The Alleged Superfluity of Scripture
in the Thought of St. Augustine and of St. Anselm

by

Jasper Hopkins
(July 1, 2009)

copyright © 2009
by Jasper Hopkins
The Alleged Superfluity of Scripture
in the Thought of St. Augustine and of St. Anselm

by

Jasper Hopkins

A. Introduction

In an amazingly audacious article Burcht Pranger brashly advances the view that Sacred Scripture has a “potential for becoming superfluous.”¹ But, even more amazingly he ascribes this view not so much to himself as to both St. Augustine and St. Anselm. And he seems to base this reading of the two saints primarily upon one passage found in Augustine’s writings and two passages present in Anselm’s. These passages are made to bear the inordinate weight of the claim that Scripture can become superfluous for truly devout believers who have a modicum of intelligence. Thus, Augustine is said to hold that “the accomplished reader who has appropriated and fulfilled the Scriptural sayings to the point of the latter² losing their meaning, has indeed turned into Scripture himself.”³ Now, leaving aside the bizarre statement about one’s turning into Scripture, we may well be surprised at the representation of Augustine along the lines of one who teaches that a devout believer can reach the stage where, for him, the Scriptures “lose their meaning.” A parallel claim is made by Pranger regarding St. Anselm, who is said to reach the point where he himself has “no need for Scripture.”⁴ Indeed, Anselm is said to proceed with a “removal of [both] Scripture and faith.”⁵

B. Augustine

1. So what is the Augustinian text on the basis of which Pranger purports to detect the Augustinian teaching that “an accomplished reader who has appropriated and fulfilled the
Scriptural sayings” may come to see the Scriptures as no longer having meaning for him? It is a text from De Doctrina Christiana I, 39, 43:

Accordingly, a man who is undergirded by faith and hope and love and who resolutely holds them fast does not need the Scriptures except for teaching others. Thus, by means of these three [graces] many men live even in solitude without [copies of] the Scriptures. Hence, I regard as being already fulfilled in them that which is said: “[Love never falleth away,] whether prophecies shall be made void or tongues shall cease or knowledge shall be made void.”

Pranger understands Augustine here to be asserting that someone who is well-grounded in faith, hope, and love has henceforth no personal need of the Scriptures, the use of which will have become superfluous and pointless as far as he is concerned. Yet, as Pranger does not grasp, Augustine is principally advancing the following restricted claim: that a steadfast believer who has been redeemed through faith, hope, and love and who is well-grounded in a knowledge of the Scriptures and who has no further access to the Scriptures can lead an acceptable spiritual life apart from such access; for his salvation does not depend upon his future reading of the Scriptures. Nonetheless, although the Scriptures may become dispensable as far as concerns that individual’s holding onto his saving faith, the Scriptures may well be indispensable for his increased growth in faith, since no believer’s faith is ever maximal.

Accordingly, Augustine elsewhere states flatly that “the man who fears God seeks out God’s will intently in the Holy Scriptures.” And such seeking-out will be an on-going quest, because a believer desires to know God’s will during each period of his life. Similarly, Augustine, when offering spiritual advice in his Epistle CXI, indicates another of the benefits of one’s immersion in Scripture: “The Lord will console you much more abundantly if you read His
Moreover, Augustine is mindful of the fact that a continual reading of the Scriptures conduces to the continued vitality of one’s faith and love. Thus, he writes:

Nos autem et ad commemorationem fidei nostrae, ad consolationem spei nostrae, et ad exhortationem charitatis nostrae, Libros propheticos et apostolicos legimus …

So Augustine himself, though full of faith, hope, and love, continues to read the Apostolic and the Prophetic books of Scripture; and in the foregoing passage he points out the reason for his doing so. Like the Psalmist he believes that God’s word is to be meditated on day and night.

It is difficult to imagine anyone more faith-filled than was Augustine, who himself never abandoned the study of Scripture and who composed his De Doctrina Christiana in order to lay down hermeneutical guidelines that would assist other believers as they sought a deeper understanding of Scripture. Now, if Augustine himself never finds Scriptural reading to be pointless and of no further use, then it is difficult to believe that he would unqualifiedly endorse the view that such reading might become superfluous for others. Does he think that they are more accomplished and steadfast than is he, so that the Scriptures become irrelevant for them but not for him?

