The translation of *De Aequalitate* was made from Hopkins's collation of the Latin text, which is not here reprinted but is found in his book 'Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations'. Minneapolis: Banning Press, 1998.
DE AEQUALITATE
(On Equality)

by

NICHOLAS OF CUSA
ON EQUALITY¹
(De Aequalitate)

“The life was the light of men” (John 1:4).

I had promised you, O Peter,² that I would write—for the exercise of your intellect, which is eager for truth and apt for comprehension—some things on equality, so that you might enter into theological discourses.³ Yet, my occupation as apostolic legate⁴ did not permit me to keep my promise more quickly and more elegantly.⁵ Therefore, receive gratefully that which God has ministered.

The theologian and evangelist John disclosed in the foregoing words⁶ (1) that God the Father, through His own consubstantial Word, or Son, gave being to all things and (2) that in His Word, or Son, who is Life, the being of all things was Life and (3) [that] the Light which is the Word was the light of man’s reason. John said these things in order that we might understand that through the Word of God we have both come into existence and been illumined in our reason. And thereafter he added⁷ that we can be illuminated by the aforesaid true Light to the point that we are led unto an apprehension of [that same] Substantial Light that thus illumines us; and then we will be blessed and happy. For since for us to understand is for us to live most nobly: if our intellect can understand the Light-of-its-own-intelligence,⁸ which is the Word of God, then it arrives at both its own Beginning,⁹ which is eternal, and that Beginning’s Son, through whom the intellect is led unto the Beginning. And this [kind of] understanding is directed toward itself when what is understood and what understands are not different and other. Therefore, when [these are not different and other] the intellect will be present in the Oneness-of-Light which is the Word of God; but it will not be present in a oneness of substance, as the Word of God the Father is present with God the Father (i.e., as the Son is present with the Father), for a created intellect cannot be united to the Uncreated God in a oneness of substance.¹⁰ Rather, man is rightly united to man, in a oneness of human essence. And so, the Word was made flesh in order that man—by the intermediacy of the man who is the Word of God and the Son of God—would be united inseparably to God the Father in the Kingdom of eternal life.

This maximal mystery concerning our Mediator and Savior, Jesus Christ, was set forth in the writings of both Testaments. Nevertheless,
[it is set forth] nowhere more clearly than in the Gospel of John the Theologian. Although the manner of this [mystery] is inexpressible and incomprehensible, nonetheless [the mystery] is described [by John] in a figure, and a symbolic likeness, of things comprehensible. Yet, as regards those who wish to enter, with faith, into the Gospel and to conceive of the manner of [this] mystery to some extent, in accordance with the powers of the human intellect: they must have an intellect very extensively exercised as concerns abstractions and the powers of our soul. I will very briefly disclose to you, then, the things that now occur to me regarding this [topic].

4 You have read in my De Beryllo that intellect wishes to be known.11 I now say that this [claim] is true with reference both to the intellect itself and to other things.12 This [claim] is nothing other than [the claim] that the intellect wishes to know both itself and other things, for its life and joy consist in knowing. Now, the Teacher, who is the Word of God, has taught me that seeing and knowing are the same thing. For He says: “Blessed are those with a pure heart, since they will see God.”13 And elsewhere [He says]: “This is life eternal, viz., to know You, who are God.”14 And again: “He who sees me sees the Father”15—where seeing is knowing, and knowing is seeing.

5 I will speak, then, about a seeing that coincides with man’s knowing. And as an approach to my intent, I state that otherness cannot be a form. For to alter is to deform rather than to form. Therefore, that which is seen in different things can also be seen in and of itself without otherness,16 since otherness did not give being to it. But sight that sees the visible—sees it apart from otherness and in and of itself—sees that it itself is not something other than is the visible. Therefore, the expression “it itself” refers both to sight and to the visible, between the two of which there is no otherness of essence but only an identity of essence. Now, something can be seen when all otherness is removed, but that which is thus seen is free of all matter. For the substrate-of-change is neither nothing nor the form-that-gives-being but is that-which-can-be-formed, which we call hyle, or matter. But when in the case of different intelligible things the intellect sees that which is understood,17 and when it sees that matter is the substrate-of-otherness: because the intellect sees by means of that which is understood-in-and-of-itself,18 it sees itself as free of all matter; and it sees that intellect is intelligible per se, because it is free of matter. And [it sees that] whatever things are not free of matter are not intelligible per
And so, natural objects are less intelligible, since they have matter that is especially subject to otherness, as is evident in the case of active and passive qualities. (If the matter were abstracted from natural objects, then they would no longer be natural beings.) However, mathematical objects are more intelligible, because their matter is not subject to such great otherness. For their matter is not subject to active and passive qualities but is subject to quantity, even though to non-perceptual quantity. For just as man is seen not to be free of all material, perceptual, quantitative, and qualitative contractedness, so too a circle is seen not to be free of all material quantity, although its quantity is non-perceptual. But being, as such, or oneness, as such, can be seen to be separated from all quantity and all quality, including intelligible quantity and quality. Now, this man, viz., Plato, is seen; and another man, viz., Socrates is seen. Therefore, man qua separated from this individual otherness is seen; and this seeing is not perceptual but is free of the perceptual because of a removal of individual contractedness. But it is not the case that in that way man is seen as separated from all natural matter; rather, he is seen as separated only from individual matter, while there remains common matter, viz., man, as such. Accordingly, man, as such, I see as free of this flesh and these bones but not as free of flesh and bones; for otherwise there would not be a natural man. And so, the man whom I see is universal man, separated from individual men; and by such a seeing, man is known through the cognitive power, which is higher than the perceptual power but lower than the purely intellective power and is united to an instrument. This power is also found in brute animals and is called the imaginative power. For we see that dogs recognize men in general and this man in particular. Likewise, men see both this shape and shape qua separated from individual contractedness but not qua separated from all matter, because they see shape only as quantified; but quantity indicates matter. This seeing occurs by means of reason, which is not greatly contracted to an instrument.

Moreover, the intellect of Plato and that of Aristotle are seen in and through their books. And intellect is seen as separated from all contractedness and matter, whether quantitative or qualitative contractedness and matter. And this seeing is done by the soul’s supreme and separated simplicity, which is called intellect, or mind.

Now, whatever is seen in different ways in something other
itself] is seen by means of that which, in itself, is the same thing as the soul of the one who sees. [For example], a man sees that the power-of-sensing is different in sight, in hearing, and so on. And the power-of-sensing that is thus present differently in the different senses is seen by him in and of itself—and apart from that difference—to be the same thing as his rational soul. And in this way the power-of-sensing that is in the different senses is seen by him by means of the power-of-sensing as it is in and of itself, a power that is common [to the different senses] and that is free of individual contractedness. Just as the straightness that is present in different straight objects is viewed by means of straightness-in-and-of-itself, so the form that is present in [different] formed objects [is viewed] by means of the form-in-and-of-itself, and the justice in just [acts is viewed] by means of justice-in-and-of-itself. And, in general, an external thing that is knowable [is knowable] by means of something internal that is consubstantial [with the rational soul].

In the foregoing way it is evident that an external thing is made actually intelligible by means of something internal. [The situation is] as if an intellectual starting-point, or intellectual beginning, begot from itself a word, or conceptual form \[ratio\],\(^3\) or notion \[notitia\], of itself. That conceptual form would be its consubstantial likeness, because it would be the conceptual form of the intellectual nature (inasmuch as the starting-point is intellectual). The beginning, or starting-point, is manifested in this [conceptual] form of its own [nature, or] substance. Otherwise, without such a conceptual form, the [intellectual] starting-point would remain unknown both to itself and to all others. From this beginning and its word, or conceptual form, there proceeds the love, or will, that belongs to them both. For love is subsequent to knowledge and to the thing known, for nothing unknown is loved. \(^3\) Moreover, [the love] shines forth in the beginning’s rational, e.g., syllogistic, work—shining forth especially in the first mood of the first figure.

For example, the soul wants to show that every man is mortal, and it argues as follows: “Every rational animal is mortal. Every man is a rational animal. Therefore, every man is a mortal animal.” The first proposition is the fecund presupposed beginning. The second proposition, begotten from the fecundity of the first, is the conceptual form, or the notion, of its fecundity. From these two the implied conclusion follows. Just as the first proposition is universal affirmative, so too is
the second, and so too the third. The one proposition is no more or no less universal than is another of them. Therefore, the universality in them is equal and without otherness. Likewise, too, the first proposition contains no more by way of substance than does the second or the third proposition. For the first proposition contains *every rational animal*, as do also the second and the third propositions. For the second proposition, which speaks of man, does not contain less [in its subject than does the first], because man alone is a rational animal. Therefore, the three propositions are equal in universality, in essence, and in power. Hence, there are not three universalities or three substances, essences, or powers. For because of [this] complete equality there is no otherness of substance in them with respect to our every apprehension, since we do not know of any other rational animal than man.

