

FREEDOM OF THE WILL : PARALLELS
BETWEEN FRANKFURT AND AUGUSTINE

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CHAPTER ONE

FREEDOM OF THE WILL: PARALLELS BETWEEN FRANKFURT AND AUGUSTINE

At first glance it seems strange to compare the views of two philosophers from such different contexts as are Harry G. Frankfurt¹ and Aurelius Augustinus. After all, Frankfurt makes virtually no use of Augustine, virtually no mention of his philosophical doctrines—whether on free will or anything else.² And yet, the two have more to do with each other than initially meets the eye. For in their own ways both of them sketch a respective theory of freedom that is similarly insightful; moreover, the theories of both lapse into paradox (paradox of which each author is aware but from which neither seeks to escape). Of course, Frankfurt's articulation of his theory is more systematic, more focused than is Augustine's. Indeed, Augustine seems to make most of his points as if *en passant*; even in *De Libero Arbitrio* he shows little interest in sustained treatment of the topic heralded in the title. So what links Frankfurt and Augustine is not their philosophical style but rather (1) their putative triumph over the philosophical elusiveness and the conceptual impenetrability of the notion of freedom-of-will and (2) the fact that in coming to cognate conclusions, they share similar strategies. Thus, they admit of plausible comparison.

I

1. Frankfurt is well-aware of how slippery is the vocabulary of mental predicates—predicates such as "desire," "will," "motive," "intention," "choice," "preference," and "purpose". Some of these terms function as both nouns and verbs, whereas others function only as nouns. Some of them are interchangeable; others are not. Frankfurt himself proposes to use the verbs "to

desire" and "to want" interchangeably, even though they are not altogether synonymous. And he wisely skirts over a discussion of the many conceptual intricacies involved in the interrelationships between the meanings of the other terms. Instead, he concentrates on making the following points.

1.1. First-order desires are distinguishable from second-order desires: "Someone has a first-order desire when he wants to do or not to do such-and-such"; and "he has a second-order desire when he wants to have or not to have a certain desire of the first order" (p. 13). If someone wants to do *X*, then this wanting is a first-order desire; and if he wants to have the desire to do *X* (i.e., if he wants to want to do *X*), then this further wanting is of the second order. For example, someone may want to answer an advertisement for employment; and he may be glad that he wants to answer the ad instead of continuing to idle about. In other words, he desires to answer the ad; and, at the same time, he wants to have this desire.

1.2. An agent's *will*, in a given instance, Frankfurt says to be his *effective* first-order desire (or desires)—i.e., to be that first-order desire that succeeds in motivating him to action (or that shall succeed when he shall act or that would succeed if he were to act). In this sense an agent's will is not coextensive with his intent, for he may intend to do one thing but be motivated to do another instead (p. 14). Nor is his will coextensive with just any first-order desire; rather, his will is constituted only by that first-order desire (or combination of desires) that effectively motivates his action.

Many animals have inclinations or urges or desires; and apparently the higher species of nonhuman animals have motives and intents, carry on deliberation, and even make decisions (p. 12). Perhaps Frankfurt would agree with Montaigne's account in his *Apologie de Raimond Sebond*:

There is no ground for thinking that the beasts do by innate and enforced inclination the same things that we do by our choice and skill. We ought to conclude from like manifestations like faculties, and

consequently to confess that the same reasoning, the same way that we follow in working, is also that of animals

The fox, of whom the people of Thrace make use when they desire to undertake to cross on the ice a frozen river, and send him before them to that end—if we should see him, on the brink of the stream, put his ear very close to the ice, to perceive whether he hears at a long or a short distance the rustle of the water flowing beneath, draw back, or go forward, according as he thus learns the greater or less thickness of the ice, should we not be justified in thinking that there passes through his head the same reasoning that there would be in ours, and that it is a ratiocination and conclusion derived from natural sense: that which makes a noise is moving; that which moves is not frozen; that which is not frozen is liquid; and that which is liquid yields under a weight? For to attribute this simply to a keenness of the sense of hearing, without reasoning and without consequence [i.e., without inference], is a wild fancy and can not enter our minds.³

Even if Frankfurt, for his part, might not agree exactly with the way Montaigne states the comparison between men and beasts, nevertheless as long as he is prepared to ascribe to beasts motives, deliberations, and decisions,⁴ he cannot altogether disagree with Montaigne and cannot deny that certain nonhuman animals have wills.

1.3. Frankfurt regards human beings as distinctive not insofar as they have wills but insofar as they have second-order desires—insofar as they can want to have or not to have different first-order desires, or preferences. For "no animal other than man . . . appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires" (p. 12). Yet, Frankfurt distinguishes second-order desires from second-order volitions: "Someone has a desire of the second order either when he wants simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his will. In situations of the latter kind, I shall call his second-order desires 'second-order volitions' . . ." (p. 16). In other words, second-order volitions are desires to have such-and-such first-order volitions, where first-order volitions are desires that move to action, i.e., are effective desires.⁵ Here Frankfurt's illustration is instructive:

Suppose a man wants to be motivated in what he does by the desire to concentrate on his work. It is necessarily true, if this supposition is correct, that he already wants to concentrate on his work. This desire is now among his desires. But the question of whether or not his second-order desire is fulfilled does not turn merely on whether the desire he wants is one of his desires. It turns on whether this desire is, as he wants it to be, his effective desire or will. If when the chips are down, it is his desire to concentrate on his work that moves him to do what he does, then what he wants at that time is indeed (in the relevant sense) what he wants to want. If it is some other desire that actually moves him when he acts, on the other hand, then what he wants at that time is not (in the relevant sense) what he wants to want. This will be so despite the fact that the desire to concentrate on his work continues to be among his desires (p. 16).

In wanting to want to concentrate on his work, the man has both first- and second-order desires; and since he wants to be motivated by the (first-order) desire to concentrate, his so wanting is that kind of second-order desire that Frankfurt calls a second-order volition. Moreover, we see from that example that the second-order volition does not motivate or modulate either the first-order desire or the action of concentration. In fact, in the foregoing passage Frankfurt speaks as though the second-order volition were inoperative in these respects. For he states that "if when the chips are down, it is his desire to concentrate on his work that moves him to do what he does, then what he wants at that time is indeed (in the relevant sense) what he wants to want. If it is some other desire that actually moves him when he acts . . . , then what he wants at that time is not (in the relevant sense) what he wants to want." Frankfurt here makes no mention of his second-order wanting as having any influence either on the intensity of his first-order wanting or on what it is that he wants in the first order. Though the agent indeed cares which of his competing inclinations is the strongest, his caring is not here said by Frankfurt to modify his inclinations. Perhaps this omission results simply from an oversight by Frankfurt. For if an agent through his second-order volitions prefers one of his first-order desires over the other and "takes its side," so to speak, thereby identifying himself

therewith, then this "commitment" would seem to make some possible difference of some kind at the first-order level. Be that as it may, Frankfurt does say that what constitutes a human being as a *person* is that he has second-order volitions, which are manifestations of his "capacity for reflective self-evaluation" (p. 12). Of course, this capacity is that rational capacity in terms of which "a person is capable of becoming critically aware of his own will and of forming volitions of the second order" (p. 17). Nonetheless, even though "the structure of a person's will presupposes . . . that he is a rational being" (p. 17), the fact remains, states Frankfurt, that "the essence of being a person lies not in reason but in will" (p. 17).

2. Freedom of the will, continues Frankfurt, seems best to be construed along the analogy of freedom of action: "Now freedom of action is (roughly, at least) the freedom to do what one wants to do.⁶ Analogously, then, the statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means (also roughly) that he is free to want what he wants to want. More precisely, it means that he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants" (p. 20).

2.1. These statements by Frankfurt are very rough indeed. For he defines for us the expression "having, or enjoying, freedom of the will," and he does so by means of a *definiens* that uses the word "free": an agent's "having freedom of the will" means an agent's "being free to will what he wants to will." This definition is not helpful unless we are told what "being free to will" means. But perhaps Frankfurt is not attempting to furnish us with a definition but wants to provide us only with a nondefinitional conceptual analysis, so that he is simply calling our attention to an *important aspect* of freedom of the will. Indeed, later he says that "a person's will is free only if he is free to have the will he wants. This means that, with regard to any of his first-order desires, he is free either to make that desire his will or to make some other first-order desire his will instead" (p. 24). Perhaps Frankfurt's saying "only if" instead of "if and only if" attests further to his nondefinitional approach.

Or perhaps he says "only if" because "only if" follows from "if and only if" (as "*A* only if *B*" follows from "*A* if and only if *B*"). In any event, if he is telling us only what freedom-of-will is in some important respect, we might still want to learn from him, if possible, what it is essentially or fundamentally. And presumably this information would have to be conveyed to us through a definition. Or if Frankfurt suspects that "freedom of will" is not really definable and that such freedom has no "essence," then we should be told this as well. For otherwise we do not know what to make of his use of the word "mean".

2.2. In the quotation above (from p. 24) Frankfurt speaks differently from the way he spoke in his example about concentration (p. 16). For now he suggests that a person's will is free only if he is free to make one of his first-order desires his will (i.e., is free to make one of these first-order desires to be the desire that moves him to action). It seems, then, that freedom of the will has to do with a person's "making" some (first-order) desire motivate himself to action; yet, earlier we were told that freedom of the will has to do with a person's "wanting" some (first-order) desire to move him to action. But Frankfurt nowhere explicitly remarks that the second-order wanting is a kind of making or, perhaps, causing; and, in fact, he earlier gave the impression that the wanting had no special influence on the first-order desires. But when, as now, "wanting" is replaced by "making," the impression naturally arises that the wanting is a kind of making, i.e., that the second-order desire is a kind of "causal condition" and not just a kind of "endorsing,"⁷ in a psychological sense. In the end, it is not really clear how someone's *wanting* to want to concentrate on his work is identical with, or at least tantamount to, his *making* his wanting-to-concentrate to be his will.⁸

3. Furthermore, Frankfurt seems to be working with two somewhat different conceptions of freedom-of-will, each being elicited in conjunction with a different illustration, viz., the illustration of the unwilling addict and the illustration of the willing addict.

3.1. The unwilling narcotics addict detests his addiction and struggles against its power over him. His first-order desires conflict, for he both desires to take the drug and desires to keep from taking it. But, in addition, he has the second-order desire not to want to take the drug. And this second-order desire is also a second-order volition, because he wants, in the second order, the first-order desire-to-keep-from-taking-the-drug to constitute his will, i.e., to be his effective desire. But, being an addict, he does not succeed in bringing his first-order desires into conformity with his second-order volition. No matter how hard he struggles, his desire for the drug eventually prevails, so that he takes the drug "against his will" and "not of his own free will" (p. 18). To be sure, then, "the unwilling addict's will is not free. This is shown by the fact that it is not the will he wants" (p. 21). For the will that he wants, but seems unable to have, is the will to refrain from taking the drug. The unwilling addict would be free only if he could make his will accord with his second-order volition, for then he would have the will that he wanted to have. "It is in securing the conformity of his will to his second-order volitions . . . that a person exercises freedom of the will" (p. 20).

3.2. The willing narcotics addict is someone who is subject to the same physiological needs and psychological cravings as the unwilling addict. Yet, he *wants* to have the craving for the drug, just as he also wants to have the drug. (Such a willing heroin addict is vividly described in a front-page article in the *New York Times*, July 22, 1992.) If his desire for the drug were somehow to become diminished, he would seek out stimulation that would heighten the desire once again. Now, asserts Frankfurt, "the willing addict's will is not free, for his desire to take the drug will be effective regardless of whether or not he wants this desire to constitute his will" (pp. 24-25). But this rationale differs from the rationale given for why the unwilling addict's will is not free.

(1) Unwilling addict: his will is not free, because the will that he has is not the will that he wants to have (p. 21).

- (2) Willing addict: his will is not free, because his desire to take the drug is effective whether or not he wants it to be effective (pp. 24-25).

But *I* is equivalent to *I'* :

- (1') Unwilling addict: his will is not free, because his desire to take the drug is effective even though he does not want it to be effective.