Assuredly, then, in last analysis, Augustine is entitled to maintain that a spiritually devout eremite can remain devout while living in solitude without possessing a copy of the Scriptures. But Augustine is far from thinking of this kind of life either as ideal or as typical. And he recognizes that the eremite’s faith and love initially grew strong either (1) as a result of his earlier exposure to the Scriptures as they were read aloud and preached in church or (2) as a result of his having had personal access to them. He recognizes, too, that
the eremite will be deprived of the divine blessings that attend the continued study of Scripture.\textsuperscript{11}

2. Furthermore, Augustine is familiar with Scripture’s instructions that enjoin believers to steep themselves in the reading of these inspired and inerrant\textsuperscript{12} texts, as he considers them to be. For believers are enjoined to search the Scriptures.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, the Psalmist prayerfully exclaims: “Thy word have I hidden in my heart that I might not sin against Thee.”\textsuperscript{14} Or again, Timothy is said by the Apostle Paul to have been acquainted with the Scriptures from childhood. And he is exhorted by Paul to continue in the things that he has learned therefrom.\textsuperscript{15} Never is Timothy told that he has no further need of the Scriptures, having become so well-acquainted with them! Augustine is aware, too, of Ephesians 6:11-18, where Christians are instructed to

put on the whole armor of God so that you may be able to stand against the deceits of the Devil … . Stand, therefore, having your loins girt about with truth and having on the breastplate of righteousness and your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace—in all things taking the shield of faith … . And take the helmet of salvation and the sword-of-the-Spirit, which is the word of God.

Accordingly, Paul exhorts Christians always (not just sometimes) to take with them the word of God, which they will have stored in their hearts. As present in their hearts, the word of God never becomes superfluous, never becomes pointless, never is meant to preempt any further reading of the Bible. Likewise, when Paul tells Timothy that all Scripture is given by inspiration of God, he goes on to say “… and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness.”\textsuperscript{16} He does not add that the Christian can reach a stage of perfection where no further exposure to God’s word is necessary, inasmuch as such exposure has become otiose.
With each of the foregoing Biblical passages Augustine is familiar; and he mentions them all at different places in his works, endorsing them all.

3. In order to grasp Augustine’s central idea as expressed in the passage cited by Pranger from *De Doctrina Christiana*, we need to contextualize Augustine’s statement. And when we do so, we readily see that Augustine is not making an unqualified point but, rather, is saying something very specific with respect to believers who, either by circumstance or by choice, have no access to the Scriptures. Part of this narrower context has to do with the fact that in Augustine’s day, the Scriptures were not available in everyone’s vernacular. They were copied in Hebrew, in Greek, in Latin. As a general rule, unless one were educated, he could not read these languages. That is, given the absence of public schooling in Augustine’s day, most people were illiterate with respect even to their natively spoken languages. Moreover, there were no public libraries. Finally, there were no printing presses: manuscripts were handcopied and were not widely distributed. Thus, even if the laity had the ability to read (as most often was not the case), still they could not easily travel to, or gain entrance to, the scriptoria of a monastery or could not readily find a local priest who would agree to let them make regular use of perhaps the sole bound-copy (of the Biblical works) that was owned by the local church.

So, then, Augustine is addressing a cluster of particular circumstances. Under these circumstances one’s love for God is sustainable whether or not one has continued access to the sacred manuscripts. Yet, as Augustine notes, the written word of God remains authoritative; and insofar as possible a believer is to seek God’s will in and through the written word, by means of which God continually speaks. A believer who is illiterate may hear God’s voice in the preaching of the gospel, as the gospel is contained in the
written records. A believer who lives in isolation from a church will be disadvantaged, not with regard to his salvation, but with regard to his advancement in the spiritual perfection that comes from his progressively conforming himself to God’s will as it is manifested in the written word of the Apostles and the Prophets.

