

**COMPLETE PHILOSOPHICAL AND
THEOLOGICAL TREATISES
of
ANSELM of CANTERBURY**

Translated
by
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and
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**The Arthur J. Banning Press
Minneapolis**

In the notes to the translations the numbering of the Psalms accords with the Douay version and, in parentheses, with the King James (Authorized) version. A reference such as "S II, 264:18" indicates "F. S. Schmitt's edition of the Latin texts, Vol. II, p. 264, line 18."

Library of Congress Control Number: 00-133229

ISBN 0-938060-37-6

Printed in the United States of America

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CHAPTER-TITLES
for
DE CASU DIABOLI

1. “What do you have that you have not received?” is addressed even to angels. From God comes only good and being; every good thing is a being, and every being is a good thing.
2. Why it seems that the Devil did not receive perseverance because God did not give it.
3. God did not give because [the Devil] did not receive.
4. How [the Devil] sinned and willed to be like God.
5. Before the fall of the evil angels, the good angels were able to sin.
6. How the good angels were confirmed in their standing and the evil angels in their fallenness.
7. Whether the will and its turning to what it ought not are the very evil which makes [men and angels] evil. Why a rational creature cannot turn himself from evil to good, as he can turn himself from good to evil.
8. Neither the will nor its turning is the very evil [which makes men and angels evil].
9. Injustice is this very evil and is nothing.
10. How evil seems to be something.
11. By means of their names, evil and nothing cannot be proved to be something but [can be proved to be] as-if-something.
12. The angel [Satan] was not able to have his first willing from himself. Many things are said “to be able” by reason of another's ability and “not to be able” by reason of another's inability.
13. If [Satan] received only the will-for-happiness, he was able to will only happiness and was not able to keep from willing it; and regardless of what he willed, his will was neither just nor unjust.
14. The case is similar if [Satan] received only the will-for-uprightness. And so, he received both wills at the same time in order to be both just and happy.
15. Justice is something.
16. Injustice is only the absence of required justice.
17. Why the renegade angel is unable to return to justice.

18. How the evil angel caused himself to be unjust and the good angel caused himself to be just. The evil angel owes gratitude to God for the goods which he received and deserted, even as the good angel, who kept the goods which he received, [owes gratitude].
19. Insofar as it *is*, the will is something good. No thing is an evil.
20. How God causes evil wills and evil actions; how they are received from Him.
21. The evil angel was not able to foreknow that he would fall.
22. [The evil angel] knew that he ought not to will that which he sinned in willing; and he knew that he ought to be punished if he sinned.
23. [The evil angel] ought not to have known that if he sinned he would be punished.
24. Even the good angel ought not to have known this [viz., that if he sinned he would be punished].
25. Even if the only reason [the good angel] is said to be now unable to sin were that he now has this knowledge from the Devil's fall, nevertheless [not to be able to sin] would be to his glory.
26. What we dread when we hear the name "evil"; and what causes the works which injustice is said to cause, since injustice and evil are nothing.
27. From where evil came to an angel who was good.
28. The ability to will what he ought not to have [willed] was always good; and the willing itself, with respect to its being, was good.

THE FALL OF THE DEVIL ¹
(De Casu Diaboli)

CHAPTER ONE

"What do you have that you have not received?"²
is addressed even to angels. From God comes
only good and being; every good thing is a being,
and every being is a good thing.

Student. Is the Apostle's question addressed to men only or also

¹Written at Bec probably some time during 1085-1090. ²I Corinthians 4:7.

to angels?: viz., “What do you have that you have not received?”

Teacher. No created being has anything from itself. For how could a thing which does not exist from itself have anything from itself? Moreover, if there is not anything except the one who has created and the things created by Him, it is clear that nothing at all can exist except the one who has created and what He has created.

S. Perfectly clear.

T. But neither the Creator nor what has been created can exist (*haberi*) except from the Creator Himself.

S. This is no less clear.

T. Therefore, only the Creator has from Himself whatever He has; and all other things have something only from Him. And just as they have from themselves only nothing, so they have from Him only something.

S. I do not see clearly why you say that other things have from God only something. For who but God causes the many things which we see passing from being to not-being not to be what they were, even if they do not pass altogether into nothing? Or who causes-not-to-be whatever is not except Him who causes-to-be all that is. Likewise, if there is something only because God causes it, then it follows that what-is-not is not because He does not cause it. Therefore, just as those things which exist have from Him their being something, so those things which do not exist, or which pass from being to not-being, seem to have from Him their being nothing.

T. Not only is he said to cause something to be (or something not to be) who causes-to-be what is not (or causes not-to-be what is), but also he who is able to cause something not to be and does not is said to cause-to-be (and he who is able to cause something to be but does not is said to cause-not-to-be).

Indeed, not only he who despoils someone but also he who, although able to, does not restrain the despoiler is said to cause someone to be naked or not to be clothed. But the former is properly said to cause this; the latter, improperly. For when the latter is said to have *caused* someone *to be naked* or not to be clothed what is meant is only that, although he was able, he did *not cause* the other to remain clothed or *not to be naked*. In this [improper] mode God is said to cause many things which He does not cause. For

example, He is said to lead into temptation because He does not keep from temptation, although He is able [to keep from temptation]. And [He is said] to cause what-is-not not to be because He does not cause it to be, although He is able [to cause it to be].

But if you consider existing things: when they pass to not-being, God does not cause them not to be. For not only does no other being exist except by His creating, but also a being cannot at all remain what it was made except by His conserving. Therefore, when He ceases to conserve what He has created, then that thing which existed returns to not-being, not because He causes it not to be but because He ceases to cause it to be. For when as though angered, God removes being by destroying something, not-being is not from Him. But when He reclaims as His own what He had bestowed, then that thing which was created by Him, and by Him was being conserved in existence, returns unto not-being, which it had not from Him but from itself before it was created. For example, if from someone you reclaim a tunic which you willingly gave for a while to him, who was naked, he does not have his state of nakedness from you; but when you reclaim what was yours, the man returns into the state he was in before having been clothed by you.

Assuredly, just as from the Supreme Good comes only good, and just as every good is from the Supreme Good, so from the Supreme Being comes only being, and every being is from the Supreme Being. Thus, since the Supreme Good is the Supreme Being, it follows that every good thing is a being and every being a good thing. Therefore, nothing and not-being are not goods, even as they are not beings. And so nothing and not-being are not from Him from whom comes only good and being.

S. I now see clearly that just as good and being come only from God, so from God come only good and being.

T. Be careful not at all to think—when we read in Scripture, or when in accordance with Scripture¹ we say, that God causes evil or causes not-being—that I am denying the basis for what is said or am finding fault with its being said. But we ought not to cling to the verbal impropriety concealing the truth as much as we ought to attend to the true propriety hidden beneath the many types of expression.

¹Isaiah 45:7.

S. You need say these things only to someone unintelligent or slanderous.

T. Return to the topic you have begun, and see whether not only to a man but also to an angel it can be said that he does not have what he has not received.

S. It is sufficiently clear that [this statement] applies no less to an angel than to a man.

CHAPTER TWO

Why it seems that the Devil did not receive perseverance because God did not give it.

S. Therefore, it is evident that just as the angel who stood in the truth persevered because he had perseverance, so he had perseverance because he received it, and he received it because God gave it. It follows, then, that just as the angel who did *not* stand in the truth¹ did not persevere because he did not have perseverance, so he did not have perseverance because he did not receive it, and he did not receive it because God did not give it. So if you can, I want you to show me how he was to blame when he did not persevere because God did not give, without whose giving [the angel] was able to have nothing. For I am certain, even if I do not see why, that this angel was damned only justly by the one who is supremely just and that he could not have been justly damned apart from being at fault.

T. Why do you think it follows that if the good angel received perseverance because God gave it, then the evil angel did not receive it because God did not give it?

S. Because if giving is the cause of the good angel's receiving, then I think that not-giving is the cause of the evil angel's not-receiving; and if not-giving is postulated, I see it to be a necessary cause that there be, as a consequence, not-receiving. Moreover, we all know that when we do not receive what we want, it is not the case that this thing is not given because we do not receive it, but is rather the case that we do not receive it because it is not given. Finally, everyone whom I have read or heard dealing with this subject has (as best I can remember) put it in the form of the following argument: "If the good angel received because God gave,

¹John 8:44.

then the evil angel did not receive because God did not give.” I do not recall ever yet having seen a refutation of this implication.

CHAPTER THREE

God did not give because [the Devil] did not receive.

T. The above inference does not hold. For even if giving were always the cause of receiving, not-giving need not be the cause of not-receiving.

S. Then, if not-giving is postulated, not-receiving does not necessarily follow. Therefore, there can be receiving even if there is no giving.

T. No, this is wrong.

S. I want you to show me by an example what you mean.

T. If I offer you something and you accept it, it is not the case that I give it because you receive it but is rather the case that you receive it because I give it. Giving is the cause of receiving.

S. That's right.

T. What if I offer this same thing to someone else and he does not accept it: Is it the case that he does not receive it because I do not give it?

S. It seems rather that you do not give it because he does not receive it.

T. In this case, then, not-giving is not the cause of not-receiving; and yet, if I postulate that I have not given, my not-giving is the cause of *inferring* that he has not received. For, indeed, the fact that one thing is the cause of another thing is different from the fact that the positing of a thing is the cause that something else follows [from it]. For example, although burning is not the cause of fire, but fire of burning, nevertheless the positing of burning is always a cause that there is inferred to be a fire. For if there is burning, there must be fire.