But *I'* and 2 are differing rationales. In discussing the unwilling addict Frankfurt indicates that this addict lacks freedom of will (in the relevant respect) both because his first-order effective desires are not in conformity with his present second-order volition and because he cannot bring them into conformity therewith. But in discussing the willing addict, whose first-order effective desires *are* in conformity with his present second-order volition, Frankfurt indicates that that addict lacks freedom-of-will because if he were to become an unwilling addict, he could not bring his first-order desires into conformity with his new second-order volition. To be consistent Frankfurt must maintain that both addicts lack freedom of the will because their desire for the narcotic is effective no matter what their second-order volition happens to be, since the second-order volition is powerless. (The desire for the drug is so strong that the willing addict would never have to take steps to heighten his desire.)

4. In appealing to the illustration of the two different kinds of narcotics addicts, Frankfurt falls prey to another imprecision. For, on the one hand, he asserts that the willing addict's will is not free (p. 24); but, on the other hand, he maintains that a person's will is free in the sense that the person is free to want what he wants to want, i.e., free to will what he wants to will, or free to have the will that he wants (p. 20). Indeed, having freedom-of-will is said by Frankfurt to "mean" being free to want, or will, in the foregoing manner. But if someone's having freedom-of-will "means" his being free to will what he wants to will, then his not having freedom of will "means" his not being free to will what he wants to will. How, then, can the willing

addict *properly* be said not to have freedom of the will (in the relevant respect) when it would be *improper* to say that he is not free to will what he wants to will? For the willing addict gladly and willingly and freely wills what he wants to will; after all, he is a willing addict—is an addict willingly. So Frankfurt, if he is to save his illustration, will have to withdraw his quasi-definition. When he does so, he will escape an inconsistency but will be left with a paradox: "The willing addict's will is not free But when he takes the drug, he takes it freely and of his own will" (pp. 24-25).

Frankfurt makes only a faint-hearted attempt to dispel this paradox: "I am inclined to understand his [i.e., the willing addict's] situation as involving the overdetermination of his first-order desire to take the drug. This desire is his effective desire because he is physiologically addicted. But it is his effective desire also because he wants it to be. His will is outside his control, but, by his second-order desire that his desire for the drug should be effective, he has made this will his own" (p. 25). Yet, this way of describing the matter is problematical. For though the addict has made this will his own, nonetheless because this will is outside his control, he is improperly characterized as taking the drug freely. Because Frankfurt continues to assert that the addict takes the drug freely even though his will is unfree, his analysis succeeds only in perpetuating the paradox.

5. A further problem haunts Frankfurt's analysis of freedom-of-will in terms of the notion of wanting-to-want. Whereas Frankfurt's instincts are correct in skirting over the maze of conceptual crisscrossings that a philosopher needs to keep in sight when using mental predicates, still his simplified and meager terminology tends too much toward oversimplification. For "wanting to want" or "desiring to desire" or "desiring to want" or "wanting to desire"—or the likes—have connotations that mislead. For our desires of the first order are inclinations; accordingly, to speak of second-order desires is suggestive of higher-level inclinations, even as the very expression "to want

to want" is thus suggestive. But the problem of free will is not a puzzle (or a set of puzzles) about the relationship between levels of inclinations, or desires, but is rather a puzzle about the relationship between inclinations and consent thereto. Inclinations, frequently enough, are not in our power. They come and go—oftentimes (even in the absence of an addiction) in spite of whether we want to have them or not. Moreover, for the most part, we cannot be certain that we really do "select" the desires that motivate us, thereby making them our will; yet, insofar as we do select them and make them our will, we cannot properly substitute "want them" or "desire them" for "select them." For, in the context of free will, selecting one's inclinations is not *desiring* them or *wanting* them; rather, it is reflectively affirming them or consenting to them. If someone insists upon the expression "second-order desires," then he will need to make clear that these desires are *rational* desires, *rational* preferences—i.e., desires and preferences that accord with our rational assessment of our interests and needs.⁹

In speaking of having free will, we would do better to call free will an ability to choose in accordance with our rational preferences than to call it, as does Frankfurt, being free to want what we want to want—a statement made obscure by the reoccurrence of the word "free" and by the absence of any differentiation of wantings other than in terms of the object of the wanting. After all, a struggling narcotics addict's will is unfree because the addict has lost the ability, or power, actually to choose in accordance with his rational preference. He knows that his addiction is destroying his relations with his employer, with his wife, with his children, and even with himself. He does not rationally consent to having the cravings for the drug; indeed, he rationally consents to not having these cravings. But his rational consent is rendered inoperative by the intensity of the cravings that prevail over his rational judgment, over his deliberation. Thus, when the time comes—whether sooner or later—he chooses *for* the drug and *at odds with* his rational

judgment. By contrast, the nonaddict is someone whose rational deliberation makes a difference to his actual choice. Far from being inoperative, his deliberation has motivating force, along with certain of his desires and inclinations.

On the other hand, the *willing* addict is ordinarily said to be in a state of denial. He is denying that he is addicted, or else he is denying that his addiction is causing him personal or social or physiological difficulties. He is not thinking and judging and assessing clearly, so that his second-order preference is not his rational preference, we tend to say. Frankfurt is right to identify the problem of freedom of the will as one that is associated, in an essential way, with the relationship between our urges and the posture that we take toward those urges. But in characterizing our "posturing," he leaves aside an essential reference to rational deliberation, thereby misleadingly likening a second-order volition to a wanting that takes as its object a particular wanting-to-do. This fact coincides with his considering "the essence of being a person" to lie "not in reason but in will" (p. 17).

To some extent the foregoing appraisal of Frankfurt may seem unfair. For Frankfurt does not so much ignore the notions of rational consent, rational deliberation, and rational judgment as he does fail sufficiently to accentuate them. To be sure, he does speak of a person's *evaluating* his own desires and motives and of a person's capacity for *reflection* upon his desires, as well as of a person's *identification* with certain of his inclinations (pp. 18-19).¹⁰ These expressed notions do *underlie* his discussion of freedom. But they tend to remain too veiled in his definition or quasi-definition of "freedom of will." They get lost, as it were, in the oversimplified, and therefore gross, language of desiring and wanting.¹¹

II

1. Like Frankfurt, Augustine tends to use an overly simplified vocabulary in discussing the notion of free will. For the

verb "*velle*" together with the noun "*voluntas*," is made to bear the weight of many undistinguished significations and connotations. Augustine's reasoning trades upon the fact that "*velle*" and "*voluntas*" are terms with diffuse meanings. To be sure, Augustine had the linguistic means to distinguish wanting (*desiderans*) from choosing (*eligens*), and to distinguish consenting (*consentiens*) from both inclining (*inclinans*) and intending (*intendens*); and sometimes he does so. Nevertheless, he does not systematically distinguish them, often preferring to use "*volens*" as a kind of catch-all term. Moreover, like Frankfurt, Augustine shows no interest in affording us a formal definition of "free choice of the will"—an interest later shown by Anselm of Canterbury in his *De Libertate Arbitrii*. Augustine himself remains at the level of common parlance, assuming that his readers are familiar enough with his nontechnical expressions.¹² Thereby he transfers a great burden to his readers, who must attend carefully to the context of a given exposition or argument in order to understand correctly the terminology employed.

1.1. Too often even good scholars misapprehend Augustine's statements. Thus, Harry Wolfson writes: "Augustine maintains that[,] as a result of the corruption produced by the fall of Adam and inherited by his descendants[,] that freedom consisting of the ability to sin or not to sin which was possessed by Adam before his fall is no longer possessed by his descendants. Whatever man today does he does it not by his own free choice but by necessity."¹³ This last statement is, of course, misleading. For Wolfson, instead of saying vaguely "man today," should invoke Augustine's distinction between redeemed and unredeemed men today. And he should point out two things: that according to Augustine (1) the redeemed are under a "necessity of sinning" in a different sense from the unredeemed; and (2) the necessity of sinning, whether for the unredeemed or the redeemed, is not altogether antithetical to free choice.

1.1.1. Though the redeemed do not obtain in this lifetime

the gift of not being able to sin,¹⁴ they do to such an extent receive the assistance of grace in not sinning that Augustine, together with St. Paul, calls them no longer servants of sin but now servants of righteousness.¹⁵ They are no longer in bondage to sin, in that they no longer delight in it, delighting instead in doing the will of God insofar as it is revealed to them.¹⁶ Moreover, God is said to assist their wills in ways that He does not assist the wills of the unredeemed:

. . . to those to whom such assistance is lacking, [this lack] is the penalty of sin. But to those to whom such assistance is given, it is given according to grace, not according to obligation. And so much more amply is it given through our Lord Jesus Christ to those to whom it has pleased God to give it that not only is there present [that assistance] without which we cannot remain [upright] even if we will to but also [that assistance] is so great and of such a kind that we will to.¹⁷

In both Pauline and Augustinian theology this divine assistance to the redeemed is a constitutive part of regeneration and of "putting on the new man."¹⁸

1.1.2. Though neither the redeemed in this lifetime nor the unredeemed can altogether escape the tendency toward willing evilly, so that in this sense a *necessitas peccandi* is present, this *necessitas* is not conceived by Augustine as depriving human beings of free choice. That is, though post-lapsarian man is free in a manner different from the manner of Adam before the Fall, nonetheless Augustine would never say, as Wolfson supposes, that whatever man today does, he does not by his own free choice but by necessity. According to Augustine, fallen man does not sin *by necessity*, because he does not sin against his will: "For if we are to label as our necessity that which is not in our power but which causes what it can even if we are unwilling (e.g., the necessity of death), then it is evident that our willings, by which we live rightly or wrongly, are not under such a necessity. For we do many things which, if we were unwilling, we surely would not do. To these things

belongs foremostly *willing*.”¹⁹ If Wolfson wants to *criticize* Augustine's position, he is certainly entitled to do so. But he is wrong to *interpret* Augustine's position in a way completely foreign to Augustine's meaning.

1.2. Wolfson's mistaken interpretation continues:

In another place, he [viz., Augustine] raises again the question, "Can men do anything by the free determination of their own will?" and again his answer is: "Far be it, for it was by the evil use of his free will that man destroyed both it and himself [*Enchiridion* 9.30 (*PL* 40.246)]. Man thus both sins and does good not by freedom of choice but by necessity.”²⁰

But Wolfson here fails to respect the context of Augustine's remarks. For Augustine does not ask, à la Wolfson, "Can men do anything by the free determination of their own will?" Rather, he asks whether by the free choice of their wills the elect can do anything that by itself would entitle them to be restored to the state of righteousness. And he answers *not* that man *destroyed* himself²¹ and his free will by using free choice evilly but rather that by so using his free choice he became spiritually *lost* and he *lost* the free choice by which any longer to be able in every respect not to sin. But in losing *this* free choice, he did not lose *all* free choice of the will. Accordingly, Augustine goes on to say that man no longer has *vera libertas*; he does not, however, say that man has *omnino non libertas*. And, in fact, he teaches that fallen man retains a vestige of Adam's original freedom. Wolfson himself eventually concedes the latter point when he writes: "But despite all this, Augustine maintains that man is free.”²² Yet, in arriving at this point Wolfson has expounded Augustine incoherently.

1.2.1. The sense in which, for Augustine, the unredeemed cannot will the good needs special explanation. For, obviously, Augustine recognizes that very many of the unredeemed perform many acts of mercy and do much good during their lifetimes. They live respectable lives—even exemplary lives. Augustine singles out Socrates for special mention. Yet, Augustine

(being true to Scripture, as he believes) deems these acts to be unavailing toward meriting the salvation and the restoration of human nature. For even if some human being's act were perfectly in accordance with his religious and moral duty, still this act would not be done solely from a sense of religious and moral duty. For it would not be willed exclusively in order to fulfill the divine moral commandment *because* it is God's moral commandment. Indeed, the will would be tainted by some degree of admixed pride, self-righteousness, self-justification, self-congratulation, concern for one's reputation, one's social image, etc. So redemption comes by grace not by merit. And a human being, once redeemed, needs the continuance of grace to assist in motivating both his religious love of God and his moral scruples, thereby enabling his natural free will to will *bene* rather than *male*.²³

1.2.2. Wolfson erroneously speaks of grace as *necessitating*: "The necessity by which man can refrain from sin and act righteously is divine grace, which alone . . . can resist concupiscence. Then Augustine goes on to maintain that, just as man is powerless to resist his concupiscence, so he is also powerless to resist the grace bestowed upon him by God; and consequently, just as by the necessity of his concupiscence man must sin, so by the necessity of grace man must refrain from sinning and act righteously.”²⁴ Wolfson does not make clear that according to Augustine God does *not* necessitate a man's will: "[*Respondemus*] *nec ex Dei potentia vel in malum vel in bonum invitum aliquem cogi. . .*"²⁵ Grace is not a necessitating power, for not even the power of God forces a man's will.²⁶ Wolfson needs to qualify his statements about the irresistibility of grace so as not to give the impression that, for Augustine, all grace is "irresistible". For the context in which Augustine calls grace *efficacious* is the context of God's predestination: salvific, or justificatory, grace is efficacious in the sense that it succeeds in so motivating a man's will that the man wills to repent. But not all grace is saving grace; and non-

saving, or enabling, grace need not be efficacious and can certainly be resisted. It is resisted every time that one of the elect sins.