C. Anselm

What two passages does Pranger adduce in making his claim that Anselm arrives at a point in his thought where he has no need for Scripture,18 where he removes both Scripture and faith?19 He adduces Chapter 1 of the Monologion and also the Preface to the Cur Deus Homo. In the former passage Anselm indicates that he is writing the Monologion in the guise of someone who is conducting his investigation sola ratione (by reason alone); and in the second passage he indicates that his argument will proceed Christo remoto (with Christ being removed; i.e., as if nothing were known Scripturally and historically about Christ). Pranger implies, furthermore, that Anselm’s Proslogion also lays out its argument sola ratione. He might also have mentioned, but does not, that the Cur Deus Homo, too, proceeds sola ratione.20 Likewise, De Incarnatione Verbi 6 conveys the idea, without using the exact phrase, that both the Proslogion and the Monologion proceed sola ratione.

Pranger assumes that the method of arguing sola ratione and Christo remoto is at odds with any reliance either upon faith or upon the revelation that comes through the Scriptures. That is why he can speak of “the absent Bible in Anselm”—an absence that occurs at the “moment at which reason reigns supreme.”21 Unfortunately for Pranger’s interpretation, there is no moment in Anselm when reason reigns supreme and when faith is discarded or, at least, temporarily left behind. In the Cur Deus Homo Anselm is attempting to prove by rational necessity that God would have willed to redeem fallen man and that the only way He
could justly do so is by means of the atoning death of a God-man. After having established this conclusion to his own satisfaction, he turns to Scripture and identifies this God-man with the historical Jesus of Nazareth. However, along the way to reaching his conclusion, he makes perfectly clear that he is seeking the rational bases of faith not in order to do away with faith but in order better to understand that which faith embraces. Boso mentions that if at any stage of the argument he cannot detect a rationale, he will still keep believing the Scriptures in the hope of arriving, in his future reasoning, at discerning a proper rationale. So reliance on Scripture is never and nowhere suspended throughout the Cur Deus Homo.

Both Scripture’s teachings and reason’s deliverances are in harmony with each other, Anselm teaches. If Scripture seems not to agree with some one of reason’s deliverances, then either Scripture has been wrongly interpreted or there is a mistake in the argument’s reasoning. In those circumstances, Anselm and Boso will investigate further. As Anselm writes:

> If I say something which a greater authority [namely, Scripture] does not confirm, then even though I seem to prove it rationally, it should be accepted with no other degree of certainty than that it appears this way to me for the time being, until God somehow reveals the matter to me more fully. For if I say something that unquestionably contradicts Sacred Scripture, I am certain that it is false; and I do not want to hold that view if I know it [to be false].

In the Cur Deus Homo Anselm does not remove Scripture and faith, as Pranger alleges; rather, they are always operative in the background, being the dynamics that motivate Anselm in his quest for rational grounds and that fix the perimeters within which his search is to be conducted. True, Anselm suspends all direct appeal to them in advancing his overall line of reasoning; but he always has an
eye on them. For the Scriptures are what Anselm is trying to buttress rationally. Thus, in the last chapter of the Cur Deus Homo, he maintains that in having established that a God-man is necessary and that Jesus fits that profile, he has established the truth of the Old Testament and the New Testament. For Jesus, who as God was unfailingly truthful, declared the Scriptures to be reliable.26

Moreover, interpreters of Anselm must keep in mind that the Cur Deus Homo—and not just the Proslogion—endorses the Scriptural watchword “Unless you believe, you will not understand.”27 Indeed, Anselm is ever seeking to understand his faith. As Boso explains: “Although [unbelievers] seek a rational basis because they do not believe whereas we seek it because we do believe, nevertheless it is one and the same thing that both we and they are seeking.”28 Perhaps most importantly, Anselm’s reasoning sola ratione and Christo remoto in the Cur Deus Homo succeeds, to whatever extent it does, only because of the Scriptural and theological and rational presuppositions that he makes. The fact that Scriptural and theological assumptions are introduced does not, he thinks, detract from the claim that his argument proceeds by reason alone. For he thinks of these assumptions either as ones that his opponents will concede for the sake of the main argument or as ones that he himself is not directly appealing to in his argument. So Anselm’s reasoning proceeds partly ex concessu. Some of his theological presuppositions are the following:

