

## ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Ap.</i>	<i>Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae</i>
<i>DC</i>	<i>De Coniecturis</i>
<i>DD</i>	<i>De Dato Patris Luminum</i>
<i>DI</i>	<i>De Docta Ignorantia</i>
<i>DP</i>	<i>De Possesit</i>
<i>IL</i>	<i>De Ignota Litteratura</i> (by John Wenck; Latin text edited by J. Hopkins 1981)
<i>MFCG</i>	<i>Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft</i> (ed. Rudolf Haubst)
<i>NA</i>	<i>De Li Non Aliud</i>
<i>PNC</i>	<i>A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa</i> (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2nd edition 1980)
<i>SHAW</i>	Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Heidelberg: C. Winter
<i>VS</i>	<i>De Venatione Sapientiae</i>

tim renderings of certain of their German sentences. The notes do not always point out these sentences.

6. In the notes foreign expressions are italicized only where they indicate titles and where there is italicization in a direct quotation.

## PRAENOTANDA

1. All references to Nicholas's works are to the Latin texts—specifically to the following texts in the following editions:

- A. Heidelberg Academy edition: *De Deo Abscondito*, *De Quaerendo Deum*, *De Filiatione Dei*, *De Dato Patris Luminum*, *De Genesi*, *Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae*, *Idiota de Sapientia*, *Idiota de Mente*, *Idiota de Staticis Experimentis*, *De Pace Fidei*, *De Li Non Aliud* (Minnesota reprint).
- B. Heidelberg Academy editions as found in the Latin-German edition of Felix Meiner Verlag's Philosophische Bibliothek: *De Docta Ignorantia*, *De Coniecturis*, *De Beryllo*, *De Possest* (Minnesota reprint), *De Venatione Sapientiae*, *Compendium*.
- C. Strasburg edition as reprinted by W. de Gruyter: All remaining Cusanus works, unless specifically indicated otherwise.

For some treatises the reference indicates book and chapter; for others, margin number and line; for still others, page and line. Readers should have no difficulty determining which is which when they consult the particular Latin text. For example, "DI II, 6 (125:19-20)" indicates *De Docta Ignorantia*, Book II, Chap. 6, margin number 125, lines 19 and 20.

2. Any Latin words inserted into the English translations for purposes of clarification are placed in parentheses—except that nouns whose cases have been changed to the nominative are bracketed. All expansions of the translations are bracketed.
3. References to the Psalms are to the Douay version (and, in parentheses, to the King James' version).
4. The *corrigenda* for *De Dato Patris Luminum* have *not* been incorporated into the Latin text as reprinted in the Appendix. Nonetheless, these corrections have been taken account of in the English translation.
5. The summaries of the positions of Walter Schulz, Klaus Jacobi, and Heinrich Rombach frequently contain, in translation, nearly verba-

## NOTES TO THE PREFACE

1. See my *Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Docta Ignorantia* (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1981) and my *Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, second edition, 1980). Also of some interest is *Nicholas of Cusa on God As Not-other: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Li Non Aliud* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979).
2. In Vol. 11 (Spring 1981), pp. 113-136, of the *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* T. Wilson Hayes published a transcription of a seventeenth-century English translation of *DD*. This translation was made by John Everard; and it was transcribed by Hayes from Folger Shakespeare Library manuscript V. a. 222, folios 1-52. Hayes's published text is riddled with transcription errors, almost all of which change Everard's meaning, thereby marring his translation. Examples of such errors are the following (page numbers refer to Hayes's published text):
  - p. 125, line 2 from bottom: change 'we' to 'which'.
  - p. 126, line 1: change 'sheweth' to 'seemeth'.
  - p. 127, line 8: change each occurrence of 'he' to 'it' (corrected in ms. to 'it')
  - p. 129, line 15: change 'sure' to 'such'.
  - p. 129, line 16: change 'with God' to 'which had'.
  - p. 130, line 4: change 'worlds' to 'worlde'.
  - p. 130, line 10 from bottom: change 'certainly' to 'certaine'.
  - p. 130, line 4 from bottom: change 'seasons' to 'reasons'.
  - p. 131, line 15: change 'maketh from' to 'maketh known'.
  - p. 131, line 19: add 'all' before 'reason'.
  - p. 132, line 18: add comma after 'somewhat'.
  - p. 133, line 2 from bottom: change 'reap' to 'reason'.
  - p. 134, line 9: change 'fall by' to 'shall be'.
  - p. 135, line 6 from bottom: change to 'lawes & praecepts'.
  - p. 135, line 3 from bottom: change to 'Philosophers,' (conjecture

from Paris ed.)

p. 136, line 15: change 'November' to 'Novembris'.

In note 1 on p. 122 Hayes explains that he has retained Everard's archaic spellings, while editorializing the punctuation. Yet, p. 122, line 8 has 'been' instead of 'bene'; and p. 122, line 9 has 'For' instead of 'Ffor'. Moreover, on p. 135, line 4 from the bottom, Hayes wrongly revises Everard's translation, banishing the correct translation to a footnote and failing properly to repunctuate the sentence.

The translation ends with the words "Amen./Deo gratias./F. Martis/Novemb. 27./1632". Hayes believes (p. 113, n. 1) that "F. Martis" is "Either the name of a scribe or a pseudonym for Everard himself." He surmises that the name may refer to Fernand Martins, "a close friend of Cusanus . . . ." Hayes thereby fails to recognize that "F. Martis" is a Latin expression and stands for "Feria Martis," i.e., Tuesday; thus, it is part of the date and is not the name of a person. In all respects Hayes's published text is uncritical. Hayes offers no evaluation of the quality of Everard's translation. He does not point out either its strengths or its errors and omissions. He does not attempt to explain why there are italics on pp. 133 and 135. He does not cite important Scripture verses, such as the one needed to clarify the thought behind lines 1-3 on p. 133. He is not aware—on the basis of the occurrence of the name "Salomon" in line 12 of p. 123—that Everard is following the Paris ed. (or, at least, some edition which is based on the Paris ed.).

