

**COMPLETE PHILOSOPHICAL AND
THEOLOGICAL TREATISES
of
ANSELM of CANTERBURY**

Translated
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PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS¹

EXORDIUM

[23:1] *Student.* There are many [notions] which I have long been wanting you to clarify. Among these are [the notions of] ability and inability, possibility and impossibility, freedom and necessity. I list these together in my inquiry because knowledge about them seems to me to be interconnected. Let me disclose in part what disturbs me with regard to them, so that after you have given me a satisfactory analysis of them, I may go on more easily to other matters, at which I am aiming.

We sometimes speak of there being an ability in a thing in which there is no ability. For everyone acknowledges that whatever can, can by virtue of an ability. Therefore, when we say “What does not exist can exist,” we are saying that there is an ability in that which does not exist—for example, when we say that a house which does not yet exist can exist. But I cannot comprehend this. For in that which does not exist, there is no ability.

Moreover, let me say: That which does not in any respect exist has no ability. Therefore, it does not have either the ability to exist or the ability not to exist. Hence, it follows that what does not exist both cannot exist and cannot not exist. Indeed, from the one negation—viz., that what does not exist cannot exist—it follows that what does not exist is not possible to be and is impossible to be and is necessary not to be. But if we accept the other negation—by which we say that what does not exist cannot not exist—we find that what does not exist is not possible not to be and is impossible not to be and is necessary to be. Therefore, from the fact that what does not in any respect exist cannot exist, it is impossible to be and is necessary not to be. But from the fact that it cannot not exist, there follows that it is impossible not to be and is necessary to be.

¹Translated from F. S. Schmitt's edition of *Ein neues unvollendetes Werk des hl. Anselm von Canterbury* [Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Vol. 33 (1936), Issue 3], pp. 23-48. Page- and line-references (inserted into the translation in brackets) are to this text. Although the fragments come from different times, Schmitt regards the main sections as dating from soon after the *Cur Deus Homo*. In private conversation Schmitt stated that he preferred this edition to the edition in the *Memorials of St. Anselm*.

[23:25] Furthermore, what cannot exist is not able to be; and what is not able to be is unable to be. Similarly, what cannot not exist is not able not to be; and what is not able not to be is unable not to be. Therefore, what does not exist both cannot exist and cannot not exist: it is unable to be and is unable not to be. But “What is unable to be is able not to be” and “What is unable not to be is able to be” are in equal measure true. Therefore, what does not exist is able and unable to be; and, similarly, it is able [and unable] not to be. Hence, it has in equal measure both an ability and an inability to be and not to be.

[24:8] But all these [results] are very absurd. For “It is impossible to be” and “It is impossible not to be” are never true [of something] at the same time; nor are, “It is necessary to be” and “It is necessary not to be”; nor, “[There is in it] an ability to be (or not to be)” and “[There is in it] an inability to be (or not to be).” Hence, if these [pairs of statements] are inconsistent, then the premise from which they follow is also inconsistent: viz., “What does not in any respect exist both cannot exist and cannot not exist, since it has no ability.” But I cannot at all discern that this premise is false.

[24:16] Concerning impossibility and necessity, I am also troubled by the fact that we say that something (e.g., to lie) is impossible for God or that God is something (e.g., that He is just) of necessity. For *impossibility* suggests powerlessness, and *necessity* suggests compulsion; but in God there is neither powerlessness nor compulsion. For if God keeps to the truth because of a powerlessness to lie or if He is just because of compulsion, then He is not freely truthful or just. But if you answer that in the case of God this *impossibility* and this *necessity* signify an insuperable strength, then I ask: why is this strength indicated by names signifying weakness?

These [problems], and perhaps others as well, cast me into a quandary about [the notions of] ability and possibility and their opposites, and about [the notions of] freedom and necessity. Although these puzzlings of mine are puerile, nevertheless I ask you to teach me—for I admit I do not know—what to answer if someone else asks them of me.

[25: 1] *Teacher*. Even if your questions seem to you to be puerile, nevertheless the answers to them are not so easy for me that these answers seem to me to be anile. For, indeed, I already see from a distance that when I begin to reply, you will summon me to greater

matters. Nevertheless, even if I am not able to do all that you have asked, I ought not to turn away from what I am able to do with the help of God.

PRAENOTANDA

T. In order to examine the questions which you pose, I deem it necessary to set forth something about the verb “to do” (“*facere*”) and to explain what is properly called one's own possession, [or one's prerogative]. Otherwise, when we come to need these [analyses] we shall have to make a digression because of them. Only, keep your questions well in mind.

S. If only you return to what has been asked, whatever you place first will not displease me.

FACERE¹

T. We have the practice of using the verb “to do” in place of every other verb, whether finite or infinite, and regardless of its signification. (We even use “to do” in place of “not to do.”) For when we ask about someone “What (How) is he doing?”: if we consider the matter carefully, [we see that] here “doing” is used in place of any verb that can be given in reply; and every verb given in reply is used in place of “doing.” For to one asking “What (How) is he doing?” there is not rightly given in reply any verb in which there is not understood the doing which is being asked about. For example, when we reply “He is reading” or “He is writing,” it is the same as saying “He is doing this, viz., reading” or “He is doing this, viz., writing.”

[25:23] However, any verb can be given in answer to one asking the foregoing question. In many cases this point is evident—as, for example, “He is singing,” “He is composing.” But in other cases it may be less evident—as are the following: viz., “He is,” “He lives,” “He is powerful” (*potest*), “He owes” (*debet*), “He is named” (*nominatur*), “He is summoned” (*vocatur*). But no one would reproach us if to someone who asked “What (How) is he doing?” we were to reply: “He is in church,” or “He is living as a good man [lives],” or “He is powerful over the whole domain in which

¹The Latin verb “*facere*” means both “to do” and “to cause.” In the following sections both translations have been used, depending upon the context and the sound in English.

he lives,” or “He owes much money,” or “He is named [i.e., is renowned] above all his neighbors,” or “Wherever he is, he is summoned before all others.” Therefore, if there is someone who knows how to do it appropriately, any verb can at times be given in answer to one who asks “What (How) is he doing?” Thus, whatever verbs are used in reply to one who asks “What (How) is he doing?” are (as I said) used in the answer in place of “doing”; and in the question “doing” is used in place of these verbs. For the question answered is the question asked, and the question asked is the question answered.