Nevertheless, the first proposition is first; and so, it exists *per se*. Likewise, the second proposition is second, and the third is third, so that the one proposition is not another [of the propositions]. Yet, the second proposition unfolds the entire nature, substance, and fecundity of the first proposition, inasmuch as it is the form of the first proposition's substance. Consequently, if the first proposition were called father, the second would be called its only-begotten son, because the second is of equal nature and substance, being in no respect lesser or unequal, having been begotten from the fecundity of the first proposition. Likewise, the third proposition, which is the implied conclusion of the other two propositions, is of equal [nature and substance with them]. The first proposition is like *memory*, since it is the presupposed beginning, which precedes [the others] in origin. The second proposition is like *intelect*, since it is the conceptual unfolding of the first proposition. The third proposition is like *will*, since it proceeds from the implication of the first and second propositions, as being their desired goal.34

Therefore, in the oneness-of-essence of this syllogism of three propositions that are equal in all respects there shines forth the essential oneness of the intellective soul—shines forth as in the intellective soul’s logical, or rational, work. For by means of the aforementioned pattern-of-inference35 the rational soul sees itself in the syllogism as in its own rational work—sees itself in the otherness of [this] work. [But] the rational soul [also] sees itself [as it is] in itself, apart from that otherness.36 And by means of seeing itself [as it is] in
itself, it sees itself in its work. And in this way you know how it is that through itself the soul proceeds unto all other things; and in all [that] variety the soul finds nothing to be intelligible except what it finds to be within itself, so that all things are the soul's likeness. And within itself the soul sees all things more truly than as they exist in different things outside itself. And the more it goes out unto other things in order to know them, the more it enters into itself in order to know itself. And in this way when it endeavors to measure and to arrive at other intelligible things by means of its own intelligible [being], it measures its own intelligible [being]—i.e., measures itself—by means of [measuring] other intelligible things. Therefore, the truth that the soul sees in different things it sees by means of itself. And the soul is the conceptual truth of knowable things, since the intellectual soul is the true notion [of knowable things]. By an intuitive seeing, the soul illumines and measures all things through itself; and by means of conceptual truth it judges the truth in different things. And by means of the truth which it finds to be present in different ways in different things, it is directed unto itself, in order to view within itself—truly and stably and without otherness—the truth which it has seen existing in different ways in different things, so that within it itself, as in a mirror-of-truth, it may see all things conceptually and may recognize that it itself is the notion of all things.

The soul sees the delimitation in all delimited things; and since there is no limit of a limit, it sees itself as an undelimited conceptual delimitation without otherness. And, hence, it sees that it is not quantitative or divisible and that, therefore, it is not corruptible. Therefore, the soul is an undelimitable conceptual delimitation. Through this delimitation it delimits all things as it wills to, by making an end-point to be at a shorter or a longer distance from a starting-point. And in this way it makes long lines to become short and makes short lines to become long; and it makes measuring-standards of length, of width, of depth, of time, and of every continuum. And it makes shapes and all other such things that cannot be made without someone who rationally delimits. Moreover, the soul imposes "limits"—i.e., names—on the delimited things; and it makes arts and sciences. It unfolds all these things from its own conceptual power. And through itself it makes judgments about all things. For example, [the soul makes judgments] about just causes, [doing so] through its concept-of-justice, which is consubstantial with it, because the soul is the conceptual form of justice through which it judges what is just and what is unjust.
When the soul sees that it has within itself a complete notion of
the world, one which enfolds the notions of all mundane things, then
it sees that within itself there is both the word, or concept, of all things
and the name of all names. Through this name the soul makes a no-
tion of every name; and it sees that all names are unfoldings of its own
name, since names are only notions of things. And this [seeing] is the
soul’s seeing that it itself is named by means of all names.

Moreover, the soul sees that it itself is timeless time.\textsuperscript{47} For it per-
ceives that what is material exists with changeable being and that
change occurs only in time. Therefore, the soul perceives that time is
present in temporal things in various ways. And, next, the soul sees
that time, in and of itself and with all difference removed, exists time-
lessly. Hence, since it sees that number is present in different num-
bered things, it also sees that number, which numbers all things, is in-
numerable in and of itself. And in this way the soul sees that time, in
and of itself, and number, in and of itself, are not other and different.
And since in temporal things the soul sees time qua contracted and
sees it in and of itself qua free of contractedness, it sees that time is
not eternity, which is neither contractible nor able to be partaken of.\textsuperscript{48}
Hence, the soul sees that it itself is not eternity, since it is time, al-
though it is time timelessly. Therefore, the soul sees itself, above tem-
poral things and on the horizon of eternity,\textsuperscript{49} as temporally incorrupt-
ible. Nevertheless, it does not see itself as unqualifiedly [incorrupt-
ible], as is eternity, which is unqualifiedly incorruptible because it is
incorr uptibility that precedes all otherness. Hence, the soul sees that
it itself is united to the continuous and temporal; for in this regard
[those of] its operations that it carries on through corruptible instru-
ments are successive and temporal—e.g., perceiving, inferring, deliber-
ating, and the like. But the soul sees that in the work of its intel-
lect, which is separated from an instrument, it is free of the continu-
ous; for when it understands, it understands immediately; and so, the
soul finds itself to be situated between the temporal and the eternal.

But [our soul] sees that one man’s soul, being more united to the
continuous and to time, or succession, arrives more slowly at an un-
derstanding, whereas another’s soul arrives more quickly, because it
is less immersed in the continuous. This latter soul more quickly frees
itself [from time, or succession], since it has more suitable instruments
for its operation; and it attains [an understanding] more precisely.
Herefrom [our soul] sees that because of its imperfection, it needs in-
Instruments and temporal succession in order to come from potentiality to actuality. Accordingly, the [higher and] more perfect intelligences\(^50\) (which are actualized and which have no need of inference in order to become actualized) are nearer to eternity and are more separated from temporal succession.

As for [our soul’s] viewing of time, consider the following: The Hebrews call the beginning of time the past, which the present succeeds, followed by the future. If you consider the past insofar as it is past \textit{time}, you see that at present it is the past and that in the future it will be the past. If you consider the present, you see that in the past it was the present and that in the future it will be the present. If you consider the future, you see that in the past it was the future and that in the future it will be the present. Now, the soul—which is timeless time\(^51\)—sees within itself these [temporal modes]. Therefore, the soul sees that it itself is timeless, triune time: past, present, and future. Now, past time, which always is and always will be the past, is perfect time. And present time, which always was and always will be the present, is perfect time. Likewise, too, future [time], which always was and always is the future, is perfect time. But these are not three perfect times but are a single perfect time: perfect in the past, perfect in the present, and perfect in the future. This [perfect] time will never be able to fail. The past does not cease as past; for it always is the past and always will be the past. Similarly, neither the present nor the future [will cease]. Therefore, in this timeless time—in which whatever-the-past-is the present and the future also are\(^52\)—there is nothing new. For although past \textit{things} in past [days] have ceased to exist, and although future things in the future have not yet come to exist but only present things at present exist, nevertheless the case is different regarding past \textit{time} and future \textit{time}, as was just explained.

Therefore, in its own being, the soul, which is timeless time, sees the past, the present, and the future. The past it names \textit{memory}; the present, \textit{intellect};\(^53\) and the future, \textit{will}. For in the intellectual nature the starting-point (or \textit{that it is}) is the point of origin.\(^54\) The intellectual nature begets from itself—i.e., from itself as starting-point (or \textit{that it is})—intellect (or \textit{what it is}). Following upon these is the intended end-point, which is called will or delight. Therefore, all things are present in \textit{that it is}, and this mode of being is called intellectual memory. All things are in \textit{what it is}, and this mode of being is called intellect (for as things are present in the intellect, they are present in the
conceptual form of themselves and are understood by means of the conceptual form of themselves). All things are in the intended end-point, and this mode of being is called will or desire.