Last of all, Hayes's introduction to the translation is a bundle of misconceptions. On p. 113 we are told that *DD* "provides an excellent summary of the radical epistemology that became influential among insurgent thinkers in the years leading up to the English Civil War"; yet, *DD* does *not* contain any radical epistemology. P. 115 speaks of Nicholas as "rejecting both the logic of rational theology and the intuition of mystical theology"; yet, Nicholas accepts intuition and mystical theology in a sense which Hayes nowhere mentions. Hayes's discussion of universals on p. 116 is utterly imprecise, as is the claim on p. 118 that, for Nicholas, "the created world represents the world of ideal forms." Moreover, *DD* does not discuss "the Platonic theory of Forms," as Hayes alleges on the same page. Nor does it identify the Father of lights (i.e., God) with the sun, as Hayes also contends on p. 118. Nor does Nicholas teach—whether in *DD*, *De Mente*, or anywhere else—that the human mind "has in it divine seeds that encapsulate the totality of everything knowable but which, to blossom and bear fruit, must be planted in the soil of the sensible world. These seed-like manifestations

of divinity, somewhat suggestive of DNA, need to be carefully fertilized in order to realize their potential" (p. 118). Nor does *DD* conclude with "a vision of a future world" (p. 120). On p. 120 Hayes also asserts, without offering any textual support, that "according to Cusanus, there is no Aristotelian or Thomistic essence in things, no fixed nature to which a thing is bound, there is no hierarchy among created things"; yet, this assertion conflicts with Nicholas's doctrine in *DI*. Similarly, Hayes is mistaken when he states, unqualifiedly: "In seeking to connect the general and the universal to the particular and individual, to the immediately sensible, Cusanus expressed a truly grand tolerance for all points of view, because his unified intellectual vision led him to see that no one point of view had any priority, but each individual perception was conditioned by the thing perceived and by the perceiver's angle of vision" (pp. 116-117). Many of Hayes's statements are philosophically and historically naive: e.g., we are told that in Nicholas's theory of knowledge "sense perception is no longer decadent, sinful knowledge" (p. 117). Yet, since the time of Plato's *Theaetetus* who has ever claimed, simpliciter, that sense perception is (sinful) knowledge? Why, then, the words "no longer"?

## NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

1. Heinrich Rombach, *Substanz, System, Struktur. Die Ontologie des Funktionalismus und der philosophische Hintergrund der modernen Wissenschaft* (Freiburg: Karl Alber, Vol. 1, 1965), p. 150: "Es ist kaum möglich, die Wichtigkeit des Cusaners für die Entwicklung der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft zu überschätzen. Er stiftet die Grundlage, die durch keinen Denker der Neuzeit je überholt worden wäre, ja vielleicht auch nicht einmal eingeholt werden konnte. Der Horizont seines Denkens schliesst nicht nur die Gedankenkreise des Descartes in sich, enthält nicht nur die wichtigsten Anstösse für die Metaphysik des Spinoza und Leibniz, sondern ist auch vorbildlich und fundamental für die kantische Wendung der Philosophie und damit auch für den deutschen Idealismus. Cusanus hat die Dimension des speculati eröffnet. Seine Spekulation wirkt bis in das Denken der Gegenwart hinein, auch dort, wo man sich seines Namens nicht erinnert."

2. The German word "Neuzeit," which I have here and elsewhere translated by "modern period," signifies the period from the end of the Middle Ages to the present. By contrast, in British and American circles, the modern period is usually distinguished from both the Middle Ages and the contemporary period.

3. Rombach, pp. 236-237. See also p. 150, n. 4.

4. Karl Jaspers, *Nikolaus Cusanus* (Munich: R. Piper, 1964), pp. 226-227: "Cusanus blieb, trotz seiner grossen Laufbahn, eine Nebenfigur in den Ereignissen der Zeit. Hoch angesehen wegen seines überragenden Geistes, war er doch auch als Kardinal wegen Mangel an grossem Vermögen ohne Machtstellung. Zuletzt war er als bevorzugter Berater des Papstes Pius II., seines alten Freundes, von einem gewissen Einfluss."

"Cusanus wirkte auch nicht durch den Gehalt seiner Philosophie, ausser auf einige Mönche. Auf den Wegen des Abendlandes, der Reformation, des neuen Katholizismus, des Absolutismus, der Aufklärung, der modernen Wissenschaften,—nirgends war Cusanus dabei. Auch als es den Weg menschlicher Vernunft and Freiheit gab . . . , da hat sich

niemand auf ihn berufen, kaum einer sich seiner erinnert."

5. Jaspers, p. 223: "Cusanus, der selber nicht als Forscher einen Platz im Gange moderner Wissenschaften hat, und nicht diese Wissenschaften nach ihrem Sinn grundsätzlich begriffen hat, ist trotzdem durch seine Philosophie auch eine Orientierung in der seit seiner Zeit erwachsenen wissenschaftlichen Welt."

6. Michael Glossner, *Nikolaus von Cusa und Marius Nizolius als Vorläufer der neueren Philosophie* (Münster: Theissing, 1891), p. 33.

7. Rombach, p. 168.

8. Ekkehard Fränztzi, *Nikolaus von Kues und das Problem der absoluten Subjektivität* (Meisenheim: Hain, 1972), pp. 44-45.

9. Richard Falckenberg, *Grundzüge der Philosophie des Nicolaus Cusanus mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Lehre vom Erkennen*. [Breslau: Koebner, 1880 (reprinted Minerva GmbH, 1968)], p. 25.

10. Kurt Flasch, *Die Metaphysik des Einen bei Nikolaus von Kues. Problemgeschichtliche Stellung und systematische Bedeutung* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), p. 266.

11. Henry Bett, *Nicholas of Cusa* (London: Methuen, 1932), p. 113.

12. Bett, p. 103.

13. Bett, pp. 132-133. Also note p. 142: "Nicholas thinks of God and the world as in the most intimate and the most necessary relation: the infinite and the finite are like two correlative aspects—the internal and the external, or the essential and the accidental, as we might say—in which all that is and all that can be exists. God is the one, eternal, uncreated, unchangeable essence of all that appears as multiple and mutable in the created universe."

14. Bett, pp. 110-111. In support of his interpretation Bett alludes in a general way to the sermon "*Pax hominibus bonae voluntatis*," in *Excitationum* V. When we look at this sermon, we find Nicholas saying: "Deus omnia propter semetipsum operatus est ut notas faceret divitias gloriae; et hoc, quia bonus. Boni enim natura sic se habet quod est suiipsius diffusiva, quia se multiplicare appetit, quia bonum" (Paris edition, folio 88<sup>v</sup>). But a few lines later Nicholas also writes: "Creavit autem deus naturam magis suae bonitatis participem, scilicet intellectualem. Quae in hoc quod habet liberum arbitrium est creatori similior et est quasi alius deus. In ista natura deus voluit magis ostendere divitias gloriae suae" (folio 89<sup>f</sup>). Nicholas is not teaching that God is under natural or moral necessity to create but is rather teaching that He creates freely since His will is good. However, His will is not subject to goodness as if to a "necessity" of moral nature. Bett's exposition is

uncritical, taking account neither of the Scripture verses that Nicholas has in mind [Ps. 113B:3 (115:3); Rom. 9:23] nor the Pseudo-Dionysian source [*De Divinis Nominibus*, Chap. 4, Sec. 20 (PG 3:719A)].