[26:5] Furthermore, everything of which a verb is predicated is a cause of there being what is signified by this verb. And in common parlance every cause is said to do that of which it is a cause. Therefore, everything of which a verb is predicated does (causes) what is signified by that verb. For—not to discuss those verbs which properly signify a doing (e.g., the verb “to run,” and other verbs of this kind)—the point I am making is evidenced even in the case of other verbs, which seem far removed from properly signifying a doing. For example, in the foregoing way, whoever is sitting is doing (causing) sitting, and whoever is enduring is doing (causing) enduring—because if there were not one who was enduring, there would not be enduring. And there would not be any naming unless there were that which is named. Nor would anything in any respect be said *to be* unless what is said to be were first conceived. So of whatever thing (*re*) a verb is predicated, in the foregoing manner a doing (causing) is signified—viz., the doing (causing) which is indicated by this verb. Therefore, with good reason the verb “to do” is in everyday discourse at times used in place of every other verb.

[26:20] *S.* To one who is willing to understand, what you are saying is clear. Still, I do not yet understand for what purpose you are saying these things.

T. You will understand in what follows.¹

¹Section 26:23 - 27:26 is an almost exact repetition of 25:14 - 26:22. We have therefore omitted it in the translation. The non-repetitive lines are 27:10-14: “Often ‘to do’ is used in place of negative verbs too—even in place of ‘not to do.’ For example, he who does not love the virtues and does not hate the vices does evilly; and he who does not do what he ought not to do does rightly. Thus, ‘to do’ is used in place of every verb, whether positive or negative; and every verb is a doing.”

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[27:26] For when we say “A man is” or “A man is not,” what is signified by the name “man” is conceived before it is said to be or not to be. And so, what is conceived is a cause of the fact that “to be” is predicated of it. Also, if we say “A man is an animal,” *man* is a cause of there being, and being said to be, an animal. I do not mean that *man* is a cause of the existence of *animal*; rather, I mean that *man* is a cause of man's being, and being said to be, an animal. For by the name, “man” we signify and conceive of man in his totality (*totus homo*); and in this totality *animal* is contained as a part. In this way, then, the part here follows from the whole, because it is necessary that the part be where the whole is. Therefore, because in the name “man” we conceive of the whole man, *man* is a cause of man's being, and being said to be, an animal. For the conception of the whole is a cause of the part's being conceived in it and being predicated of it. In this way, then, of whatever thing “to be” is predicated—whether it is predicated simply (e.g., “A man is”) or whether it is predicated with an addition (e.g., “A man is an animal” or “A man is healthy”)—the conception of this thing precedes and is a cause of this thing's being said to be (or not to be), and is a cause of the intelligibility of what is said. So of whatever thing (*re*) a verb is predicated, in the foregoing manner a doing (causing) is signified—viz., the doing (causing) which is indicated by this verb. Therefore, with good reason the verb “to do” is in everyday discourse at times used in place of every other verb, and every verb is said to be a doing.

[28:13] For, indeed, even the Lord in the Gospel uses “*facere*” (or “*agere*,” which means the same thing) in place of every other verb when He says: “Whoever does (*agit*) evil hates the light”¹ and “Whoever does (*facit*) the truth comes to the light.”² Now, assuredly, he who does what he ought not or who does not do what he ought does evil. This point is understood to hold true, in a similar way, for every verb. For example, he does evil who is present where or when he ought not to be, or who is sitting or is standing where or when he ought not to be. And he does evil who is not present, not sitting, or not standing where and when he ought

¹John 3:20. ²John 3:21.

to be. But he does the truth who does what he ought and who does not do what he ought not. Likewise, he does the truth who is present or is sitting or is standing where and when he ought to be, and who is not present, not sitting, and not standing where and when he ought not to be. In this way the Lord reduces every verb, whether positive or negative, to a doing.

[28:26] There is a further consideration about the verb “*facere*”: viz., in how many modes common discourse uses it. Although this classification [of modes] is especially complex and very complicated, let me nevertheless say about it something which I think bears upon what we shall be saying later and which can be of some help to someone who wants to pursue this classification more carefully.

Some causes are called efficient causes (e.g., someone who composes a literary work); in comparison with these, others are not called efficient (e.g., the matter from which something is made). Nevertheless, (as I said), every cause is said to do, and everything which is said to do is called a cause. Now, whatever is said to do (*facere*) either causes (*facit*) something to be or causes something not to be. Therefore, every doing can be said either (A) to cause to be or (B) to cause not to be. These two are contrary affirmations whose negations are (C) “not to cause to be” and (D) “not to cause not to be.” Now, the affirmation (A) “to cause to be” is sometimes used in place of the negation (D) “not to cause not to be”; and, conversely, “not to cause not to be” is sometimes used in place of “to cause to be.” Likewise, (B) “to cause not to be” and (C) “not to cause to be” are used in place of each other. For example, sometimes the reason someone is said to *cause* evil things *to be* is that he does *not cause* them *not to be*; and sometimes the reason he is said not to cause evil things not to be is that he causes them to be. Likewise, sometimes the reason someone is said to *cause* good things *not to be* is that he does *not cause* them *to be*; and sometimes the reason he is said not to cause good things to be is that he causes them not to be.

[29:20] Let us now understand *doing* (*causing*) in terms of a classification. Since a doing (causing) is always either in relation to being or in relation to not-being, (as has been said), we will be obliged to add “to be” or “not to be” to the distinct modes of doing (causing) in order for them to be clearly distinguished. Ac-

cordingly, we speak in six modes about *causing* [*to be*]: in two modes when a cause (A.1) causes to be, or (A.2) does not cause not to be, that very thing which it is said to cause [to be]; and in four modes when it (A.3 - A.6) either does or does not cause something else to be or not to be. For, indeed, we say of any given thing “It causes something to be” either because it (1) causes-to-be the very thing which it is said to cause [to be], or because it (2) does not cause this very thing not to be, or because it (3) causes something else to be, or because it (4) does not cause something else to be, or because it (5) causes something else not to be, or because it (6) does not cause something else not to be.¹

[29:31] When someone who kills a man with a sword is said to cause him to be dead, [it is said] in the first mode. For he directly (*per se*) causes the very thing which he is said to cause.