S. I must admit that this is right.

T. So I think you see that if you have received because I have given, it does not follow that someone who has not received has not received because I have not given—even though it follows that if I have not given, then he has not received.

S. I see, and I am pleased that I see.

T. Do you have any further doubt that just as the angel who

stood steadfast received perseverance because God gave it, so to the angel who did not stand God did not give perseverance because he did not receive it?

S. You have not yet shown me this. You have proved only this: viz., that from the fact that the good angel received because God gave, it does not follow that the evil angel did not receive because God did not give. If you wish to maintain that God did not give to him because he did not receive, then I ask why he did not receive: Was it because he could not, or was it because he would not? For if he did not have the ability-to-receive or the will-to-receive, then God did not give it. For if God had given it, he surely would have had it. Therefore, if only by God's giving was [the evil angel] able to have either the ability or the will to receive perseverance, then how did he sin in not receiving what God did not grant him either to be able to receive or to will to receive?

T. God did give him the ability and the will to receive perseverance.

S. Then, he received what God gave, and he had what he received.

T. Yes, he received it and had it.

S. Therefore, he received and had perseverance.

T. No, he did not receive it; and so, he did not have it.

S. But did you not say that God gave to him, and he received, the ability and the will to receive perseverance?

T. I said it. But I did not say that God gave him the receiving of perseverance. [I said] only [that God granted him] to be able to, and to will to, receive perseverance.

S. So if he was able [to receive perseverance] and willed [to receive it], then he did receive it.

T. This inference does not necessarily follow.

S. Unless you show me, I fail to see why not.

T. Have you ever begun something with the ability and the will to complete it, but nevertheless failed to complete it because your will was changed before the completion of the thing?

S. Often.

T. So you willed to, and were able to, persevere in what you did not persevere.

S. To be sure, I willed [to persevere]; but I did not persevere in willing, and thus I did not persevere in the action.

T. Why did you not persevere in willing?

S. Because I did not will to.

T. Is it not the case that as long as you willed to persevere in the action you willed to persevere in willing?

S. I cannot deny it.

T. Why do you say, then, that you did not will to persevere in willing?

S. I might once again reply that I did will to persevere but that I did not persevere in *this* willing; but then, as I recognize, the argument would continue to infinity, with you always asking the same question and me always giving the same answer.

T. Therefore, you ought not to say: "I did not will to persevere in willing because I did not will to persevere in the willing of this willing." Rather, when it is asked why you did not persevere in an activity in which you willed to persevere and were able to persevere, you can reply that it is because you did not persevere in willing. But if it is asked again why you did not persevere in willing, you must give some other explanation regarding this failure of will than that you did not persevere in the willing of this willing. For in answering [as you do], you do not indicate anything other than the very thing that is being asked about: viz., that you did not persevere in willing to persevere in the action.

S. I see that I did not understand what I was saying.

T. Then, tell me in one word what it is to persevere, as far as the matter requires, in doing something.

S. *Perficere* [i.e., to complete it]. For we call persevering in writing something *perscribere* [i.e., to complete writing it]; and we call persevering in leading *perducere* [i.e., to lead completely to the destination].

T. So let us likewise say—even though this word is not in use—that persevering in willing is *pervelle* [i.e., to will completely].

S. Let it be said.

T. Then, when you did not complete (*perfecisti*) what you willed [to finish] and were able [to finish], why didn't you complete it?

S. Because I did not will it completely (*non pervolui*).

T. So then, say too that the Devil, who received the ability and the will to receive perseverance, and the ability and the will to persevere, did not receive perseverance and did not persevere because he did not will it completely.

S. Once again I ask: Why didn't he will it completely? For when you say that what he willed he did not will completely, it is as if you were saying that what he willed at first, he did not will afterwards. Therefore, when he no longer willed what he willed at first, why did he not will it except that he did not have the will [for it]? I am not talking about the will which he had at first when he did will, but about the will which he did not have when he did not will. Yet, why did he not have this will except because he did not receive it? But why did he not receive it except because God did not give it?

T. Once again I answer: It is not the case that he did not receive it because God did not give it; rather, God did not give it because he did not receive it.

S. Show this.

T. [The Devil] freely lost the will which he had. And just as he received the possession of it for as long as he had it, so he was able to receive the permanent keeping of what he deserted. But because he deserted, he did not receive. Therefore, that which he did not receive to keep because he deserted it, he did not receive not because God did not give it, but, rather, God did not give it because he did not receive it.

S. Who does not see that it is not the case that he did not will to keep because he deserted but that he deserted because he did not will to keep? For to one who is keeping something, not-willing-to-keep always precedes willing-to-desert. For someone wills to desert what he has because he does not will to keep it. Therefore, I ask: Why did [the Devil] not will to keep what he was keeping except because God did not grant him to will [to keep it]?

T. It is not the case that not-willing-to-keep always precedes willing-to-desert.

S. Show me when it is not the case.

T. When you do not will to keep a thing for its own sake but will to desert it for its own sake (for example, a lighted coal placed in your bare hand), then perhaps not-willing-to-keep precedes willing-to-desert, and you will to desert because you do not will to keep. For before you are holding it you do not will to hold it; however, you cannot will to desert it except when you have it. But when you have a thing which only on account of something else you do not will to keep and which only on account of something else you

will to desert, and when you prefer this other thing which you cannot have unless you give up what you do have, then willing-to-desert precedes not-willing-to-keep. For example, when a miser wills to keep money but prefers bread, which he cannot have unless he spends money, he wills to spend (i.e., to desert) the money before he does not will to keep it. For it is not the case that he wills to spend money because he does not will to keep it; rather, he does not will to keep it because he must spend it in order to have bread. For before he has money, he wills to have it and to keep it; and when he has it, he does not at all not will to keep it, as long as it is not necessary for him to give it up.

S. That's true.

T. Therefore, it is not always the case that not-willing-to-keep precedes willing-to-desert; sometimes willing-to-desert is prior.

S. I cannot deny it.

T. Therefore, I say that the reason [the Devil] did not will when and what he ought to have willed is not that his will had a deficiency which resulted from God's failure to give; rather, [he did not will when and what he ought to have willed] because by willing what he ought *not* to have willed, he expelled his good will in consequence of a supervening evil will. Accordingly, it is not the case that he did not have, or did not receive, a good persevering will because God did not give it; rather, God did not give it because he deserted it by willing what he ought not to have willed; and by deserting it he did not keep it.

S. I understand what you are saying.

CHAPTER FOUR

How [the Devil] sinned and willed to be like God.

T. Do you still have any doubt about its not being the case that the Devil willed to desert what he had because he did not will to keep it, but its being the case that he did not will to keep it because he willed to desert it?

S. I do not doubt that it can be so; but you have not yet made me certain that it is so. Therefore, first show what [the Devil] did not have but willed to have, so that he willed to desert what he did have—just as you have shown in the case of the miser. Then if nothing will be able to be contradicted, I will admit that I do not

doubt it to be true.

T. You do not doubt that the Devil sinned, since he was not able to be unjustly damned by a just God; but you are asking how he sinned.

S. That's right.

T. If he had perseveringly kept justice, he would never have sinned or have been unhappy.

S. We believe this.

T. But no one keeps justice except by willing what he ought, and no one deserts justice except by willing what he ought not.

S. No one doubts this.

T. Therefore, by willing something which he was not supposed to will at that time, he deserted justice and thereby sinned.

S. This follows. But I ask: What did he will?

T. Whatever he already had in his possession he was supposed to will.

S. Yes, he was supposed to will what he had received from God, and he did not sin by willing that.

T. Therefore, he willed something which he did not already have and was not supposed to will at that time—just as Eve willed to be like gods¹ before God willed this.

S. I cannot deny that this follows in this way.

T. But [the Devil] was able to will nothing except what is just or beneficial. For happiness, which every rational nature wills, consists of benefits.

S. We can recognize this in ourselves, for we will nothing except that which we think to be just or beneficial.

T. But [the Devil] was not able to sin by willing justice.

S. That's true.

T. Therefore, he sinned by willing something beneficial which he did not possess and was not supposed to will at that time but which was able to increase his happiness.

S. It is clear that [the matter] could not have been otherwise.

T. I think you see that he extended his will beyond justice by inordinately willing something more than he had received.

S. I now see clearly that he sinned both by willing what he ought not to have and by not willing what he ought to have. And, clear-

¹Genesis 3:5.

ly, it is not the case that he willed more than he should have because he did not will to keep justice; rather, he did not keep justice because he willed something else; and by willing this, he deserted justice, as you have shown about the bread and the money in the example of the miser.

T. But when [the Devil] willed what God did not will him to will, he willed inordinately to be like God.

S. If God can be conceived only as so unique that nothing else can be conceived to be like Him, how was the Devil able to will what he was not able to conceive? For he was not so obtuse as not to know that nothing else can be conceived to be like God.

T. Even if he did not will to be altogether equal to God, but contrary to the will of God willed to be something less than God, then even in this case he willed inordinately to be like God; for he willed something by an autonomous will (*propria voluntate*), which was subject to no one else. For it ought to be the characteristic only of God so to will something by an autonomous will that He is not subordinate to a higher will.

S. That's right.

T. However, not only did [the Devil] will to be equal to God because he presumed to have an autonomous will, but he even willed to be greater [than God] by willing what God did not will him to will, for he placed his will above the will of God.

S. This is clear enough.

T. Therefore, I think that from the foregoing argument it is now evident to you that the Devil both freely departed from willing what he was supposed to will and justly lost what he had because he freely and unjustly willed what he did not possess and was not supposed to will.