15. Bett, p. 167.

16. See my *Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Docta Ignorantiae* (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1981) and my *Nicholas of Cusa's Debate with John Wenck: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Ignota Litteratura and Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae* (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1981), where my critique of Vincent Martin can also serve, mutatis mutandis, as a critique of Henry Bett, by whom Martin is influenced. My critique of Klaus Jacobi, in Chap. 2 of the present volume, also bears upon Bett.

17. Bett, p. 134.

18. *De Beryllo* 33 (55:10-12; 57:1-5).

19. Bett, p. 179.

20. Bett, p. 191.

21. Also note the last section of *De Visione Dei* 24, as well as the important statement at *De Coniecturis* II, 17 (182:7-8).

22. *DI* III, 8 (228:20-26).

23. Bett, p. 134.

24. Nicholas, however, also uses "explicatio" in other contexts. For example: "Faith enfolds within itself everything which is understandable. But understanding is the unfolding of faith" [*DI* III, 11 (244:9-11)]. Moreover, there are the illustrative mathematical and metaphysical illustrations (e.g., plurality is unfolded from oneness; motion is unfolded from rest).

25. Bett, pp. 162-163.

26. See *VS* 12 (31:26-29), where Nicholas denies that *posse fieri* is comprehensible.

27. *DI* II, 9 (148:17-20).

28. Lewis Beck, *Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).

29. Beck, p. 62.

30. Beck, p. 63.

31. See, for example, *DI* II, 9 (150:5-6); *DP* 12 (last sentence); *VS* 7 (18:21-22).

32. *DI* II, 2 (98:11-99:13).

33. Beck, p. 63.

34. Beck, p. 66.

35. Beck, p. 66.
36. Beck, p. 66: "What is true of the relation of God to the world is true of the relation of the world to the individual things in it: each individual thing is the whole universe in condensed form (*contracte*)."
37. Beck, p. 66.
38. Beck, p. 66, n. 18.
39. Beck, p. 67.
40. Also note *DI* II, 3 (109:11-15).
41. Beck, p. 67.
42. Beck, p. 60.
43. Beck, p. 69.
44. Beck, p. 70.
45. Beck, p. 70, n. 31.
46. Moreover, in *DI* III Nicholas nowhere uses the expression "God-man," which Beck attributes to him (p. 70). Instead, he repeatedly speaks of Jesus as "God and man."
47. J. Hopkins, *Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Docta Ignorantia* (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1981).

## NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. Walter Schulz, *Der Gott der neuzeitlichen Metaphysik* (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1957; 6th printing 1978).
2. Schulz, p. 11: "Diese Vorlesung setzt sich nicht zur Aufgabe, den historischen Wirkungen des grossen Kardinals Nikolaus von Kues nachzufragen, ihr Anliegen ist vielmehr, den Ansatz seines Denkens herauszuarbeiten und zu zeigen, dass dieser Ansatz die neuzeitliche Metaphysik bis zur Gegenwart bestimmt."
3. Schulz, p. 11. However, Schulz does mention, along the way, Nicholas's influence on Giordano Bruno (p. 23).
4. "Diese Vorlesung handelt über Cusanus und die Geschichte der neuzeitlichen Metaphysik. Ihr Anliegen ist es, zu zeigen, dass Cusanus der Denker ist, der einen Wesenszug dieser Metaphysik erstmalig herausgestellt hat" (p. 29).
5. Schulz, pp. 11 and 22.
6. Schulz, p. 12.
7. I have translated this directly from the Latin text cited by Schulz on

- p. 113, n. 6: "Ostendo quod non ita videtur mihi modo, ut quia sit ideo intelligat, sed quia intelligit ideo est, ita quod Deus est intellectus et intelligere, et est ipsum intelligere fundamentum ipsius esse."
8. Schulz, p. 13: "Gott wird nicht mehr bestimmt als vorhandenes Seiendes, dem sachhaltig angebbare Eigenschaften zukommen, Gott ist vielmehr Vollzug, und zwar Vollzug des eigenen Denkens."
9. Schulz, p. 14.
10. Schulz, p. 14.
11. Schulz, p. 15. These last two sentences are direct quotations: "Das Sichtbare ist als Gesehenes das abbildhaft Ausgefaltete des im ersiehenden Gott noch Eingefalteten. Das sichtbare Abbild ist also schon immer, aber als unsichtbares, im bildenden Urbildner; und umgekehrt: das unsichtbare Urbild ist, aber als sichtbar gewordenes, immer noch im Abbild aufbewahrt."
12. Schulz, p. 15: "Gott kommt sowenig ohne das Seiende vor, wie das Sehende ohne Gesehenes, und das Seiende ist sowenig ohne Gott, wie das Gesehene ohne Sehenden. Das Seiende ist der sichtbar gewordene Gott."
13. Schulz, p. 16. Also note p. 22, where Schulz says that Nicholas's metaphysics places God in "essentially indissoluble relation to the world and to man."
14. This is translated from Schulz's German translation on p. 18: "Was anderes, Herr, ist Dein Sehen, wenn Du mich mit dem Auge der Zuneigung anblickst, als dass Du von mir gesehen wirst?" Schulz gives the Latin, from *De Visione Dei* 5, on his p. 113, n. 9: "Quid aliud Domine est videre tuum, quando me pietatis oculo respicis, quam te a me videri?" Schulz is using the Paris edition (1514).
15. Translated from Schulz's German translation on p. 19: "Dass Du nicht zu mir hinsiehst, das ist eben dies, dass ich nicht zu Dir hinsehe, sondern Dich geringschätze und verachte." Schulz gives the Latin, from *De Visione Dei* 5, on his p. 113, n. 10: "Quod enim me non respicis, est, quia te non respicio, sed respuo et contemno."
16. Translated from Schulz's German translation on p. 19: "Wenn ich sehe, wie in bezug auf meine Veränderung der Blick Deines Bildes und Dein Antlitz verändert erscheint, so kommst Du mir vor, als seist Du, weil Du mir verändert begegnest, gleichsam der Schatten, der der Veränderung des Sichbewegenden folgt." Schulz gives the Latin, from *De Visione Dei* 15, on his p. 113, n. 11: "Nam dum video, quomodo ad mutationem meam videtur visus iconae tuae mutatus et facies tua mutata, quia mutatus occurris mihi, quasi sis umbra quae sequitur mutationem ambulantis." Schulz inadvertently omits "videtur": "tua

videtur mutata”.

17. Schulz, p. 19.

18. Schulz, p. 14.

19. Schulz is aware of Nicholas's view that God is a unitary trinity of *Seer, Seen*, and the *Union* of both—so that God sees not only the world but also Himself, as Exemplar. See pp. 14-15. Schulz's discussion of this topic, when compared with Nicholas's text, is unduly vague.