Regarding to-cause-to-be-dead I do not have an example of the second mode unless I posit the case of someone who can restore a dead man to life but who is unwilling to. If this were the case in the present context, then he would in the second mode be said to cause the other to be dead, because he would *not cause* him *not to be* dead. In other matters examples are abundant—as, for instance, when we say that someone causes-to-be the evil things which he does not cause not to be, although he is able to [do so].

[30:3] It is in terms of the third mode when we say of any given person “He has killed another” (i.e., “He has caused him to be dead”) because he ordered that the other be killed, or because he caused the killer to have a sword, or because he brought an accusation against the man who was killed, or [it is an instance of the third mode] even in the case where we say of the man who was killed “He killed himself” because he did something on account of which he was killed. For, indeed, these persons did not themselves directly (*per se*) cause that very thing which they are said to cause—i.e., they did not directly kill or directly cause to be dead or to be killed. Rather, by *causing* something else, they indirectly (*per medium*) caused what they are said to cause.

It is in the fourth mode when we say that someone who did not give weapons to the slain man before he was killed—or who

¹See Diagram I, table A, supplied by the translators as an appendix to the present text.

did not restrain the killer, or who did not do something which, had he done, the other would not have been killed—has killed him. These men too did not kill the other directly (*per se*); rather, by *not causing* something else *to be* they have caused what they are said to cause.

[30:16] It is the fifth mode when we say of someone “He has killed another” because by removing his weapons he caused the intended victim not to be armed, or by opening a door he caused the killer not to be confined where he was being detained. In this instance as well, the one who is said to have killed the other did not kill him directly (*per se*); rather he killed him indirectly (*per aliud*), by *causing* something else *not to be*.

It accords with the sixth mode when the one who did not cause the killer not to be armed, by removing his weapons, is accused of having killed the victim—or when the man who did not lead the intended victim away so that he would not be in the presence of the killer is so accused. These individuals too did not kill directly. Rather, they killed indirectly—viz., by *not causing* something else *not to be*.

[30:26] (B) *To-cause-not-to-be* receives the same classification. For whatever is said to cause something not to be is said [to do so] either because it (B.1) causes that very thing not to be, or because it (B.2) does not cause that very thing to be, or because it (B.3) causes something else to be, or because it (B.4) does not cause something else to be, or because it (B.5) causes something else not to be, or because it (B.6) does not cause something else not to be.

Examples of these modes can be found in the case of killing a man,¹ just as I have cited for to-cause-to-be.

Just as in the first mode of causing-to-be the one who kills causes to be dead, so in the first mode of causing-not-to-be he *causes not to be living*.

But in the second mode I do not have an example of causing-not-to-be-living unless (as I did earlier) I posit the case of someone who can restore a dead man to life. For if he were unwilling to do this, we would say (in the second mode) “He causes not to be living” because he does *not cause to be living*. For even though

¹See Diagram I, table B, supplied by the translators as an appendix to the present text.

to be dead is not the same thing as not to be living (for only what is deprived of life is dead, but many things which are not deprived of life are not living—e.g., a stone), nevertheless just as to kill is nothing other than to cause to be dead (and to cause not to be living) so to restore to life is the same as to cause to be living (and to cause not to be dead). In other matters there are many examples of this second mode. Indeed, he is said to cause goods not to be who does not cause them to be, although able to do so.

[31:13] In the four remaining modes (viz., causing or not causing something else to be or not to be) the examples which have been cited for (A) to-cause-to-be are sufficient.

Let us now¹ speak about *to-cause-not-to-be*, which I have said also to consist of six modes. These modes are in every respect the same as those found in to-cause-to-be, except that here they are in to-cause-not-to-be and there they are in to-cause-to-be.

For here the first mode is when we say of a thing “It causes not to be” because the very thing which it is said to cause not to be it does cause not to be. For example, we say of someone who kills a man “He *causes* him *not to be living*” because he causes the very thing which he is said to cause.

The second mode is when we say of [a thing] “It causes not to be” because the thing which it is said to cause not to be it *does not cause to be*. In regard to causing a man to be living (or not to be living), I cannot give an example of this [second] mode unless I posit the case of someone who can cause a dead man to be living. In the present context, if he were not to do this, we would say “He causes the dead man not to be living” because he would *not cause him to be living*. In other matters examples are abundant. For instance, if someone whose job it is to cause a house to be lit up at night does not do what he ought to, we say “He causes the house not to be lit” because he does not cause it to be lit.

[31:33] The third mode is when we say of [a thing] “It causes not to be” because it *causes* something else (i.e., something other than what it is said to cause not to be) *to be*—as, for example, when we say of someone “He caused the victim not to be living” because he caused the killer to have a sword.

The fourth mode is when we say of [a thing] “It causes not to

¹The Latin text begins anew the discussion of *facere non esse*.

be” because it *does not cause* something else *to be*—as, for example, when we say of someone “He caused the victim not to be living” because he did not cause him to be armed prior to his having been killed.

The fifth mode is when we say of a thing “It causes not to be” because it *causes* something else *not to be*—as, for example, when we say of someone “He caused another not to be living” because he caused him not to be armed prior to his having been killed.

The sixth mode is when a thing causes not-to-be because it *does not cause* something else *not to be*—as, for example, when someone (although he is able to do so) does not cause the killer not to be armed, by removing his weapons.

[32:6] Note 1. Moreover, notice that although “to cause to be” and “not to cause not to be” are used for each other, nevertheless they are different from each other. For, indeed, properly speaking, he causes to be who causes there to be what previously was not. But not only he who causes something to be but also he who does not cause anything either to be or not to be are, in equal measure, said not to cause not to be.

Likewise, to-cause-not-to-be and not-to-cause-to-be differ from each other. For, properly speaking, he causes not to be who causes there not to be what previously was. But not only he who causes there not to be what previously was but also he who does not cause either to be or not to be are both said not to cause to be.

Note 2. Indeed, I have taken these examples (which I have given of causing-to-be and of causing-not-to-be) from [the class of] efficient causes, since what I wanted to show appears more clearly in these causes. But just as the aforementioned six modes are discerned in efficient causes, so also they are found in non-efficient causes, if anyone cares to investigate them carefully.

[32:21] *S.* I see this clearly.

