* II, 10 (125:1-2) and (120:3-4). *DC* II, 11 (129:3-8). As at the outset of *DC* II, 11, so also here at the outset of *DC* II, 14 Nicholas begins with an allusion to Diagram P but then immediately switches to Diagram U. He does the same thing in *DC* II, 16 (155-156).


408. While not failing to emphasize that the human soul and body constitute a unity, Nicholas here identifies man’s three regions as (1) the region of the corporeal nature (a region that includes the vegetative power), (2) the region of the perceptual nature, and (3) the region of the rational nature, the highest gradation of which coincides with the lowest gradation of the intellectual nature. Each of these regions is represented in Diagram U by one of the major circles inside the one largest circle, which, in the present case, represents man. [Regarding the expression “rational-intel-
ligible,” see DC II, 13 (134:12-14.) The loftiest of the three major circles symbol-
izes the rational-intelligible component of the human being; the middle major circle
symbolizes the sensitive, or perceptual, component; the lowest major circle symbol-
izes the corporeal-vegetative component. Each of these regions is further subdivided
into three orders, each of which is subdivided into three choirs, so that there are nine
ultimate divisions in each region—viz., the nine subdivisions that are symbolized by
the nine smallest circles of that region. Nicholas does not tell us just what, in the pre-
sent instance, these nine respective smallest circles symbolize. Throughout this sec-
tion he makes no effort to articulate his analysis clearly. Indeed, in general it is fair
to ascribe to him a mind that is more speculative than analytic.

409. These three divisions correspond to the three next-to-smallest circles within
the lowest of the three major circles. (See n. 408 above.) Each of the three stands
for an order (within a region) and is subdivisible into three more circles, so that alto-
gether there are nine smallest circles in this region of the corporeal-vegetative nature.

The continually transitory bodily parts are parts such as hair and nails; the more
stable and more fixed parts are parts such as arms and legs; the very noble parts are
the eyes and the ears, for example. All bodily parts are under the influence of the
vegetative power, which is not really a corporeal power but is a power of the soul.
In an extended sense, however, the vegetative power may be called a corporeal power
insofar as it operates on the body. [See the phrase “corporeal spirit” at DC II, 10
(128:8). See also Sermo I (14:1-6).]

410. That is, conceive of the major middle circle (symbolizing the perceptual na-
ture) as subdivisible into three further circles, each of which contains three more cir-
cles, making a total of nine ultimate distinctions, which here symbolize nine grada-
tions from the more obtuse perceptual nature to the more subtle perceptual nature.

411. The noble soul is the rational-intelligible soul. The nine distinctions here
alluded-to correspond to the nine smallest circles contained in the loftiest major cir-
cle through the intermediary of the three in-between-size circles.

412. That is, the vegetative power partakes in some measure of the sensitive
power but prevails over it at this level. Cf. DC II, 10 (124:3-5).

413. The spirit that discriminates is the rational spirit. (See n. 411 above.) The
highest gradation of reason coincides with the lowest gradation of intellect.

414. Regarding Nicholas’s conception of a hierarchical universe, see both the
reference in n. 187 above and the passage (in DC) that is marked by the note. See also
DC II, 16 (155:10-13).

415. “... the nature that discriminates”: see n. 413 above.


417. “… with a more absolute freedom”: i.e., with a freedom less restricted than
is the freedom characteristic of the senses.

418. Man, by way of his rational human soul, partakes of the region of intel-
lectual spirits, and by way of that region he partakes of the Divine Mind. See n. 36
and n. 17 above. See also DC II, 16 (155:10-13).

419. These choirs are the three gradations of man’s intellectual power. In Dia-
gram U they correspond to the three uppermost of the twenty-seven smallest circles.

420. “... of humanity”: i.e., of human nature. VS 33 (99).

421. Man’s powers are enumerated by Nicholas, in threes, not only as vegeta-
tive, perceptual (i.e., sensitive), and rational but also as perceptual (i.e., sensitive),
rational, and intellectual. DC II, 10 (125) and II, 17 (174). See also De Concordantia Catholica I.6.34, as well as VS 20 (56:17-18).

Diagram U can be used illustratively in many different ways, depending upon what the unitary largest circle is made to symbolize.

422. At DI II, 2 (104) man is said to be a god manqué and a created god. At De Dato Patris Luminum 2 (102) man is called a humanified god. And both in DB 7:1-2 and in Sermones, p. Vol. II, f. 89r, line 3 he is called a second god (secundus deus; alius deus). See n. 424 below.


424. Man, as also every creature, is a “finite infinity,” or a “finite god”. DI II, 2 (104:6). See n. 422 above.

425. DI I, 8 (22).

426. See the references in n. 314 and n. 315 above.

427. DC I, 1 (5:10-13). See n. 420 above.


429. See the references in n. 423 above.

430. “… I state already”: viz., in the previous paragraph (in the English translation).