Augustine states expressly that grace is not opposed to free choice: "*liberum arbitrium per gratiam non evacuatur, sed statuitur*."²⁷ Moreover, he teaches plainly that some measure of free will is always present in (non-infant) human beings, since otherwise they would not be blamable for their misdeeds; the fact that God commands them to keep His precepts attests to their free choice.²⁸ "Surely, where there is said [in Scripture] 'Do not do this, and do not do that' and where, for doing or for not doing something in the divine admonitions, the work of the will is required, free choice is sufficiently demonstrated. So let no one, when he sins, accuse God in his heart; but, rather, let each impute to himself his sinning. And when he does something in conformity with God, let him not dissociate this from his own will. For since he acts willingly, [his deed] is to be called a good work" ²⁹ Augustine regards being willing or being unwilling as "of one's own will," i.e., as free.³⁰ Accordingly, he states that "in us there is always free will, though it is not always good. For either it is free from justice, [viz.,] when it serves sin, and then it is evil; or it is free from sin, [viz.,] when it serves justice, and then it is good."³¹ However, when a man wills to act evilly, he is *primarily* free not insofar as he is *free from justice* but insofar as he uncoercedly wills to act evilly.³² Augustine goes on to say that the assistance of grace is needed in order to will, and to do, the good.³³ But the fact that grace is needed for doing the good does not imply that one who without grace does evil, does it unfreely. On the other hand, neither does the assistance of grace, we have seen Augustine to say, in any way violate or remove free choice. Not even when God is said by Augustine to give to believers the will to believe does Augustine consider this gift to override freedom of will or the will's free choice.

. . . the act of the will [by which we believe] is to be attributed to the gift of God not only because it is from free choice, which is created in

us as part of our nature, but also because by influences from things observed God induces (*agit*) us to will and to believe. [These influences may come] outwardly from the gospel's exhortations, as when the commandments of the law accomplish something if they advise a man of his weakness in order that in faith he may seek refuge in justificatory grace. [Or they may come] from within, [as instanced by cases] where no one has within his power what comes into his mind, though to consent or dissent is of his own will. In these ways, then, when God induces (*agit*) the rational soul to believe Him (for it cannot believe anything by free choice if there is no influencing or calling to that which it believes), assuredly God works in man to-will-to-believe, and in all things His mercy precedes us. But to consent to God's calling or to dissent from it is of one's own will, as I said. This fact not only does not invalidate the utterance "What do you have which you have not received?"¹⁴ but even confirms it. Indeed, only by consenting can the soul receive and have the gifts of which it hears the verse [speak]. Accordingly, what it receives and has is of God; but, assuredly, the act-of-receiving and the act-of-having are of the one who receives and has.³⁵

God's inducing, urging, and persuading us, Augustine firmly believes, does not deprive us of our power to consent thereto or to dissent therefrom. And in this power resides our essential freedom. We cannot always control what thoughts we have, he notes above; nor can we always control what desires or inclinations arise in us. But, he claims, we do always retain the power to consent or not to consent to having them; that is, when we thus consent or dissent, we do so of our own will, i.e., freely. Insofar as we have thoughts or desires that we do not consent to having, the thoughts and desires are not imputed to us as sin,³⁶ for we have them against our will. But our consenting or dissenting is not against our will. Finally, even though we may either consent to or dissent from having certain thoughts and desires that we cannot keep from arising in us, we can only *consent* to our acts of will or our choices; for anyone who wills wills willingly, i.e., with consent.

Thus, Augustine can speak of free choice as "*naturaliter insitum*," as "naturally implanted,"³⁷ within us and as belonging by nature to the rational soul.³⁸ Yet, not only after the Fall but

even beforehand the will required the assistance of divinely given incentives in order to will the good. So special grace is required for assisting the will in its upright exercise. Yet, free choice belongs to man by nature, not by special grace. Of course, whatever belongs to man by nature is received by the gift of God. Hence, Augustine sometimes speaks of the existence of free choice as pertaining to grace;³⁹ but this is not special grace but the common grace by which every human being possesses whatever belongs to his nature.

1.2.3. Finally, Wolfson errs in asserting that "the reduction of all bad concupiscences to the concupiscence of sex and the identification of sexual concupiscence with the inherited corruption is something new introduced by Augustine into Christian theology."⁴⁰ This would, indeed, have been a new view if it had been introduced by Augustine—as it was not. That is, Augustine does not *reduce* "all bad concupiscences to the concupiscence of sex"; nor does he teach the *identification* of sexual concupiscence with inherited corruption as if inherited corruption were only that. On the contrary, Augustine considers sexual lust to be but one form of lusting. This view is expressed clearly in *De Libero Arbitrio* 3.17.48 (PL 32:1294-1295). *Avaritia* (greed), Augustine says, which is called by Scripture the root of all evils,⁴¹ is to be understood not simply as concerning money but as concerning all things that are desired immoderately, in any context where anyone wills something more than is sufficient. *Avaritia*, in this sense, is *cupiditas*; and *cupiditas*, he says, is a wicked will (*improba voluntas*); hence, a wicked will is the cause of all evils. Here, as elsewhere, Augustine implicitly uses "*cupiditas*" as interchangeable with "*concupiscentia*". Indeed, though he here calls *avaritia* the root of all evils, elsewhere he writes:

Hoc [opus] enim peccati nomine appellat [Apostolus], unde oriuntur cuncta peccata, id est, ex carnali concupiscentia. Quidquid enim est peccatorum in dictis, in factis, in cogitationibus, non exoriuntur nisi ex mala cupiditate, non exoriuntur nisi ex illicita delectatione. Huic ergo

illicitae delectationi si resistamus, si non consentiamus, si membra velut arma non ministremus: non regnat peccatum in nostro mortali corpore.⁴²

Hereby Augustine shows, among other things, that he sometimes uses "*carnalis concupiscentia*," "*mala cupiditas*," and "*illicita delectatio*" interchangeably⁴³ and that, like "*avaritia*," what they too name is the source of all sins. Moreover, by saying that "*cuncta peccata*" ("all sins") arise from carnal concupiscence, Augustine is denying that whenever through concupiscence we sin "in words, deeds, and thoughts," we are thereby always sinning sexually. For sexual sins compose only a part of the category of all sins. Moreover, sexual sins are instances of the sin of *avaritia*; *avaritia* is not an instance of sexual lust. So Wolfson's fancy about an alleged reduction by Augustine of "all bad concupiscences to the concupiscence of sex" is just *that*—viz., fancy.⁴⁴

In *De Civitate Dei* 14.13.1 Augustine explains the evil wills of Adam and of Eve as having their origin in pride, which he characterizes as "*perversae celsitudinis appetitus*" (PL 41:420). Because pride is a kind of desire (*appetitus*), it too is identified as the beginning of every sin.⁴⁵ So the source of Eve's sin and of Adam's sin was a desire for an inordinate elevation—not the desire for sexual union. Moreover, Augustine teaches that *mala cupiditas* or *carnalis concupiscentia* insofar as they have to do with the lust of sexual arousal first appeared after the Fall.⁴⁶ Had Adam and Eve not fallen, they would have continued to unite sexually (for procreation) without experiencing concupiscence, for the operation of the bodily members that are required for sexual union would have continued to remain subjected to the rational will.⁴⁷ Only if concupiscence in the bad sense were reduced by Augustine to the lust of sexual desire—something we have seen not to be the case—could inherited corruption be identified by him with sexual concupiscence and sexual concupiscence be identified with inherited corruption. Wolfson, instead of using the expression "identification with"

should state that the penal corruption that was inherited as a consequence of Adam's sin includes sexual concupiscence, even as it includes other forms of inordinate desire, as well as also the vulnerability to sickness, unhappiness, and death.

It is important to recognize that even though Augustine does regard sexual concupiscence as an evil, the use of this evil within marriage is a good: "*Cum vero sit bonum nuptiarum bonus usus mali, quid mirum si de ipso malo, quo bene utitur bonitas nuptiarum, trahitur malum quod est originale peccatum?*"⁴⁸

2. So Adam's original sin does not result from sexual lust, but rather sexual lust results from Adam's sin. Adam's fall, like Satan's, resulted from pride—an inordinate desire, or will, for elevation. And this first evil willing is said by Augustine not to have had an efficient cause but to have had only a deficient cause (*causa deficiens*).⁴⁹ That is, it arose when Adam (1) failed steadfastly to will the good that God willed for him to will and (2) willed an inferior good instead. This wayward willing Augustine does not know how to explain, because he regards it as fundamentally irrational. But he feels certain that its motivating cause was not God, since before the Fall Adam's inclinations were fully subject to Adam's will, and Adam's will was disposed to will uprightly. Augustine refers to Adam's first sinful willing as a falling away (*defectus*) from the good—a falling away that has no other explanation than that Adam wanted something else simply because he wanted it.⁵⁰

When Augustine teaches that Adam's descendants inherit original sin, he means that they inherit the guilt and the corrupting consequences of that sin, not the actual sin itself. They inherit it in the sense that when they reach the age of reason and accountability, inordinate desires dispose them toward willing evilly, and thereby toward sinning personally.⁵¹ Though their respective nature has an inherited corruption, the substance of the nature is good, maintains Augustine: an infant "is both innocent through having no sin of his own and guilty through original sin. But his nature's substance, of which God

is the Author, is good even in great sinners"⁵² So man's nature, though vitiated by the Fall, remains essentially something good—i.e., remains a good thing qua nature.

2.1. The guilt⁵³ and corruption caused to human nature by Adam's sin is said by Augustine to be *propagated* to Adam's descendants by carnal generation. Yet, the guilt of that sin is not produced in them by the act of procreation itself (i.e., by the sexual relations), even though they contract it through the instrument of natural procreation.⁵⁴ (For through procreation, Augustine thinks, the vitiated soul is propagated together with the body.) This contracting is what Augustine alludes to when he indicates that *originale malum de carnali concupiscentia trahitur*.⁵⁵ To be sure, Augustine does not know just how the soul is naturally propagated. (And at times he expresses doubt as to whether it really is propagated.⁵⁶) But though he does not understand the mechanism, he believes the teaching of Scripture, where the Psalmist says "I was conceived in iniquities: and in sins did my mother conceive me" (Psalms 50:7) and where the Apostle writes "in Adam all die" (I Corinthians 15:22). Accordingly, he concludes that even if we cannot understand how it is that infants contract original sin, we ought at least to believe it.⁵⁷

2.2. Because Jesus's conception was not "*de opere Adam*,"⁵⁸ i.e., was not "from the work of Adam," Jesus's human nature, assumed from the cleansed seed of Mary, was not subject to the guilt and the penalty of Adam's sin.

Therefore, He alone [viz., God the Son,] having become also a human being while remaining God, never had any sin and did not assume sinful flesh, although [His humanity was taken] from His mother's sinful flesh. For, assuredly, the flesh that He assumed from her He either cleansed before assuming or cleansed in assuming. And so, [He created and chose] the Virgin Mother, who conceived not by the law of sinful flesh (i.e., not by the motion of carnal concupiscence) but who because of her devout faith deserved [to have] the holy embryo made within her. Her whom He was going to choose He created; her from whom He was going to be created He chose.⁵⁹

Accordingly, God the Son assumed a sinless human nature, conceived miraculously from Mary's seed by the power of the Holy Spirit—assumed it apart from the power of the male seed and apart from the accompaniment of *concupiscentia vel libido*.