• that God is ‘Something than which a greater cannot be conceived’—from which description it follows that God wills and does nothing without a reason.29

• that man has free will.30

• that no one can attain happiness unless his sins are forgiven.31

• that no mere human being passes through this life without sinning.32
• that vengeance belongs only to God. 33
• that what contradicts Scripture is false. 34
• that in the case of God a fitting reason to which nothing is opposed is tantamount to a necessary reason. 35
• that what Scripture teaches is in harmony with what reason teaches. 36
• that the God-man will be such that his human nature will not be intermingled with his divine nature. 37

But in the Cur Deus Homo Anselm also makes presuppositions that he draws directly from Scripture:

• that man was created by God, not by the Devil. (Genesis)
• that man was created in a state of innocence and fell away from that state. (Genesis)
• that as originally created, man was meant to be in every respect equal to the good angels. 38
• that God created angels in a perfect number, so that fallen angels would have to be replaced (by human beings) so as to maintain the pre-established number of inhabitants of the Heavenly City. 39
• that if man had never sinned, he would never have died. 40

From the foregoing assumptions, in addition to others, Anselm makes inferences that seem to him to be theologically reasonable. A good example of such an inference is his assertion that Adam and Eve are among the redeemed, 41 a doctrine not taught in Scripture, yet a doctrine compatible with Scriptural teachings.

Just as in the Cur Deus Homo so also in the Monologion and the Proslogion reason cannot be said to “reign supreme” in any respect that would eliminate the need for, and the use of, faith and the Scriptures. This is why Anselm in Proslogion 4 writes in reference to himself, the author who is addressing God: “… now by Your enlightening I understand
to such an extent that [even] if I did not want to believe that You exist, I could not fail to understand [that You exist].” Yet, one’s understanding that God exists, and even one’s understanding of what God’s nature is, does not necessarily lead to one’s loving and trusting God. One might believe that God exists and is loving, just, omnipotent, omniscient, etc., while yet rebelling against Him, disobeying His commands, feeling hostility toward Him (as did Satan in Milton’s Paradise Lost—Satan, who would rather “reign in Hell than serve in Heaven”). Accordingly, Anselm holds that God must “soften a man’s heart” if that man is to want to come to Him. Anselm takes seriously the Scriptural doctrine that faith is a gift of God. 42 This is why at the end of Proslogion 4 he can say: “What at first I believed through Your giving . . . .” For God gives saving faith by enabling it. And he enables it by motivating the soul and by arranging the circumstances. In this light Augustine writes in his Confessions: “Unaware I was led by You to Ambrose in order that, aware, I might be led by Ambrose to You.”43

But “faith” has a meaning other than trust (fiducia). There is also faith in the sense of the content of belief. The Medievals distinguished between fides quae creditur (the faith which is believed) and fides qua creditur (the faith by means of which it is believed). The latter is subjective; and insofar as it is accompanied by love for God, it receives the name ‘saving faith’. The former has to do with the doctrines that are believed, i.e., has to do with the object of belief. And even the devils are said to have belief (fides) about God in this latter sense. 44 Now, on Anselm’s view: neither in the subjective sense (faith as trust in God and commitment to God and involving love for God) nor in the objective sense (the body of beliefs that define an organized religion such as Christianity or Judaism, etc., and that are assented to on the basis of authority) does faith become superfluous once reason comes up with “proofs”. So, if as in the Monologion and the Proslogion, reason (as Anselm claims) demonstrates
both the existence of God and the attributes of God, this fact
does not mean for him that the Scriptures are no longer
necessary with respect to identifying the content of the faith
that is to be rationally justified—just as it also does not mean
that faith as trust is no longer necessary for salvation.