20. Schultz, pp. 20 and 29.

21. Schulz, p. 29: “Cusanus hat mit dieser Erkenntnis das Ganze der neuzeitlichen Metaphysik umgriffen: dass die Transzendenz ist als das dialektisch Andere der endlichen Subjektivität, als das Andere, das sich in allen Wandlungen dieser Metaphysik mitwandelt je nach der Bestimmung der endlichen Subjektivität.”

22. On p. 29 Schulz incautiously writes: “Dass die Transzendenz nur mein Abbild ist . . . .” But the word “nur” (which Schulz adds to Nicholas's idea) is inconsistent with the further point that “die Transzendenz ist mein Urbild” (p. 30).

23. Schulz, p. 30.

24. See *De Visione Dei* 12 and 13.

25. This clause is part of a longer sentence governed by the word “if”: “Si videre tuum est creare tuum et non vides aliud a te, sed tu ipse es obiectum tui ipsius—es enim videns et visibile atque videre—quomodo tunc creas res alias a te?” But it is clear that Nicholas is endorsing this antecedent clause. Even Schulz admits, on p. 14, that God sees Himself, according to Nicholas.

26. Schulz, p. 22.

27. *DI* 11, 3 (110:4-6 and 11-25).

28. This theory of vision is traceable back to Aristotle's *De Anima*. N. B. In *De Visione Dei* 12 Nicholas states that God, who sees Himself, is a triunity of *Seer, Seen*, and *Seeing*. But this is a point about the God-head, not a point about God's relationship to the world. That is, God-as-seen is not the world but is the second member of the Trinity.

29. *DP* 72:6-7.

30. *De Visione Dei* 15. Schulz, being misled by the punctuation in the Paris edition, mistranslates a portion of this passage. See n. 11 on his p. 113, as well as his corresponding translation on p. 19. These are reproduced in n. 16 above.

31. Even in *De Visione Dei* Nicholas propounds the doctrine of God's omnipotence. See Chap. 10. Note the criticism of Schulz made by W. Beierwaltes on p. 32, n. 114 of “*Visio Absoluta*. Reflexion als Grundzug

des göttlichen Prinzips bei Nicolaus Cusanus,” *SHAW*, 1978.

32. See *DI* 1, 24 (78).

33. In spite of Schulz's unscholarly method, his imprecise expression, and his exuberant eisegesis, his treatment of Cusa has too often been too uncritically accepted. For example, Leo Gabriel, in his editor's introduction to Volume III of the Duprés' German translation of Nicholas's treatises, refers approvingly and deferentially to Schulz's interpretation of *De Visione Dei*. [*Nikolaus von Kues, Philosophisch-theologische Schriften*, ed. by Leo Gabriel, translated by Dietlind and Wilhelm Dupré (Vienna: Herder, 1967), Vol. III, p. xii.]

## NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. Klaus Jacobi, *Die Methode der cusanischen Philosophie* (Munich: K. Alber, 1969), p. 21: “Das philosophische Denken des Nicolaus von Cues—von der ersten grossen Schrift ‘*De docta ignorantia*’ (1440) angefangen bis hin zu den Spätschriften ‘*De venatione sapientiae*’, ‘*De ludo globi*’ und ‘*De apice theoriae*’ (1463/64)—erscheint als in hohem Masse einheitlich und selbig.” See pp. 21-34 for further details.

2. Jacobi, p. 153.

3. Much of the recapitulation is almost verbatim, though in English translation.

4. Jacobi, pp. 147-148.

5. Jacobi, p. 148.

6. Jacobi, p. 148.

7. Jacobi, p. 148.

8. Jacobi, p. 149.

9. Jacobi, p. 151.

10. Jacobi, pp. 151-152: “Weil die geschenkte Ewigkeit nur in eingeschränkter Weise aufgenommen wurde, deshalb existiert die anfangs- und ursprunglose Ewigkeit (*aeternitas sine principio*) als in angefangener und gegründeter Weise (*principiative*) aufgenommene. *Die Welt* also, *sofern in ihr die Ewigkeit ihr ganzes Sein ist, hat keinen Ursprung*. Aber weil die Ewigkeit nur in gegründeter Weise im Abstieg der Welt aufgenommen wurde, deshalb *ist die Welt nicht die absolute Ewigkeit, sondern die in gegründeter Weise zusammengezogene Ewigkeit*. Die Ewigkeit der Welt also wurde eine gegründete, und die ewige Welt wurde eine gemachte. *Und es ist nicht eine andere Welt, die beim Vater ewig ist, und*

wieder eine andere, die durch den Abstieg vom Vater gemacht wurde, sondern ebendieselbe Welt.' . . . 'So ist gleichsam die Welt der veränderliche, abschattungshafte Gott, und die unveränderliche und nicht abgeschattete Welt der ewige Gott.'" Jacobi's German partly mistranslates the Latin. Cf. my translation in Chap. 5 of the present volume. Also see n. 68 below.

11. Jacobi, p. 152.
12. Jacobi, p. 154.
13. Jacobi, p. 155.
14. Jacobi, p. 149.
15. Jacobi, p. 157.
16. *DP* 67. Translated from Jacobi's German translation, p. 157: "'Die Verneinung also, die auf das Sein geht, verneint, dass dies Sein das . . . vorausgesetzte Sein ist, und das heisst nichts anderes, als dass das Sein nach dem Nichtsein keineswegs das ewige und unausprechliche Sein ist . . . So sehe ich Gott wahrer als die Welt. Denn die Welt sehe ich nur mit dem Nichtsein und negativ, wie wenn ich sage: ich sehe, dass die Welt nicht Gott ist; Gott aber sehe ich vor dem Nichtsein, deshalb wird kein Sein von ihm verneint. Sein Sein ist also jedes Sein von allem, was ist oder in irgendeiner Weise sein kann.'"
  17. Jacobi, p. 157.
  18. Jacobi, p. 158. Jacobi is referring to *DP* 71:17-19.
  19. Jacobi, p. 158.
  20. On p. 159 Jacobi cites *DD* 5 (122:2-4), which he construes as: "The Word Himself, who is the infinite Light of the Father, . . . manifested Himself perceptibly to us—without contraction—in our Lord Jesus Christ." At the beginning of Section 2.5 below, I indicate that this is a mistranslation.
  21. Jacobi, p. 159.
  22. Jacobi, p. 159.
  23. Jacobi, p. 161.
  24. Jacobi, p. 160.
  25. Jacobi, p. 172.
  26. Jacobi, p. 172.
  27. *DD* 2 (97). Maria Liaci is one of the few persons who take these words seriously. See her fine article "Accenti spinoziani nel 'De dato patris luminum' del Cusano?" in *Nicolò da Cusa* (Florence: Sansoni, 1962), pp. 217-242 (Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Magisterio dell' Università di Padova).