T. Indeed,¹ I have taken these examples from [the class of] efficient causes, since what I want to show appears more clearly in

¹The Latin text repeats “Haec quidem exempla de causis efficientibus assumpsi, quoniam in his clarius apparet, quod volo ostendere,” which is found in the text at the beginning of note 2 above. The Teacher’s speech here reverses modes 4 and 5, as presented in the earlier ordering.

these causes. Now, in the five modes after the first mode efficient causes do not cause what they are said to cause. Nevertheless—since the second mode does not cause not to be what the first mode causes to be, and since the third mode causes something else to be, and the fourth mode causes something else not to be, and the fifth mode does not cause something else to be, and the sixth mode does not cause something else not to be—efficient causes are said to cause what the first mode causes (as I have exemplified in every mode). Similarly, non-efficient causes are said to cause in accordance with the same modes.

[32:31] For there are non-efficient proximate causes of the existence of what they are said to cause; and there are [non-efficient] remote causes of the existence of something else rather than of the existence of what [they are said to cause]. For example, a window which causes a house to be lighted is not an efficient cause but is only that through which light-rays [efficiently] cause [the house to be lighted]. Nevertheless, the window is a proximate cause of the existence of what it is said to cause; for through itself (*per se*) rather than through an intermediary (*per aliud*) it is a cause of there being what [it is said to cause]. This [cause] belongs to the first mode of causing, since what the window is said to cause to be it does (in its own way) cause to be. But if when the window is missing or when it is shuttered it is said to cause the house to be dark, this [cause] belongs to the second mode; for we say of the window “It causes the house to be dark” because it does not cause this very state of affairs [viz., the house's darkness] not to be. But if he who has made a window is said to cause a house to be lighted, or if he who has not made a window is said to cause a house to be dark, or if someone says that his own land nourishes him, then these are remote causes. For they do not cause through themselves (*per se*). Rather, the man [causes] by means of the window which he has made, or which (when he ought to have) he has not made; and the land [causes nourishment] by means of the produce which it has yielded.

Thus, those causes—whether they be efficient or non-efficient—which are in the first or the second mode can be called proximate causes; but the other causes [i.e., in modes 3-6] are remote causes.

[33:9]The negations (C) “not to cause to be” and (D) “not to

cause not to be” are divided into just as many modes [as the affirmations *A* and *B*]. This fact is recognizable in the examples which have been given for the modes of (A) causing-to-be and of (B) causing-not-to-be, if [in these tables] the affirmative modes are changed into negations and the negative modes are changed into affirmations. [This contradicting of each of the modes in the two affirmative tables transforms them into two corresponding negative tables.] However, for the four modes subsequent to the second mode [i.e., for modes 3-6], if anyone wants to keep here [i.e., in the negative tables] the same [lexical] order as I set forth above [i.e., in the affirmative tables], then let him state affirmatively in the third mode [of the negative tables] what I have stated negatively in the fourth mode [of the affirmative tables]; and let him state negatively in the fourth mode [of the negative tables] what was stated affirmatively in the third mode [of the affirmative tables]. And likewise let him do a similar thing with the fifth mode [of the negative tables] and the sixth mode [of the affirmative tables], and with the sixth mode [of the negative tables] and the fifth mode [of the affirmative tables].

Moreover, we must note that in the modes of the negative tables the first mode simply denies, without suggesting anything else. But the five subsequent modes [in the negative tables] have [this] negation in place of the contrary of its [i.e., the first mode's] affirmation. For example,¹ he who revives someone is said, in the second mode, not-to-cause-him-to-be-dead in place of to-cause-him-not-to-be-dead; and he is said not-to-cause-him-not-to-be-living in place of to-cause-him-to-be-living. But he who (in the third mode) *causes* the intended victim *to be* armed, by giving him weapons, or who (in the sixth mode) *does not cause* him *not to be* armed, although able to remove his weapons, or who (in the fifth mode) *causes* the intending killer *not to be* armed, by removing his weapons, or who (in the fourth mode) by not giving weapons to the intending killer *does not cause* him *to be* armed: if he is said not to cause to be dead (or not to cause not to be living), he is understood to cause, as

¹See Diagram II, supplied by the translators as an appendix to the present text. In Diagram II, modes 2-6 of table B are substitutable for modes 2-6 of table C; and modes 2-6 of table A are substitutable for modes 2-6 of table D. ²This incorrect Latin sentence of the Schmitt text [33:25-29] has been corrected by the translators in the translation itself.

far as he can do so, not to be dead (and to cause to be living).²

[33:30] The same principle of classification which I cited for to-cause-to-be and to-cause-not-to-be obtains for whatever verb “to cause” is similarly conjoined with—as, for example, when I say “I cause you to do something” or “I cause you to write something,” or “I cause something to be done” or “I cause something to be written.” These modes which I have cited for “to cause” (“*facere*”) are in a certain respect found in other verbs too. Although not every mode is found in every verb, nevertheless one or more are found in each verb—and especially in those verbs (such as “ought to” and “is able to”) which are transitive to verbs. Indeed, when we say “I am able to read” or “I am able to be read [through my writings]” or “I ought to love” or “I ought to be loved,” then “able to” and “ought to” are transitive to verbs.

[33:40] There are also verbs which are transitive not to verbs but to some thing (*rem*)—as, for example, [when we say] “to eat bread” and “to cut wood.” There are also verbs which are intransitive—as, for example, “to recline,” “to sleep.” Nonetheless, some of these intransitive verbs appear to be transitive to a verb—as, for example, when we say “The people sat down to eat and to drink, and they rose up to play.”¹ But it is not so. [That is, it is not the case that such verbs (e.g., “to sit,” “to arise”) are transitive to a verb.] For it is not the case that just as we say “The people want to eat and to drink and to play” so we say “The people sat down to eat and to drink, and they rose up to play.” For the latter is analyzed as “The people sat down in order to eat and drink, and they rose up in order to play.”

Some modes, from the aforementioned ones, are also found in the verb “to be.” Indeed, the first two modes are easily recognized; but the four subsequent ones—which cause or do not cause something else to be or not to be—are more difficult to detect, because there are many ways in which these modes cause and do not cause something else to be or not to be. Nevertheless, I shall say a few things about this matter. And by comparison with these statements [of mine] you will be able to notice in Scripture and in common discourse other points which I shall not mention.