Even should reason be able to prove the existence of
God, Anselm still requires instruction from the Scriptures in
order to know, for example, such things as whether or not
God is a predestinating God—something that reason cannot
tell him. But when the Old Testament depicts God as saying,
with respect to Esau and Jacob before their birth, “the elder
shall serve the younger,” and when this statement is
alluded to approvingly in the New Testament (Romans 9:12),
then Anselm will accept the doctrine of predestination. And
even if both the Monologion and the Proslogion purport to
demonstrate that God is triune, Anselm still finds the
Scriptures indispensable; for they serve as a norm for the
assessment of his reasoning, by letting him know whether or
not his intellect is deceiving him. If he can find the doctrine
of the Trinity clearly taught in Scripture, then he will have
confidence in the rational argument that seems to be showing
that God is three-in-one. If he cannot find the doctrine
clearly taught in Scripture, then he will reassess the accuracy
of his chain of thought so as either to reaffirm it or to
question it. In (1) using Scripture to test his reasoning and in
(2) using his reasoning to test his interpretation of Scripture,
Anselm holds to the same reciprocal relationship between
revelation and reason as does Augustine.

By way of further example: reason cannot tell Anselm
how God will punish sinners. It can tell him only that justice
demands their punishment. In order to find an answer to his
query, he will have to turn to the Scriptures. And, in doing
so, he will have to use his reasoning in order to interpret
Scripture. On the other hand, as we have already seen with
regard to Adam and Eve’s salvation, reason will sometimes
assist by helping Anselm to answer questions that Scripture
does not address. In *De Casu Diaboli* Anselm asks whether
Satan foreknew that he would fall—something not ascer-
tainable from Scripture. By making rational inferences in the
light of certain of his presuppositions, Anselm is able
reasonably to conclude that Satan foreknew that he *could* fall
but did not foreknow that he *would* fall. Similarly, Satan
foreknew that if he fell, he *could* (justifiably) be punished;
but he did not know that if he fell, he *would* (actually) be
punished.

In the end, there are for Anselm two different sources of
knowledge; and these sources do concur and must concur:
some knowledge comes from Scriptural revelation; some
knowledge comes from reason and experience. Accordingly,
in *De Incarnatione Verbi* 6 Anselm uses the expression “to
know by clear reasoning” as well as by faith.” Similarly, as
he thinks, even someone of only modest intelligence can
know by clear reasoning that ‘Something than which a
greater cannot be thought’ exists. But this truth may also be
known from Scripture. Does the fact that a religious believer
knows this truth by clear reasoning lead Anselm to judge that
such a believer no longer needs the authority of the Bible
with respect to this truth? Not at all. For only the Bible will
tell the believer what obligations the fact of God’s existence
lays upon him. And—from Anselm’s Catholic viewpoint—
only the Bible will assure him that the God-man has already
come. Furthermore, the Bible—in its stories about Abraham,
Isaac, Jacob, in its stories about the Israelites, about Moses,
about the Davidic Kingdom, about the promised Messiah,
about the life of Jesus, etc.—will supplement and enrich the
truths inferred by reason. For, to take an additional example,
what could reason, on its own, rightly and reliably infer
regarding whether or not *all* human beings are to be saved
through Christ?
So why, then, does Pranger assert that, for Anselm, revelation becomes superfluous once conclusivistic reasoning comes into play? It is because he over-emphasizes Anselm’s word “sola”: for he takes “reason alone” to mean that any and all recourse to the Scriptures is excluded. But what Anselm means is that by itself reason can establish some truths independently of direct appeal to the authority of revelation. Yet, revelation is not therefore set aside. For in confirming the Scriptures, reason gives credence to the accompanying tenets that are revealed in Scripture, so that now Scripture takes on more importance than ever.