28. Also note *DI* III, 1 (182:5-8): "Book One shows that the one absolutely Maximum—which is incommunicable, unintermixable, incontractible to this or that—exists in itself as eternally, equally, and unchangeably the same."
  29. *DD* 2 (98:1-2).
  30. *DD* 2 (98:2-18).
  31. *DD* 2 (102:2-3).
  32. In *DI* Nicholas refers to God as the Being of all things, the Essence of all things. But he means that God is the Being of all beings, the Essence of all essences. See pp. 10-12 and 21-22 of the Introduction in my *Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Docta Ignorantia* (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1981).
  33. Cf. Proposition 5 of the list of propositions attached to *NA*.
  34. *DI* II, 3 (111:15-22).
  35. Cf. *DI* II, 3 (111:15-17); III, 1 (188:10-13).
  36. Cf. *DI* II, 3 (110:4-6).
  37. Cf. *Ap.* 26:7-8.
  38. *DI* II, 2 (103:3-9).
  39. Cf. *DP* 67:9-11: "His being is the complete being of all the things which either are or in any way can be." The context shows that Nicholas's point is the following: God is the being of all things insofar as these are enfolded in Him.
  40. *DI* II, 3 (111:3-5). When Nicholas here says that the world is "altogether nothing," he means that it is totally dependent being and, therefore, *of itself* altogether nothing.
  41. *DI* II, 2 (100:3-4). Cf. *Ap.* 22:9–23:14 (especially 23:8-9).
  42. Cf. *DI* II, 7 (130:14-15).
  43. Jacobi, p. 149, n. 33.
  44. *DD* 2 (97:15-17).
  45. *DD* 2 (98:1).
  46. See, in particular, *DI* II, 2 and 3 and parts of *Ap.* 8, 9, 16, and 26.
  47. *Ap.* 17:4.
  48. *DI* II, 2 (98:6-8).
  49. *DI* II, 2 (98:11-15).
  50. *DD* 2 (99:5-8).
  51. *DI* II, 2 (104:5-13).
  52. Jacobi, p. 152.
  53. *DI* II, 2 (104:6).
  54. Jacobi, p. 148.

55. *DI* II, 2 (104:6-7).  
 56. E.g., *DI* II, 9 (150:9-10); II, 13 (177:9-10).  
 57. *DI* II, 8 (140:6-8). *De Coniecturis* II, 17 (172:1-2; 180:4-5; 182:3-4).  
 58. *DI* III, 1 (183:10-13). The context here is that of the two natures of Christ.  
 59. *DI* III, 1 (182:5-6). N. B. The Latin word "immersibile" means "unintermixable"; God cannot be mingled with His creation.  
 60. *DD* 2 (97:15-17).  
 61. *DD* 3 (107:4-6).  
 62. Jacobi, p. 151: "Die Welt also, *sofern in ihr die Ewigkeit ihr ganzes Sein ist, hat keinen Ursprung.*"  
 63. Jacobi, p. 148.  
 64. *DD* 3 (106:2-3).  
 65. *Ap.* 31:26-27.  
 66. *DD* 3 (106:9). In *DP* 71:17-19 Nicholas says that "all things—in their own most congruent eternal being—are most clearly most simple Eternity itself." Here he is talking about things insofar as they exist in God. This passage is important for showing that Nicholas sometimes uses "a thing's own being" to refer to a thing's state of enfoldedness in God, even though in *DD* he uses this expression to refer to a thing's state of unfoldedness from God.  
 67. *DD* 3 (106:5-6). Cf. *DP* 59:11-13. An "originated eternity" is not really eternity. Nicholas uses this expression in order to indicate that the world, which is originated from God, was enfolded in God ontologically (not temporally) prior to its having been unfolded. As enfolded in God, it is God's Eternity; as unfolded from God it is neither God nor eternal.  
 68. *DD* 3 (106:14-16). The world is unchangeable and is the Eternal God only insofar as it is present in God.  
 69. *DI* II, 2 (103:1-2).  
 70. E.g., *NA* 16 (79:5). Cf. *VS* 21 (62:8).  
 71. *VS* 22 (65:26-27); 7 (16:7-8).  
 72. *De Beryllo* 16 (18:7-10): "Et attende quod veritas, quae est id quod esse potest, est imparticipabilis, sed in similitudine sua, quae potest secundum magis et minus recipi secundum dispositionem recipientis, est communicabilis." See *VS* 7 (16:7-8) and 22 (65:26-27).  
 73. *DD* 2 (99:4-5).  
 74. But even the word "likeness" and the sense in which creatures, for Nicholas, are a likeness of God needs clarification. See pp. 14-16 of my *Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance* and pp. 19-28 of *PNC*.  
 75. *DD* 2 (99:13). A mirror receives not the face itself but a likeness of

- the face itself.  
 76. Similarly, created being is not a contraction of the Absolute but is a contracted "likeness" of the Absolute. Jacobi misses this point when he ascribes to Nicholas the view that the empirical world is the contraction of the Absolute (p. 152).  
 77. *Ap.* 17:4-8.  
 78. *DD* 4 (111:33).  
 79. See *DD* 5 (115-117).  
 80. According to Jacobi's interpretation of Nicholas "*the creature is 'theophany,' God in the mode of manifestation, but not God Himself*" (p. 148). Jacobi accentuates the phrase "God in the mode of manifestation" by quoting, approvingly, Heinrich Rombach's interpretation of Cusa: "Necessarily, then, finite beings both are and are not God" (Jacobi, p. 148, n. 31).  
 81. Section 1.2 above  
 82. Jacobi, p. 157. Against Jacobi's view note *Ap.* 17:17-26.  
 83. *DP* 67:8-9. Jacobi, p. 157.  
 84. Cf. *DP* 68:16—69:2.  
 85. *DP* 74:1-2 and 18. Cf. *De Deo Abscondito* 9:8.  
 86. Cf. *DP* 12:18-19 with *DI* II, 9 and *De Mente* 13 (104:7-9).  
 87. Strictly speaking, Nicholas regards the signification of "soul," in any respect that we can understand it, to be infinitely removed from signifying God as He is in Himself. He does not, however, for this reason reject, *tout simplement*, the affirmation that God is the World-soul. Cf. *DI* II, 9 with I, 24.  
 88. God is conceivable only to Himself. See *DP* 30:2-3. Cf. *DI* I, 26 (88:19-20).  
 89. *DP* 75:1-3.  
 90. *DP* 74:16-18.  
 91. Jacobi, p. 159. Jacobi takes this citation from *DD* 5 (122:2-4).  
 92. The Latin sentence at *DD* 5 (122:1-4) should be repunctuated in the Heidelberg Academy edition of *Nicholai de Cusa Opera Omnia*.  
 93. *DI* III, 1 (183:10-13); III, 1 (182:5-6).  
 94. *DI* I, 2 (7:7-8). But note *DI* II, 4 (112:9).  
 95. *DI* II, 4 (116:14-19).  
 96. *DI* I, 24 (77:1-7). *Ap.* 27:3-5.  
 97. *DI* III, 7 (225:11-17).  
 98. For a discussion of this passage see my *Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance*, pp. 37-40.  
 99. "*In all unserem Erkennen ist also Gott der Erkannte*" (p. 154).