3. Thus far we have seen that Augustine, like Frankfurt, proceeds without a formal definition of "freedom of the will" and that his terminology is at one and the same time overly simplified and highly connotative. In many ways he has recourse to the language of desire; but he also makes unsystematic use of the language of consent and does so in ways more explicit than Frankfurt's equally unsystematic allusions to "reflective self-evaluation" (p. 12), "forming volitions" (p. 17), "identification and withdrawal" (p. 18), and "commitment" (p. 21).

3.1. Part of what motivates Augustine's approach is the Latin translation of Psalms 118:20: "*Concupivit anima mea desiderare justificationes tuas in omne tempore*":⁶⁰ "My soul has desired to long for Your justifications⁶¹ at all times." Here the Psalmist speaks of a *bona concupiscentia*. And Augustine puzzles over "how it is that the longing is desired and yet there is not present in us that thing the desire for which is already present in us."⁶² For even longing is desiring, he says. So he attempts to understand the Psalmist's distinction in terms of an illustration: A sick man who is troubled by nausea and who wants to overcome it desires to long for food, while desiring not to have the nausea. Since the nausea is an associated ailment of the body, whereas the desire to long for food is present in the mind, the mind desires that the appetite return; and this phenomenon Augustine finds unsurprising. But what still intrigues him is the case where *both* desires belong properly to the mind—the case, that is, where someone desires to long for God's justifications. How is it that in one and the same mind, he asks himself, I have the desire for a longing but do not have the longing? How are these things *two* things instead of one and the same thing? "Why do I desire to long for the justifica-

tions and not desire the justifications rather than the longing for them? Or in what way can I desire the longing for the justifications and not also desire the justifications themselves, given that I desire the longing for them because I desire to have them? But if so, then surely I already desire them. Why, then, is it necessary that I desire the longing for them, since I already have it and am aware that I have it? For I could not desire the longing for justice except by desiring justice. Isn't this what I said above, viz., that there must be loved even the love by which is loved what ought to be loved?—even as there must be hated the love by which is loved what ought not to be loved." Augustine continues his dialectic:

Indeed, we hate the desire by which our flesh desires contrary to our spirit,⁶³ and what is this desire except an evil love? Moreover, we love the desire by which our spirit desires contrary to the flesh; and what is this desire except a good love? But when we say "ought to be loved," what are we saying other than "ought to be desired"? Therefore, since God's justifications are rightly desired, the desire for God's justifications is rightly desired. This point can be stated in another manner as follows: if God's justifications are rightly loved, then the love of God's justifications is rightly loved.⁶⁴

Augustine continues by asking whether perhaps desiring and longing are two different things in that not every desire is a longing. For both those things that are possessed and those things that are not possessed are desired; regarding the former, the reason that a man enjoys the things that he possesses is that he continues to *desire* them. By contrast, longing is a desire only for things that are absent, not for things already possessed.

But how can God's justifications be absent except when they are not known? Or are they also to be considered absent when they are known but are not done? For what are justifications except just *works*, not words? And, accordingly, they cannot be longed for, because of a weakness of soul. But where by the mind's reason there is seen how useful and health-giving they are, the longing for them can be desired.

For oftentimes we see what ought to be done, and yet we do not do it. For we are not delighted to do it, and we desire to be [thus] delighted. The intellect grasps rapidly; but a weak and human affection complies slowly, and at times does not comply at all. Accordingly, then, [the Psalmist] desired to long for the things he discerned to be good, desiring to have the delight for those things whose accordance with reason he was able to see.⁶⁵

3.2. In the foregoing passages Augustine speaks of *concupiscere desiderare*, *concupiscere desiderium*, *diligere concupiscenciam*, *appetere ut appetat*, *diligere dilectionem*, *concupiscere concupiscenciam*, *cupire ut delectet*, and *cupire habere delectationem*—all in the course of interpreting the Psalmist's utterance "*Concupivit anima mea desiderare . . .*" This is Augustine's "language of desire," which even here he relates to the rational judgments of the mind, since he recognizes, contrary to the Platonic Socrates, that a man does not always act in accordance with his better judgment. In interpreting Psalms 118:20 Augustine does not address the issue of free will. The reason for this absence we have already seen: viz., that he conceives of free choice not in terms of desiring to desire but in terms of our ability to consent to our desires and promptings, where consenting involves an essential relationship to reason and reflection. The language of consent looms prominently in Augustine and overlaps with both the language of desire and the language of willing: one can consent to an evil desire for something or consent to will something. Moreover, one consents willingly⁶⁶ or dissents willingly;⁶⁷ but no one consents unwillingly, any more than anyone wills unwillingly.⁶⁸ Though one can will to will and desire to desire and will to desire⁶⁹ and desire to will, Augustine seems to find no use for the notion of consenting to consent.

The terms "*consensio*" (or "*consensus*") and "*assensus*" Augustine tends to use interchangeably, as in the expressions "*assensus voluntatis*"⁷⁰ and "[*voluntatum*] *consensio*."⁷¹ But he also uses "*cordis assensus*,"⁷² which he interchanges with "*cordis consensio*."⁷³ Similarly, he indicates not only that *voluntas*

*consentit*⁷⁴ but also that *ratio consentit* and *mens consentit*⁷⁵ and *homo consentit*.⁷⁶ What all of this usage shows is that the language of consent is, for Augustine, made to serve a role that captures not only the inclinational element in free choice but also the rational component. "For we consent," he tells us elsewhere, "when we approve and are willing";⁷⁷ approving involves the dimension of rational judgment, whereas being willing involves the dimension of affection.⁷⁸ Where we do not approve, we do not consent, maintains Augustine. Moreover, though approving involves rational discernment, it is not the same thing as rational discernment. For we do, and consent to do, many things which we discern that we ought not to do. Even though in so doing we act against our better judgment, we nonetheless act freely insofar as we consent to our action, Augustine wants to say. For in consenting, we approve of having the inclination that we have, without necessarily approving of it in the sense of judging it to be a right or a good inclination to have. In such a case our rational judgment plays a role—though not an overriding role—in motivating us. For, truly, "*quid agendum sit videmus, nec agimus—quia non delectat ut agamus, et cupimus ut delectet*."⁷⁹

4. Like Frankfurt, Augustine, too, only *sketches* a theory of freedom. He does not seek to escape from the labyrinth of linguistic and conceptual puzzles within which his own use of language entraps him. Still, he is aware of many of these conceptual *traquenards*, and the best he can do is to call attention to some of them, as he does with the Psalmist's words "*Concupivit anima mea desiderare . . .*" Like Frankfurt he, too, is aware of certain paradoxes that arise within his own statement of his views. And, like Frankfurt, he points to these paradoxes without seeking to penetrate their paradoxicality. But he thinks that to say *something* about them is preferable to ignoring them altogether. In the end, the depth and the complexity of the philosophical problems that generated them prove insurmountable to him. And so, not being able to deal with them

analytically, he deals with them rhetorically and homiletically.

4.1. Examples of such paradoxes abound. We have already noticed the paradox that no one wills against his will, that no one's will is ever compelled.⁸⁰ At times, Augustine gives the impression that God simply would not violate human freedom by allowing a will to be compelled;⁸¹ at times, he intimates that such compulsion would be logically impossible.⁸² In the end, he settles for concluding that it never happens, and he seeks to differentiate compulsion from inducement and persuasion. Both God and the Devil, he tells us, provide incentives in order to motivate us; however, we ourselves retain the power to withhold consent. Satan's inducements are enticements, because they are inducements toward evil: "If the Devil on occasion [enticingly] suggests something, he lays hold of the one who consents; he does not compel him against his will. For he seduces or draws only him whom he has found to be in some respect already like himself. For example, he finds him to be inordinately desiring something; and the inordinate desire opens the door for the Devil's [enticing] suggestion to enter."⁸³ Augustine, we have seen, never satisfactorily explores the concept of addiction. And yet, as we have also seen,⁸⁴ his theory of consent leaves room for consistently introducing the notion of "choosing unfreely," had he but seen how to do so or but thought the doing-so desirable.

Moreover, we saw earlier that even God's enabling and summoning inducements can be resisted and that they *are* resisted every time a redeemed man sins. In the case of conversion, however, God so prepares the will that the prospective convert wants to repent. Even this preparation of the will Augustine refuses to consider as compelling, though he concedes that it is always effective. And so, he proceeds to examine the further paradox—fostered by Scripture⁸⁵ itself—that (1) God works in a man his willing to convert and yet that (2) that man converts freely.

4.2. Another clear example of Augustine's recognition of

paradoxicality is discernible in his exposition of Psalms 118:3.⁸⁶ He summarizes his quandary:

Because of what is written in this psalm, viz., "For they that work iniquity have not walked in His ways," and because "iniquity is sin," as the Apostle John says,⁸⁷ then a difficult question arose: viz., how it is that in this life saints (1) cannot be without sin (because it is true that "if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us"⁸⁸) and nevertheless (2) can walk in the Lord's ways, wherein those who work iniquity do not walk. [This question] was answered with the Apostle Paul's words "It is no longer I that do it but the sin that dwelleth in me."⁸⁹ For how is it that one in whom sin dwells would be without sin? Nevertheless, he walks in the Lord's ways, wherein those who work [iniquity] do not walk. For no longer does *he* commit sin but rather the sin that dwells in him [does so]. However, the [foregoing] question was answered in such a way that another, more difficult [question] was begotten: viz., how a man does that which he does not do. For [the Apostle] said both "That which I will, I do not"⁹⁰ and "I do not do it but, rather, the sin that dwells in me [does it]." Hence, we are to understand [the following]: When the sin that dwells in us works in us, then we do not commit the sin if our will does not at all consent to it but rather restrains even the members of the body so that they do not obey the bodily desires. For does anything except only our illicit desires produce sin in us when we are unwilling [to sin]? If no assent of the will is given to these [desires], then some feeling is indeed motivated but no effect results therefrom Therefore, these desires produce the sin. If we comply with them, we also commit sin. But if we obey the Apostle and do not comply with them, then not we but the sin that dwells in us does the work.⁹¹

Here Augustine, in terms of his notion of consent, suggests an explanation for how a person can have sinful desires and still be upright. But in dealing with the paradoxicality, he furnishes only a rhetorical and homiletical response. For to ascribe to *sin* the work that is done is to use the rhetorical technique of reification and personification: sin does the work of producing the illicit desires; the man does the work of either complying or not complying with them. When the man does not comply he does not sin; rather, he is made sinful by sin, which works

in him to produce his sinful desires. Augustine's explanatory technique does not succeed, because it by-passes the heart of the Apostle's quandary. For the Apostle acknowledges that "the good which I will, I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do" (Romans 7:19). And what he then affirms is "if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that do it but sin that dwelleth in me" (Romans 7:20). So what the Apostle states, paradoxically, is that *if he does* that which he does not will to, then *he* does not do it but his indwelling sin does it. But what Augustine explains is that *if the Apostle does not do* that which he does not consent to, then neither does he do it nor does sin do it (for no action occurs), even though sin produces the desire to do it. Consequently, the Apostle's paradoxical statement retains its paradoxically, the density of which Augustine has made only a homiletic attempt to explore. But, after all, can any more be expected of him in his sermon. For the psychology of sin is beset by theory-laden expressions whose underlying conceptions are not fully amenable to philosophical analysis. And Augustine, whose only conception of addiction is as habit (*consuetudo*), does not have the philosophical tools to do more than to adduce certain bafflements for us. These latter are posed in such a way that—like the *aporiai*, in the *Confessiones*, concerning time and memory—they resist straightforward solution.