The foregoing considerations regarding timeless time show that the soul is a likeness of eternity and that through itself, as through a likeness of eternity, it looks unto Eternal Life, which alone it desires, even as the intellectual image of Eternal Life, or Eternal Rest, looks unto its own Truth (of which it is an image), without which it cannot have rest. For the image of Rest finds rest only in Rest. That which the soul finds to be within itself because of the perfection of its essence (viz., a triunity of timeless time, and a begetting of a second time that succeeds a first time, and a procession of a third time from the first two, and an equality-of-nature in the three hypostases of timeless time, and an indwelling of one hypostasis in another hypostasis, and so on)—this the soul applies transferredly to its Beginning, which is eternal, in order, to some extent, to be able to see within itself, as in a mirror and a symbolism, its Beginning.

Moreover, the soul’s intellect—by means of which the soul understands the fact that within it the world is enfolded conceptually (even as the world is enfolded in the Universal Brightness of the Form of the Eternal Light, which is the Cause of the intellect and of all other things)—is ordered only to the following: viz., that when it understands the fact that it enfolds all things conceptually, or assimilatively, and understands that its own conception is not the reason or cause of things’ really being that which they are, it would turn to seeking, by means of itself, the Cause of both it itself and all other things and would say [to itself]:

In the Cause of myself—a Cause that shines forth within myself qua caused, so that I am a conceptual enfolding of the world—there is, necessarily, the essential and eternal enfolding of all causable things. [These are present in my Cause] as in each and every thing’s most adequate Ground both of being and of knowing. In the likeness of this Universal Cause, I partake (by its gift) of intellectual being, which consists in a universal likeness of the Universal Cause both of being and of knowing. For in myself there shines forth the rational power of that Cause’s universality and omnipotence, so that when I view myself as its image, then by means of contemplation I can approach it more nearly through a transcending of myself. For in order to see myself
amid all the things [in my conceptual world], I remove other-
ness from them all. But in order to be able to see my Cause, I
must take leave of myself as caused and as image; otherwise, I
will not arrive at the Living Ground of my reason. Now, the teaching of Christ, the son of God, aims at the following end:
viz., that the soul, which longs for a vision of God and of its own
Ground, leave behind this world and its own self. Christ promises
us the manifestation—on this pathway—of His Father, the Creator of
all things, according as these matters are set forth in the Gospels.

Furthermore, because some men have maintained that the soul is
a harmony, let me speak about that [topic]. The harmony that is seen
in many harmonic concordances is seen in and of itself to be the soul.
First the consonance is seen and thereafter its ratio. And from these
two delight is seen to follow. Harmonic consonance is seen as that
it is and as a starting-point; and it begets a ratio of itself, or num-
ber of itself, wherein it understands itself, or views itself, as in a fig-
ure of its substance. From the starting-point and the ratio there arises
delight. For example, the ratio of that harmonic consonance which is
called an octave is a double relation. If the octave were an intellect,
it would know itself and see itself in this proportion—[see itself] as
in a consubstantial and most adequate ratio, which is the figure of its
substance and in which it knows itself to be what it is. For when one
asks whereby the harmony of an octave is known, one ought to an-
swer that [it is known] by means of a double relation; for an octave
knows itself in a double relation as in that octave’s own concept or
conceptual word. And so, if an octave were a practical intellect and
wished to make itself perceptible in musical instruments, it would do
so by means of the proper and consubstantial ratio whereby it knows
itself, i.e., by means of a double relation. And just as was stated about
an octave, so in general [something similar can be said] about har-
mony that, insofar as it is seen in and of itself, is free of all contract-
edness to an octave, a fifth, and a fourth. In that [thus uncontracted]
harmony the harmonic concordance is memory, the ratio of the con-
cordance is intellect, and from these two there arises delight, which
is will.

Therefore, through itself the soul arrives at all harmony that is per-
ceptible in otherness—just as through what is internal the soul arrives
at what is external. (Something similar must be said generally re-
garding every mathematical science and every other science.) For
through the word through which the soul attains itself it also attains all things. [The situation is] as if a mathematical circle were memory that attained itself in its definition [ratio], viz., [in] its having its center equally distant from its circumference. By means of this definition the memory would know itself and all the formable circles that it could also form by means of this definition—whether circles of earth or of bronze, whether large circles or small ones. Through this [illustration], as through a symbolism, the soul sees that in eternity the eternal Beginning-of-creation creates all creatable things by means of its conceptual Form [ratio]. For example, if the Beginning of creation were Being itself, then by means of the Form of its own Being it would create all beings, according as this [teaching] is expressed by John the Theologian apropos of the Logos, or the Beginning’s Rational Word, through which Word, John declares, all things were made.  

Moreover, if you take cognizance of the fact that the Form of the quiddity of being is also the Form of all formable beings and that that Form precedes otherness—i.e., [is present] where universal and particular are not other and different but coincide—then you will see that the Form of things is the universal Form of all things in such a way that it is also the particular Form of all things. For each thing that is in any way formable is not formable apart from that Form; and in that Form it is that Form. Therefore, conceive that (1) the Form-of-formable-things and (2) what-is-formable are [one and] the same thing. Then you will see that [one and] the same Form is the Form of all formable things. For just as it is wholly the Form of each and every formable thing, so it is wholly each and every formable thing, since, in the Beginning, [Form and what-is-formable] are the same thing. But a creature, which goes forth from that Form, cannot be such that that Form and the creature’s formability are the same thing; for were that the case, the creature would not be a creature but would be the Word of the Creator. But since a creature goes forth in accordance with its own form and formability, it is not the Word but is a likeness of the Word in that it has gone forth from the Word according to its own form and formability, which in the Word are the Word.

[The situation is] as if grammar, considered in and of itself, were an intellect that knew itself in terms of its own precise form [ratio], or definition. In that form it would know all that could be known [about grammar] or that could be externally spoken, or expressed, or set forth. For that form would encompass, universally and particular-
ly, all such things, howsoever knowable and expressible. Consequently, nothing could be said grammatically that would not have to be said in accordance with that form and in accordance with the expressibility that coincided with that form. Therefore, every expression would go forth into the perceptible world in accordance with its own form and its own expressibility, both of which were—in the form of the grammar—the form of the grammar. [These expressions] would go forth as they were present in the form of, or the word of, the grammar. I say “as they were present in the word” since they could not go forth otherwise, i.e., through otherness, which is not a form-of-being; rather, [they go forth] as they were in the word, [where they are] the word. Likewise, the word that is uttered is true because it corresponds to the internal word, i.e., to the mind. For it went forth from the internal word in such a way that just as it was the internal word, so it is also the expressed word. But the breath (spiritus) without which an utterance cannot be made proceeds from the father of the word and from the word. And [in the case of God, the Spirit] is consubstantial with the Father and with the Word, because it is co-eternal [with them]. For [the Spirit] precedes the creature—just as the will, qua cause of the expression, precedes the external expression. This will is tricausal: efficient cause, formal cause, and final cause. [You may read] about this [topic] elsewhere.69

25 And comparably with what was said about grammar, elevate yourself to the absolute mastery, in which every art and every science are enfolded; and in like manner note that the form of that mastery is just as you have heard regarding the form of grammar. A similar analogy holds regarding spirit,70 without which there is no internal movement and, hence, no expression of the mastery in either creatures with intellect or creatures with senses.

26 You might perhaps ask: “Since the great Augustine states71 that the soul, which is the image of the Trinity, has memory, from which a previously concealed understanding72 is begotten, and from both of which will proceeds: how is this [statement of his] to be construed?” I reply that the intellectual memory is the beginning of concepts but that it does not appear unless it is known, even as it does not appear that you have a memory of the first principle “each thing either is or is not [the case]”73 unless it is manifested in the light of reason. For when it is manifested to reason, it is immediately seen always to have been true; and in this way it is found to have been in the memory but
to have appeared only when reason manifested it. Hence, memory, which is a beginning [of concepts and principles], begets from itself an understanding of itself, just as from a first principle memory begets from itself a knowledge of itself. This is what Augustine means [by saying] that the soul is the locus of specific forms, or the enfolding of specific forms.

27 But the intellective memory is separated from matter. On account of this freedom it can reflect on intelligible forms and can understand them. And because what is understood is known insofar as agrees with him who understands, will accompanies [understanding]. Now, the characteristic operation that accompanies the soul insofar as the soul is retentive of intelligible forms is called memory. The characteristic operation by means of which [the soul] turns toward intelligible forms, in knowing, is called intellect. The characteristic operation through which [the soul] is affected with regard to the forms that are understood is called will. Those who were accustomed to saying that our learning is remembering glimpsed to some extent this hidden intellectual memory.