100. "... *all* unsere Erkenntnis im Grunde Gotteserkenntnis ist ..." (p. 155).

101. Without explicitly drawing the following comparison, Jacobi creates the impression that just as Nicholas believes that "in all things God alone is sought" [*DI* II, 13 (179:9)], so he believes that in whatever is known God alone is the ultimate object of knowledge.

102. Jacobi, p. 162: "In der Welt kommt Gott nicht vor, ja es kommt, die Welt in ihrer Andersheit und Abständigkeit genommen, nicht einmal etwas Gott Ähnliches in der Welt vor; Gott bleibt solcher Welterkenntnis in unerkennbarer Transzendenz fern . . . ."

"Obwohl aber die Erkenntnis in der Dimension der Andersheit nicht auf Gott trifft, kann die Erkenntnis des Weltlich-Seienden doch dazu dienen, Gott zu erkennen, dann nämlich, wenn die Gegenstände in all ihrer Mannigfaltigkeit und Varietät als 'Theophanien', als Selbstbekundung Gottes durchschaut werden. In allem Erkennbaren wird so nichts anderes als Gott gesehen, der die eine Wahrheit alles Seienden ist. Wenn Gott die *eine* Wahrheit von allem ist, dann muss diese Erkenntnis, die Gott in allem erkennt, die Andersheit des Seienden als solche negieren."

103. Jacobi, p. 166, n. 104; p. 173, n. 130.

104. Yet, notice Jacobi's criticisms of Schulz on pp. 109-110 of *Die Methode der cusanischen Philosophie*.

### NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. Heinrich Rombach, *Substanz, System, Struktur. Die Ontologie des Funktionalismus und der philosophische Hintergrund der modernen Wissenschaft* (Freiburg: K. Alber, Vol. I, 1965).

2. Rombach, p. 150, n. 4: "Es wäre nicht falsch, würde man Cusanus den Aristoteles des neuzeitlichen Denkens nennen." Cf. pp. 236-237.

3. Rombach, p. 207. Strictly speaking, Rombach contradicts himself. For on p. 207 he states that Nicholas did not have the *concept of function* ("Cusanus gibt uns zwar den Gedanken der Funktion, aber noch nicht den Begriff"), whereas on p. 211 he refers to Nicholas's *concept of function* ("In seinem Begriff von Funktion spielen immer noch Substanzgesichtspunkte hinein"). Accordingly, I take Rombach to mean that Nicholas had no *explicit* concept of function. As we shall see later, this is just one example of Rombach's many, many imprecisions. Another immediate example is his translation of "qui ista prius inaudita

legerint" [*DI*, II, 11 (156:3)] as "[die Leser,] die so Unerhörtes früher nicht lasen" (p. 207, including n. 79).

4. Rombach, pp. 180-183.

5. Rombach, p. 183.

6. Rombach, p. 207. Cf. p. 211.

7. Rombach, pp. 211-212.

8. Rombach, p. 163: "*Funktion meint, dass eine Sache aufgeht in dem, was sie in anderem wirkt, ist Sein im anderen.*" Rombach, p. 173: "Es [d.h. ein Ding] ist ja nur, was es (im anderen) wirkt und als was es (durch anderes) bedingt ist."

9. Rombach, p. 214: "Etwas ist genau identisch mit dem Ganzen. *Nichts ist es selbst; alles ist Alles.*" Cf. Rombach, p. 165: "Alle Dinge sind also—nimmt man sie nur grundsätzlich und streng—das gleiche; sie sind: die Welt."

10. Rombach, pp. 173 and 212.

11. Rombach, p. 177.

12. Rombach, p. 173. Cf. p. 162.

13. Rombach, p. 177: "Substanziale Verfassung kann eigentlich nur Gott zugesprochen werden."

14. Rombach, p. 213.

15. Rombach, p. 165: "Alle Wesenheiten sind nur die eine und einzige Wesenheit des Alls: 'omnes essentiae sunt ipsa omnium essentia.'"

16. Rombach, p. 163.

17. Rombach, p. 163.

18. Rombach, p. 163 (practically verbatim, in translation).

19. Rombach, p. 152.

20. Rombach, p. 156.

21. Rombach, p. 155.

22. Rombach, p. 152, n. 6.

23. Rombach, p. 159.

24. Rombach, p. 161.

25. Rombach, p. 161.

26. Rombach, p. 162.

27. Rombach, pp. 164-165.

28. *DI* II, 5 (117:11-13). Translated from Rombach's German translation, p. 208: "In jedem Geschöpf ist das Universum das Geschaffene selbst (in qualibet enim creatura universum est ipsa creatura) und so nimmt jedes alles auf, derart, dass das All in ihm jenes selbst *in zusammengezogener Weise* ist (ut in ipso sit ipsum *contracte*)."

29. *DI* II, 5 (119:15-19), my translation.