In his brilliance Augustine, like Frankfurt, succeeds in showing us new and elucidating ways of looking at certain familiar perplexities. He puts the old wine into new bottles, so to speak. But, like Frankfurt, he too does significantly more: he reshapes some of the old concepts (e.g., "desiring to desire"), and he adds new paradox-begetting perspectives of his own. An instance of this latter addition is his introduction of the notion of Adam's (and Satan's) first sin as a falling away (*defectivus motus*) of the will whereby the will was turned away from a greater good in preference of a lesser, illicit one—a movement, nonetheless, which was *voluntarius*, or *spon-*

taneus.⁹² This movement is said to have resulted not from a *causa efficiens* but from a *causa deficiens*,⁹³ so that the origin, though voluntary, is ultimately inexplicable. Augustine's claim is here paradoxical because for a choice to be free, it must be one's own; and calling it one's own suggests an efficient act of the will, except perhaps in those cases where not-choosing is tantamount to choosing. But evil choices cannot all be relegated to this latter class of cases. It seems, then, that speaking of a "deficient" cause of the will should be but a *modus loquendi* by whose use Augustine means to say that the ultimate source of Satan's evil act-of-will was Satan's "efficient" self-determination of his own will. But Augustine explicitly rules out this alternative, claiming that Satan's created nature was good and that this good nature could not have been an efficient cause of an evil will. And so, we are left to puzzle over Augustine's words: "If an efficient cause of this evil willing is sought, nothing is found. For what is it that makes [this] willing *evil* when it does the evil work? Consequently, the evil willing is the efficient [cause] of the evil work; but nothing is the efficient [cause] of the evil willing" (*De Civitate Dei* 12.6).

At times Augustine revels rhetorically in the beauty of quasi-paradoxical expression: "*Nemo ergo ex me scire quaerat, quod me nescire scio, nisi forte ut nescire discat, quod sciri non posse sciendum est.*"⁹⁴ At other times he uses a paradoxical-sounding expression primarily to capture our attention: "*Dilige, et quod vis fac.*"⁹⁵ For his further discussion shows that he does not intend his words to be construed as meaning something radical. Yet, his imperative admits of being as easily misunderstood as does Luther's command "*pecca fortiter.*"

5. Finally, like Frankfurt, Augustine himself attributes to nonhuman animals wills, memories, and judgments. And like Frankfurt he regards such animals neither as having free will nor as being persons nor as being rational, insofar as rationality involves what Frankfurt refers to as "reflective self-evaluation" (p. 12).

5.1. Brute animals, qua perceivers, Augustine characterizes as resembling human beings by virtue of having not only five "outer" senses but also a single "inner" sense. When Augustine speaks of "outer sense," he means not the sense organ itself but the power of the soul that makes use of a given organ. Thus, the sense of sight is located primarily in the soul, not in the eye, a bodily organ. Even though Augustine does sometimes speak of the eye as seeing and the ear as hearing, these expressions are common parlance and are shorthand for his view that the soul makes use of the eye for seeing and of the ear for hearing. Moreover, since the soul, with its enlivening and sensing powers, is present to the instruments of perception such as the eye, the visual sense is sometimes spoken of by Augustine as located in the eye; but, of course, this figurative statement does not exclude the visual sense's belonging nonmetaphorically to the soul. "And, therefore, given that sensing is not done by the body but by the soul through the body: even though we say astutely that the bodily senses are distributed in accordance with the difference of the material elements, nevertheless since the soul, wherein the power of sensing is present, is not material, it performs its activity-of-sensing through a quite refined body."⁹⁶

The foregoing point about the outer senses, viz., that they belong to the soul, requires special mention only because it has sometimes been denied—perhaps partly on the basis of a misleading translation in the *Fathers of the Church* series. For example, Oscar Schmiede writes: "By 'sense' Augustine means 'sense organ' so that when it is said here [viz., *DT* 11.2.3] that the vision is the informed sense[,] [then] that is to say that it is the informed sense organ."⁹⁷ Schmiede seems misled by the English translation with which he is working. For Stephen McKenna's translation of a segment of *DT* 11.2.2 reads: "We differ from them [viz., the blind] in this, that there is in us even when we do not see, the organ by which we can see and which is called the sense" ⁹⁸ Here the expression "organ by which we can see" rather than, say, "*unimpaired organ through*

which we can see" can mislead. Since in the above passage Augustine himself does not use a Latin word for organ⁹⁹ (or for unimpaired organ) but, rather, the translator supplies the English word, a closer translation is called for: "We differ [from them] in that there is present in us even when we are not seeing, that by which we are able to see, which is called the sense." Schmiede's misconception might also be occasioned by McKenna's outright mistranslation a little farther along in the same text: "And though the inanimate body does not experience any sensation, yet the soul, when it is mingled together with the body, does experience sensation through a bodily organ, and this same organ is called the sense."¹⁰⁰ Here a more accurate translation would be: "And though the inanimate body does not sense, yet the soul, when it is united with the body, senses through a bodily instrument, and the same instrument is called [the instrument] of the sense."¹⁰¹ Elsewhere Augustine also speaks of "*vis qua per oculos cernimus*" ("the power by which we discern through the eyes"),¹⁰² "*species visibilis qua sensus corporis formabatur*" ("the visible form by which the bodily sense was informed"),¹⁰³ and "*[species] corporis ex qua sensus formatur*" ("the form of the material object, from which [form] the sense is informed").¹⁰⁴ There are many other such passages that attest to the sense's being in-formed and that witness against the in-formation of the organ, or instrument, of sense. Unfortunately, a reader's understanding of these passages is sometimes influenced by McKenna's freer translations of other passages such as *De Trinitate* 11.4.7: ". . . that will, which continually moves the eye to be informed here and there . . ." ¹⁰⁵ According to this translation the eye is in-formed—i.e., the organ of sight receives a likeness of the material object's immaterial form. Yet, what the Latin clause really says is quite different: ". . . that will which repeatedly conducts in this and that direction the mind's gaze that is to be in-formed . . ." ¹⁰⁶ So it is not the eye but a mental power of the soul that receives the immaterial formal likeness, according to Augustine.

Some confusion may arise from *De Libero Arbitrio* 2.3.8:

"*Namque aliud est quo videt bestia, aliud quo ea quae videndo sentit, vel vitat vel appetit: ille enim sensus in oculis est, ille autem intus in ipsa anima . . .*"¹⁰⁷ John Burleigh, whose translation Schmiede here uses, renders the Latin words accurately enough: "For in the case of the beast the sense of sight is a different thing from the sense to shun or to seek the things it sees. The former belongs to the eyes, the latter is within the soul itself."¹⁰⁸ A merely cursory look at Augustine's words might suggest that the sense of sight belongs to the eyes but not to the soul. However, this is not Augustine's point. Rather, he means that the "outer" sense of sight is in the eyes insofar as the soul's power of seeing is in the eyes; by contrast, the "inner" sense is not in the eyes (or in any of the other bodily members) but is the sense-within-the-soul that senses all five of the outer senses and what they transmit to it.¹⁰⁹

So according to Augustine human beings have in common with nonhuman animals the power of perception, and this power relates both to the outer senses and to the inner sense. The inner sense, we have just noted, senses the outer senses as well as their contents. Thus, it is *aware* of when an outer sense is sensing (i.e., is seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, or touching) and when it is not. Moreover, it *remembers* what it previously sensed, so that it avoids objects or situations remembered to cause pain, just as it also seeks out objects or situations remembered to produce pleasure. Moreover, the inner sense *judges* concerning the outer senses, just as the outer senses judge concerning material objects.¹¹⁰ For example, the inner sense might judge that a voice heard by the outer sense is coming from behind. Finally, the inner sense is a communal sense, which *synthesizes* the data received from the various outer senses.

5.2. Students are often confused by the fact that, for Augustine, the inner sense belongs to the outer man. The terminology of "*homo exterior*" and "*homo interior*" Augustine draws from II Corinthians 4:16: "*Et si exterior homo noster corrumpitur, tamen interior renovatur de die in diem.*"¹¹¹ In *De Trini-*

tate 12.1.1 (*PL* 42:997-998) he identifies the outer man as follows: "Whatever we have in the mind in common with a mindless animal is still rightly said to pertain to the outer man. For not only will the body be considered to be the outer man but so too will be the body's associated life, by which are enlivened the structure of the body and all the senses with which the outer man is furnished for sensing external objects. When the images from these senses—images fixed in memory—are viewed again in recollecting, the recollecting is still said to pertain to the outer man." This delineation coincides with Augustine's earlier statement in *De Trinitate* 11.1.1: "No one doubts that just as the inner man is endowed with understanding, so the outer man is endowed with bodily senses" (*PL* 42:983). Of course, the "bodily" senses are not the bodily *instruments* of sensing but are the soul's *sensory powers* (sight, hearing, etc.). Further confirmation of what Augustine means by "outer man" is found in *De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII* 51.3 (*PL* 40:33): "Because man apart from life is not rightly called man, the outer man is not the body alone; nor is [the outer man] only the life that is in the bodily senses. Rather, it is more correctly understood to be both together."¹¹²

When Augustine states that nonhuman animals have memory and make perceptual judgments, he specifies that their memory and judgment are without a rational component. In *De Trinitate* 15.23.43 he alludes to "man's memory, and especially that which brute animals do not have—viz., that by which intelligible things are so contained [therein] that they did not enter into the memory by way of the bodily senses."¹¹³ As early as *De Libero Arbitrio* 2.6.13 he explicitly denied that nonhuman animals have reason or understanding;¹¹⁴ and in *De Vera Religione* he denied that they have knowledge.¹¹⁵ Their souls he sometimes refers to as spirits,¹¹⁶ just as the souls of men are also called spirits.¹¹⁷ But the human soul includes a mind,¹¹⁸ referred to by Augustine as "the eye of the soul" or "the head of the soul."¹¹⁹ And this mind, the possession of which distin-

guishes men from the brute animals, constitutes the image of God in man¹²⁰—an image which Augustine calls the inner man.¹²¹ For the inner man consists of that which human beings do *not* have in common with other animals, viz., the rational use of the things that *are* had in common with them.¹²²

5.3. So to the outer man belong the body, the outer senses, and the inner sense; to the inner man belongs the mind, which, in general, Augustine thinks of as reason, or understanding. In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1.8.18 he uses "*ratio*" "*mens*," and "*spiritus*" interchangeably.¹²³ But in other places, when he differentiates *ratio* and *mens*, he indicates that *mens* uses *ratio*, not vice versa.¹²⁴ To be sure, Augustine's terminology may not infrequently appear confusing, either because it is intrinsically unclear or because the reader does not pay enough attention to the context. Many readers are confused when they read expressions such as the one in *De Trinitate* 4.3.5: "*Corpus vero tanquam homo exterior*"¹²⁵ ("the body, as being the outer man ..."); and instead of patiently exploring the other clarificatory parts of *De Trinitate*, they conclude that, for Augustine, "outer man" indicates only the body. Similarly, when they run across clauses such as ". . . *ut secundum animam viveretur, id est secundum interiorem hominem, qui etiam novus homo propter regenerationem dicitur* . . ." ¹²⁶ (" . . . so that one might live in accordance with the soul, i.e., in accordance with the inner man, which because of regeneration is also called the new man"), they readily assume that the "*id est* . . ." portion *restates*, rather than *qualifies*, what precedes it, so that Augustine is identifying the inner man with the soul as such (rather than with the mind of the soul).