28 Furthermore, I ask: if you see in and of itself the memory that you have seen in the different things rememberable, won’t you find the soul to be memory? A similar point holds (1) as regards the intellect [that you have seen] both in things understood and in and of itself and (2) as regards the will both in things willed and in and of itself. You thus see that the soul is memory, intellect, and will in and of themselves. Now, if you see memory in terms of its own form, by means of which it knows itself, then you also see that by means of this same form it knows all things rememberable; and it is evident that nothing is knowable unless it is remembered. Therefore, if memory knows itself, and if only what is rememberable is knowable, then assuredly when within itself memory knows everything rememberable, it knows everything knowable. Therefore, memory, which is hidden, is revealed by the intellect, since the intellect is nothing but the memory’s intellect. And will is nothing but, at once, the memory’s will and the intellect’s will. For that which is not found to be both in the memory and in the intellect cannot be in the will either.

29 You might perhaps say: “It seems that you are now speaking differently from earlier-on, when you attributed that to memory and what to intellect.” But that is seen sooner than what. [So] how is it that you now say that intellect reveals memory?” I reply: That is seen sooner,
but *that* is not understood except through an *understanding* of it. *That* is first seen in memory; but as it is seen there, it is *that* and not *what*. But it is said to be intellectually hidden as long as it is not seen in its own form. (Only by means of this form is it understood.) For what anything is is not known apart from the light of intellect. And since the intellective soul lives by understanding: as long as it does not understand something, it does not find that thing within itself vitally, but that thing remains hidden to the intellective soul—even as that perceptible thing which [the soul] has perceived only by means of hearing remains hidden to sight until sight sees it.

30 You must be attentive, lest a variation in our manner of speaking cause you difficulty. For the teachers often call the intellectual memory *intelect*, as when they say that the intellect begets from itself a word, or concept, of its own intellectual being. You should understand “Intellect” to stand for the Father, who is Intellectual Memory. But, in addition, intellect is understood as something’s intellect, viz., memory’s—even as a son is someone’s son, viz., a father’s. And, in this sense, Intellect is the Intellectual Memory’s Word, which in Greek is called *Logos*.

31 You might perhaps ask: “Doesn’t the Word understand itself? And if so, then it understands itself by means of a Word, or Logos, begotten from itself; so Word will beget Word, *ad infinitum*.” I reply: It is not the case that Memory is Word of the Word. [Rather,] just as Memory understands itself in relation to its Word, so too the Word understands itself in relation to Memory, similarly to when a son understands himself as a son in relation to his father qua his own beginning, not [in relation to his father] qua someone begotten from the son himself. Therefore, memory understands itself and all other things in relation to the Word begotten from itself. But the Word understands itself and all other things because the Word that is begotten, i.e., the Intellectual Concept that is begotten, enfolds within itself all things—even as in relation to his son a father knows himself to be a father and in relation to his father a son knows himself to be a son.

32 Since there is no understanding without conceiving, you wonder how it is that the Word knows itself without a Concept (or Word) of itself that is begotten from the Word itself. But you will see how when you take note of the fact that conceiving is common to the Begetter and the One Begotten. For the Father-who-begets cannot know Himself as father except by means of the concept of His Begotten Son; and
the Son cannot know Himself as son except by means of the concept of his Begetting Father. But, in the case of the Son, “conceiving” does not mean begetting (as it does mean in the case of the Father) but, rather, means being begotten. Hence, the Father does not have from the Son the fact that He knows Himself, even though without the Son He would not know Himself to be a father. Now, since by nature the Father understands, by nature He begets from Himself one without whom He could not understand either Himself or anything else and without whom He also could not be understood. Therefore, He begets from His own intellectual substance a consubstantial Word, in which He understands Himself and all things. Therefore, a word is that without which no one—neither Father nor Son nor Holy Spirit nor angels nor souls nor any intellectual nature—could understand anything; and a word adequately serves all intelligent beings for purposes of understanding. But the Word that suffices [for understanding] itself and all other things does not need to beget its own Word, since any Word that could be begotten [by it] would be equal to the Word begotten by the eternal and infinite Father. Therefore, within itself the Word knows all things, because it is the Word of the Father, in which the Father and the Holy Spirit and all things are present. In and through the Word the Father knows Himself and all things, because He is the Father of the Word. The Word knows itself and all things, because it is the Word of the Father.

On the basis of the foregoing points I say that it is clear enough that if a speaker understands a word which he utters, then he understands the perceptible external-word by means of the imperceptible internal-word. And the internal-word, begotten from his own intellect, is, indeed, his rational intellect’s concept, by means of which the intellect understands itself and its external word. For example, let it be the case that the intellect of the speaker is absolute equality. Equality’s rational word, whereby equality has conceived itself, is the concept of what is simple, or unalterable; to this concept nothing can be added, and from it nothing can be subtracted. In this concept, or word, equality views its own quiddity. And by means of this word, equality (1) understands each of its own external words and (2) does all its own works.

Now, no nameable name can befit the First Beginning, for the First Beginning precedes all otherness, whereas all names are imposed with regard to the distinction of one thing from another; and so, distinc-
tion and name do not apply to the Beginning, which precedes other-

ness. Nevertheless, if “equality” is taken to stand for the absolutely

Unchangeable and if equality precedes all otherness-of-being and all

otherness-of-being-possible (so that it neither is anything other nor can be anything other nor can admit of any change whatsoever, whether by increasing or by decreasing or in any other way, since whatever things can be spoken of or named or conceived are subsequent to it),

then “Equality” is the most equal name of the First and Eternal Be-

ginning. Therefore, on account of our weakness, let us add that Equality is intellectual, even though it is infinitely more than intellectual.89 And let us say that, assuredly, the most perfect Beginning, which is Equality, understands both itself and the works that it performs. For no man doubts that he sees such understanding to be present in every rational agent. For example, a builder understands himself to be a builder, and he knows what he is making. Indeed, unless the Creator of creatures knew Himself to be the Creator and knew what He created, a creature would not be a creature more than not a creature, and the heavens would not be heavens more than not-heavens, and so on.

So if Absolute Equality is identical with the Creator of heaven and earth, then it knows itself to be Equality and knows all that it makes. Assuredly, the Word [or Concept] of its knowing, wherein Equality knows itself, must be its Equal. For Equality cannot form any other Word, or Concept, of itself than the Concept [conceptus] of Equality. Therefore, the Concept (ratio)-of-Equality90—through which Concept Equality knows itself and which Concept we endeavor to express by means of the expression “Unchangeable”—is nothing but the Defini-

tion or Figure of Equality’s substance. In this way, then, [Absolute] Equality’s Equal is an Equality-of-Equality. It follows, then, that there is one Equality, which is both Equality and Equality-of-Equality. Therefore, there is Equality that begets from itself its Word, which is its Equality.91 From these two there proceeds Union-that-is-Equality (we call this Union the Spirit of Love), since from Equality that begets and Equality that is begotten there can proceed only Equality, which is called Union or Love. It is as if we were to say: “Absolute Equality is Love.”92 Therefore, Intellectual Love begets from itself a Con-

cept of its own essence—a Concept which can be nothing but Love-
of-Love—from which, together,93 there can proceed only Love, which is the Union of both.

However, there cannot be three Equalities, since if the one [of
them] were one Equality and the other [of them] were another Equality, surely the latter would not precede otherness; only where [there is priority to otherness] can there be Equality. Hence, it is impossible that a plurality of things be altogether equal, since those things can be a plurality only if they are different from one another and are distinct in essence. Therefore, there will not be a plurality of Equalities; rather, prior to all plurality there will be Equality that begets a Word, Equality that is begotten, and Equality that proceeds from both. And although the Begetting Equality is neither the Begotten Equality nor the Equality that proceeds, nevertheless the Begetting Equality is not another Equality than the Begotten Equality and than the Equality that proceeds. Therefore, the number by which we number the Begetting Equality, the Begotten Equality, and the Proceeding Equality is not—since it precedes otherness—a number that is understandable by us. For in regard to the [“three”] things numbered, we do not see their number apart from otherness unless we look at number in and of itself (prior to the different numerable things), where they are “three” things prior to three. For the things which we number by three we call three, and the number by which we number three things we call three. The number does not depend on the things numbered. Hence, with respect to us, number in and of itself is only the soul, as was said previously. In Absolute Equality number is only Begetting Equality, Begotten Equality, and Proceeding Equality. In Equality they are number-that-is-Equality. They are not three things equal in number but are three Substances, or Hypostases, of Equality. For we see, above all, the necessity of affirming that the most perfect First Beginning is prior to otherness and is eternal and that, therefore, it does not at all lack knowledge of itself and its works. Consequently, we affirm, of necessity, that the Beginning is triune—that, although the one Beginning exceeds our every concept, it is trine prior to otherness and to things numerable.