S. I think that nothing is more evident.

T. Therefore, although the good angel received perseverance because God gave it, it is not the case that the evil angel did not receive it because God did not give it. Rather, God did not give it because [the evil angel] did not receive it; and he did not receive it because he did not will to receive it.

S. Indeed, you so satisfy me regarding the things about which I ask that neither in what you set forth nor in the outcome of your argument do I mentally see any truth to totter.

CHAPTER FIVE

Before the fall of the evil angels,
the good angels were able to sin.

T. Do you think that the good angels were likewise able to sin before the evil angels fell?

S. Yes, but I would like to understand it rationally.

T. You are certain that if the good angels were not able to sin, then they kept justice not by their own ability but by necessity. Therefore, they would no more have merited grace from God because they remained standing while the others fell than because they preserved rationality, which they were unable to lose. But if you carefully consider the matter, they would not even [in that case] rightly be called just.

S. So reason shows.

T. Therefore, if the angels who fell had not sinned when they were able [not to sin], then to the degree that they would have been truly just and would have merited grace from God, to that degree they would have been better than the good angels. Thus, it would follow that the men who are elect would eventually be better and greater than the good angels, or else that the [number of] reprobate angels would not be perfectly restored, since the men who would assume their places would not be such as the reprobate angels would have become [viz., better than the good angels].

S. I think that both of these alternatives must be completely denied.

T. Therefore, the good angels were able to sin before the fall of the evil angels; [their state] was not otherwise than as was shown about [the state of] the angels who sinned.

S. I do not see that [the matter] can be otherwise.

CHAPTER SIX

How the good angels were confirmed in their standing
and the evil angels in their fallenness.

T. Thus, the angels who preferred the justice which they possessed to the something more which they did not possess received through the reward of justice the good which they lost as if on account of justice (as far as justice in the will was concerned). And

they remained truly secure with respect to that good which they already had. Therefore, they were exalted to the point that they obtained whatever they were able to will, and they no longer see what more they can will. For this reason, they are not able to sin.

But as for the angels who preferred that which God did not yet will to give them, and who preferred it more than standing in the justice in which they had been created: through the judgment of justice they did not at all obtain that good on account of which they despised justice, and they lost the good which they already had. Therefore, the angels were so separated that (1) those who adhered to justice are able to will no good in which they do not delight and (2) those who deserted justice are able to will no good of which they are not deprived.

S. Nothing is more just or lovely than this separation. But if you are able to say, I would like to hear what kind of benefit it was which the good angels thus gained by justly not willing and the evil angels thus lost by unjustly desiring.

T. I do not know what it was. But whatever it was, it suffices to know that it was something toward which they could grow and which they did not receive when they were created, so that they might attain it by their own merit.

S. And let it now suffice that we have examined the matter this far.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Whether the will and its turning to what it ought not
are the very evil which makes [men and angels] evil.

Why a rational creature cannot turn himself from evil to good,
as he can turn himself from good to evil.

S. I do not know why it is that just when I was hoping to come to the end of our inquiry, I see instead other questions arising, as though sprouting forth from the roots of the questions we have felled. For although I see very clearly that the evil angel could have come to an excessive need of good for no reason except because of an immoderate desire, I am quite troubled about the source of his unordered will. For if his will was good, then he fell from such great good into such great evil because of a good will. Likewise, if his will was good, God gave it to him, because from himself he had only nothing. Therefore, if he willed what God gave to will,

how is it that he sinned? Or if he had this will from himself, he had something good which he did not receive.

On the other hand, if his will is evil and is something, then it is again the case that this will is only from God, from whom is everything that is something. And we can in like manner ask how he sinned in having a will which God gave or how God could have given an evil will. But if this evil will was from the Devil himself and is something, then [the evil angel] had something from himself and it is not the case that every being is good. And if, indeed, an evil will is a being, then evil won't be nothing, as we are accustomed to say it is. Or if an evil will is nothing, then [the Devil] was so gravely damned for nothing, and hence was damned without reason.

However, what I am saying about the will can be said about concupiscence or desire, since the will is concupiscence and desire. And just as there is a good and an evil will, so there is a good and an evil concupiscence and a good and an evil desire.

But suppose we say that (1) the will is a kind of being and so is something good, and that (2) when it is turned to what it ought to will, it becomes a good will, but when it is turned to what it ought not to will, it is called an evil will. [In this case,] I see that whatever I said about the will can be said about the turning of the will. For I am greatly perturbed about from where the Devil had the evil turning of will and about the other things which I said regarding the will just now.

There is still something else I greatly wonder about when I consider this turning of the will: viz., why did God create that nature, which He had exalted with such great excellence, to be such that it could turn its will away from what it was supposed to will and towards what it was not supposed to will but could not turn its will away from what it ought not to will towards what it ought to will? For it seems that such a creature from such a creator ought much rather to have received the ability to do the good for which it was created than the ability to do the evil it was created to avoid. We can also ask this same question about our own nature, since we believe that no man can have a good will unless God gives it but can always have an evil will by the mere permission of God.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Neither the will nor its turning is the very evil
[which makes men and angels evil].

T. We cannot deny, it seems to me, either that the will or that the turning of the will is something. For although the will and its turning are not substances, nevertheless it cannot be proven that they are not beings, since there are many beings besides the ones which are properly called substances. Furthermore, a good will is not anything more than is an evil will; and an evil will is not something evil more than a good will is something good. For a will which wills to bestow mercifully is not anything more than is a will which wills to seize forcibly; and this latter will is no more something evil than the former will is something good. Therefore, if an evil will were the evil in virtue of which someone is called evil, then a good will would be the good in virtue of which someone is made good. But an evil will would be nothing if it were the very evil which we believe to be nothing. Therefore, a good will would be nothing, since a good will is not anything more than is an evil will. Hence, we would not be able to deny that the good which makes [men and angels] good is nothing, since it would be identical with the good will, which would be nothing. But no one doubts it to be false that a good will and this very good are nothing. It follows that an evil will is not the very evil which makes [men and angels] evil—even as a good will is not the very good which makes them good.

What I have just said about the will can also be considered in the case of the turning of the will. For the turning which turns the will from seizing [forcefully] to bestowing [mercifully] is not anything more than is the turning which turns that same will from generosity to greed. And the other things which I have just finished mentioning about the will [also apply to the turning of the will].

S. What you say seems true to me too.

T. Therefore, neither the evil will nor the depraved turning of the will is that evil which we call nothing and in virtue of which the angel [Satan] and the man [Adam] became evil. And neither the good will nor the good turning of the will is the good in virtue of which they are made good.

CHAPTER NINE

Injustice is evil itself and is nothing.

S. Then, what shall we say to be the evil which makes [men and angels] evil, and what shall we say to be the good which makes them good?

T. We ought to believe that justice is the good in virtue of which men and angels are good, or just, and in virtue of which the will is called good, or just. But we ought to believe that injustice is the evil which makes both the will and [men and angels] evil and which we call nothing other than the privation of the good; and so, we maintain that this very injustice is nothing other than a privation of justice. For when a will was first given to rational nature, it was—at the moment of giving—turned by the Giver towards what it was supposed to will; or better, it was not *turned* but was *created upright*. As long as the will stood fast in this uprightness (which we call truth or justice) in which it was created, it was just. But when it turned itself away from what it was supposed [to will] and turned towards that which it ought not to have [willed], it did not stand fast in the “original” uprightness, so to speak, in which it was created. When [the will] deserted this original uprightness, it lost something great and received nothing in its place except its privation, which has no being and which we call injustice.

CHAPTER TEN

How evil seems to be something.

S. I concede what you say, viz., that evil is a privation of good. But nonetheless, I regard good as a privation of evil. And just as I perceive in the case of the deprivation of evil that there results something else which we call good, so I notice in the case of the deprivation of good that there results something else which we call evil.

Now, by means of various arguments evil is proved to be nothing. For example: “Evil is only defect or corruption, which does not at all exist except in some being. And the greater the defect and corruption in this being, the more they reduce it to nothing. Moreover, if this being becomes altogether nothing, defect and corruption are also found to be nothing.” Although in this or some other way evil is proved to be nothing, my mind cannot give

assent (except by faith alone) unless the [following] counter-argument, which proves to me that evil is only something, is refuted.

For if nothing is signified by the name “evil,” then when we hear this name our hearts shudder in vain at what they understand by its signification. Likewise, if the word (*vox*) “evil” is a name (*nomen*), then surely it is significative. However, if it is significative, it signifies. But it signifies only something. Therefore, how is evil nothing if what its name signifies is something?

Finally, while justice is present, there seems to be such great tranquility and peace of mind that in many cases justice (like chastity and patience too) seems to be nothing other than a cessation of evil. But when justice departs, very conflicting and very harsh and very manifold passion besets the mind. Like a cruel master, it compels the wretched and puny man to be afflicted with worry over very many shameful and oppressive tasks and to labor very grievously at them. It would be astonishing if it could be shown that *nothing* accomplishes all these things.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

By means of their names, evil and nothing cannot be proved to be something but [can be proved to be] as-if-something.

T. I think you are not so mad as to say that nothing is something, even though you cannot deny that “nothing” is a name. Therefore, if by means of the name “nothing” you cannot prove that nothing is something, how do you think that by means of the name “evil” you can prove that evil is something?

S. An example which resolves one contentious issue by means of another contentious issue accomplishes nothing. For I do not know what this very nothing is. Therefore—since the question at hand is about evil, which you say to be nothing—if you wish to teach me what I may understand evil to be, teach me first what I may understand nothing to be. Then reply to the other arguments (besides [the argument from] the name “evil”) by which I said I was troubled about the fact that evil seems to be something.