[34:16] The verb “to be” also imitates the verb “*facere*.” For

¹Exodus 32:6.

something is said to be what it is not—not because this something is what it is said to be but because it is something else which is the reason (*causa*) for what is said. For, indeed, someone is said¹ to be a foot for the lame and an eye for the blind—not because he is what he is said to be [viz., a foot, an eye] but because he is something else which serves the lame man in place of a foot and serves the blind man in place of an eye. Also, the lives of just individuals who are living amidst many toils because of their desire for eternal life are called happy—not because their lives are in fact happy but because their present lives are a cause of their some day being happy.

A resemblance with the verb “*facere*” is also found in the verb “to have.” For example, someone bereft of eyes is said to have eyes—not because he really has eyes but because he has someone else who does for him what eyes do. And he who does not have feet is said to have feet simply because he has something else which serves him in place of feet.

[34:29] We often attribute a name or a verb *improperly* to some object [and do so] because that object to which the name or the verb is improperly attributed [stands in one of the following relations] to the object to which the name or the verb is *properly* attributed:

It is similar to it.

It is its cause, effect, genus, species, whole, or part. It has the same capability.

It is its external form [i.e., shape] or a thing shaped according to that form. (True, every external form is similar to the thing shaped according to it, but not every similarity is an external form or a thing shaped according to that form.)

In some other way (as I began to say) than through external form it signifies, or is signified by, that whose name or verb it [improperly] receives.

It is its content or container,

or they are related as the one who uses some thing and the thing which he uses. It seems to me that as often as this [kind of attribution occurs, it is] this [improperly spoken of object] which is said to do [what the other object really does].

[34:40] All the modes which I have cited for the verb “*facere*”

¹Job 29:15.

are sometimes found in other verbs as well; although not all of the modes are found in every particular verb, one or more are present. For example, every verb which is properly predicated of a thing (so that the thing does what it is said to do) is predicated according to the first mode. Some examples of this are: “He reclines,” “He sits,” “He runs” (when he does so with his own feet), “He builds a house” (when he does so with his own hands), “Daylight is,” “The sun shines,” or something else. But if it is not the case that the thing does that which it is said to do, then we are predicating in accordance with some mode other than the first. Some examples of this are: when someone who orders [a house to be built] but does not do the actual work is said to build a house—or when we say that a horseman runs, although he himself does not run but causes his horse to run. Therefore, as often as we hear a verb being predicated of some object which is not doing what it is being said [to do], then a careful observer will find [that this is being said] in one of the five modes (which I have cited) subsequent to the first mode.

[35:14] For, indeed, when someone says to me “I ought to be loved by you,” he is speaking improperly. For if he *ought*, then he has an obligation to be loved by me. And so he ought to demand from himself that he be loved by me, for he is [the one who is] under obligation. (Moreover, if he does not discharge his obligation, he sins.) But even though this is the way he is saying it, this is not the way he means it. Accordingly, “He ought to be loved by me” is said because he is a cause of my obligation to love him. For if he deserved [my love], he was a cause of my obligation to love him; and if it is not the case that because of his action he deserved [my love], then by the mere fact that he is a man, he has within himself a reason (*causa*) for my obligation to love him. Therefore, just as we say “He causes it” of someone who does not [directly] cause a thing but who is in one of the aforesaid modes a cause of someone else’s [directly] causing this thing (as I have shown above), so we say “He is under this obligation” of him who is not under an obligation but who in some way causes someone else to be under that obligation; for he is a cause of the other’s being obliged. After the same fashion, we say “The poor ought to receive from the wealthy,” even though the poor are not under obligation; rather, they are something else, viz., in need; and this

[condition] is the reason (*causa*) why they cause the wealthy to be obliged to expend money.

[36:3] We also say that we are not-obliged-to-sin in place of saying that we are obliged-not-to-sin. Yet if the matter is properly considered [we see that] not everyone who does what he is not obliged to do sins. For, indeed, just as to-be-obliged is the same as to-be-under-obligation, so not- to-be-obliged is nothing other than not-to-be-under-obligation. Now, it is not always the case that a man sins when he does what he is not under obligation to do. For, indeed, a man is not under obligation to marry, for he is permitted to maintain his virginity. It follows, then, that he is not obliged to marry. And yet, if he does marry he does not sin. Therefore, it is not always the case—provided “not obliged to” is properly understood—that a man sins when he does what he is not obliged to do. Nevertheless, no one denies that a man ought to marry. Therefore, he is both obliged and not obliged. Now, if you recall what has already been said, then [you will see that] just as we say “not to cause to be” in place of “to cause not to be,” so we say “not to be obliged to do” in place of “to be obliged not to do.” And so, where “to be obliged not to sin” is found, “not to be obliged to sin” is said in place of it. Our custom [of speaking] has adopted this latter expression to such an extent that nothing else is understood by it than “to be obliged not to sin. “

[36:18] But as for our saying that if a man wants to marry, then he ought to marry: “ought to marry” is said in place of “is not obliged not to marry,” just as earlier I showed that “to cause to be” is said in place of “not to cause not to be.” Similarly, then, just as we say “not to be obliged to do” in place of “to be obliged not to do,” so we say “to be obliged to do” in place of “not to be obliged not to do.” However, the expression “to be obliged to do” [i.e., “ought to do”] can be understood in the sense in which we say that God ought to rule over everything. For it is not the case that God is obliged with respect to anything; rather, all other things ought to be subject to Him. Therefore, we say that God ought to rule over all other things because He is the cause that all other things ought to be subject to Him—even as I said that the poor *ought* to receive from the wealthy because within them is the reason (*causa*) why the wealthy ought to contribute to them. In this sense, then, we can say that a man ought to marry. For everything which is

someone's possession, [or prerogative], ought to be subject to his will. Now, each man who has not vowed chastity has the prerogative either to marry or not to marry. Accordingly, since to marry or not to marry ought to be in accordance with his wishes, we say that if he wants to he ought to marry, and if he does not want to he ought not to marry.

[37:6] Now, when we ask God to forgive us our sins, it is not to our advantage for God to do for us precisely what our words say. For if He forgives us our sins, He neither blots them out nor removes them from us. But when we pray that [our] sins be forgiven us, what we are asking is not that they themselves be forgiven us but that the debts which we owe for our sins be forgiven us. For, indeed, since [our] sins are the cause of (and do cause) our owing the debts which we need to have forgiven us, we pray that the sins be forgiven, although we ought to pray that the debts be forgiven. In this case, what we desire is not that the sins be forgiven us but that the debts which the sins have caused be forgiven us. This fact is evident in the Lord's Prayer, where we pray "Forgive us our debts."¹

Thus it happens that a man typically says to someone who burns down his house or causes him some other detriment: "Restore to me the damage you have caused." And the one who has burned down the house says: "Forgive me the damage I have caused you." [But we do] not [take these statements to mean] that the damage must be restored or forgiven. Rather, [we take them to mean that] what has been removed because of the damage must be restored and that what must be paid because of the damage must be forgiven.