From the foregoing considerations it is evident that Equality creates all things by its Word, or Form. And so, all things exist insofar as they partake of the form of equality. But the fact that no two things are found to be in all respects equal is due to the fact that no two things can partake of equality equally. Therefore, not anything is devoid of equality, since the form of equality is the form of being, without which no thing can exist. Therefore, the [respective] quiddity of all existing things is an equality through which every existent thing is neither anything more nor anything less but is that which it
is. This equality is, for all things, the equal form of being. Hence, a quiddity cannot admit of more and less, because it is an equality. Therefore, none of all existing things are replicable, because all things exist insofar as they partake of the form-of-equality, of which a plurality of things cannot partake equally. Therefore, being is an unreplicable equality, as are also substance and animality and humanity and every genus and every species and every individual (for individuality is an unreplicable equality). And no thing is a true thing except insofar as it partakes of oneness-of-equality, i.e., of the form of equality. Likewise, no thing is just or virtuous or good or perfect [unless it partakes of the form of equality].

Every science and every art is founded on equality. Rules of law or grammatical rules, or whatsoever other rules, are only participations in the form of equality. For example, to reduce to an equality the discrepancies in the movements of the stars is the science of astronomy. To reduce to a rule the differences among grammatical constructions is the science of grammar. And so on. Moreover, a name does not have any truth in its signification except in terms of an equality of signifier and signified. Likewise, too, every art is founded on an equality, as, for example, [the art] of painting [is founded] on an equality of symbol and symbolized, of image and exemplar. Similarly, the art of medicine looks unto an equality of temperament. Justice is founded on the following rule of equality: “Do unto others that which you wish to be done unto you yourself.” If equality is removed, then practical wisdom ceases, as do self-restraint and every virtue, since every virtue consists of a mean, which is an equality.

Without equality we do not understand truth, which is the adequation of the thing and the intellect. Without equality there is neither life nor existence nor time nor motion nor continuance. For example, motion is only a continuation of rest; and what is rest except an equality? Something similar holds true as regards the now, since time is only a continuation of the now; and what is the now except an equality, which cannot be either greater or lesser? Similarly, a line is only the development of a point; what is a point except an equality? And in this way you see that nothing at all can exist except with respect to an equality. For the form of equality shines forth in all existent things insofar as they exist. And that form is not replicable or changeable or corruptible, since it is the congruent form-of-being of all things; it would not be a congruent form if it were not the form of
absolute equality. Therefore, of all things there is one congruent form, or congruent measure, viz., equality; this form (ratio) of equality is neither greater nor lesser than all measurable things. By way of comparative illustration: a single definition (ratio) of “circle” is the precise definition of all positable circles and is the congruent reason (ratio) why they are neither more nor less than circles—whether they are circles equal to one another or circles unequal with respect to size and other accidental features.

Harmony and peace and order, through which all things both exist and are conserved, are an equality. Likewise, beauty, harmony, delight, love, and all other such things are an equality. Without equality you cannot see a plurality of unequal things. For unequal things agree in that they are unequal. What are harmony and resemblance other than an equality? Similarly, [what are] love and friendship [other than an equality]? And like favors like because of an equality. And although oneness is seen to be the father of equality—since equality is oneness taken once, as you know from elsewhere—nevertheless absolute equality enfolds oneness. For that which is equal exists in a single way. For in oneness only equality is seen. Similarly, since what is good diffuses itself, it has this [property] only from equality. And the good is desired equally by all, on account of equality. No thing can be divided from itself, on account of each’s indivisible equality with itself. And each thing is a certain mode of participation in equality. It is as if quantity were said to partake of absolute magnitude and as if a linear quantity were said to be a mode of participation in magnitude according to length; and as if a surface were said to be such a mode according to width; and as if a material object were said to be such a mode according to depth; and as if a figure were said to be such a mode according to its surface form; and a circle, according to circular shape; and a sphere, according to spherical shape; and a cube, according to cubical shape—and so on, as regards an infinite number of such things that partake variously of [absolute] magnitude by means of quantity. This magnitude is only a participation in equality. Likewise, then, a man is only a certain mode of participation in animality. Something similar holds true for a lion and a horse. Moreover, animality is a participation in equality. But equality enfolds equally every mode-of-being—whether elemental, vegetable, animal, rational, or intellectual. Yet, equality is partaken of differently by different things, since an equal participation is impossible. Therefore, equality is present equally to all things, but it is not received equally—just as in
a meadow the sun’s ray is present equally to all plants but is not 
received equally, so that the plants are only different modes-of-reception 
of the vigor of the sun’s ray, a ray which is partaken of by them.

Isn’t it the case that when equality is removed, nothing is under-
stood, nothing is seen, nothing exists, nothing endures? For example,
the more equal the temperament, then the healthier, the more perfect,
the more durable it is. Equality itself is an eternal duration. Equality
that is life is eternal life. The intellect’s activity of understanding is 
its living; [and] life consists of an equality. Therefore, if the soul,
which illumines all things, sees that nothing would remain if equality
were removed, then it concludes that all things are from equality,
through equality, and in equality. If you exercise your intellect in these
matters, and if you apply it not to the words but to the meaning, you
will penetrate ever more precisely many things that previously were
hidden to you. For when you look unto the statements made about
equality, then surely you will grasp better and more steadfastly, by
faith, that which you see written about the Trinity in the Holy Scrip-
tures and in the teachers who expound them: viz., (1) that the Son 
and the Holy Spirit have the same nature as the Father and (2) that the
Son is equal to the Father, as is also the Holy Spirit, and (3) that the
person of the Father, the person of the Son, and the person of the Holy
Spirit are distinct from one another. Moreover, that which is the most
difficult of all difficult things to grasp—viz., that there would be a
Trinity prior to all otherness—you will understand better when you
note that the three equal persons are equal not accidentally but essen-
tially, since they are equal without otherness. Similarly, they are only
one and the same unreplicable Equality. Since equality does not hap-
pen to the persons or is not partaken of by them, it is that which each
person [of the Trinity] is essentially. And where there is nothing other
than an unreplicable Equality, there there can be no otherness.

Hence, when we read that the person of the Father, the person of
the Son, and the person of the Holy Spirit are distinct, we must not
understand that the one person is distinct [from the others] by means
of otherness, which that Trinity precedes. And if we wish to see where-
by the person of the Father, the person of the Son, and the person of
the Holy Spirit are distinct, we will find only Equality, which is prior
to otherness. Hence, when I speak of “the Equality in virtue of which
the Father is the Father,” “the Equality in virtue of which the Son is
the Son,” and “the Equality in virtue of which the Holy Spirit is the
Holy Spirit,” I speak the truth. Nevertheless, I have spoken of only one unreplicable Equality. For it is not true that the Equality of which I first spoke, when I spoke of “the Equality in virtue of which the Father is the Father,” is another Equality or is not that Equality of which I spoke secondly, [when I spoke of] “the Equality in virtue of which the Son is the Son,” and [is not that Equality] of which I spoke thirdly, [when I spoke of] “the Equality in virtue of which the Holy Spirit is the Holy Spirit.” And since I see that these propositions are true prior-to-otherness, where the Father is not anything other than Equality, and where, likewise, the Son and the Holy Spirit are not [anything other than Equality], then if I speak of “the Equality in virtue of which the Father is the Father,” it is the same thing as speaking of the Equality of the Father’s being the Father. And then I see the following proposition to be true: [viz., that there is] an Equality of the Father’s being the Father. But the [proposition that there is] an Equality of the Father’s being the Son I do not see to be equal to the first proposition or to be equally true. And herefrom I affirm that the Father is not the Son or the Holy Spirit, although they are one and the same Equality and are prior to all otherness. And I clarify my conception by means of [the consideration of] equality which I have expounded by reference to time and to the soul and to the syllogism.