T. Since to-be-nothing and not-to-be-anything do not at all differ, how can we say what that-which-is not-anything is?

S. If there is not anything which is signified by the name “nothing,” then this name does not signify anything. But if it does not

signify anything, it is not a name. But surely it is a name. Therefore, although no one says that nothing is something but we must always admit that nothing is nothing, nevertheless no one can deny that the name “nothing” is significative. But if this name signifies not nothing but, rather, something, then that which is signified seems unable to be nothing and seems rather to be something. Therefore, if that which is signified is not nothing but is something, how will it be true that by means of this name what is nothing is signified? Indeed, if nothing is spoken of truly, then it is truly nothing; and so, it is not anything. Hence, if that which is signified by the name “nothing” is not nothing but is something (as this line of reasoning seems to show), then it is falsely and improperly called by this name.

But on the contrary, if as everyone judges, what is named nothing is truly nothing and is not at all anything, does anything at all seem to follow more logically than that the name “nothing” signifies nothing—i.e., does not signify anything?

Thus, why is it that this name, viz., “nothing,” does not signify nothing but signifies something, and does not signify something but signifies nothing?

T. Perhaps signifying nothing and signifying something are not opposed.

S. If they are not opposed then either the word “nothing” signifies (in different respects) both nothing and something or else a thing must be found which is both something and nothing.

T. What if both alternatives can be discovered to be the case—viz., that there is an ambiguity of signification in the name “nothing” and that the same thing is both something and nothing?

S. I would like to know of both.

T. It is evident that this word, viz., “nothing,” does not at all differ, with respect to its signification, from what I term “not-something.” Also, nothing is clearer than that the word “not-something” indicates by its signification that absolutely every thing and all that is something should be removed from the understanding, and that no thing whatsoever nor what is at all something should be retained in the understanding. But the removal of a thing cannot at all be signified except together with the signification of that very thing whose removal is signified. (For example, no one understands what “not-man” signifies except by understanding what

a man is.) Therefore, it is necessary that the word “not- something” signify something by “destroying” that which is something. But since by removing everything that is something, the word “not- something” signifies no being which it indicates is to be retained in the understanding of the hearer, it signifies no thing nor what is something.

Therefore, by means of these different considerations, the word “not- something” does in some respect signify a thing and something, and does not in any respect signify a thing or something. For it signifies by removing and does not signify by establishing. In this manner, the name “nothing,” which destroys everything that is something, signifies something rather than nothing by destroying and signifies nothing rather than something by establishing [i.e., by positing]. Therefore, it is not necessary that nothing be something simply because its name somehow or other signifies something. Rather, it is necessary that nothing be nothing, because its name signifies something in the aforementioned way. And so, in this aforementioned way the fact that evil is nothing is not opposed to the fact that the name “evil” is significative—provided that “evil” signifies something by destroying [i.e., by negating] it and, thus, is constitutive of no thing.

S. I cannot deny that in accordance with your reasoning just now the name “nothing” somehow signifies something. But it is well-enough known that the something which in this manner is signified by this name is not named nothing; and when we hear this name [“nothing”], we do not accept it for that thing which it thus signifies. Therefore, I ask about that for which this name stands and about that which we understand when we hear this name. About *that*, I say, I am asking what it is. For this name *properly* signifies that thing; and so, it is a name because it is significative of that thing and not because it signifies something by negating in the aforementioned way. Indeed, it is the name of that thing because of the signifying of which it is reckoned [as a name] among names; and that thing is called nothing. I ask: How is that thing something if it is properly called nothing? Or how is it nothing if the name that is significative of it signifies something? Or how is the same thing both something and nothing? I ask the same questions about the name “evil” and about that which it signifies and about what is named “evil.”

T. You are right in asking, because although by the previous consideration “evil” and “nothing” do signify something, nevertheless what is signified is not evil or nothing. But there is another respect in which they signify something and in which what is signified is something—though not really something but only as-if-something (*quasi aliquid*).

Indeed, many things are said according to form (*secundum formam*) which are not the case according to fact (*secundum rem*). For example, *timere* [to be afraid] is called active according to the form of the word, although it is passive according to fact. So too, blindness is called *something* according to a form of speaking, although it is not something according to fact. For just as we say of someone that he has sight and that sight is in him, so we say that he has blindness and that blindness is in him, although blindness is not something but rather is not-something. Moreover, to have blindness is not to have something but is rather to be deprived of that which is something. For blindness is nothing other than not-seeing, or the absence of sight where sight ought to be. But not-seeing, or the absence of sight, is not anything more where sight ought to be than where it ought not to be. Therefore, blindness is not anything more in the eye because sight ought to be there than is not-seeing, or the absence of sight, in a stone, where sight ought not to be. Also, many other things which are not something are likewise called something according to a form of speaking, since we speak about them as about existing things.

Therefore, in this way, “evil” and “nothing” signify something; and what is signified is something not according to fact but according to a form of speaking. For “nothing” signifies only not-something, or the absence of things which are something. And evil is only not-good, or the absence of good where good either ought to be or is advantageous to be. But that which is only the absence of what is something is surely not something. Therefore, evil truly is nothing, and nothing is not something. And yet, in a certain sense, evil and nothing *are* something because we speak about them as if they were something, when we say “Nothing caused it” or “Evil caused it” and “What caused it is nothing” or “Evil is what caused it.” [These expressions] resemble our saying “Something caused it” or “Good caused it” and “What caused it is something” or “Good is what caused it.” Accordingly, when we flatly deny a statement

which someone makes, we say: "That which you are saying is nothing." For "that" and "which" are properly said only of that which is something. And when "that" and "which" are said in the manner I have just mentioned, they are not said about that which is something but about that which is spoken of as if something.

S. You have satisfied me regarding the argument from the name "evil" —an argument by means of which I used to think I could prove that evil is something.

CHAPTER TWELVE

The angel [Satan] was not able to have his first willing from himself. Many things are said "to be able" by reason of another's ability and "not to be able" by reason of another's inability.

S. It remains now for you to teach me what I can reply to the other arguments which tend to persuade me that evil is something.

T. In order to elucidate the truth of the matter, we must begin a bit more slowly. But it is necessary that you not be content to understand merely one at a time those things which I shall say; rather, you must gather them all together in your mind as if in one view.

S. To be sure, I shall be as attentive as I can. But if in any respect I am slower than you wish, do not be displeased to wait for me according as you see my slowness to require.

T. Then, let us suppose that God is now creating the angel [Satan], whom He wills to make happy, and is creating him not as a whole at once but in stages. And let us suppose that the angel has been created up to the point of now being adapted for having a will but without as yet willing anything.

S. Suppose what you wish, but explain what I am asking about.

T. Then, do you think that the angel would be able to will something by himself (*per se*)?

S. I do not understand exactly what you mean by "by himself." For because he has nothing which he has not received (just as you said earlier about every creature), he can do nothing by himself.

T. By "by himself" I mean "by means of that which he already has." For example, someone who has feet and those features which

are sufficient for being able to walk is able to walk by himself. But someone who has feet but does not have feet free of infirmity is not able to walk by himself. Thus, in this sense I am asking whether that angel who is already adapted for willing but does not as yet will anything is able to will something by himself.

S. I think that he is *able* if he ever *wills*.

T. You are not answering my question.

S. In what way am I not?

T. I am asking about a state where there is no willing and about an ability which precedes an occurrence. And you are answering in terms of an actual willing and of an ability which accompanies an occurrence. For by the very fact that anything *is* it is *able to be*. But not everything which *is* was able to be before it was. Therefore, when I ask whether the angel who is not willing anything is able to will, I am asking about an ability prior to the willing, by which ability he would be able to move himself to willing. But when you reply that if he wills he is able [to will], you are speaking of an ability which accompanies the willing. For if he wills, it is necessary that he is able to will.

S. I know that there are two abilities: one which is not yet operative, and a second which is already operative. But I cannot fail to know even this: that if, regarding whatever is so able to be that it already is, it at some time was not, then it was able to be before [it was]. For if it had not been able [to be], it would never have been. Therefore, I think I have given a good answer; for anyone who is able to will because he already wills must have been able before he willed.

T. Do you think that what is nothing has nothing at all and hence has no ability, and without any ability is altogether unable?

S. I cannot deny this.

T. I think that the world was nothing before it was created.

S. You speak the truth.

T. Therefore, before it was, it was altogether unable.

S. This follows.

T. Therefore, before it was, it was not able to be.

S. And I say: if [the world] was not able to be, it was impossible that it should ever be.

T. Before the world existed, it was both possible and impossible [to be]. Indeed, it was impossible for that which did not have

the ability to make it exist. But it was possible for God, who had the ability to create it. Therefore, the world exists because God was able to create it before it was created, not because the world itself was able to exist before [it did exist].

S. I am unable to contradict your reasoning; but our common way of speaking does not agree [with your statement].

T. It is not surprising. For in our common way of speaking many things are said improperly. But when it is necessary to search out the very core of truth, it is necessary to analyze the troublesome impropriety as far as the subject-matter requires and allows. As a result of this impropriety of speaking we happen very often to say (1) that a thing is able, not because *it* is able but because another thing is able, and to say (2) that a thing which *is* able is not able, since another thing is not able. For example, if I say, "A book is able to be written by me," surely the book is unable; but I am able to write a book. And when we say, "This man is not able to be overcome by that man," we mean only that the latter is not able to overcome the former.

Hence, we say that God is not able [to do] anything opposed to Himself or anything evil, since He is so powerful in happiness and justice—or better, since He is so all-powerful in simplicity of goodness (for happiness and justice are one good in Him and not different goods)—that nothing is able [to cause] any harm to the Supreme Good. Indeed, for this reason He is not able to be corrupted or to lie.