D. Conclusion

Pranger’s main error is that of over-simplifying. He has given us a simple-minded Anselm and an equally simple-minded Augustine—both of whom are alleged to see reason’s accomplishments as rendering revelation pointless in the degree to which reason itself is successful. Pranger must look at the whole Augustine and the whole Anselm—not just focus on three passages apart from their fuller context. An emblematic instance of Pranger’s missing the fuller context is his construing of Anselm’s rubric “unum argumentum” as “a single argument.” This construal—instead of the contextually more accurate construal “a single argument-form” or, still better, “a single consideration” (namely, the consideration that God is Something than which a greater cannot be thought)—leads Pranger to focus too narrowly on Proslogion 2-4 instead of upon the entire Proslogion. For later in the Proslogion Anselm tells us that God is greater than reason can grasp, that the eye of the soul is darkened, that God’s splendor bedazzles the mind, that there is a sense in which God is both seen and not seen by the one who seeks Him. Anselm’s prayer for further enlightenment is a prayer of faith. Indeed, the presence of faith pervades the Proslogion, where Anselm believes in order to understand. And although the Proslogion’s
prayerful intonations are not found in the *Monologion*, nevertheless the *Monologion*, far from discarding the act of faith, attempts to show that it is necessary (*Monologion* 76). And by establishing rationally that God exists and creates *ex nihilo* and is triune, the *Proslogion* points men toward the Scriptures, not away from them.
NOTES


2. Sic (vs. “latter’s”).


4. Ibid., p. 462.

5. Ibid., p. 467.

6. Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana 1, 39, 43 (PL 34:36). Unless otherwise indicated, the translations of Augustine are mine. The Scriptural verse here quoted is I Corinthians 13:8: “Charitas nunquam excidit: sive prophetiae evacuabuntur, sive linguae cessabunt, sive scientia destruetur” (Vulgate text). Augustine, who uses the Old Latin Bible (the Itala) writes not “destruetur” but “evacuabitur”. And the English translation used by Pranger renders the verse, in part, as: “If there are prophecies, they will lose their meaning; if there are tongues, they will cease; if there is knowledge, that too will lose it meaning.” (R.P.H. Green’s translation). (“PL” abbreviates the series Patrologia Latina, edited in Paris by J. P. Migne.)


9. Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichee, XIII, 18 (PL 42:294): “Now, we read the [Biblical] books of the Prophets and the Apostles for the observance of our faith, for the consolation of our hope, for the encouragement of our love ….”


11. Note what Augustine says about the profundity of Scripture, which could be studied for a lifetime without exhausting its truths. Epistle 137, 1, 3 (PL 33:516).

12. Regarding Augustine’s view on inerrancy, see his Epistle 82, 1, 3 (PL 33:277).


15. II Timothy 3:14-17.
16. II Timothy 3:16.
17. See n. 7 above.
20. *Cur Deus Homo* I, 20 (Anselm’s last speech in the chapter). See also II, 22 (Boso’s speech). “*Cur Deus Homo*” is abbreviated hereafter as “*CDH*”.
24. Cf. Augustine’s similar view. See n. 12 above.
27. Commendation of the *Cur Deus Homo* to Pope Urban II [copied with the *CDH* and placed before the Preface]. See *Isaias* (*Isaiah*) 7:9 in the Old Latin translation.
29. *CDH* I, 8 (Anselm’s first speech). See also *CDH* II, 10 (near the end).
30. Anselm alludes *en passant* to free will in *Proslogion* 25 and *CDH* I, 22 and 24. He analyzes the concept of free choice in his *De Libertate Arbitrii*.
31. *CDH* I, 10 (end).
33. *CDH* I, 12.
34. *CDH* I, 18.
35. *CDH* I, 10 and I, 20 and II, 16.
41. *CDH* II, 16.

42. Ephesians 2:8.


44. James 2:19.


46. See Augustine, Epistle 143, 7 (*PL* 33:588) and *De Doctrina Christiana*, II, 7, 9 (*PL* 34:39).

47. When Anselm uses the term “ratio” in the foregoing contexts, he means for its referent to include any source of evidence that does not involve direct appeal to authority. Thus, one proceeds *sola ratione* even when one introduces evidence from experience and conclusions from natural-law ethics, along with valid inferences therefrom—and not just when one argues on the basis of *a priori* considerations.

48. Note Pranger’s statement that “Anselm’s *sola ratione* would have been much more harmless had it been applied minus the *sola* ...” (p. 466).
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bourke, Vernon J. *The Essential Augustine*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1964. [Contains a list of Augustine’s works together with a list of English translations.]