For the same reason, the Lord says that those whom we mercifully forgive and to whom we mercifully give "will give into your bosom a good measure, pressed down, shaken together, and running over."² For since those to whom mercy is shown are a cause of mercy's being returned to men who show it, the former are said to return mercy to the latter.

VELLE, VOLUNTAS

[37:29] We say "to will to be" in the same six modes as we say

¹Matthew 6:12. ²Luke 6:38.

“to cause to be.” Likewise, we say “to will not to be” in just as many different modes as we say “to cause not to be.”

It is noteworthy that sometimes we so will [something] that, if we can, we cause the occurrence of what we will—as, for example, when a sick man wills health. For if he can, he causes himself to be healthy; and if he cannot, nevertheless he would cause it if he could. This willing can be called an *efficient* will, since insofar as it can it effects the existence of what it wills.

Sometimes, however, we will that which we are able to cause and yet do not cause. Still, if it does occur we are pleased by its occurrence and approve of it. For example, if a poor, naked man whom I am unwilling to clothe were to tell me that he is naked because I want him to be naked or because I do not want him to be clothed, I might answer that I want him to be clothed and not to be naked. Moreover, I approve of his being clothed rather than being naked, even though I do not cause him to be clothed. The will by which I thus want the man to be clothed can be called an *approving* will.

[38:14] We also will in another way—as, for example, if a creditor wills, as a concession, to accept from a debtor barley in place of the wheat which the debtor cannot pay. We can call this will merely a *conceding* will, for the creditor prefers wheat but concedes the debtor's paying with barley because of the latter's indigence.

Moreover, it is customary to say that someone wills a thing which he neither approves nor concedes but only permits (although able to prevent it). For example, when a ruler does not will to restrain robbers and plunderers in his dominion, we say that he wills the evils which they do (even though these evils displease him), since he wills to permit them.

[38:24] Now, it seems to me that every kind of willing is contained within this fourfold classification. Of these four different kinds of will, that which I have called the efficient will causes (insofar as it can) what it wills; and it also approves, concedes, and permits. But the approving will does not cause what it wills; it only approves, concedes, and permits. And (except for the sake of something else) the conceding will neither causes nor approves what it wills; it only concedes and permits. And the permissive will neither causes nor approves nor concedes what it wills; it only permits this thing—though disapproving it.

Divine Scripture makes reference to all four kinds of willing. Let me give a few examples of this. For instance, when Scripture says of God “He has done whatsoever He has willed to do”¹ and “He is merciful to whom He wills to be,”² this will is an efficient will; and it belongs to the first mode of willing-to-be (after the fashion of causing-to-be), because it wills the very thing it is said to will.

But when Scripture says “He hardens whom He wills to,”³ this will is a permissive will and belongs to the second mode of willing-to-be, since the reason He is said to will-to-be-hard is that He does not will (by means of an efficient will) not-to-be-hard (i.e., He does not will to cause not to be hard). On the other hand, if the reason we say “He wills to harden” is that He does not will to soften, the meaning is the same, and this will is likewise a permissive will. But it belongs to the fourth mode of willing-to-be. For the reason God is being said to will to harden is that He does not will something else to be, viz., [He does not will] to be softened. For He who softens causes to be softened and causes not to be hardened.

[39:21] Now, when we hear that “God wills for every man to be saved,” this will is an approving will. Like to-will-to-harden, it belongs to the second mode of willing-to-be, since it does not will to cause not to be saved; and it belongs to the fourth mode because it does not will for something else to be (i.e., it does not will, by an efficient will, for a man to be condemned—i.e., it does not will to cause something on the basis of which he would be condemned). This verse is directed against those who say that the will of God is the cause of their being unjust (rather than just) and of their not being saved—although the injustice for which they are condemned comes from themselves and does not come from the will of God.

If we say “God wills for virginity to be kept,” in the case of those whom He causes to keep it, then His will is an efficient will in the first mode of willing-to-be. But in the case of other men this will is an approving will, because God does not will (with an efficient will) for their virginity not to be kept (second mode) or does not will for their virginity to be violated (fourth mode).

¹Psalms 113B:3 (115:3). ²Romans 9:18. ³*loc. cit.*

CAUSAE

[40:1] Some causes are called efficient causes—for instance, a craftsman (for he produces his own work) and wisdom (which makes someone wise). By comparison with these, other causes are not called efficient causes (e.g., the matter from which something is made, and the place and time in which spatial and temporal things occur). Nonetheless, every cause—each in its own way—is said to do, and everything which is said to do is called a cause.

Every cause does (*facit*) something. One [kind of] cause causes (*facit*)—and is a cause of—the existence of what it is said to cause either to be or not to be; another [kind of] cause does not cause the existence of what it is said [to cause], but is only a cause of what is said. For example, both a guard and Herod are said to have killed John [the Baptist], since both caused (and were causes of) the occurrence of that which they are said to have caused. And a resemblance—viz., that the Lord Jesus during infancy and childhood dwelt with Joseph as if He were his son—caused (and was a cause of) His being called (but not of His actually being) the son of Joseph. God granting, I shall first say something about the cause which causes the existence of what it is said to cause; and afterwards I shall speak about the other [kind of] cause.

[40:18] Some causes of this kind are proximate causes. They do through themselves (*per se*) that which they are said to do, with no other cause intervening between them and the effect which they cause. And there are remote causes, which do what they are said to do, but do so not through themselves but only through one or more intermediary causes. For example, the man who orders that a fire be set, and the man who sets the fire, and the fire itself—all cause burning. However, through itself and without any intermediate cause between itself and its effect, the fire causes [burning]. But he who sets-on-fire causes burning by the sole intermediary of fire. And he who orders that the fire be set causes burning by means of two other intermediate causes, viz., a fire and the man who sets the fire. Thus, some causes do through themselves that which they are said to do, whereas others—because they are remote causes—do something else which, nonetheless, produces the same effect. Nevertheless, it sometimes happens that an effect is attributed to a cause which causes something else rather

than to a cause which through itself causes the same [effect]—as, for example, when we impute to a magistrate what is done by his command and authority and when we say that the man who does something because of which he is killed, is killed by himself rather than by someone else.