So, then, whatever does not exist is not able, before it exists, to exist by its own ability. But if another thing is able to cause this thing to exist, then in this manner this thing is able to exist by means of another's ability.

But although *ability* or *inability* can be divided in many ways, let it suffice for the present [to note] only that many things are said *to be able* not by their own ability but by another's, and many things are said *not to be able* not by their own inability but by another's. Therefore, regarding the angel whom we postulated as newly created and already created up to the point that he is adapted for having a will but is not yet willing anything—when I ask about him whether he is able to will anything by himself, I am speaking about his own ability. Answer me in terms of this ability.

S. If [the angel] is already so adapted for willing that nothing else is lacking to him than to will, I do not see why he cannot [will] by himself. For whoever is adapted for seeing and does not see when he is placed in the light with his eyes closed, is able to see by himself. Why, then, is it not the case that the one who is not [yet] willing likewise wills by himself, even as someone who is not seeing is able to see by himself?

T. Because the one who is not seeing has sight and the will by which he is able to direct his sight. But we are speaking about one who has no will. Therefore, if a certain thing moves itself from not willing to willing, tell me whether it thereby wills to move itself.

S. If I say that the thing is moved without willing, there will follow that it is not moved by itself but by something else—except perhaps in a case where someone blinks at an on-coming blow or if someone is compelled by some disadvantage to will what he was not previously willing. For in these cases I do not know whether he first wills to move himself to this willing.

T. No one is compelled by fear or by a sense of any disadvantage, or attracted by the love of any benefit, to will anything, unless he first has a natural will [i.e., inclination] to avoid disadvantage or to possess what is beneficial. By this natural will he moves himself to other willings.

S. I cannot deny it.

T. Then, say that whatever moves itself to willing wills first to move itself [to willing].

S. That's right.

T. Therefore, that which does not at all will is not at all able to move itself to willing.

S. I cannot dispute this.

T. It remains, then, that that angel who has been created already-adapted for having a will, but who does not yet will anything, is not able to have his first willing from himself.

S. I must admit that anyone who is not willing anything is not able to will anything by himself.

T. However, he is not able to be happy unless he wills happiness. I here mean by "happiness" not happiness with justice but the happiness which everyone wills—even the unjust. Indeed, all will to be well-off. For leaving aside the fact that every nature is called good, we commonly speak of two goods and of two op-

posing evils. One good is what is called justice, whose opposing evil is injustice. The other good is what seems to me able to be called benefit (*commodum*), to which the opposing evil is disadvantage (*incommodum*). But, of course, not everyone wills justice, and not everyone flees from injustice. But not only every rational nature but even everything which is able to sense wills benefit and avoids disadvantage. For no one wills [anything] except what he considers to be in some respect beneficial to himself. In this manner, then, everyone wills to be well-off, and no one wills to be badly-off. I am speaking now about this happiness because no one is able to be happy who does not will happiness. For no one can be happy either in having what he does not will or in not having what he does will.

S. It must not be denied.

T. And someone who does not will justice ought not to be happy.

S. This must equally be conceded.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

If [Satan] received only the will-for-happiness, he was able to will only happiness and was not able to keep from willing it; and regardless of what he willed, his will was neither just nor unjust.

T. Let us hypothesize, then, that at first God gives him [viz., the angel Satan] only the will-for-happiness, and let us see whether simply by virtue of having received a will, he is now able to move himself to willing something other than what he has received to will.

S. Proceed with what you have begun. For I am ready to understand.

T. It is evident that [the angel] does not yet will anything other than happiness, because he has not received anything else to will.

S. True.

T. Therefore, I ask you whether he is able to move himself to willing anything else.

S. I am unable to see how someone who does not will anything else would move himself to willing something other than happiness. For if he wills to move himself to willing something else, he wills something else.

T. Therefore, just as before he was given a will he was not able to will anything at all by himself, so after he has received only the will-for-happiness he is not able to have any other will from himself.

S. That's right.

T. Isn't it the case that if he thinks something to be conducive to acquiring happiness, he is able to move himself to willing it?

S. I am not sure what to answer. For if he is *not* able to, I do not see how he is willing happiness, for he is not able to will that by means of which he thinks he is able to attain happiness. On the other hand, if he is able to, I do not understand how he is unable to will something [other than happiness].

T. If someone wills something not for the sake of the thing he is seen to will but rather for the sake of something else, should he be properly judged to will (1) that which he is said to will or (2) that for the sake of which he wills?

S. Assuredly, (2) that for the sake of which he is seen to will.

T. Therefore, someone who wills something for the sake of happiness does not will anything other than happiness. Therefore, he is able both to will what he thinks to be conducive to happiness and to will only happiness.

S. That's plain enough.

T. I ask, further, whether after having received only the will-for-happiness he is able to keep from willing happiness.

S. He is not able at the same time both to will and not to will.

T. True. But I am not asking that. Rather, I am asking whether he is able to desert this willing and to move himself from willing happiness to not willing happiness.

S. Indeed, if he does this unwillingly, he does not do it. But if he does it willingly, he wills something other than happiness. But he does not will anything other than happiness. Therefore, I think it obvious that he is not at all able by himself to keep from willing the only thing he has received to will.

T. You understand correctly. But tell me now whether [this angel], who wills only happiness and is not able to keep from willing happiness, is able to keep from willing a greater happiness in proportion as he understands it to be greater.

S. If he did not more greatly will happiness in proportion to the degree he deemed it to be greater and better, then either he would

not be willing happiness at all or else he would be willing something else on account of which he did not will the better happiness. But we are hypothesizing that he wills happiness and not anything else.

T. Therefore, he wills to be happy in proportion to his recognition that a greater happiness is possible.

S. Without doubt, he so wills.

T. Therefore, he wills to be like God.

S. Nothing is clearer.

T. What do you think?: Would his will be unjust if in this manner he willed to be like God?

S. I do not wish to call it just, because he would be willing what was not fitting; nor do I wish to call it unjust, because he would will of necessity.

T. But we posited that someone who wills only happiness wills only benefits.

S. That's right.

T. Therefore, if that [angel], who willed only benefits, were not able to have greater and truer benefits, would he not will whatever lesser benefits he was able to use?

S. Indeed, he would not be able to keep from willing even whatsoever lowest benefits if he were not able [to have] greater ones.

T. When he willed unclean and very base benefits in which irrational animals take pleasure, wouldn't this same will be unjust and blameworthy?

S. How would [that] will be unjust and blameworthy, for it would will what it had received not to be able to keep from willing?

T. However, it is evident that this will is the work of God and the gift of God (even as is life or sensibility), whether when it wills the loftiest benefits or when it wills the basest ones. And it is evident that neither justice nor injustice is in this will.

S. No doubt about it.

T. Therefore, insofar as [this will] is a being, it is something good. But as far as justice or injustice is concerned, [this will] is neither good nor evil.

S. Nothing is clearer.

T. But [the angel] ought not to be happy if he does not have a just will. Indeed, he cannot be completely and laudably happy if

he wills what neither is able to be nor ought to be.

S. That's quite apparent.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

The case is similar if [Satan] received only the will-for-uprightness. And so, he received both wills at the same time in order to be both just and happy.

T. So let us consider the will-for-justice. If this will were given to this same angel to will only what was fitting for him to will, would he be able to will anything other [than what was fitting]? Or would he be able by himself to keep from willing what he had received to will?

S. What we saw in the case of the will-for-happiness must in every respect hold true in the case of this will too.

T. Then, [Satan] would have neither a just nor an unjust will. For even as *there* [in the case of the will-for-happiness] the will would not be unjust if it willed unfitting things, since it would not be able to keep from willing them, so *here* [in the case of the will-for-justice] if the will willed fitting things, it would not thereby be just, since it would have received this capability in such way that it would not have been able to will otherwise.

S. That's right.

T. Then, since [Satan] cannot be called just or unjust merely because he wills happiness or merely because he wills what is fitting (for he would will these of necessity), and since he neither can nor ought to be happy unless he wills to be happy and wills justly, it is necessary for God to make both wills so agree in him that he wills to be happy and wills justly. Accordingly, the addition of justice would so temper the will-for-happiness that its excesses would be checked while its power to transgress would remain unabridged. Thus, although with respect to the fact that he would will to be happy he would be able to exceed the mean, nevertheless with respect to the fact that he would will justly he would not will to exceed the mean. And so, thus possessing a just will-for-happiness he could and should be happy. And by not willing what he ought not to will, although able [to will it], he would merit never to be able to will what he ought not to will. And by always keeping justice by means of a tempered will, he would in no way ex-

perience need. But if he were to desert justice by means of an immoderate will, he would in every way experience need.

S. Nothing more fitting can be thought.

T. Keep in mind that when we were previously considering only the will-for-happiness—apart from the limit which we added [viz., justice] so that the will would subordinate itself to God—we said that regardless of what it willed, neither justice nor injustice was in it.

S. I remember well.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Justice is something.

T. Do you think that a thing which when added to this same will tempers it, so that it does not will more than it ought to will or more than is profitable to will, is something?

S. No one with any sense will think it to be nothing.

T. I believe you are sufficiently aware that this thing is nothing other than justice.

S. It cannot conceivably be anything else.

T. Therefore, it is certain that justice is something.

S. Indeed, it is something exceedingly good.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Injustice is only the absence of required justice.

T. Before that will received this justice, was it under obligation to will and not to will in accordance with justice?

S. No, it was not under an obligation with respect to what it had not received and therefore did not have.

T. However, you do not doubt that it was under an obligation after it received [justice]—unless it were to lose [justice] as the result of some overpowering force?