How flexible Augustine's terminology can become is evident from *De Civitate Dei* 11.27.2, where he applies "*sensus*" to the inner-man: "For we have a different sense that belongs to the inner man—one far more excellent than the [bodily senses], one by which we sense what things are just and what things are unjust."¹²⁷ To be assured of understanding this statement,

we have to look elsewhere—i.e., look elsewhere to find reassurance that this nonbodily "sense," though "inner," is not the inner sense described in *De Libero Arbitrio* 2 but is reason, by which men, unlike brute animals, discriminate between *just* and *unjust*.¹²⁸ In the foregoing passage Augustine's choice of "*alius sensus*" is potentially misdirecting. As if to preclude such a misunderstanding, he elsewhere speaks of "*sensus interior rationalis*": "*Nam pecora, etsi sensum interiorem rationalem et mentem intelligentem atque discernentem non habent, quam homo habet* . . ." ¹²⁹

5.4. Augustine says little regarding the notion of person. Most of what he does say deals with the trinity of persons in God; but he does indicate, as well, that "*persona*" is a name that applies also to human beings: "For just as in every man (except for the one human nature that was uniquely assumed) the soul and the body are one person, so in Christ the Word and the human nature are one person."¹³⁰ He seems never to have offered an explicit definition of "person," though he does assert that in the Trinity the three persons are three ways in which the divine essence is related to itself, so that the persons are relations.¹³¹ But this usage differs from the ordinary usage according to which a human person is not a *relation* of the human nature to itself. Indeed, Boethius later defined "person" as "the individual substance of a rational nature," though this definition is far from clear.¹³²

Occasionally, Augustine uses nontechnical words in highly qualified senses, without expressly articulating the qualifications; as a result, an unsuspecting reader may be misled. For example, he states that "just as in a oneness-of-person a soul is united to a body, so that there is a human being, so too in a oneness-of-person God is united to a human nature, so that there is Christ." But then he goes on to use the theologically misleading word "*mixtura*": "Therefore, in that [human] person there is a *mixtura* of a soul and a body; in the [divine] person there is a *mixtura* of God and a human nature."¹³³ This

word is usually translatable as "mixture" or "mingling" or "commingling". But here it cannot have this meaning because we know from what follows that Augustine rules out any admixing of the divine and the human natures in Christ such that the human nature becomes in some respect divine or the divine nature becomes in some respect human. Hence, the word "*mixtura*" will be rendered more properly by the English word "uniting": in the person of Christ there is a uniting of God and a human nature. Likewise, in every human person there is a uniting of a soul and a body. Hence, for Augustine, the concept *individual human being* (*iste homo*) is essentially related to the concepts *human person*, *human body*, and *human soul*, so that a disembodied soul would be a human soul but not a human being. By contrast, the concept *human nature* (*homo; humana natura*) does not include the concept of human person but only the concepts of human body and human soul; otherwise, the person of God the Son, in being confessed to have assumed a human nature, would also have to be confessed to have assumed a human person. But Christ is one person, not two, teaches Augustine.¹³⁴

Conclusion. We might wish that Augustine had told us more about his notion of a human person, just as we might lament his not having systematically developed a more technical philosophical and theological vocabulary. Yet, we cannot fail to appreciate both the attention that he does pay to the subtle functionings of language and the keen understanding that he displays in accepting *congruentissimae et usitatissimae locutiones*.¹³⁵ In dealing with the problem of free choice of the will Augustine uses the ordinary language both of desire and of consent. Had he developed the latter more fully, he might perhaps have better been able to avoid the paradoxes into which he fell. His discussion of second-order desires, as well as his acceptance of paradox, parallels in certain significant respects Frankfurt's approach. Moreover, together with Frankfurt he insists upon distinguishing persuading from constraining.¹³⁶ Fur-

thermore, both of these philosophers agree that a man's actions may be free even though, given the same circumstances, he would not—and sometimes could not—have done otherwise. Both maintain that animals have wills and make perceptual judgments but that they are not persons.

Frankfurt's position on the topic of free will is argued more cogently, more tightly, more focusedly than Augustine's; nevertheless, Augustine's position, *theologia remota*,¹³⁷ is the more promising. For the notion of 'consenting to have (or consenting not to have) a given desire'—unlike the notion of 'desiring to have (or desiring not to have) a given desire'—is associated intrinsically with the notions of deliberation and reflection. Augustine's accentuating these notions does more justice to our intuitions about free will than does Frankfurt's minimizing them. Equally promising is Augustine's view that the human will, if free, must belong to a person and that the person, to be a *human* person, must unite a mind and a body. According to Frankfurt "the essence of being a person lies not in reason but in will" (p. 17); and yet, he adds, a creature without reason cannot be a person. "For it is only in virtue of his rational capacities that a person is capable of becoming critically aware of his own will and of forming volitions of the second order. The structure of a person's will presupposes, accordingly, that he is a rational being" (p. 17). With this last sentence Augustine would agree. Though we cannot expect that Augustine would have concurred with Frankfurt's further claim—viz., that the essence of personhood resides in man's capacity for second-order volitions¹³⁸—still, he would not have been unsympathetic therewith. For he acknowledges the Psalmist's desire to long for doing works conformable to divine justice: "*Concupivit anima mea desiderare justificationes tuas . . .*"

Frankfurt's brilliance is manifested in his philosophical development of the Psalmist's insight; Augustine's brilliance is exhibited by his insight into the philosophical limitations that arise when such a development occurs in terms only of the language of desire.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>BN</i>	Jean-Paul Sartre, <i>Being and Nothingness</i> . Translated by Hazel Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956.
<i>CD</i>	Aurelius Augustinus, <i>De Civitate Dei</i> (PL 41).
<i>DT</i>	Aurelius Augustinus, <i>De Trinitate</i> (PL 42).
<i>HE</i>	Rudolf Bultmann, <i>History and Eschatology</i> . New York: Harper Torchbook, 1962; first published in 1957.
<i>IH</i>	R. G. Collingwood, <i>The Idea of History</i> . New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.
<i>PL</i>	<i>Patrologia Latina</i> . Edited by J.-P. Migne. Series published in Paris.
<i>S</i>	F. S. Schmitt, editor. <i>Sancti Anselmi Opera Omnia</i> . Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: F. Frommann Verlag, 1968.

NOTES

NOTES TO FRANKFURT AND AUGUSTINE

1. I am dealing with Frankfurt almost exclusively qua author of his richly insightful article "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," *Journal of Philosophy*, 68 (January 14, 1971), 5-20. This article is reprinted in Frankfurt's collection of his articles entitled *The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). All page references are to this book, abbreviated hereafter as "*What We Care About*."

Valuable discussion relevant to Frankfurt's ideas abound in the philosophical literature. Attention is called to the following (in alphabetical order): (1) Richard Double, *The Non-Reality of Free Will* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). (2) Phillip Gosselin, "The Principle of Alternate Possibilities," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 17 (March 1987), 91-104. (3) Robert A. Imlay, "Frankfurt, Van Inwagen and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," *The Modern Schoolman*, 66 (March 1989), 221-228. (4) Peter van Inwagen, *An Essay on Free Will* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), especially pp. 162-182. (5) Margery B. Naylor, "Frankfurt on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," *Philosophical Studies*, 46 (September 1984), 249-258. (6) Wright Neely, "Freedom and Desire," *Philosophical Review*, 83 (January 1974), 32-54 [no mention of Frankfurt; but applies to Frankfurt]. (7) Eleonore Stump, "Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will," *Journal of Philosophy*, 85 (August 1988), 395-420. (8) Irving Thalberg, "Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 8 (June 1978), 211-226. (9) Gary Watson, "Free Agency," pp. 96-110 in his edition of *Free Will* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). (10) Gary Watson, "Skepticism about Weakness of Will," *Philosophical Review*, 86 (July 1977), 316-339. (11) Susan Wolff, "Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility," pp. 137-151 in John Christman, editor, *The Inner Citadel* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). (12) Robert Young, "Autonomy and the 'Inner Self,'" *ibid.*, pp. 77-90.

2. Frankfurt does refer to Augustine's views on lying. See pp. 131-132 of his *What We Care About*.

3. Translation taken from Vol. II, pp. 211-212 of *The Essays of Montaigne*, translated by George B. Ives (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1925).

4. "Human beings," writes Frankfurt, "are not alone in having desires and motives, or in making choices. They share these things with the members

of certain other species, some of whom even appear to engage in deliberation and to make decisions based upon prior thought" (p. 12).

5. Strangely, Frankfurt nowhere in his article actually uses the expressions "first-order volition" and "first-order willing."

6. For competing conceptions of free action see Don Locke's "Three Concepts of Free Action," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary vol. 49 (1975), 95-112. See also Frankfurt's reply in "Three Concepts of Freedom," *ibid.*, pp. 113-125. (Frankfurt's response is reprinted in *What We Care About*, pp. 47-57).

7. On p. 18 Frankfurt creates the impression that some kind of psychological endorsement often goes on but that the agent's endorsing one or more of his first-order desires is not that wherein his freedom consists: "The unwilling addict identifies himself, however, through the formation of a second-order volition, with one rather than with the other of his conflicting first-order desires. He makes one of them more truly his own, and in so doing, he withdraws himself from the other." Though the unwilling addict endorses one of his first-order desires, his will is not free (p. 21). See the discussion in my Section 3 of the present chapter.

8. In a different context—not that of wanting to want to concentrate but that of making a decision—Frankfurt elsewhere writes: "In making up his mind a person establishes preferences concerning the resolution of conflicts among his desires or beliefs. Someone who makes a decision thereby performs an action, but the performance is not of a simple act that merely implements a first-order desire. It essentially involves reflexivity, including desires and volitions of a higher order" ("Identification and Wholeheartedness," Chap. 12 of *What We Care About*, p. 176). Here Frankfurt makes an ostensibly good point, but he owes us a discussion of how this implementation proceeds.

9. Gary Watson's emphasis upon the distinction between desiring and valuing moves in the right direction. See his article "Free Agency," pp. 96-110 in his edition of *Free Will* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). Frankfurt himself elsewhere acutely discerns: "Feelings may accord better with reason than judgment does" ("Rationality and the Unthinkable," Chap. 13 of *What We Care About*, p. 189). And he adds: "There is a mode of rationality that pertains to the will itself (*ibid.*, p. 190).

10. Elsewhere Frankfurt acknowledges that his "notion of identification is . . . a bit mystifying, and I am uncertain how to go about explicating it. In my opinion, however, it grasps something quite fundamental in our inner lives, and it merits a central role in the phenomenology and philosophy of human mentality" ("Three Concepts of Free Action," Chap. 4 of *What We Care About*, p. 54). With this acknowledgement and opinion one can only agree. Regarding identification see also (and especially) pp. 165-170 of "Identifica-

tion and Wholeheartedness," Chap. 12 of *What We Care About*; regarding deliberation see pp. 174-175, *ibid.*

Frankfurt also elsewhere expresses recognition of the fact that "a person's judgment may itself be radically contrary to reason. Therefore, the fact that his judgment guides his conduct hardly means in itself that he is acting rationally" ("Rationality and the Unthinkable," Chap. 13 of *What We Care About*, p. 189).

11. I do not here examine Frankfurt's notions of person, wanton, moral responsibility, or alternate possibilities. In "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" his discussion of the foregoing notions is certainly profitable. His way of dealing with the problem of an infinite regression of hierarchical desires (pp. 21-22) seems basically right-headed as far as it goes. Frankfurt himself recognizes that it needs to go further ("Identification and Wholeheartedness," *What We Care About*, pp. 166-167). Moreover, his claim that in some cases it is true that someone may have acted freely even though he could not have acted differently—a claim made and argued for in "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility"—coincides, in important respects, with Augustine's way of viewing the matter.

12. See Section 1 of my chapter on Rist (=Chap. Two below).

13. Harry A. Wolfson, "St. Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy," Chap. 6 of his *Religious Philosophy: A Group of Essays* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 163-164.

14. Augustine, *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* 3.7.21 (PL 44:604); 3.7.19 (PL 44:602). See especially *De Peccatorum Mentis et Remissione* 2.6.7 (PL 44:155); 2.7.8 (PL 44:155-156); 2.14.21 (PL 44:164); 2.17.26 (PL 44:167); 3.13.23 (PL 44:199-200).

15. Romans 6:16-18. The redeemed, says Augustine, have the ability to refrain from sinning if they will to; moreover, their wills are assisted in this direction by God. Grace assists them to the point of enabling them not to will evilly; however, it does not, in this lifetime, assist them to the point of their not being able to will evilly. Note *De Peccatorum Mentis et Remissione* 2.6.7 (PL 44:155): "Si a me quaeratur utrum homo sine peccato possit esse in hac vita, confitebor posse per Dei gratiam et liberum ejus arbitrium Dubitare non possum nec Deum aliquid impossibile homini praecepisse nec Deo ad opitulandum et adjuvandum, quo fiat quod jubet, impossibile aliquid esse. Ac per hoc potest homo, si velit, esse sine peccato, adjustus a Deo." PL 44:155 (punctuation modified by me).

16. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 9.30 (PL 40:247).

17. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia* 11.32 (PL 44:936). Cf. Augustine, *De Diversis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* 1.1.9 (PL 40:106): "Ut autem non cedatur, sitque mens hominis adversus cupiditatem robustior, gratia

facit, de qua post dicturus est."