Therefore, turn toward the very sacred Gospel with an intellect exercised in the aforementioned [reflections], and consider (1) how it is that John the Evangelist wrote his Gospel in order to affirm the faith that Jesus is the Son of God (so that those who believe in His name would have life) and (2) that he heard Christ saying to God the Father: “Glorify me together with Yourself, O Father, with the glory which I had with You before the world began.” Moreover, [Christ said] this: “If you had known me, then assuredly you would have known my Father also.” And again: “He who sees me sees the Father.” And elsewhere: “Whatever things the Father has are mine; and all things mine are Yours, and all things Yours are mine.” Also: “I am in the Father, and the Father is in me.” Furthermore, Christ said: “I have come as light into the world, so that everyone who believes in me will not remain in darkness.” And elsewhere: “I have gone out from the Father and have come into the world.” And again: “The word which you have heard is not mine but is of the Father, who has sent me.” And to the Father He says: “Your word is truth.” Moreover, He called Himself the Way, the Truth, and the Life and said that no one could come to the Father except by
Him. And [He said] that the Father gave Him power over all flesh so that He might give them life.’ And that which [the Father] gave Him is greater than all things, and [the Father] placed all things in His power and gave Him all judgment, because He is the Son of man. [Christ] called Himself the Son of God and said that the Father who abides in Him would do the works and that He, [Christ], did works which no one before Him did and that His works bore witness of the fact that God the Father sent Him. And [He said] that He was Life and Resurrection and Living Bread that gives Eternal Life. And [He said] many other such things, which John heard and wrote down.

Before narrating all the foregoing things which he disclosed, John, in the following words, set forth his theology, showing that the whole of the matter could [herein] be seen to be true: “In the beginning was the Word.” For in the beginning, before anything that God the Father made, there had to have been that without which nothing was made. Now, without the Logos, or Concept, or Word nothing was made by the most wise God, the Father and Creator of all. Therefore, in the beginning, before God the Father made anything, there was the Logos; and the Logos was only with God. And because [in the beginning] there was no other, the Word was not with God in such a way as to be another but was identical with God. Hence, as is evident, it was necessary that God the Father and Creator have a rational Word—not a Word that was something other but a Word that was consubstantial with Himself, i.e., a consubstantial Word or Concept or Notion, wherein was God’s knowledge of Himself and of all creatable things. And because this Word was consubstantial with, and of the same nature as, the Father and Creator (from whom it existed, even as the knowledge of a thing is from the thing), the Word was His Son. For if one who is begotten is of the same nature as the begetter, he is a son. And this fact explains that which Christ said to the Father: “Glorify me with the glory which I had with You before the world was made,” so that it may indeed be manifest that I am Your consubstantial Son. This [Word], as says the Evangelist, was in the beginning with God, for God-the-Word was with God in such a way that He was God. And so, John infers that prior to all creatures, the Logos was with God. For pure intellect is never without a knowledge of itself; likewise, the Eternal God the Father is never without His consubstantial Logos.
Consequently, all things have been made by means of the Word, for intellectual activity does all things by means of its concept, which is its word—according as I said previously that there is one and the same Concept by means of which the Creator knoweth Himself and other things and by means of which He creates, just as I gave the illustration of a circle. And things were made in such a way that without the Word nothing was made, since this Word is the most precise rational Definition and rational Determination of all creatable and intelligible things, so that if apart from the Logos something would have been made by God, or would be made by God, it would not reasonably be made. And for this to be said about our most wise God would be blasphemy. Therefore, just as by a very wise king’s command, which is expressed by his word, all things regal are done (this word is only his reason, for a most wise king’s word does not partake of reasonableness but is reasonableness and truth), so by the Word of the Lord the heavens have been formed and by His silence not anything was formed.

But since, necessarily, in the consubstantial Word all creatable things were present as in a vivifying, encompassing Concept, and since the living Concept is Life, everything that was made by means of the Word was—in the Word—the Word, which is Life. For the concept of any thing is alive with an eternal life. For example, by means of the concept through which a circle is a circle, the circle always was and always will be a circle without flaw. Therefore, even if the creatures that have been created are not alive, nevertheless since in the Word they are the Word, which is God, they have been alive eternally. And that Life was not only the Word of God through which God creates all things but was also the Word through which by God’s own Light God directs men, who richly possess the light of reason. For the Word of God is a lamp for feet that are on the course toward eternal life. And the Light shined in the darkness of ignorance; and the darkness did not comprehend the Light, which is the Word of God, by which God spoke in many different ways both through nature and through the prophets. Thereafter, subsequently to all the prophets, a man was sent by God, a man whose name was John. John came for a witness, in order to bear witness of the radiance of the Light, viz., the Word-of-God, who appeared at that time. John was not that Word, which is Light, but he came in order to bear witness of the radiance of the Light. But the Word of God was the true Light, which illumines every man endowed with reason who
The Logos, or Word, was in the world, and the world was made by Him, because God the Father spoke and all things were made; and the world knew Him not. He came unto His Father’s own dwellings, viz., to the Holy Land, and His own people did not receive Him as the Word of God. But however many (of them and of all nations) received Him obeyed Him as the Word of God who was sent from God. To them, although they were but men, He gave the power to become sons of God through grace, just as He Himself was [the Son of God] by nature. And those who received Him were begotten by the Spirit of the Son of God. [They were] not [begotten] by that begottenness by which men are born from blood-relatives and by the will of the flesh and by the will of man according to this world; rather, they were born in spirit by means of a heavenly begottenness on the part of God, who is Spirit. Therefore, the Word, which can accomplish and effect all these things, is the Logos, or the Son of God. Indeed, the Word was made flesh, because the Son of God became the Son of man. And the Son of man dwelt among us, and we beheld His glory—the splendid glory not as of a son of God by adoption (as many are seen to be) but the glory as of the Father’s Only-Begotten (who has from the Father all the things that are the Father’s), who was, indeed, the Word, full of all grace and truth.

The foregoing is the heart of the gospel according to the understanding of John the Theologian. And in expounding it, John amplifies it and proves it by the witness of God the Father, of John [the Baptist], of the Apostles, of miracles, as well as by the teachings and the claims of the Word-of-Truth, by His voluntary sacrifice to the point of a most ignominious death for the salvation of all believers, and by His resurrection from the dead. By all these evidences John showed most clearly that Jesus is the Son of God, who spoke the words of His Father, who is truthful, and who did the works of Him whose words are more steadfast than are heaven and earth and whose promises are very great, especially [the promise] of a resurrection unto immortal life, which God alone possesses. Of this possession Christ Himself is the heir, and those who in heart and deed believe in Him are joint-heirs. And all these deeds are accomplished by man with the help of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and from the Son and who is the Spirit-of-the-Son and who is God’s Love. When this Love is diffused throughout the hearts of
believers, it makes them pleasing to God because of the indwelling Holy Spirit. And it unites them, by an indissoluble bond, to Christ, who is the Head\textsuperscript{167} and the Heir\textsuperscript{168} and the Possessor of immortality,\textsuperscript{169} so that in the oneness of the Body-of-Christ, enlivened by the Spirit of Christ, they may be joint-heirs of the kingdom of immortality and may be most happy possessors of eternal life.

This is the heart of the gospel,\textsuperscript{170} a gospel which has been explained variously (in accordance with the grace given) in my different sermons attached below.\textsuperscript{171} [The gospel was explained by me] (1) less clearly when I began [my sermons] during my adolescence and when I was a deacon, (2) more clearly when I became a priest,\textsuperscript{172} and (3) still more perfectly, as it seems, when I assumed the office of bishop in my church at Brixen\textsuperscript{173} and when I exercised the authority of apostolic legate in Germany and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{174} Would that God should grant me to make still further progress during my remaining lifetime and grant me, at length, to embrace the Truth face to face, in eternal joy. Pray, O Brother, that He may indeed grant this. And if in any of the foregoing statements or in any of the sermons attached below or in any of my other writings there be found anything that deviates from the Catholic truth, I renounce it and revoke it through the present words.
ABBREVIATIONS


CA Cribratio Alkorani [Vol. VIII (edited by Ludwig Hagemann) of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1986)].


DC De Coniecturis [Vol. III (edited by Josef Koch and Karl Bormann) of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1972)].


DM Idiota de Mente [Latin text contained in J. Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge (Minneapolis: Banning, 1996)].

DP De Possest [Latin text as contained in J. Hopkins, A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa (Minneapolis: Banning, 3rd ed. 1986)].

DVD De Visione Dei [Latin text as contained in J. Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa’s Dialectical Mysticism: Text, Translation, and Interpretive Study of De Visione Dei (Minneapolis: Banning, 2nd ed. 1988)].


NA De Li Non Aliud [Latin text as contained in J. Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-other: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Li Non Aliud (Minneapolis: Banning, 3rd ed. 1987)].


Abbreviations


VS *De Venatione Sapientiae* [Vol. XII (edited by Raymond Klibansky and Hans G. Senger) of *Nicolaic de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: F. Meineer Verlag, 1982)].