S. I think that the will is always bound to this obligation, whether it keeps what it has received or whether it willingly deserts it.

T. You judge correctly. But what if, having no need and being unconstrained by any overpowering force, this same will [for happiness] were to desert the justice which was so usefully and so wisely added to it—to desert by freely using its own power, i.e., by willing [something] more than it ought [to will]? Would anything re-

main with this will other than what we saw to be there before the addition of justice?

S. Since only justice was added, then when justice is gone, surely there remains only what was first there—except for the fact that having received justice has made the will a debtor, and, so to speak, certain lovely vestiges of justice have remained after justice has been deserted. For by the very fact that [the will] remains a debtor to justice, it is shown to have been adorned with the honor of justice. But even this is sufficiently just, viz., that what once received justice should always be under obligation with respect to justice—unless it were to lose justice as a result of being overpowered. And certainly a nature which is proved once to have had so honorable a good and to be always obliged to have it is proved to be much more worthy than a nature which is known never to have this good and never to be obliged [to have it].

T. You are thinking well. But add to your thought that the more praiseworthy the nature which had this good and ought [to have it] is shown to be, the more blameworthy the person who does not have what he ought [to have] is proven to be.

S. I strongly agree.

T. In the case under consideration, determine for me what shows the nature to be praiseworthy and what makes the person blameworthy.

S. To have had, or to be under obligation with respect to, [justice] manifests a natural dignity; not to have [justice] causes personal dishonor. For owing¹ was caused by the one who gave; but not having was caused by the one who deserted. For he is indebted because he has received; but he does not have because he has deserted.

T. Therefore, what you are blaming in the will which did not stand fast in justice is not that it owes justice but that it does not have justice.

S. What I blame in that will is nothing at all other than the absence of justice, or the not-having of justice. For, as I have already said, to owe [justice] beautifies; but not to have [justice] mars. And the more the debt is becoming, the more the not-having is unseemly. Indeed, the will is marred by the not-having, for which it

¹One *owes* justice when he *ought* to have it but does not. “*Debeo*” means both “I owe” and “I ought.” Cf. *Cur Deus Homo* II, 18.

itself is to blame, only because it is adorned by the obligation-to-have, which results from the goodness of the Giver.

T. Don't you judge this will, which does not have the justice it ought to have, to be unjust and to have injustice in it?

S. Who would not so judge?

T. If [this will] were not unjust and if injustice were not in it, then I think that you would be blaming nothing in it.

S. Absolutely nothing.

T. So you are blaming nothing else in it except injustice and the fact that it is unjust.

S. I cannot blame anything else in it.

T. Then, if you blame nothing in the will other than the absence of justice and its not having justice, as you said a moment ago, and if it is true that you blame nothing else in it except the fact that injustice is in it, or that it is unjust, then it is evident that in the will injustice, or being unjust, is only the absence of justice, or the not having of justice.

S. These can in no respect be different.

T. Then, even as the absence of justice and the not having of justice have no being, so injustice and being unjust have no being; and, thus, they are not something but are nothing.

S. Nothing follows more logically.

T. Also bear in mind that we have already established that when justice departed [from the will], then except for the debt of justice, nothing remained in [the will] other than what [the will] had before it received justice.

S. Assuredly, this has been established.

T. But before [the will] had justice, it was not unjust and did not have injustice.

S. Right.

T. Therefore, when justice departs either injustice is not in the will and the will is not unjust or else injustice and being unjust are nothing.

S. Nothing can appear more necessary.

T. But you have conceded that the will has injustice and is unjust after it has deserted justice.

S. Indeed, I cannot help seeing [this point].

T. Therefore, injustice and being unjust are nothing.

S. What I earlier believed without knowing, you have caused

me, still believing, to know.

T. I think that you also now know—since injustice is only the absence of justice, and being unjust is simply not having justice—why after justice has been deserted, rather than before justice has been given, (1) the absence of justice is called injustice, and (2) not to have justice is to be unjust, and (3) the absence of justice and not having justice are blameworthy. The only reason is that it is not unfitting for justice to be absent except where it ought to be present. For even as not having a beard is not unbecoming for a man who ought not yet to have one, though when the time comes for him to have a beard, his not having one is unseemly: so too not having justice does not mar a nature which ought not to have it, though not having justice does disgrace a nature which ought to have it. And the more the fact that one ought to have [a beard] manifests a manly nature, the more not having [a beard] blemishes a manly appearance.

S. I see well enough that injustice is only the absence of justice where justice ought to be.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Why the renegade angel is unable to return to justice.

T. When we hypothesized that only the will-for-happiness was given to the aforementioned angel [viz., Satan], we saw that he would have been unable to will anything else.

S. We saw clearly what you say.

T. Once justice has been abandoned and there is only the prior will-for-happiness remaining, is this renegade angel able to return by himself to the will-for-justice, to which he could not come before it was given?

S. He is now much less [able to come by himself to justice]. For *then* [i.e., when he at first had only the will-for-happiness] he was unable to have [justice] because of his state of nature; but *now* [i.e., after having received and deserted justice] he ought not to have it also because of his merited fault.

T. Therefore, he is in no respect able to have justice from himself when he does not have justice, because [he is unable to have it from himself] either before he receives it or after he deserts it.

S. He ought not to have anything from himself.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

How the evil angel caused himself to be unjust and the good angel caused himself to be just. The evil angel owes gratitude to God for the goods which he received and deserted, even as the good angel, who kept the goods which he received, [owes gratitude].

T. Isn't it the case that in some way, even when [Satan] had justice, he was able to give it to himself?

S. How could he have?

T. We say "to cause" in many modes. For example, we speak of causing something when we cause a thing to be, and also when we are able to cause it not to be but do not cause it not to be. And so, since the evil angel was able both to remove justice from himself and not to remove it from himself, he was able in this manner to give justice to himself—even as the angel who stood steadfast in the truth in which he was created did not (when able to) cause himself not to have justice, and so gave himself justice, and received this entire gift from God. For both angels received from God the possession [of justice] and the ability to keep it and the ability to forsake it. God gave this latter ability so that they would be able in some manner to give justice to themselves. For if they were in no manner able to remove justice from themselves, they would in no manner be able to give justice to themselves. Therefore, he who in this manner gave justice to himself received from God the fact that he gave justice to himself.

S. I see that by not removing justice they were able to give it to themselves. Yet, the one gave it to himself, whereas the other removed it from himself.

T. Do you see, then, that they owe to God equal amounts of gratitude, in proportion to His goodness, and that it is not the case that the Devil, because he removed from himself what God gave and because he was unwilling to accept what God offered, is under a lesser obligation to return to God what is God's?

S. Yes, I see.

T. Therefore, the evil angel ought always to thank God for the happiness which he himself removed from himself, even as the good angel [ought always to thank God] for the happiness which he himself gave to himself.

S. Absolutely true.

T. I think you are aware that God can in no manner cause anyone to be unjust except by not causing someone who is unjust to be just, although able to do so. For before having received justice, no one is just or unjust; and after having received justice, no one becomes unjust except by willingly deserting justice. Therefore, even as the good angel caused himself to be just by not removing justice from himself when able, so God causes the evil angel to be unjust by not returning justice to him, although able to do so.

S. This is easily recognized.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

Insofar as it *is*, the will is something good. No thing is an evil.

T. Let us return to considering the will, and let us remember what we have already considered, viz., that before the will-for-happiness receives justice it is not something evil but something good, regardless of what it wills. Hence, it follows that when [the will] deserts the justice it has received, then if it is the same being that it previously was, it is something good with respect to what it is [essentially]. But with respect to the fact that the justice which was in it is no longer there, [the will] is called evil and unjust. For if to will to be like God were an evil, the Son of God would not will to be like the Father. Or if to will the basest of pleasures were an evil, the wills of brute animals would be called evil. But the will of the Son of God is not evil, for it is just; and an irrational will is not called evil, for it is not unjust.

Thus, it follows that no will is an evil thing and that every will, insofar as it is, is a good thing because it is the work of God. And only insofar as it is unjust is it evil. And since no thing is called evil except an evil will or else on account of an evil will (e.g., an evil man and an evil action), nothing is more apparent than that no thing is an evil and that evil is simply the absence, in the will, of that forsaken justice—or the absence of justice in some other thing, on account of an evil will.

CHAPTER TWENTY

How God causes evil wills and evil actions; and how they are received from Him.

S. Your argument is so bound together by true, necessary, and clear reasons that I do not in any respect see how what you say can be undone—except that I do see something to be implied which I do not believe ought to be said but which I do not see how to deny if what you say is true. For if to will to be like God is not nothing or is not an evil but is a good, then this will was able to exist only from Him from whom all existing things come. Therefore, if the angel did not have what he did not receive, then what he had, he received from Him from whom he had it. However, what did the angel receive from Him except what He gave? Therefore, if he had the will to be like God, he had it because God gave it.

T. Why is it strange if just as we say that God leads into temptation when He does not deliver from it, so we say that He gives an evil will by not preventing it when He can—especially since the ability to will anything at all comes only from Him?

S. Put this way, it does not seem to be inappropriate.

T. Therefore, if there is no giving without a receiving, then just as someone who willingly concedes and also someone who permits, though disapproving, are commonly said to give, so someone who receives what has been conceded and someone who dares to take forbidden things are not incorrectly said to receive.

S. What you say seems to me neither incorrect nor uncommon.

T. Then, what do we say in opposition to the truth if we say that when the Devil willed what he ought not to have [willed] he received this willing from God because God permitted it, and also did not receive it [from God] because God did not consent to it?