30. Rombach, p. 165. Cf. p. 223: "Das Einzelne ist darum diese Ganz-

- heit, ohne dass es in seiner Bestimmtheit aufgelöst wäre.”
31. Rombach, p. 165.
  32. Rombach, p. 165.
  33. Rombach, p. 165 (verbatim, in translation).
  34. Rombach, p. 165. Rombach alludes to *NA* 10 (39:4-11).
  35. Rombach, pp. 222-223. It is not clear whether Rombach wants to ascribe this position to Nicholas or whether it is ascribable to functionalism only in general. However, we may presume that what Rombach thinks to be true of functionalism in general, he also thinks to be true of Nicholas's "functionalism"—in the absence of a disclaimer. See the discussion in Section 2.6 below.
  36. Rombach, pp. 222-223, n. 89.
  37. Rombach, p. 223.
  38. Rombach, p. 223.
  39. Rombach, p. 174. Cf. p. 168: "Freilich ergibt sich keine *einfache* Identität zwischen Gott und Welt. Das würde ja Pantheismus bedeuten, von dem sich der Cusaner fern weiss. Zwar ist die Welt ihrem Inhalte nach Gott, aber der Form nach von ihm durch eine unendliche Kluft getrennt. Gott ist nur *absolut* genommen ihre Washeit, relativ genommen ist er es nicht."
  40. Rombach, p. 175.
  41. Rombach, p. 175.
  42. Rombach, p. 175 (verbatim, in translation).
  43. Rombach, p. 168 (verbatim, in translation).
  44. Rombach, pp. 168-169 (verbatim, in translation).
  45. Rombach, p. 171 (verbatim, in translation).
  46. Rombach, p. 151.
  47. See n. 3 above.
  48. "All the essences are only the one and only essence of all things" [*DI*, I, 16 (45:7)].
  49. Two sentences earlier Rombach writes: "Alle Dinge sind also—nimmt man sie nur grundsätzlich und streng—das gleiche; sie sind: die Welt."
  50. Rombach, pp. 164 and 175.
  51. Paris ed., Vol. I, f. 219 recto and verso.
  52. See Rombach, p. 172, first new paragraph.
  53. Rombach, p. 172: "Insofern nun alles in Gott ist, ist Gott, gemessen an allem, das absolut Grösste (maximum absolutum), und sofern er in allem steckt und nichts so klein zu sein vermag, dass es nicht ihn, und zwar als ganzen, enthielte, ist er zugleich auch das Kleinste (minimum absolutum)."

54. Note *NA* 14 (70:2-4); 15 (73:11-13). Cf. Anselm of Canterbury. *Monologion* 22.
55. Rombach, p. 207, n. 78: "Gott hat 'die Verhältnisse der Teile *wechselweise aufs genaueste zusammengestimmt* (ita proportionabiliter partium ad invicem proportionem constituens), dass überall die Bewegung der Teile zum Ganzen führt (ut in qualibet sit motus partium ad totum)' (*D. ign.* II, 13).—Dies ist die vielleicht klarste Definition der Funktion in den cusanischen Texten."
56. Cf. *DI* II, 4 (116:2-3) with *Ap.* 28:20 and with *DP* 65:13-14.
57. My translation of the Latin.
58. *NA* 10 (37:21-23): "But if you see the essence as free from other and in Not-other, surely in accordance with the nature of that in which you see it [viz., in Not-other], you see it to be indestructible." Insofar as the essences are unfolded, Not-other is said to be in them [*NA* 10 (37:7-12)].
59. Cf. *NA* 14 (53:7-10); 13 (52:10-17); 10 (38:5-6).
60. See n. 3 above.
61. Rombach, p. 171.
62. *DP* 68:11-23 (my translation): "*Cardinal*: If in its essence the sun were also thereby all the things it is not, then assuredly it would be prior to not-being and so [would be] both sun and all things, since nothing could be denied of it. *John*: I grant it. But the concept of the sun—a sun which is finite—confuses me. *Cardinal*: Assist yourself, then, and look at the *very being of the sun*. Next, remove (1) [the determination] *of the sun* and (2) everything which is not abstract—thereby removing [all] negation. You now see that nothing is denied of the 'sun's' being. For when you see that the being of the sun is not the being of the moon, this [recognition] occurs because you see being which is inabstract and is contracted and limited in such way that it is called solar. Therefore, if you remove the boundary and see Boundless or Eternal Being, then you undoubtedly see it in its priority to not-being."
63. *DP* 73:10-11. Cf. *DI* I, 22 (68:22-23).
64. *DP* 8:14-15.
65. *DP* 68:18-19.
66. *DP* 19:31-32.
67. *DP* 2:3-6.
68. *DP* 11:1-12.
69. Rombach, p. 171, italics mine.
70. Rombach, p. 152: "Nichts ist alles, ein jedes zeigt sich in dem, was es ist, dadurch dass es anderes nicht ist."
71. Rombach, p. 214: "Etwas ist genau identisch mit dem Ganzen."

*Nichts ist es selbst; alles ist Alles.*"

72. Rombach, p. 163.

73. *DI* II, 4 (115:13).

74. *DI* II, 5 (118:14-17).

75. Rombach, p. 165.

76. Rombach, p. 228: "Ein absoluter Beobachter, der ausserhalb der Welt steht und die Relationen nicht als *einzelne* Relationen aufgreift, sondern auf das Ganze blicken möchte, würde nichts zu sehen bekommen. Für Gott ist die Welt nicht 'da'."

77. Rombach, p. 168: "Zwar ist die Welt ihrem Inhalte nach Gott, aber der Form nach von ihm durch eine unendliche Kluft getrennt."

78. Rombach, p. 224: ". . . dass es innerhalb der funktionalistisch gedachten Welt keinen anderen Inhalt gibt, als diese Welt selbst . . ."

79. *DI* II, 5 (119:15-19). *DP* 9:6-7.

80. See, in their respective context, *DI* I, 16 (43:15); II, 2 (101:1-3); II, 13 (179:10-11). *Ap.* 28:21; 31:23-27. *DP* 8:21-22; 12:1.

81. Rombach, p. 165.

82. Rombach, pp. 168-169.

83. *Ap.* 31:23-27.

84. Rombach, p. 211: "Das endliche 'Seiende' ist der Gott im Nichts. Deus in nihilo. Der 'geschaffene Gott' (Deus creatus), der vereinzelte (auf eine zufällige Bedingung eingeschränkte) Gott (Deus occasionatus)."

85. *DI* II, 2 (104:3 and 6).

86. *DI* II, 3 (110:11-12).

87. Rombach, p. 211: "Die Möglichkeit der Streuung der ursprünglichen Einheit und Einfachheit ist nur zu verstehen, wenn man das Seiende funktionalistisch denkt. Dass Cusanus diese Voraussetzung für eine Klärung des Verhältnisses von Identität und Differenz gesehen hat, ist sein übergrosses geistesgeschichtliches Verdienst. Es macht ihn zum Stammvater der neuzeitlichen wissenschaftlichen Denkweise."

88. Rombach, pp. 210-211: "Das Nichts ist der Gesichtspunkt, unter dem der Eine Inhalt sich in eine Pluralität verzweigt. Diese Pluralität wird *richtig* gesehen, wenn die Einzelheiten in strengster ganzheitlicher Verklammerung erkannt werden (Funktionalismus). Sie wird *falsch* gesehen, wenn einzelne Einzelheiten als sie selbst, d.h. als selbst ein Seiendes (Substantialismus) betrachtet werden."

89. *DI* I, 18 (53:15-16).

90. *DI* III, 1 (189:1-3): "Principia enim individuantia in nullo individuo in tali possunt harmonica proportione concurrere sicut in alio, ut quodlibet per se sit unum et modo quo potest perfectum."