433. DM 9 (123:7).

434. This state is completed only in the future life, where believers arrive at the perfection of their sonship-with-God. See De Filiatione Dei.

435. Here at 146:2 I am following the chapter-title in Codex Latinus Cusanus 218.

436. “… the Diagram of all things”: i.e., Diagram U at I, 13 (66).

437. See the passage marked by note 339 above.

438. Here at 146:12 I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 and certain other mss.) “ferentes” in place of “ferentia”.

439. DM 15 (159:7). VS 12 (32:10-13). In the Latin text of DC II, 15 (147:5-7) “specifica” goes with “natura” and not with “religio”. Nicholas uses the expression “natura … specifica” also in Sermo XLI (7:6-7).

440. That is, Group A1 is distinguished into A1a, A1b, and A1c, in accordance with Diagram U.

441. That is, Group A2 is distinguished into A2a, A2b, and A2c, in accordance with Diagram U.

442. That is, Group A3 is distinguished into A3a, A3b, and A3c, in accordance with Diagram U.

443. The third heaven is symbolized by the upper circle, viz., circle A.

444. The second heaven is symbolized by the middle circle, viz. circle B.

445. The lowest, or first, heaven is symbolized by the lowest circle, viz. circle C.
446. See the references in n. 3 above.
447. Here at 148:7 “intellectualis” goes with “unitas”, even though at 150:13 it goes with “religio”.
448. “… the circle of all inhabitants”: i.e., the largest circle of Diagram U.
449. Here at 150:5 I am reading (together with all the mss.) “ipsa” [= “figura”] in place of “ipsa”.
450. Nicholas here reverses the usual order of making the upper circle represent the North and making the lower circle represent the South. A bit later, in section 151, he uses the upper portion of Diagram P to represent the North and uses the lower portion to represent the South. Nicholas’s use of Diagram U and of Diagram P, like his use of number-symbolisms, is extremely contrived. Cf. n. 237 above. When it serves his purpose, Nicholas speaks of there being only three syllogistic figures; yet, for other purposes he speaks of there being four syllogistic figures.
451. The highest heaven is the third heaven.
452. That is, it is necessary that all regions have some individuals each of whom has one or more skills or powers, so that all skills and powers are represented in that region.
453. DC I, 9 (41).
454. Here the northern point is represented by the upper portion of Diagram P. See n. 450 above.
455. Here at 151:3-4 Cusa constructs his sentence in such a way that “tenebrae” is governed by “unitas”. However, “alteritas” is the correct word to understand with “tenebrae”, as Happ rightly sees in his German translation, op. cit. [n. 181 above].
457. “… the earlier diagram”… viz., Diagram P, alluded to in section 151 above and sketched in I, 9 (41).
458. Cf. DC II, 14 (142) and DC I, 13 (67:15-16) and DC II, 16 (156:12-14).
459. Here Nicholas switches to Diagram U, sketched in DC I, 13 (66). [See n. 406 above.] The largest circle is made to symbolize the realm of the intelligences.
460. “… root divisions, square divisions, and cubic divisions”: i.e., three divisions, nine divisions, and twenty-seven divisions—corresponding to the number of circles in Diagram U [3, 3^2, and 3^3]. See both DC I, 13 (65) and n. 375 above.
461. See the last two sentences of the first paragraph of n. 36 above.
462. “…even as God is … the Oneness of all things”: See n. 81 of Notes to De Beryllo (in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]). Note also DC II, 16 (167).
463. The first region is the loftiest region, symbolized here by the major circle that is uppermost.
464. The highest order is symbolized by the uppermost circle that is contained within the uppermost of the three major circles.
465. The highest choir is symbolized by the uppermost smallest circle.
466. The human soul, i.e., the rational soul, is the highest species of soul.
467. “… every soul”: viz., all rational or sensitive or vegetative souls.
468. See both the passage marked by n. 458 above and the references contained...
in the note.

469. "... of the most perfect species of animal": Nicholas uses the comparative adjective "perfectior" ("perfectioris speciei animalis") to express what we express by the superlative. He uses the comparative as a way of indicating his view that no species is so perfect that there could not be a species more perfect than it. DI III, 1 (188). Note Gerda F. von Bredow, “Der Sinn der Formel ‘meliori modo quo’...” MFCG 6 (1967), 21-30 [includes discussion].

470. The human soul (i.e., the rational soul) is not one of the intelligences. However, it partakes of the domain of the intelligences by means of its intellect, which is a higher operation than is the soul’s rational operation. See n. 37 above.