S. Nothing here seems to be opposed to the truth.

T. Therefore, when the Devil turned his will to what he ought not to have [willed], that willing and that turning were something. And yet, he had something only from God and [by permission] of God, since he was able to will something or to move his will only by permission of the one who creates all natures substantial and accidental, universal and individual. For insofar as the will and its turning, or movement, are something, each is a good and is due to God. But insofar as the will lacks the justice which it ought not to lack, it is *something* evil—rather than an absolute evil. And what is evil is not due to God but is due to the one who wills,

or who moves his will.

To be sure, injustice is an unqualified evil, since it is identical with the evil which is nothing. But a nature in which there is injustice is *something* evil, because the nature is something and is something other than injustice, which is an evil and nothing. Therefore, what is something is caused by God and is of God's doing; but what is nothing, or an evil, is caused by someone unjust and is of his doing.

S. Indeed, we must admit that God creates the natures of all things. But who would concede that He causes the particular actions of evil wills—for example, the depraved movement of will by which the evil will moves itself?

T. Why is it strange to say that God causes the particular actions which are done by an evil will? For we say that He causes the particular substances which are made by an unjust will and by dishonorable action.

S. I do not have anything to say against this. Indeed, I am not able to deny that any given action is really something. Nor do I wish to deny that what really has some being is caused by God. Nor does your reasoning in any way accuse God or excuse the Devil; rather, it completely excuses God and accuses the Devil.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

The evil angel was not able to foreknow that he would fall.

S. But I would like to know whether this renegade angel foreknew these things about himself.

T. When you ask whether the angel who did not stand fast in the truth foreknew that he would fall, we must decide about the kind of knowledge you mean. For if you are talking about the knowledge present only when something is understood with rational certainty, then I answer that what is able not to be is altogether unable to be known. For what is able not to be, cannot at all with rational certainty be inferred to be. Hence, it is evident that [the evil angel] was not at all able to foreknow his fall, the future occurrence of which was not necessary. For let us postulate that this fall had not been going to occur. Then, do you think that it could have been foreknown, if it was not going to occur?

S. It seems that what is able not to happen in the future cannot be foreknown and also that what is foreknown is not able not to happen in the future. Yet, I am reminded now of that very celebrated question about free choice and divine foreknowledge. For although the claim that free choice and divine foreknowledge are compatible is made with such great authority and is held with such great utility that it must not at all be doubted on the basis of any human reasoning, nevertheless they do seem incompatible from the point of view of rational reflection. Thus, with regard to this question, we see some persons inclining so much towards one of the alternatives that they completely desert the other and perish under a wave of unbelief; but many others, by holding back [from one side or the other] are endangered as if by contrary winds battering against each other from different directions. Therefore, although it is evident that there is divine foreknowledge of all things done by free choice and that none of these deeds occur of necessity, nevertheless what is foreknown seems to be able not to happen in the future.

T. For the time being, I will give a brief answer to this. God's foreknowledge is not properly called foreknowledge. For the one to whom all things are always present does not have foreknowledge of future things; rather He has knowledge of present things. Therefore, since *foreknowledge of a future event* is a different notion from *knowledge of a present event*, divine "foreknowledge" and the foreknowledge about which we are asking need not have the same consequence.

S. Agreed.

T. Let us return to the question which was at hand.

S. I agree to your proposal—but with the stipulation that when I shall ask about the problem I mentioned, you shall not refuse to tell me what God will deign to reveal to you about it. For a solution to this puzzle is exceedingly necessary—if a solution has already been given by someone, or if one can be given. For, leaving out of consideration what is said by Divine Authority (which I believe without doubting), I confess that as yet I have nowhere read an account which would satisfy me intellectually as a solution to this problem.

T. When we shall come to this problem—if perchance we do come to it—the solution will be as God will give. However, since

it is now evident, on the basis of the argument just given, that the apostate angel could not have foreknown his downfall by means of that foreknowledge from which the necessity of the event follows, receive still another argument which excludes his having had any premonition—not only by foreknowledge but by any thought or suspicion whatsoever—of his fall.

S. I await this.

T. If while he was still standing fast with a good will, he foreknew that he would fall, then either he was willing that it happen or else he was unwilling.

S. One of these alternatives must be true.

T. But if together with foreknowledge of his fall he were ever willing to fall, he would *already* be fallen because of this evil will.

S. What you say is clear.

T. Therefore, if he were willing to fall, it would not be the case that he knew he would fall *before* he fell.

S. There can be no objection to your conclusion.

T. On the other hand, if he knew that he would fall but he were unwilling to fall, he would have been wretched with grief to the same degree that he willed to remain upright.

S. It cannot be denied.

T. But the more he willed to stand fast, the more just he was; and the more just he was, the more he ought to have been happy.

S. It cannot be denied.

T. Therefore, if he foreknew that he would fall but he were unwilling to fall, he would have been as wretched as he ought to have been happy—something unfitting.

S. Indeed, I cannot deny that your inference holds. But often this [sort of thing] is known to happen not only fittingly but even laudably and by heavenly grace. For many times—to recall a few things regarding the troubles of the just—the more just someone is, the more he is affected by the pain of sympathy over another's downfall. Often, too, we see that someone who has a greater steadfastness in justice suffers a greater force of persecution by the unjust.

T. The argument is not the same in the case of men and in the case of that angel. For because of the sin of our first parent human nature was made capable of suffering countless troubles; from this passibility grace works incorruptibility in us in many ways. But

that angel, having not yet sinned, did not deserve to suffer from any evil.

S. You have met my objection. Clearly, just as this argument removes from the evil angel any foreknowledge of his fall, so it equally removes all thought thereof.

T. There is also something else which seems to me sufficient to show that beforehand he in no way thought of his future transgression. Surely, he would have thought that this transgression would be either compelled or voluntary. But there was no way in which he might suspect that he would ever be compelled; and as long as he willed to persevere in the truth, he was in no way able to think that by his own will alone he would desert the truth. For I have already shown that as long as he had an upright will, he willed to persevere in this will. Therefore, I see no way in which while he was willing perseveringly to keep what he had, he could even have suspected that in the absence of any other cause he would willingly desert what he had. I do not deny that he knew he was able to change the will he had. But I say he could not have supposed that in the absence of any other cause he would ever freely change the will he was willing perseveringly to keep.

S. Anyone who closely understands what you are saying sees clearly that the evil angel was in no way able to know, or even to suspect, that he would do what he evilly did.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

[The evil angel] knew that he ought not to will
that which he sinned in willing; and he knew
that he ought to be punished if he sinned.

S. But I want you to show me, as well, whether [the evil angel] knew that he ought not to will what he willed in transgressing.

T. You ought not to be in doubt with regard to this issue if you consider what was just said. For if he had not known that he ought not to will what he unjustly did will, he would not have known that he ought to keep the will which he deserted. Therefore, he would not have been just by keeping, nor unjust by deserting, the justice which he would not have known. Indeed, if he did not know that he ought to be content with what he had received, then he was not able to keep from willing [something] more than he had. Fi-

nally, since he was so rational that nothing prevented him from using his reason, he was not ignorant of what he ought or ought not to have willed.

S. I do not see that your reasoning can be invalidated. But nevertheless, a certain question does seem to me to arise from it. For if [the evil angel] knew that he ought not to desert what he had received, then surely he knew equally that he ought to be punished if he were to desert. So, having received an inseparable will to be happy, how could he freely have willed that which would make him unhappy?

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

[The evil angel] ought not to have known
that if he sinned he would be punished.

T. Just as it is certain that he could not have escaped knowing that he *ought to be* punished if he sinned, so he ought not to have known that he *would be* punished if he sinned.

S. How did he fail to know this if he was so rational that his rationality was not prevented from knowing the truth, as ours often is prevented by a burdensome, corruptible body?

T. Because he was rational he was able to understand that he could be justly punished if he were to sin. But since “the judgments of God are a great deep,”¹ and “His ways unsearchable,”² he was unable to discern whether God would do what he justly could do.

But suppose someone should claim:

[That angel] was not at all able to believe that God was going to damn, because guilty, His own creature whom He had created by means of such great goodness. [And he] especially [could not have believed it] because [of the following considerations]: No example of justice punishing injustice had previously occurred. Moreover, he would have been certain that the number of those who had been created to enjoy God was fixed by such great wisdom that just as it had no superfluity, so if it were diminished it would be imperfect; but so excellent a work of God would not remain imperfect in any respect. Now, if man had already been created, then [that angel] would not at all have been able to know that God was going to substitute human nature for angelic nature, or angelic nature for human nature, if either were to fall. Rather, he would have believed that God was going to restore each

¹Psalms 35:7 (36:6). ²Romans 11:33.

nature to that end for which it had been created—restore each to its own place, not to the other's place. On the other hand, if man had not yet been created, then [the angel] would have been all the less able to suppose that man was going to be created as a substitute for angelic nature.

Now, if someone should make this claim, what unfittingness would there be in it?

S. Indeed, there seems to me to be more fittingness than unfittingness.

T. Let us return to what I said earlier, viz., that [the angel] ought not to have had this knowledge [that he would be punished if he sinned]. For if he had known, then while possessing and willing happiness he would not have been able freely to will what would have caused him to be unhappy. Therefore, he would not have been just when he kept from willing what he ought not to have willed, for he would not have been able to will it. But even on the basis of the following argument consider whether he ought to have known what you ask about: Assume that he knew. Then, he either would have sinned or would not have sinned.