**PRAENOTANDA**

1. (a) In the English translations brackets are used to indicate words supplied by the translator to complete the meaning of a Latin phrase, clause, or sentence. (b) When a clarifying Latin word is inserted into the translation, brackets (rather than parentheses) are used if the case ending or the verb-form has been modified.

2. All references to Nicholas of Cusa's works are to the Latin texts in the following editions (unless explicitly indicated otherwise):

   A. Heidelberg Academy edition of *Nicolaic de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Felix Meiner Verlag: Hamburg): De Concordantia Catholica; De Coniecturis; De Deo Abscondito; De Quaerendo Deum; De Filiatione Dei; De Dato Patris Luminum; Coniectura de Ultimis Diebus; De Genesis; Apologia Docta Ignorantiae; De Pace Fidei; De Beryllo (1988 edition); Critirion Alkorani; De Principis; De Theologicis Complementis; De Venatione Sapientiae; De Apice Theoriae; Sermones (Haubst's numbering of the sermons is given in roman numerals; Koch's numbering is given in arabic numerals.)

   B. Texts authorized by the Heidelberg Academy and published in the Latin-German editions of Felix Meiner Verlag's series *Philosophische Bibliothek*: De Docta Ignorantia.

   C. Editions by J. Hopkins: *De Aequalitate* (1998); *Idiotae de Sapientia, de Mente, de Statis Experimentis* (1996); *De Visione Dei* (1988); *De Possot* (1986); *De La Non Alia* (1987); *Compendium* (1996). Except in the case of *De Aequalitate*, the left-hand margin numbers correspond to the margin numbers in the Heidelberg Academy editions; line numbers and some paragraph-breaks differ.


   The references given for some of these treatises indicate book and chapter, for others margin number and line, and for still others page and line. Readers should have no difficulty determining which is which when they consult the particular Latin text. E.g., 'DI II, 6 (125:19-20)' indicates *De Docta Ignorantia*, Book II, Chapter 6, margin number 125, lines 19-20 of the edition in the series *Philosophische Bibliothek* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag).

3. The folio numbers in the right-hand margin of the Latin text of *De Aequalitate* co-
respond to the folios in Codex Latinus Vaticanus 1245.

4. References to the Bible are given in terms of the Douay version. References to chapters and verses of the Psalms include, in parentheses, the King James’ locations.

5. Italics are used sparingly, so that, as a rule, foreign expressions are italicized only when they are short. All translations are mine unless otherwise specifically indicated.

6. Citations of Nicholas’s sermons are given in terms of the sermon numbers assigned by Rudolf Haubst in fascicle 0 [=zero], Vol. XVI of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1991).

NOTES TO DE AEQUALITATE

1. This work was composed at Rome during the first quarter of 1459. It is not a sermon but is, rather, a discourse (sermo) that precedes a collection of the sermons. (See, below, n. 1 of Notes to De Principio.) Nonetheless, in Codex Latinus Vaticanus 1245 this discourse appears toward the end of the collection of sermons, not at the beginning, as it does in the Florence manuscript. The present English translation was made from the facing Latin text, which is a collation of (1) folia 257r - 262v of the aforementioned Vatican manuscript, (2) folia 1' - 10' of Codex Latinus Ashburnham 1374 (in the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Florence, Italy), and (3) folia 167' - 176 of Codex Latinus Sublacensis 235.Segn.CCXXXII (Subiaco, Italy). See, above, n. 6 of Notes to the Preface.

The title “De Aequalitate” comes not from the manuscripts but from Josef Koch and others. The numbers in the right-hand margin of the Latin text correspond to the folio numbers of the Vatican codex.

2. Regarding Peter of Erkelenz, see, below, n. 1 of Notes to De Apice Theoriae.

3. See, below, n. 1 of Notes to De Principio.

4. On January 11, 1459 Nicholas was named by Pope Pius II to be apostolic legate and general vicar for the administration of certain temporal affairs in Rome.


6. “… in the aforesaid words”: i.e., in the words of John 1:4.


8. Human intellects are themselves lights. The Word of God is the Light of those lights and of other lights (viz., of angelic intelligences). Concerning God as light, see Nicholas’s De Dato Patris Luminum. See also, below, the reference in n. 36 of Notes to De Apice Theoriae. Cf. Compendium 10 (33:13-15).

9. In De Principio Nicholas elaborates on this theme of reflectively arriving at the Beginning, who is God.

10. DI III, 2 (192-194).

11. DB 4 and 54 and 65.
12. That is, it is true that the intellect wants things other than itself to be known to itself, just as it also wants itself to be known to itself.
16. “… can be seen in and of itself”: i.e., its essence can be seen in abstraction from individual instantiations. See DB 54. Although abstract quiddities can be known, they cannot be known precisely, teaches Nicholas. See, below, n. 84 of Notes to De Venatione Sapientiae. Cf. DP 43:18-19. De Quaerendo Deum 5 (49:18-22).
17. “… when … the intellect sees that which is understood”: i.e., when the intellect sees it qua abstract and abstracted.
18. “… understood in and of itself”: i.e., understood apart from material otherness and qua abstract.
19. Nicholas never abandons the view that empirical knowledge is arrived at by way of abstraction from sense-experience. See pp. 29-31 of my Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge (1996). See also, above, n. 132 of Notes to De Beryllo.
23. “… non-perceptual quantity”: i.e., intelligible, non-physical quantity.
24. That which is altogether immaterial (e.g., the human soul) has no length, width, or depth. Nicholas is here speaking of an abstract circle as having “material” quantity insofar as the circle is conceived to have size.
25. That is, the form of man—human nature as such—is seen.
26. “… in that way”: i.e., in the way that mathematical objects are viewed.
27. That is, the concept of man includes the concept of having flesh and bones. A human nature is understood by Nicholas in the same way that Augustine (and others) understood it: viz., as consisting of both a body and a soul. The disembodied state is a state of imperfect human nature. See, e.g., Augustine’s De Trinitate 13.9.12 (PL 42:1023) and 15.7.11 (PL 42:1065).
28. That is, otherwise there would not be a real individual man, because anything with flesh and bones would not be a man.
29. The instrument (organum) is the human body.
30. Elsewhere Nicholas refers to this power as the power of reason (ratio). See, below, n. 38 of Notes to De Venatione Sapientiae.
31. DM 12 (142:15).
32. The Latin word “ratio” admits of being translated differently in different contexts. Although it is here translated as “conceptual form,” I later also translate it simply as “form” and as “concept,” as well as by “Ground” and by (the English word) “ratio”. See, below, n. 29 of Notes to De Principio.
33. Augustine, De Trinitate 8.4.6 (PL 42:951); 9.3.3, first sentence (PL 42:962); 10.2.4 (PL 42:974).
34. Nicholas borrows from Augustine’s De Trinitate [e.g., 10.12.19 (PL 42:984)] the characterizations memoria, intellectus, voluntas, which both men use as symbols of the Trinity. Augustine interchanges “intelligentia” and “intellectus” [cf. 14.7.10 (PL 42:1044) with 14.8.11 (PL 42:1044)], just as he also interchanges “voluntas” and “amor” (or “caritas”); see 15.20.38 (PL 42:1087, bottom).
35. “... the aforementioned pattern-of-inference”: viz., the mood AAA of the first figure. See, below, n. 25 of Notes to De Venatione Sapientiae.

36. Although the rational soul sees itself as it is in itself, it does not see itself precisely as it is in itself. See n. 16 above.

37. Nicholas here has in mind the fact that the soul knows by means of concepts, or species intelligibiles. See n. 5 on p. 512 of my Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge (1996), as well as pp. 29-49. See also Cusa, VS 29 (86). Cf. DVD 22 (97:15-20).

38. See pp. 291 (last paragraph) and 292 of my Miscellany on Nicholas of Cusa (1994).


40. See De Aequalitate 13.

41. See, above, n. 11 of Notes to De Theologicis Complementis.

42. Cf. DVD 13 (54). See VS 27-29.

43. VS 27 (82:13-20).


46. Compendium 6 (17:17-22) and 10 (34:1-4). See n. 40 on p. 515 of my Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge.

47. By speaking of “timeless time” (“intemporale tempus”) Nicholas means to indicate three things: (1) that the soul exists endlessly in time rather than merely for a given period of time, (2) that the passing of time does not itself take time, and (3) that the modes of time (viz., past, present, and future) are non-transient, even though temporal objects may pass from one mode to another.