[41:3] Now, just as some efficient causes cause proximately and through themselves the very thing which they are said to cause, whereas others cause remotely and by means of intermediaries [what they are said to cause]—so it is in the case of non-efficient causes. For example, iron is a proximate [material] cause of a sword; in its own way and through itself (*per se*) it causes the sword, and it does so without the presence of any intermediate cause. And the earth of which the iron is made is a remote cause of the sword, and causes it through something else (*per aliud*), i.e., through an intermediary (*per medium*), viz., iron. For every cause has other causes of itself. [This chain of causation continues] until [it reaches] the Supreme Cause of all things, viz., God, who, although He is the Cause of everything that is something, has no cause. Moreover, every effect has a plurality of causes of different kinds—except for the first effect [which has only one cause], since only the Supreme Cause created everything else. In fact, in the killing of one man there are several causes: he who does the killing, he who orders the killing, the reason for which the victim is killed, and also (as necessary conditions) the place and the time [of the killing], and several other causes as well.

Moreover, some causes are said to cause by doing [something], others by not doing [anything]—and sometimes not only by not doing [anything] but also by not even existing. For he who does not prevent evil things is said to cause them to be, and he who does not cause good things is said to cause them not to be. Similarly, just as when learning is present it causes good things to be and evil things not to be, so when learning is not present, it is said to cause, by its absence, evil things to be and good things not to be. However, causes of this last kind are included among those which are said to cause by not doing [anything].

[41:25] Although quite frequently causes are said to cause through something else (rather than through themselves), i.e., through an intermediary (and thus in this case they can be called remote causes), nevertheless every cause has its own proximate ef-

fect, which it causes through itself and for which it is a proximate cause. For example, he who kindles a flame is a proximate cause of the flame; and through the medium of the flame he sets a fire, of which he is a remote cause. Therefore, when a cause is proximate, it is properly said to cause, since it causes through itself; but when it is remote, the reason it is said to cause [what it is said to cause] is that it causes something else.

Every cause is either a being or a not-being. And, likewise, every effect is either a being or a not-being; for every cause either causes to be or causes not to be. Now, by “a (state of) being” I mean anything, [or any state of affairs], which is spoken of without negation—whether it is spoken of with one word or with more than one word. And by “a (state of) not-being” I mean what is spoken of by way of denial. When the sun is spoken of, a being is spoken of, but it is not yet signified to be a cause. Likewise, when I say “shines,” I speak of something, but I do not yet signify that it is the effect of anything. But when I say “The sun shines,” [I signify that] the sun is a cause and shining is an effect; and each is something and an existent, because the sun has its own being and causes light to be. Therefore, in this example, the cause is a being, and the effect is a being. [42:2] However, if I say “The sun causes night not to be,” here the cause is a being but the effect is a (state of) not-being. In a similar way, I speak of a (state of) being by means of more than one word. For example, the sun's being above the horizon (*terram*) is something and causes day to be and night not to be. In this example being causes both being and not-being. Moreover, the sun's not being above the horizon causes night to be and day not to be. In this example (*prolacione*) not-being causes both being and not-being. Just as what is said to cause is obviously a cause, so what in some respect or other is signified to be a cause causes that of which it is said to be a cause. For example, to say “Because of the sun's presence it is day and not night” or “Because of the sun's absence it is night and not day” is tantamount to saying “The sun's presence causes it to be day and not to be night” and “The sun's absence causes it to be night and not to be day.” Thus, he who says “My knees are weak from fasting, and my flesh is changed because of oil”¹ is saying the same

¹Psalms 108:24 (109:24).

thing as: “Fasting has weakened my knees; oil has changed my flesh.” But fasting [has caused weakness] because it was present; and oil [has caused a change] because it was absent, i.e., because it was not present. For often we say that a cause causes to be and not to be through its presence and absence—even though we do not explicitly append the words “presence” and “absence.” For example, we might say that the sun causes day to be and night not to be, and causes day not to be and night to be. But it causes the one state of affairs by its presence, the other by its absence.

ALIQUID

[42:22] We speak of something (*aliquid*) in four modes.

1. For we properly label as something that which is spoken of by a name of its own and is conceived by the mind and exists in reality—as is true of a stone or a tree. For these latter have their own names and are conceived by the mind and exist in reality.

2. We also speak of as something that which has a name and is conceived by the mind, but does not exist in reality—as, for example, a chimera. For by the name “chimera” there is signified a mental concept of a kind of animal; nevertheless a chimera does not exist in reality.

3. It is also our custom to speak of as something that which has only a name (without there being in our minds any concept corresponding to this name) and which altogether lacks existence—as, for example, injustice and nothing. For we call injustice something when we state that someone who is punished on account of injustice is punished on account of something. And we call nothing something if we say either “Something is nothing” or “Something is not nothing.” For whether [either] statement is true or whether it is false, we say that something is affirmed of something or that something is denied of something. Nevertheless, in our minds there is no concept of injustice and of nothing, even though they signify, even as do infinite names. For, indeed, to signify is not the same as to form something in the understanding. For, in fact, “not-man” signifies, because it causes the hearer to understand that *man* is not contained in (but is removed from) its signification. Nevertheless, *not-man* does not form in the understanding something which is signified by this utterance—as *man*

does form a concept, which the name “man” signifies. Thus, “injustice” signifies the removal of required justice and does not posit anything else in the understanding; and “nothing” signifies the removal of something and does not posit anything in the understanding.

4. We also speak of as something that which does not have a name of its own and does not have a concept and does not have any existence—as, for example, when we call not-being something and say that not-being is. For instance, when we say that the sun's not being above the horizon (*terram*) causes it not to be day: if every cause is called something and if every effect is called something, then we shall not deny that its not being day and the sun's not being above the horizon are something, since the one is a cause and the other an effect. And [in the following case] we say that not-being *is*: when someone says that something is not the case and we reply by stating that the matter is as he says it is. Yet, if we were to speak properly, we ought rather to say that the matter is not, even as he says it is not.

Therefore, although we speak of something in four modes, one thing is properly called something, whereas it is not the case that the others are [properly called] something. Instead, they are as-if something, because we speak of them as if they were something.