471. Lines 4 to 6 of the Latin sentence here at 157:4-7 furnish a good example of how Nicholas interchanges "intelligentia" and "intellectus" without a change of meaning or of reference. The same interchange occurs at 157:12.

472. No part of reason is ontologically prior to the intellect. Yet, reason’s cognitive activity is epistemically prior to the intellect’s activity, even as the activity of the senses is prior to the activity of reason. See the beginning of section 159 below. See also, below, the sentence marked by n. 500.

473. "... its inferior part is the imagination": "portio ... inferior ... phantastica seu imaginativa" (157:8-9). Nicholas does not distinguish between imaginatio and phantasia. See n. 46 of Notes to De Quaerendo Deum in my Miscellany on Nicholas of Cusa. Regarding this distinction see Hugo of Straßburg, Compendium Theologicae Veritatis II.37 and II.39 (Straßburg edition, 1489).

474. These “elements” of the human soul are (1) the power of understanding, (2) the power of apprehending (or of discriminating and inferring), (3) the power of imagining, and (4) the power of perceiving.

475. Nicholas makes no distinction between the expressions “ascendere ad” and “ascendere in”—or between “descendere ad” and “descendere in”. See, for example, the Latin passage here at 157:10-13.

476. See, below, the cross-references in n. 311 of Notes to De Ludo Globi.
477. “... perception” (“sensatio”): Nicholas does not differentiate sensation from perception; rather, he uses “sensatio” and “perceptio” interchangeably.


482. These successive unities show the synthesized character of knowledge. Note Nicholas’s phrase “componens ratio” (“synthesizing reason”) in De Genesi 2 (155:9).

483. See n. 202 and n. 393 above.
484. That is, the angels.
485. That is, whatever men know is also known by the angels.
486. “Lingua Romana” could also here be understood as indicating the Italian dialect spoken at Rome in Nicholas’s day.
487. That is, Nicholas hears the sounds but is not able to distinguish the sounds into words—a common problem with those who do not speak French or understand it in its oral form.
488. Here Nicholas makes perfectly clear that the intelligences are angels. Cf. LG II 977:2).
489. The natural appetite is the intellectual appetite, which, in section 159, Nicholas says to aim at becoming an intellect perfect even in actuality, rather than aiming at becoming the senses. “But since the intellect cannot in actuality be constituted in some other way, it does become the senses, in order in this way and by this means to be able to pass from potentiality into actuality.” Regarding the intellect’s natural appetite, see also De Sapiencia I (13). VS 12 (32:10-11).

The accidental appetite is the perceptual appetite. Cf. the different allusion to natural appetite and accidental appetite, in DC II, 7 (110).
490. “… the intellectual otherness…”: i.e., what is other than intellect.
491. “… the intellect’s oneness…”: Although Nicholas sometimes calls God the intellect’s Oneness [DC I, 7 (27:8)], he here is referring to the intellect’s own unicity. See n. 393 and n. 202 above.
492. “… reason’s light”: Although Nicholas sometimes thinks of intellect as reason’s light [DC I, 7 (27:8-9), DC II, 16 (157:2-3)], he here means the light by which reason “illumines” images.
493. See n. 202 above. See, below, the first line of the English translation of section 163.
494. Examples of principles known per se are (1) that a whole is greater than any one of its parts and (2) that each thing either is or is not the case. Cf. Compendium 11 (36:7-9).
495. See n. 3 above.
496. Here at 162:4 I am surmising “generis” in place of “generum”.
497. That is, from the consideration that otherwise preciseness would be attained.
498. See my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One], n. 19 of Notes to De Coniecturis. See also Klaus Kremer’s “Philosophische Überlegungen des Cusanus zur Unsterblichkeit der menschlichen Geistseele,” MFCG 23 (1996), 21-70.
499. “… is the more absolute oneness”: The intellect (whose otherness is reason) is a oneness that is very much free from dependence upon the body—more free therefrom than is reason. Note DC II, 16 (166:8-10).
500. See both n. 472 above and the passage marked by it in the English translation.

Here at 163:5 I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 and certain other mss.) “cum rationem praevienit” in place of “cum corruptibilis rationem praevienit”.
501. The higher rational nature is the power-of-apprehending. DC II, 16 (157:7-8). See n. 474 above.
502. “… pure reason” (“ratio pura”): See DC II, 16 (170:8-15). In De Filia-
tione Dei 3 (69:14) Nicholas also uses the expression “intellectus purus,” as he also does at the end of De Aequalitate 44.

503. See n. 355 above.

504. Here I have repunctuated the corresponding Latin sentence. Indirect questions are sometimes left in the indicative mood by Nicholas. The repunctuated Latin (at 163:11-14) reads: “Et in hoc differentiam rationis humanae atque bestiarum venari poteris, cur ipsa humana in immortalitate vitae intellectualis, quae est semper intelligere, absorbetur quia semper per se est intelligibilis, uti lumen per se visibile.” (Though “bestiarum” is plural, it comes over into English better in the singular.)