48. In the strict sense, only God is eternal and is Eternity. He cannot be partaken of. See, below, the references in n. 191 of Notes to De Venatione Sapientiae. Note De Ludo Globi I (Paris edition, Vol. I, f. 154", lines 13-16): "CARDINALIS: Non puto intelligentem negare mundum esse aeternum, licet non sit aeternitas. Solus enim omnium creator sic est aeternus quod aeternitas. Si quid alius dicitur aeternum, hoc habet non qua ipsa est aeternitas sed qua eius participione seu ab ipsa est" [punctuation modified slightly by me]. See also Hans G. Senger, “Das Zeit- und Ewigkeitsverständnis bei Nikolaus von Kues im Hinblick auf die Auferstehung der Toten,” MFCG 23 (1996), 139-163 [includes discussion].

49. See the references, below, in n. 277 of Notes to De Venatione Sapientiae.

50. These more perfect intelligences are the angels.

51. The soul is non-temporal time because it is incorruptible in time. It is “timeless” in the sense that it escapes the conditions of temporal corruption and is non-temporary. Accordingly, the soul’s non-temporality consists in its being unceasingly temporal, i.e., perpetual: it always has a past, a present, and a future. Regarding Cusa’s notion of perpetuitas, see Klaus Kremer’s detailed article “Philosophische Überlegungen des Cusanus zur Unsterblichkeit der menschlichen Geistseele,” MFCG 23 (1996), 21-70 (especially pp. 39-47). Cf. Hans G. Senger’s “Das Zeit- und Ewigkeitsverständnis bei Nikolaus von Kues im Hinblick auf die Auferstehung der Toten,” MFCG 23 (1996), especially pp. 140-142 and 151-153, as well as Senger’s comments on pp. 159-160, along with those of Hermann Schnarr on p. 161. Note what
Aquinas says about perpetuitas in SCG II.84.7.

52. Alternative translation: “… in which it is not the case that the past is something which the present and the future are not.” More literally: “… where the past is nothing which the present and the future are not.”

53. See n. 34 above. The Latin word “intellectus” I translate sometimes as “intellect,” sometimes as “understanding.”

54. Regarding the expressions “that it is” (“quia-est” or “quod-est”) and “what it is” (“quid-est”), see, above, the references in n. 16 of Notes to De Theologicis Complementis.

55. “… looks unto its own Truth”: i.e., looks unto God, in whose image it is constituted.

56. “… the three hypostases of non-temporal time”: viz., the past, the present, and the future. Nicholas uses the triunity of perpetuity, or unceasing temporality, as a symbolism of the Divine Trinity, where each hypostasis is a person of the Trinity and where each hypostasis dwells in the other.


59. Passages such as this one belie the attempt to make Nicholas out to be a proto-Kantian.

60. Cf. NA 10 (39).


63. Here, again, Nicholas uses trinitarian symbolism. See the passage marked by n. 34 above.

64. See n. 54 above.


66. John 1:3.

67. In God all things are God, teaches Nicholas. See, below, the references in n. 48 of Notes to De Venatione Sapientiae. See also n. 81 of Notes to De Beryllo.

68. Here Nicholas makes the important point that each creature has its own (essential) form. See, above, n. 135 of Notes to De Beryllo.

69. DI II, 9 (150b1-10). DB 17. See also, above, the reference in n. 46 of Notes to De Beryllo. Cf. Aristotle’s De Anima II.4 (415b7-28).

70. The Latin word “spiritus” signifies spirit or breath, depending upon the context. Nicholas’s example here trades upon this association. Cf. De Filiatione Dei 4 (74).

71. See the reference in n. 34 above.

72. Like Augustine, Nicholas often uses “intelligentia” and “intellectus” interchangeably. See n. 34 above.

73. See, below, the references in n. 109 of Notes to De Venatione Sapientiae.


75. Intelligible forms are species intelligibles. See n. 37 above.

76. See n. 53 and n. 72 above.
77. Namely, the Platonists.
78. That is, one may ask regarding intellect and will a question similar to the question asked about memory.
79. De Aequalitate 18.
80. Nicholas is here explaining that the Father (memoria) begets a Word, or a Son. But the Son (intellectus) does not also beget a Word. “Intellectus” sometimes is used in place of “memoria intellectiva” or “memoria intellectualis” and, thus, refers to the Father, not to the Son.
81. The Father knows Himself through Himself as well as in and through the Son. Cf. John 14:7 and 14:10. Note especially Augustine, De Trinitate 15.7.12 (PL 42:1065): “At vero in illa Trinitate quis audeat dicere Patrem, nec se ipsum, nec Filium, nec Spiritum sanctum intelligere nisi per Filium, vel diligere nisi per Spiritum sanctum, per se autem meminisse tantummodo vel sui vel Filii vel Spiritus sancti …?” See further.
82. That is, apart from the Son the Father could not understand Himself as Father.
83. Without the Son the Father could not understand the world, which was created by the Father through the Son. See De Aequalitate 45 and 35.
84. We understand the Father through understanding the Son, for he who sees the Son sees the Father also. John 14:9.
85. That is, any Word begotten by the Father’s Word would be equal to the Father’s Word.
86. Cf. John 14:10 with Colossians 1:16.
87. Since the Word is the Father’s Word, the Father knows Himself in and through the Word; since the Father is the Father of the Word, the Word knows Himself in and through the Father. The Father also knows Himself in and through Himself, even as the Word also knows Himself in and through Himself. See n. 81 above.
89. Because God is infinitely more than can be signified by any predicate, all predication regarding God is metaphorical.
90. Nicholas here (35:4-6) interchanges “conceptus [aequalitatis]” and “ratio aequalitatis.” A few lines later he interchanges “amor” and “caritas,” just as he earlier interchanged “intellectus” and “intelligentia” and later (46:12) interchanges “verbum” and “sermo”. One must avoid the pitfall of supposing that such terms, when used interchangeably, should be translated differently. Cf. n. 50 on p. 308 of my Miscellany on Nicholas of Cusa (1994).
91. “… which is its Equality”: i.e., which is Equality of Equality.
92. See n. 90 above.
93. “… from which, together”: i.e., from Intellectual Love and from Love-of-Love.
94. VS 23.
95. DP 50:4-5. DP 41:4-8. DI I, 19 (57:10-11).
96. De Aequalitate 15.
98. Finite beings partake of equality. They do not partake of the Form-of-Equality qua God. See, below, n. 40 of Notes to De Venatione Sapientiae. As for God’s being the ultimate Form of Being, note DP 14:15-16.
99. See the reference in n. 94 above.
100. See, below, n. 105 of Notes to *De Venatione Sapientiae*.
101. On the Ptolemaic understanding of planetary and sidereal motion, celestial bodies were believed to move in perfect circles and at constant speeds. In order to account for the observed “wandering” of the planets and for their apparent retrograde motion, Ptolemaic astronomers posited epicycles.
102. This is a rule of equality—i.e., a rule of equity.
106. *De Aequalitate* 22.
107. Cf. the reasoning in VS 21 (61:1-4), as well as in VS 22 (67:2-10).
108. *DI* I, 8 (23).
111. Namely, the proposition that the Father is the Father and the proposition that the Son is the Son and the proposition that the Holy Spirit is the Holy Spirit.
112. Namely, the conception that the Trinity is one and the same Equality, prior to all otherness.
115. *De Aequalitate* 10-12.
117. John 17:5.
118. John 8:19.
120. John 16:15.
121. John 17:10.
123. John 12:46.
124. John 8:42.
129. John 17:2.
134. John 5:36.
Notes to De Aequalitate

139. See the references in n. 37 and n. 38 above. See also the passage, in De Aequalitate, marked by n. 59 above.
140. In Latin the word for a son ("filius") is also a word meaning "a descendant." The Scripture verse alluded to by Nicholas in the next sentence is John 17:5.
141. Pure intellects are intellects associated with no bodies, viz., angelic intellects and the Divine Intellect.
142. De Aequalitate 32 and 35.
143. De Aequalitate 22 and 39.
144. "... for this to be said": i.e., for it to be said that God created unreasonably.
147. John 1:5.
148. See n. 90 above.
159. Romans 8:15.
161. "... the heart of the gospel": summa evangelii: i.e., the core of the gospel, which “summarizes” the gospel.
164. I Timothy 6:16.
165. Romans 8:17.
166. De Aequalitate 35.
169. I Timothy 6:16.
170. See n. 161 above.
171. The present work is meant not as a sermon but as a discourse preceding the sermons. See n. 1 above.
172. Nicholas became a priest sometime between 1436 and 1440.
173. Named Bishop of Brixen on March 23, 1450, Nicholas actually assumed his office toward the beginning of April, 1452.