DE POTESTATE

[44:1] Ability is an aptitude-for-doing. I use “doing” here in place of every verb, finite or infinite, which occurs in ordinary discourse. For example, he does rightly who speaks or sits or stands when he ought to, and who wills or endures what he ought to, and who is where and when he ought to be. But he does wrongly who does not speak or sit or stand when he ought to, and who does not will or endure what he ought to, and who is not where or when he ought to be. Moreover, he does wrongly who does not do what he ought to; and he does rightly who does not do what he ought not to do. Therefore, it is evident that “to do” is used in place of every verb, finite or infinite—and even in place of “not to do.”

So ability is an aptitude-for-doing; and every aptitude-for-doing is an ability. But here we must be careful not to take aptitude-for-

doing (*aptitudo ad faciendum*) and aptitude-to-do (*aptitudo faciendi*) as exact equivalents. For every aptitude-for-doing is also an aptitude-to-do; but not every aptitude-to-do is also an aptitude-for-doing. For example, that aptitude-to-write (*aptitudo scribendi*) which is also an aptitude-for-writing (*aptitudo ad scribendum*) exists even before anything is written, and it is called the ability-to-write. But that aptitude-to-write which is also an aptitude-at-writing (*aptitudo in scribendo*), and in accordance with which we say [of someone that] he writes aptly, does not precede the writing and is not an ability to write; rather, it is the effect of the ability to write. For someone writes aptly because he has a prior ability to write aptly. It is not the case that the writing can be done aptly because it is done aptly.

[44:21] However, we have said “aptitude for doing” and not simply “aptitude for something,” because there is an aptitude-for-something (e.g., the aptitude of clothing for the body) which is not an aptitude-for-doing, and this [aptitude-for-something] is not an ability. For although clothing is called apt for the body, it is not for that reason said to be able. Therefore, it was right to say that ability is an aptitude-for-doing. For in that it is called an aptitude, it is distinguished from everything which is not an aptitude. And in that it is specified to be an aptitude *for doing*, it is distinguished from every other [kind of] aptitude—whether from that aptitude which is not an aptitude for something (as, for example, is aptitude at writing) or from that aptitude which is an aptitude for something but not for doing (as, for example, the aptitude which clothing has for the body—an aptitude which can better be called [in Latin] “*aptitudo corpori*” [than “*aptitudo ad corpus*”], for clothing is said to be *apta corpori*). Hence, this definition of “ability” contains neither more nor less than it ought to. (However, this definition of “ability” is constructed in accordance with our way of speaking and not in accordance with the proper signification of the word “ability.”) For this definition of “ability” takes account of whatever in any respect is able. For example, wood is able to be cut; and a man is able to cut. Wood is able to be cut because it has an aptitude for being cut; and a man is able to cut because he has an aptitude for cutting.

PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS
TRANSLATORS' APPENDIX

Diagram I: "To Cause Someone to Be Dead"

Affirmative Tables

Table A: "To Cause to Be Dead"

1. A directly causes C to be dead.
2. A directly causes C to be dead, because A does not cause C not to be dead.
3. A causes C to be dead, because A causes B to be armed.
4. A causes C to be dead, because A does not cause C to be armed.
5. A causes C to be dead, because A causes C not to be armed.
6. A causes C to be dead, because A does not cause B not to be armed.

Table B: "To Cause Not to Be Living"

1. A directly causes C not to be living.
2. A directly causes C not to be living, because A does not cause C to be living.
3. A causes C not to be living, because A causes B to be armed.
4. A causes C not to be living, because A does not cause C to be armed.
5. A causes C not to be living, because A causes C not to be armed.
6. A causes C not to be living, because A does not cause B not to be armed.

Negative Tables

Table C: "Not to Cause to Be Living"

1. A does not directly cause C to be living.
2. A does not directly cause C to be living, because A directly causes C not to be living.
3. A does not cause C to be living, because A causes B to be

- armed.
4. A does not cause C to be living, because A does not cause C to be armed.
 5. A does not cause C to be living, because A causes C not to be armed.
 6. A does not cause C to be living, because A does not cause B not to be armed.

Table D: "Not to Cause Not to Be Dead"

1. A does not directly cause C not to be dead.
2. A does not directly cause C not to be dead, because A directly causes C to be dead.
3. A does not cause C not to be dead, because A causes B to be armed.
4. A does not cause C not to be dead, because A does not cause C to be armed.
5. A does not cause C not to be dead, because A causes C not to be armed.
6. A does not cause C not to be dead, because A does not cause B not to be armed.

Diagram II: "To Cause Someone to Be Living"

Affirmative Tables

Table A: "To Cause to Be Living"

1. A directly causes C to be living.
2. A directly causes C to be living, because A does not cause C not to be living.
3. A causes C to be living, because A causes C to be armed.
4. A causes C to be living, because A does not cause B to be armed.
5. A causes C to be living, because A causes B not to be armed.
6. A causes C to be living, because A does not cause C not to be armed.

Table B: "To Cause Not to Be Dead"

1. A directly causes C not to be dead.
2. A directly causes C not to be dead, because A does not

directly cause C to be dead.

3. A causes C not to be dead, because A causes C to be armed.
4. A causes C not to be dead, because A does not cause B to be armed.
5. A causes C not to be dead, because A causes B not to be armed.
6. A causes C not to be dead, because A does not cause C not to be armed.

Negative Tables

Table C: "Not to Cause to Be Dead"

1. A does not directly cause C to be dead.
2. A does not directly cause C to be dead, because A directly causes C not to be dead.
3. A does not cause C to be dead, because A causes C to be armed.
4. A does not cause C to be dead, because A does not cause B to be armed.
5. A does not cause C to, be dead, because A causes B not to be armed.
6. A does not cause C to be dead, because A does not cause C not to be armed.

Table D: "Not to Cause Not to Be Living"

1. A does not directly cause C not to be living.
2. A does not directly cause C not to be living, because A directly causes C to be living.
3. A does not cause C not to be living, because A causes C to be armed.
4. A does not cause C not to be living, because A does not cause B to be armed.
5. A does not cause C not to be living, because A causes B not to be armed.
6. A does not cause C not to be living, because A does not cause C not to be armed.

Diagram III: Relationship between Tables

- A: To cause to be.
- B: To cause not to be.
- C: Not to cause to be.
- D: Not to cause not to be.