505. Here at 163:16 of the printed Latin text “alteritas” is a misprint for “alteritas”.

506. “… in the other species of animals”: i.e., in non-human animals.

507. See n. 478 above.

508. Regarding Platonic optics, see n. 9 of Notes to De Theologicis Complementis, in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One].

509. See n. 202 above.

510. “… absolute intellect” (“absolutus intellectus”): i.e., as Nicholas has just said, intellect insofar as it is free from all bodily instruments.

511. “… elevated upward from images”: i.e., abstracted from images. According to Nicholas [DVD 24 (107:14-15)] “there cannot be in the intellect anything which is such that it was not first in the senses.” Cf. DM 2 (64:12-13). NA 13 (51:14-21). VS 36 (107:2). Compendium 4 (9:6-7) Sermo CXXVII (2:9-10), Sermones, p, Vol. II, f. 104r, lines 4-3 from bottom. See n. 481 above. See also n. 51 of Notes to the Introduction, in my Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge.

512. See the references not only in n. 512 above but also in n. 480 above.

514. DC I, 6 (22:3-6). DC I, 7 (27:3-5). DC II, 1 (75:19-21).


517. De Filiatione Dei 6 (86:5-8).

518. DC I, 6 (24). De Filiatione Dei 3 (62) and 5 (80). Sermo IV (32:26-28).

519. “… by means of a theophany”: i.e., by means of a Divine Manifestation, a manifestation of the Divine.

520. See n. 111 above.

521. Here at 168:4 I am surmising “ipsam” for “ipsum”.

522. “… intellectual truth”: i.e., truth as apprehended by the intellect.

523. “… rational truth”: i.e., truth as apprehended by reason.

524. “… in the circle’s own less-contracted oneness”: i.e., in intellectual oneness.

525. “… exists intelligibly”: i.e., exists in the intelligible domain.

526. See n. 111 above.

527. In the corresponding Latin sentence, I am discounting the editors’ insertion of “quam” at 168:22.

528. At 168:26 of the corresponding Latin text I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 and certain other mss.) “qui” in place of “quae”, and I am deleting “hoc” as redundant.
529. That is, God is the Ultimate Ground of all things intelligible, i.e., of all things understandable. Cf. De Filiatione Dei 4 (72:14-16).
530. That is, intellectual knowledge is the most perfect kind of knowledge, as a solid is more perfect than is a surface, a line, or a point.
531. DB 3.
532. Note the expression “surmising knowledge” (“coniecturalis cognitio”). According to Nicholas coniectura is a form of knowledge. See n. 4 above.
533. “… are a man” (“homo”): i.e., are a human being.
534. That is, Absolute Oneness, which is Infinity itself, is partaken of without it itself’s becoming contracted, differentiated, restricted, qualified, or delimited. See n. 17 above.
535. De Dato Patris Luminum 2 (100).
536. That is, colors partake of light and do so in different respective degrees.
537. These are the distinctions in Diagram U. See DC I, 13.
538. See n. 537 above.
539. See n. 17 above. See also DC I, 4 (16:5-6).
540. “… the contractedness of your humanity”: One must be careful, here at 173:10, not to misconstrue “in eius contractione” as referring to contraction of the Divinity. For, according to Nicholas, the Divine Nature is in every respect uncontracted.
541. DC I, 1 (6). See the references in n. 19 above.
542. That is, let the largest circle in Diagram U symbolize your human nature.
543. “… the highest nature of your humanity”: i.e., the highest region of your human nature, viz., the region of intellect.
544. Nicholas here again alludes to Diagram U—with its one largest circle (now symbolizing a human nature) and its three larger circles (now symbolizing the higher, the middle, and the lower regions of human nature).
545. “… you have intelligence”: i.e., you have an intellect. See the last two sentences of the first paragraph of n. 36 above.
546. See the references in n. 539 above.
547. This is the power of adequation. See Compendium 10 (34:18-24).
548. “… belongs to your intellect’s oneness-by-participation”: i.e., belongs to your intellect’s oneness, which is a oneness by participation.
549. “… humanity”: i.e., human nature.
550. DI I, 20 (62). See the likeness between human nature and the Trinity as this likeness is discussed in CA II, 3-4.
551. “Equality of oneness” is here used interchangeably with “equality of being.”
552. The elect are those who love God.
553. DVD 17. CA II, 7 (104 and 106).
556. “… amidst equality”: i.e., amidst equity and justice.
557. See n. 556 above.
558. That is, by means of a just life.
559. See the references in n. 555 above. See also the translated passage marked by that note.