18. Ephesians 4:22-24.

19. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* 5.10.1 (PL 41:152). See also n. 136 below.

20. Wolfson, p. 164. Influenced by Wolfson, and repeating his mistake, is Ghita Holmstrom-Hintikka in her *Action, Purpose and Will A Formal Theory* [Acta Philosophica Fennica, Vol. 50 (Helsinki: The Philosophical Society of Finland, 1991)], p. 157.

21. Note also *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali* 2.40.46 (PL 44:408): "Ac per hoc Deus hominem damnat propter vitium, quo natura dehonestatur; non propter naturam, quae vitio non aufertur."

22. Wolfson, p. 170. Wolfson goes on to make the very point about not all freedom's having been lost.

23. Augustine, *Epistola* 157.2.4 (PL 33:675): "Illud vero quod dicunt, sufficere homini liberum arbitrium ad dominica praecepta implenda, etiamsi Dei gratia et spiritus sancti dono ad opera bona non adjuvetur, omnino anathematizandum est..."

24. Wolfson, p. 168.

25. Augustine, *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* 1.18.36 (PL 44:567): "[I respond that] not even by the power of God is anyone forced against his will either into evil or into good."

26. Wolfson misleads us further when in the passage quoted above he states unqualifiedly that for Augustine man is "powerless to resist his concupiscence." For what Wolfson means (and later says) is that of himself, i.e., unassisted by grace, fallen man is powerless to resist concupiscence. But with divine aid a man need not consent to concupiscence, so that in not consenting he does not sin. Note Augustine, *De Continentia* 8.19 (PL 40:362): "Sed eis [motibus desideriorum] non consentiendo mente serviebat [Paulus] legi Dei, et tenebat membra, ne fierent arma peccati." See also *Epistola* 196.2.5 (PL 33:893). *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* 1.10.21 (PL 44:561). On the possibility of resisting concupiscence see also *Contra Julianum* 5.6.24 (PL 44:799). *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 1.71 (PL 45:1096). *De Fide et Operibus* 23.43 (PL 40:225).

27. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera* 30.52 (PL 44:233).

28. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* 2.3 and 2.4 (PL 44:883).

29. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* 2.4 (PL 44:884).

30. "Velle enim et nolle propriae voluntatis est" *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* 3.5 (PL 44:885).

31. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* 15.31 (PL 44:899). Cf. *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* 1.3.7 (PL 44:553): "Sed haec voluntas quae libera est in malis, quia delectatur malis"

32. Note Augustine, *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* 1.2.5 (PL

44:552): "Nam liberum arbitrium usque adeo in peccatore non perit, ut per illud peccent, maxime omnes qui cum delectatione peccant et amore peccati, hoc eis placet quod eos libet." Wolfson cites this passage on his p. 171; but he mistranslates the last part of it.

See Section 3.1 of my chapter on Rist as well as n. 96 of that chapter.

33. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* 15.31 (PL 44:899-900). See especially 4.7 (PL 44:886). *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* 1.3.7 (PL 44:553).

34. I Corinthians 4:7.

35. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera* 34.60 (PL 44:240-241).

36. Augustine, *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* 1.10.21 (PL 44:561).

37. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera* 33.57 (PL 44:237).

38. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera* 33.58 (PL 44:238).

39. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* 2.6.7 (PL 44:155).

40. Wolfson, p. 166.

41. I Timothy 6:10.

42. Augustine, *Sermo* 155.1.1 (PL 38:841), punctuation modified by me.

43. Wolfson is aware of such interchangeability. See his p. 166.

44. If Augustine reduces *mala concupiscentia* to anything, it is to *desiderium peccati*. Note *De Perfectione Iustitiae Homini* 6.12 (PL 44:297). For a discussion of the alleged stages of development in Augustine's doctrine of original sin see Paul Rigby, *Original Sin in Augustine's CONFESSIONS* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1987), especially pp. 20-28, which deal with Athanasius Sage's interpretation.

45. Ecclesiasticus 10.15, cited by Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 14.13.1.

46. Augustine, *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 6.41 (PL 45:1605) and 6.14 (PL 45:1530, bottom).

47. Augustine, *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* 1.17.34 (PL 44:565-566). Of the four alternatives set forth Augustine favors the fourth. See especially *De Gratia Christi et Peccato Originali* 2.36.41 (PL 44:405). *De Civitate Dei* 14.24.1 (PL 41:432).

48. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* 3.23.53 (PL 44:729).

49. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* 12.7 (PL 41:355). What is said about Satan's first evil choice applies also to Adam's. See n. 92 and n. 93 below.

50. "That falling away (*defectus*) is voluntary (*spontaneus*). For if the will [of Adam] had remained steadfast in its love of the higher, immutable good by which it was illumined so that it might see and was kindled that it might love, then it would not have been turned aside therefrom toward pleasing itself and, hence, would not have become darkened and have grown cold" Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* 14.13.1 (PL 41:420-421).

51. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* 2.4.8 (PL 44:679).

52. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* 3.23.52 (PL 44:729).
53. Infants have no personal sin. Nor are they personally guilty of Adam's personal sin. They inherit sinful Adamic human nature. See *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* 1.17.22 (PL 44:121); 1.26.39 (PL 44:131); 1.35.65 (PL 44:147).
54. "Therefore, the reason that men are conceived in iniquity and are nourished in sins in the uterus by their mothers is not that having sexual relations with their spouses is a sin but rather that what is made is made from flesh that is under punishment. For the punishment of the flesh is death; and, assuredly, mortality is present [in the flesh]." Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 50.10 (PL 36:591-592).
55. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* 3.24.54 (PL 44:730): "The original evil is contracted by way of carnal concupiscence." At 2.4.8 (PL 44:679) he writes: "[peccatum originale] generatione contrahitur."
56. *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* 3.10.18 (PL 44:196). See also 2.36.59 (PL 44:185-186).
57. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* 3.4.8 (PL 44:189).
58. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 50.10 (PL 36:592): "Solus esse innocens infans potuit, qui de opere Adam non natus est."
59. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* 2.24.38 (PL 44:174-175).
60. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 118.8.3 (PL 37:1520). See the entire passage through 118.9.1 (PL 37:1522).
61. By "justificationes" Augustine understands "deeds of justice," or "the works of those who are just [insofar as they are just]." These works are ascribed to God, even though done by men, because they are commanded by God and because apart from God's grace they would not be done: "Justificationes enim sunt, non dicta, sed facta justitiae, opera scilicet justorum, quae imperat Deus. Ideo autem Dei dicuntur, quamvis a nobis fiant, quia nisi ipso donante non fiunt" [*Enarrationes in Psalmos* 118.6.1 (PL 37:1514)]. "Justificationes autem facta sunt justa, id est, opera justitiae" [*ibid.*, 118.8.3 (PL 37:1520)]. In the translation above I use the Douay version's word "justifications" instead of a more clumsy paraphrastic English expression such as "good works which You command" or "works conformable to divine justice."
- Much of the "exposition" that follows is taken virtually verbatim from Augustine's text (even when quotation marks are not used).
62. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 118.8.4 (PL 37:1521).
63. Galatians 5:17.
64. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 118.8.4 (PL 37:1521-1522).
65. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 118.8.4 (PL 37:1522).
66. Augustine, *De Vera Religione* 14.28 (PL 34:134). Cf. *De Libero*

- Arbitrio* 3.10.29 (PL 32:1285): ". . . dum [homo] consentit male suadenti, non utique nisi voluntate consentit
67. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera* 34.60 (PL 44:240).
68. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* 3.3.7 (PL 32:1274). *De Civitate Dei* 5.10.1 (PL 41:152).
69. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1.27.30 (PL 44:431). Here Augustine writes "*ego nolo concupiscere*," an expression that implies the alternative conception *velle concupiscere*.
70. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* 3.26.62 (PL 44:734).
71. Augustine, *Contra Maximum* 2.10.2 (PL 42:765). Note also *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 118.3.1 (PL 37:1507), where Augustine switches from saying "*quando nequaquam ei [=peccato] voluntas nostra consentit. . .*" to saying "*Quibus [illicitis desideriis] si voluntatis non adhibeatur assensus. . .*"
72. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1.27.30 (PL 44:431).
73. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1.29.31 (PL 44:431).
74. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1.27.30 (PL 44:431): "In hoc itaque consentiunt, voluntas legis, et mea."
75. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 4.6 (PL 36:80). The negative command "*saltem ei [irae] non consentiat ratio et mens*" implies that the opposite action is conceivable. Note, too, that Augustine speaks of "*mentis arbitrium*," and not only of "*voluntatis arbitrium*": ". . . ut [peccatores] propriae mentis utantur arbitrio, et in peccato sua voluntate retinentur . . ." *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* 1.3.7 (PL 44:553).
76. Augustine, *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* 21.9 (PL 42:394).
77. Augustine, *De Mendacio* 19.40 (PL 40:514): "Tunc enim consentimus, cum approbamus et volumus . . ."
78. Note the expression "*in ipso suae voluntatis affectu*" in *Epistola* 102.4.26 (PL 33:381). Regarding approval/disapproval, Harry Frankfurt also includes it in his notion of identification: "Sometimes, when we disapprove of the course our passions have taken . . ." ("Identification and Externality," Chap. 5 of *What We Care About*, *op. cit.*, p. 63).
79. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 118.8.4 (PL 37:1522), punctuation in Latin text modified by me: Oftentimes "we see what ought to be done, and yet we do not do it; for we are not delighted to do it, and we desire to be [thus] delighted." Even regarding sinning Augustine writes [*Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* 1.2.5 (PL 44:552)]: "Nam liberum arbitrium usque adeo in peccatore non perit, ut per illud peccent, maxime omnes qui cum delectatione peccant et amore peccati; hoc eis placet quod eos libet": "For in sinners free choice is so far from having perished that through it they sin—especially all those who sin with delight and with a love of sin. *They are pleased that [sin] is pleasing to them*" (my emphasis; punctuation modified by me).

80. See Section 8.3 of the present book's chapter on Rist.
81. "[Respondeo] nec ex Dei potentia vel in malum vel in bonum invitum aliquem cogi" Augustine, *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* 1.18.36 (PL 44:567).
82. "Non voluntate autem volumus, quis vel delirus audeat dicere?" Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* 3.3.7 (PL 32:1274).
83. *Sermo* 32.11.11 (PL 38:200). See n. 136 below.
84. See Section 8.3 of the present book's chapter on Rist.
85. Philippians 2:13.
86. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 118.2.2 - 118.3.1 (PL 37:1506-1507). See especially 118.3.1.
87. I John 3:4.
88. I John 1:8.
89. Romans 7:20.
90. Romans 7:19.
91. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 118.3.1 (PL 37:1506-1507).
92. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* 14.13.1 (PL 41:420): "Spontaneus est autem iste defectus." Cf. *De Libero Arbitrio* 2.20.54 (PL 32:1270): "Motus ergo ille aversionis, quod fatemur esse peccatum, quoniam defectivus motus est, omnis autem defectus ex nihilo est, vide quo pertineat, et ad Deum non pertinere ne dubites. Qui tamen defectus quoniam est voluntarius, in nostra est positus potestate. Si enim times illum, oportet ut nolis; si autem nolis, non erit."
93. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* 12.7 (PL 41:355). Note also *De Civitate Dei* 12.6. See Section II.2 of the present chapter.
- Augustine's claim that Adam's (and Satan's) initial evil and disobedient choice was the *inexplicable* result of a deficient cause (i.e., of a voluntary lack of persistence in willing a higher commanded good in preference over a lower forbidden one) is *not* inconsistent with his claim that that initial evil choice resulted from pride and occurred because creatures have been created *ex nihilo*. Although the initial evil choice may have resulted from pride, Augustine regards the origin of that pride as inexplicable and as itself the initial evil willing, or desire, that motivated Adam's actual choice of the forbidden fruit. "Non malum ergo opus factum est, id est, illa transgressio, ut cibo prohibito vescerentur, nisi ab eis [scilicet, Adam et Eva] qui jam mali erant" [*De Civitate Dei* 14.13.1 (PL 41:421)]. That Adam's created being tended toward not-being helps explain, thinks Augustine, how it was possible for Adam to sin; it does not, however, help explain why Adam did what it was possible for him to do.
- An opposite view is held by Robert F. Brown, who considers Augustine to be inconsistent. See Brown's "The First Evil Will Must Be Incomprehensible: A Critique of Augustine," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 46