S. One of these alternatives would be the case.

T. If having foreseen such great punishment he would have sinned without being in any need and without anything compelling, then he would have been all the more deserving of punishment.

S. That's right.

T. Then, this foreknowledge was not advantageous to him.

S. For one who was going to sin it was truly no advantage to have prior knowledge of punishment.

T. On the other hand, if he had not sinned, then either he would have kept from sinning solely because of a good will or else because of fear of punishment.

S. Nothing else can be said.

T. But by his very deed he demonstrated that he would not have kept from sinning solely from love of justice.

S. There's no doubt about it.

T. But if he had kept from [sinning] because of fear, then he would not have been just.

S. It is obvious that he ought in no manner to have known that

his sinning would result in the punishment which came to be imposed on him.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

Even the good angel ought not to have known this
[viz., that if he sinned he would be punished].

S. But since we believe that both the angel who stood in the truth and the angel who did not stand in the truth were endowed with equal knowledge in their original state, I do not see why this knowledge was denied to the angel whose good will was so resolute that it sufficed to avoid sinning.

T. [If the good angel had foreknown], he neither could have nor ought to have disdained the punishment which he would have foreknown.

S. So it seems.

T. Therefore, just as the love of justice would have sufficed by itself to keep him from sinning, so would the aversion to punishment have sufficed by itself.

S. Nothing is clearer.

T. Therefore, he would have had two inducements (*causas*) for not sinning—the one honorable and useful, the other not honorable and not useful—viz., a love of justice and an aversion to punishment. For it is not honorable to keep from sinning merely because of an aversion to punishment; and where the love of justice is by itself sufficient for not sinning, the aversion to punishment is useless therefor.

S. There is nothing I can object to.

T. What then? When there is seen to be in the good angel only that inducement for persevering which is useful and honorable because un compelling (*spontanea*), isn't his perseverance much more splendidly pleasing than if at the same time there is seen to be in him that inducement which is understood to be useless and dishonorable because compelling (*necessaria*)?

S. What you say is so clear that I now rejoice that he did not know that which a moment ago I was wishing he knew—except that we cannot deny that he now has this same knowledge, which he cannot fail to have from the example of the angel who sins.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

Even if the only reason [the good angel] is said to be now unable to sin were that he now has this knowledge from the Devil's fall, nevertheless [not to be able to sin] would be to his glory.

T. As for the fact that both the good angel and the evil angel are now certain that this kind of punishment follows this kind of guilt: just as each has a different kind of knowledge, so the cause of the knowledge is not the same and the consequence of the knowledge is dissimilar. For what the evil angel knows by his own experience the good angel learned from the evil angel's example. But the former [knows] in his way because he did not persevere; the latter [learned] in his way because he did persevere. Therefore, just as the evil angel's knowledge is to his disgrace since blamably he did not persevere, so the good angel's knowledge is to his glory since laudably he did persevere.

So if the only reason the good angel is said to be now unable to sin were that he has this knowledge, it is clear enough that just as the knowledge which is obtained from laudably persevering is glorious, so the inability to sin which is the result of this glorious knowledge would be to his glory. Therefore, just as the evil angel deserves to be blamed because he is unable to return to justice, so the good angel deserves to be praised because he is unable to depart [from justice]. For just as the former is now unable to return because he departed solely by an evil will, so the latter is now unable to depart because he remained steadfast solely by a good will. Therefore, it is evident that just as it is the penalty of sin for the evil angel to be unable to recover what he deserted, so it is the reward of justice for the good angel to be unable to desert what he kept.

S. Your reflections upon the good angel's knowledge and inability would be very lovely if, as you maintain, this knowledge and this inability had accrued to him because he persevered. For he seems to have acquired these not because he himself persevered but because the renegade angel did not persevere.

T. If what you say is true, then the good angel would be able to rejoice over the fall of the apostate angel, inasmuch as it would have been to his benefit that the other angel fell; for the knowl-

edge by which he would no longer be able either to sin or to be unhappy would have been acquired not because he himself was well-deserving but because the other angel was ill-deserving. But this entire inference is utterly absurd.

S. The more absurd it seems (as you show) for the fall of the angel who sins to benefit the angel who stands, the greater the need for you to show that the reason the good angel acquired the knowledge under discussion is not that the other angel sinned.

T. You ought not to say that the good angel gained this knowledge *because* the evil angel sinned; rather, you ought to say that the good angel gained this knowledge *by the example of* the falling angel because he sinned. For if neither had sinned, God would surely have given this knowledge in some other way—on account of the merit of perseverance and without the example of someone's falling. For no one will deny that God was able to give this knowledge to His angels in some other way. Therefore, when the evil angel sinned, God used the example of his fall to teach the good angel what He was going to teach [him in any case]. [God taught in this way] not because of an inability which resulted in His not being able to teach in another way, but because of a greater ability by means of which He was able to make good come from evil, so that not even evil would remain unordered in the kingdom belonging to omnipotent Wisdom.

S. What you say is especially pleasing to me.

T. Clearly, then, were it the case that the good angel is no longer able to sin only because he knows that punishment followed the sin of the evil angel, this inability [to sin] would serve not to diminish his praiseworthiness but to reward him for the justice he kept. But you know (because it was made clear earlier) that the reason he is not able to sin is the following: on account of the merit of perseverance he has been so elevated that he no longer sees anything more that he can will.

S. None of the things learned in the course of our rational investigation has slipped my memory.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

What we dread when we hear the name "evil";
and what causes the works which injustice is said to cause,
since injustice and evil are nothing.

S. But although you have satisfactorily answered all my questions, yet I still await your explaining what it is that we dread when we hear the name "evil," and (since evil is nothing) what causes the works which injustice, itself an evil, seems to cause—e.g., in the case of robbery or of sensuality.

T. I shall give you a brief answer. The evil which is injustice is always nothing; but the evil which is disadvantage (*incommoditas*) is without doubt sometimes nothing (as is blindness) but is sometimes something (as are sadness and pain). And we always regard with aversion the disadvantage which is something. Therefore, when we hear the name "evil," we fear not an evil which is nothing but an evil which is something that follows the absence of good. For example, injustice and blindness, which are evils and are nothing, are followed by many disadvantages which are evils and are something; and these latter are what we dread when we hear the name "evil."

However, when we say that injustice causes robbery or that blindness causes a man to fall into a pit, we should not at all understand that injustice and blindness cause something. Rather, we should understand that if justice were in the will and sight in the eye, then neither the robbery nor the fall into the pit would occur. Such is the case when we say, "The absence of a rudder drives the ship onto the rocks," or "The absence of a bridle causes the horse to run wild." Here we mean only that if the ship had a rudder or the horse a bridle, then the winds would not drive the ship [onto the rocks] nor would the horse run wild. For just as a ship is directed by a rudder and a horse by reins, so a man's will is directed by justice and his feet by sight.

S. You have so satisfied me about the evil which is injustice that every query which used to be in my mind regarding evil has now been settled. For the puzzle concerning this evil seems to arise from the fact that if this evil were some sort of being, it would be from God, from whom must derive all that is something, and from whom cannot possibly derive sin or injustice. But regarding evil that is disadvantage, I see nothing to be against right faith if it is sometimes something.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

From where evil came to an angel who was good.

S. But let it not weary you to reply briefly to my foolish question, so that I may know how to answer those who ask me about the same thing. (Indeed, it is not always easy to answer wisely one who is asking foolishly.) I ask, then: From where did the first evil that is called injustice, or sin, come to an angel who was created just?

T. Tell me from where nothing comes to something.

S. Nothing neither comes nor goes.

T. Then, why do you ask from where injustice, which is nothing, comes?

S. Because when justice departs from where it was, we say that injustice approaches.

T. Then, express yourself more properly and clearly, and ask about the departure of justice. For, indeed, a suitable question often conduces to an answer, whereas an unsuitable question often produces a greater hindrance.

S. So why did justice depart from the just angel?

T. If you wish to speak properly, justice did not depart from him, but he deserted justice by willing what he ought not to have [willed].

S. Why did he desert it?

T. When I say that he deserted it by willing what he ought not to have [willed], I indicate clearly *why* and *how* he deserted it. For he deserted it *because* he willed what he ought not to have willed; and he deserted it *in this manner*, viz., by willing what he ought not to have [willed].

S. Why did he will what he ought not to have [willed]?

T. There was no cause which preceded this willing—except that he was able to will.

S. Did he will because he was able?

T. No, for the good angel was likewise able to will [what he ought not to have willed]; nevertheless he did not will [it]. For although no one would ever will if he were not able [to will], nonetheless it is not the case that what someone is able to will he wills *because* he is able, and for no other reason (*causa*).

S. Then, why did he will [what he ought not to have willed]?

T. Only because he willed [it]. For this willing had no other cause (*causa*) by which in any respect to be driven or drawn; rather, it was an efficient cause of itself—if this can be said—and its own effect.

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

The ability to will what he ought not to have [willed]
was always good; and the willing itself,
with respect to its being, was good.

S. If the ability to will and the willing were something, then they were something good and were from God.

T. Each was something. Indeed, the ability was only something good and was a free gift from God. And indeed, with respect to its being, the willing was something good; yet, since it was unjustly done it was evil; nevertheless, it was from God, from whom is everything that is something. Surely, someone has from God not only that which God freely gives but also that which he unjustly seizes with God's permission. And even as God is said to cause what He permits to occur, so He is said to give what He permits to be seized. Therefore, since with God's permission the evil angel, through robbery,¹ used the ability freely given by God, he had the use—which is the same thing as the willing—from God. For to will is nothing other than to use the ability to will (just as to speak and to use the ability to speak are identical).

¹See Philippians 2:6.