- (September 1978), 315-329.
94. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* 12.7 (PL 41:355): "Therefore, let no one seek to know from me what I know that I do not know—unless, perhaps, [he seeks it] in order that he may learn not to know that which must be known to be unable to be known." At a later period in the history of philosophy and theology Nicholas of Cusa generalizes upon this theme.
95. "Love, and do what you wish." *In Epistolam Joannis ad Parthos* 7.8 (PL 35:2033).
96. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* 3.5.7 (PL 34:282): "Ac per hoc quoniam sentire non est corporis, sed animae per corpus, licet acute disseratur secundum diversitatem corporeorum elementorum sensus esse corporis distributos; anima tamen cui sentiendi vis inest, cum corporea non sit, per subtilius corpus agitat vigorem sentiendi."
97. Oscar J. Schmiede, "Augustine, on Perceiving the Natural World," Ph.D. dissertation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1971), p. 146. That by "sense organ" Schmiede means the physiological organs is attested by his question: "How is it possible to be aware of the world when neither the world nor our sense organs can produce effects on the soul?" (p. 3)
98. Augustine, *The Trinity*, translated by Stephen McKenna (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), p. 317.
99. "Hoc autem distamus, quod nobis inest et non videntibus, quo videre possimus, qui sensus vocatur . . ." PL 42:985.
100. Augustine, *The Trinity*, translated by McKenna, pp. 317-318.
101. "Et quamvis non sentiat corpus exanime, anima tamen commixta corpori per instrumentum sentit corporeum, et idem instrumentum sensus vocatur." *De Trinitate* 11.2.2 (PL 42:986). Though in the clause "*et idem instrumentum sensus vocatur*" the word "*instrumentum*" appears only once, it is meant to be understood a second time (and "*sensus*" is in the genitive, not in the nominative, case). Cf. the clause (in n. 112 below) "*Tamen quia homo sine vita non recte appellatur . . .*," where "*homo*" is meant to be understood a second time.
- "*Sentire*" could also here be translated as "to perceive." No distinction is being made between sensing and perceiving.
102. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 9.3.3 (PL 42:963).
103. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 11.3.6 (PL 42:989).
104. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 11.4.7 (PL 42:990).
105. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 11.4.7 (PL 42:989), translated by McKenna, p. 324.
106. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 11.4.7 (PL 42:989): "Voluntas vero illa quae hac atque illac fert et refert aciem formandam . . ."
107. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* 2.3.8 (PL 32:1244).

108. Augustine, *On Free Will*, translated by John H. Burleigh in *Augustine: Earlier Writings* [The Library of Christian Classics, Vol. 6 (London: SCM Press, 1953), p. 139].

109. See *De Libero Arbitrio* 2.4.10 (PL 32:1246): "Arbitror etiam illud esse manifestum, sensum illum interiore non ea tantum sentire, quae acciperit a quinque sensibus corporis, sed etiam ipsos ab eo sentiri."

110. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* 2.5.12 (PL 32:1247).

111. See Augustine, *DT* 11.1.1 (PL 42:983). Cf. II Corinthians 4:16 in the Vulgate. See also Romans 7:22 and Ephesians 3:16. Still worthy of note are Bruce Bubacz's *St. Augustine's Theory of Knowledge: A Contemporary Analysis* (Lewiston: Mellen Press, 1981) and Gareth B. Matthews' "An Interpretation and Critique of the Concept of the Inner Man in the Epistemology of St. Augustine," Ph. D. dissertation (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1960). See also Gerard O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

112. "Tamen quia homo sine vita non recte appellatur, non corpus solum homo exterior, neque sola vita quae in sensu est corporis, sed utrumque simul rectius fortasse intelligitur" (punctuation altered by me). Note also *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* 24.2 (PL 42:475): "Paulus quidem apostolus interior-em hominem in spiritu mentis, exterior-em vero in corpore atque ista mortali vita vult intelligi...."

113. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 15.23.43 (PL 42:1090): "Quamvis enim memoria hominis, et maxime illa quam pecora non habent, id est, qua res intelligibiles ita continentur, ut non in earn per sensus corporis venerint" A parallel distinction can be made between the nonrational will, common to all animals, and the rational will, present (among animals) in the human animal alone.

Augustine holds that concepts of material objects are formed from memory images, which are perceptual likenesses of the actual immaterial forms in material objects. In perceiving, we perceive the material objects by means of the perceptual likenesses; in thinking recollectively of material objects, we think of them through our memory images. "Thus, it happens that everyone who conceives of material objects (whether he constructs something [in thought] or hears or reads of someone telling about things past or foretelling things future) has recourse to his memory, and there he finds the mode and the measure of all the forms that he beholds when conceiving. For no one can at all conceive of a color or a corporeal shape that he has never seen, a sound that he has never heard, a taste that he has never tasted, an odor that he has never smelled, or the touch of any material object that he has never touched. But if the reason that no one conceives of anything material unless he has sensed it is that no one remembers anything material unless he has sensed it,

then just as the mode of sensing is to material objects, so the mode of conceiving is to memory. For the senses receive the form from the material object that we sense, and memory [receives the form of that object] from the senses. But the gaze of conceiving [receives the form] from memory" [*De Trinitate* 11.8.14 (PL 42:995)].

In *De Trinitate* 8.6.9 (PL 42:953) Augustine mentions the mind (*animus*) as something the concept of which has not entered into our memory by way of the senses. Further such examples include our concepts of numbers, of justice, of beauty, and of God. Also see PL 42:954 and *De Libero Arbitrio* 2.8.22 (PL 32:1252).

114. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* 2.6.13 (PL 32:1248): ". . . si quid congruentius de ratione atque intelligentia dici potest, quam non habet natura bestiarum." See also 1.8.18 (PL 32:1231). Also note *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 1.17.28 (PL 34:186): "Omnia enim animalia caetera subjecta sunt homini, non propter corpus, sed propter intellectum, quem nos habemus, et illa non habent . . ." Cf. Psalms 31:9.

115. Augustine, *De Vera Religione* 42.79 (PL 34:158). Cf. *De Civitate Dei* 11.27.2 (PL 41:341): "Verumtamen inest sensibus irrationalium animalium, etsi scientia nullo modo, at certe quaedam scientiae similitudo."

116. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 148.3 (PL 37:1939): "[Pecora] non habent rationem intelligendi; sed habent spiritum corporis animati, et vitam manifestam"

117. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 14.16.22 (PL 42:1053).

118. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 15.27.49 (PL 42:1096): ". . . homo in sua natura melius caeteris animalibus, melius etiam caeteris animae suae partibus habet, quod est ipsa mens . . ." Also note *De Trinitate* 15.7.11 (PL 42:1065): "Non igitur anima, sed quod excellit in anima mens vocatur."

119. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 15.7.11 (PL 42:1065).

120. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 15.7.11 (PL 42:1065): "Quapropter singulus quisque homo, qui non secundum omnia quae ad naturam pertinent ejus, sed secundum solam mentem imago Dei dicitur . . ."

121. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 1.17.28 (PL 34:186): ". . . homo ad imaginem Dei factus dicitur, secundum interiorem hominem . . . , ubi est ratio et intellectus . . ." See n. 120 above.

122. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 13.1.4 (PL 42:1016).

123. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* 1.8.18 (PL 32:1231): "ratio . . . , vel mens vel spiritus."

124. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* 1.9.19 (PL 32:1232): "Sed si alius ratio, alius mens, constat certe non nisi mentem uti posse ratione." See also *Sermo* 43.2.3 (PL 38:255), where Augustine distinguishes *ratio* from *intellectus*.

125. PL 42:890. Cf. Augustine, *Sermo* 161.11.11 (PL 38:884): "Corporis

enim hujus, id est, exterioris hominuis ornamenta . . . "

126. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 6.2 (PL 36:91). Also note the sentence "Ab Adam enim usque ad Moysen genus humanum vixit ex corpore, id est secundum carnem: qui etiam exterior et vetus homo dicitur . . ." at 6.2 (PL 36:90). See also *De Trinitate* 13.1.2 (PL 42:1014): "It is known by both [groups of men] what man is, whose outer part, viz., his body, they have learned of through the lights of the body [i.e., the eyes]; but the inner part, viz., the soul in themselves, they know of because they are men and because of conversance with other men."

127. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* 11.27.2 (PL 41:341): "Habemus enim alium interioris hominis sensum isto longe praestantiorum, quo justa et injusta sentimus . . . "

128. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 29.2.2 (PL 36:218).

129. *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 148.3 (PL 37:1939).

130. Augustine, *Epistola* 169.2.8 (PL 33:746): "Nam sicut in homine [corrected from *nomine*] quolibet, praeter unum illum [hominem] qui singulariter susceptus est, anima et corpus una persona est; ita in Christo Verbum et homo una persona est." For Augustine "human nature" indicates soul and body. Note *De Trinitate* 13.20.25 (PL 42:1034): "Necessaria ergo est fides ut beatitudinem consequamur, omnibus humanae naturae bonis, id est, et animi et corporis." Cf. *De Trinitate* 13.9.12 (PL 42:1023): "Fides autem ista totum hominem immortalem futurum, qui utique constat ex anima [et] corpore, et ob hoc vere beatum, non argumentatione humana, sed divina auctoritate promittit." When Augustine says, regarding human beings, that the soul and the body are one person, he means that they are united in one person, so that together with the person they constitute the human being an individual human being. Though having a rational soul contributes to human personhood, Augustine seems not to regard it as a sufficient condition thereof. For God the Son assumed a human nature, which included a rational soul; he did not, however, thereby assume a human person.

131. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.5.6 (PL 42:914).

132. "Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia." Boethius, *De Persona et Duabus Naturis* (PL 64:1343). Regarding the trinitarian terminology, see J. Hopkins, *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), 91-93.

133. Augustine, *Epistola* 137.3.11 (PL 33:520): "Nam sicut in unitate personae anima unitur corpori, ut homo sit; ita in unitate personae Deus unitur homini, ut Christus sit. In illa ergo persona mixtura est animae et corporis; in hac persona mixtura est Dei et hominis . . . " Other difficulties relate to the proper translation of the word "*homo*"; cf. the Latin text here with the English translation given of it. See also the translation given for the first Latin

sentence in n. 130 above.

134. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* 1.31.60 (PL 44:144-145).

135. The expression comes from *Epistola* 169.2.8 (PL 33:746): "sed congruentissima et usitatissima locutione dicimus . . . "

136. Augustine, *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* 1.18.36 (PL 44:567): "Nec ex Dei potentia vel in malum vel in bonum invitum aliquem cogi; sed Deo deserente pro meritis ire in malum, et Deo adjuvante sine meritis converti ad bonum. Non enim est homo bonus si nolit; sed gratia Dei etiam ad hoc adjuvatur ut velit. . . ." Note also 1.3.7 (PL 44:553): "Non itaque, sicut dicunt nos quidam dicere, et iste audeat insuper scribere, *omnes in peccatum*, velut inviti, *carnis suae necessitate coguntur*: sed si jam in ea aetate sunt, ut propriae mentis utantur arbitrio, et in peccato sua voluntate retinentur, et a peccato in peccatum sua voluntate praecipitantur. Neque enim agit in eis etiam qui suadet et decipit, nisi ut peccatum voluntate committant, vel ignorantia veritatis, vel delectatione iniquitatis, vel utroque malo et caecitatis et infirmitatis."

137. We need not agree with John M. Rist that leaving aside large portions of Augustine's theology necessarily distorts his philosophy. For most of his philosophy is only sketched, whereas his theology is worked out in elaborate detail. The philosophical sketches can be filled-in in a variety of ways that would be compatible with the theology.

138. According to John M. Rist, Augustine teaches that will "is the basic core of the human person" (p. 220). (See the beginning of Section 2 in Chapter Two below.) Rist is mistaken in his claim, for Augustine teaches that will *belongs to* the basic core of the *human being*.