91. Rombach, p. 211: "In seinem Begriff von Funktion spielen immer noch Substanzgesichtspunkte hinein." Previously (p. 207) Rombach told us that Nicholas has no concept (*Begriff*) of function.

92. Rombach, p. 183. Qua interpretation of Nicholas, Rombach should say not that everything which is is God but rather that *in God* everything is God.

93. *Ap.* 28:18-23. *DP* 26 and 68.

94. *DI* II, 2 (100:12-14). *DP* 38:14-15. Cf. *DI* II, 13 (180:4-9).

95. *DI* II, 2 (99:9-13).

96. *DI* II, 4 (115:13-14).

97. Rombach, p. 163.

98. Rombach, p. 208.

99. Rombach, p. 162.

100. Rombach, p. 211.

101. *DI* II, 4 (115:16-19).

102. Cf. Rombach, p. 162: "*World* would then signify that each being can be understood not from out of itself but only from out of the others—i.e., from out of the totality of all others. A small thought-experiment can show what this would mean: If continuity, as fundamental ontological character, signifies the complete determinateness of a being through its relationship to other beings (i.e., to all other beings), then if all other beings are destroyed, it too would have to disappear completely, even if no one in any way laid a hand upon it itself."

103. *DI* II, 5 (121:4-13).

104. Cf. *DD* 2 (100:13-20): "The substantial form of Socrates is one, simple, indivisible form. The whole of it is in the whole of Socrates and in each of his parts; through this form Socrates and all that is a part of him exist. For example, the [hand of Socrates] has from the form of Socrates the fact that it is Socrates' hand and not someone else's. But because the hand does not receive the form of Socrates with the simplicity and universality by which this form is the form of Socrates but rather with a particular descent (viz., as such a member), the hand of Socrates is not Socrates. The case is similar regarding the other members."

105. *DI* III, 12 (256:5).

106. *DI* II, 2 (104:13-14; II, 5 (120:1-3 and 121:1-3); III, 1 (189:15-19).

107. *DI* II, 2 (104:7).

108. *DI* II, 12 (166).

109. See *DI* II, 9, where Nicholas refers to God as World-soul.

110. *DI* III, 3 (201:5-6). See my list of *corrigenda* for the Latin text of

*DI*—a list found in *Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance*.

111. *DI* II, 13 (178:6-8). Cf. II, 4 (116:11-14).

112. See Section 1.3 above, together with n. 35.

113. *DI* II, 4 (116:4-9). Also see *DI* II, 13 (175:19-28) and II, 12 (172:12-14).

114. Rombach, p. 169: "Vor allem muss man davon ausgehen, dass der Cusaner im vierten Kapitel des zweiten Buches der *Docta Ignorantia* nichts anderes erreichen will als die Klarheit darüber, dass Gott nur 'vermittelt durch die Welt' mit den Dingen eins ist." Rombach continues: "Eine unmittelbare Identität lehnt er aufs entscheidendste ab."

115. Rombach, p. 150: "Es ist kaum möglich, die Wichtigkeit des Cusaners für die Entwicklung der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft zu überschätzen . . . . Der Horizont seines Denkens schliesst nicht nur die Gedankenkreise des Descartes in sich, enthält nicht nur die wichtigsten Anstösse für die Metaphysik des Spinoza und Leibniz, sondern ist auch vorbildlich und fundamental für die kantische Wendung der Philosophie und damit auch für den deutschen Idealismus."

116. Much later Rombach alludes to the fact that Nicholas is mentioned by Kepler, Pascal, and Leibniz. See Rombach, p. 296 and Rombach, Vol. II, pp. 186-187 and 323.

117. Rombach, p. 159: "Gerade darum, weil die Welt nirgendwo eine notwendige Grenze hat und ihrem Sinne nach überall ins Unendliche reicht, muss sie an irgendeinem Punkte ihre faktische Begrenzung erfahren als eine Einschränkung *von aussen her*."

118. Rombach, p. 161: "Die Unendlichkeit der Welt ist identisch mit ihrer Endlichkeit; so kann der Cusaner von der *finita infinitas* der Welt sprechen."

119. Rombach, p. 158: "Zwar dehnt sich das Weltall nach allen Seiten und in jeder Hinsicht *von Wesen her* ins Unendliche aus, doch hält diese Ausdehnung an einer bestimmten Stelle *faktisch* an, so dass die Welt ihre eigene Unendlichkeit nicht erfüllt."

120. Rombach, p. 173: "Ein Ding vermöchte nicht allein zu sein; es könnte sich nicht konstituieren. Es bedarf des Durchgangs durch Andersheit, um zu sich selbst zu kommen."

121. *DI* II, 4 (113:4-5). Literally: "[Absolute Maximality,] which is, absolutely, that which all things are . . . ."

122. *DI* II, 4 (113:9-11). Literally: "the world . . . being, contractedly, that which all things are . . . ."

123. *DI* II, 4 (115:3-4). Literally: "In them [viz., the sun and the moon,] the universe is, contractedly, that which they are."

124. I myself am inclined to take "id quod sunt omnia" as having to do with essence, so that the sentences may be construed as I have rendered them above.

125. In my judgment Klibansky is more nearly correct than Wilpert.

126. *DI* II, 5 (117:13-15).

127. *DI* II, 5 (117:17-18).

128. *DI* II, 5 (117:19-20).

129. *DI* II, 4 (115:14-16).

130. I am inclined to take the four sentences to mean, respectively:

(1) "Since each thing is contracted, it is not the case that it can be actually all things; hence, it contracts all things, so that [in it] they are it."

(2) "Hence, in the 'order of nature,' [as it were,] all things preceded, without plurality, each thing."

(3) "Therefore, it is not the case that many things are in each thing actually; rather, [in each thing] all things are, without plurality, this repective thing."

(4) "However, it is not the case that God is in the sun sun and in the moon moon; rather, [in them] He is that which is sun and moon without plurality and difference." Cf. *DI* II, 4 (115:1-3)—specifically the words "in illis."

131. *DI* II, 5 (118:8-10).

132. I tend to think that this Latin sentence and the previous one are equivalent and that Nicholas *meant* by the previous Latin sentence the same thing that is expressed by this one.

133. *DI* II, 5 (118:11-13).

134. Cf. the switch from "in omnibus particularibus" [*DI* II, 4 (116:16)] to "in universis" [*ibid.* (116:21)].

135. *DI* II, 4 (115:1-3).

136. I opt for the latter construal—doing so in the light of the entire context, including *DI* II, 4 (113:4-5).

137. I now regard "seem" as the better translation.

138. *DI* II, 5 (121:1-2): "Quiescunt igitur omnia in quolibet, quoniam non posset unus gradus esse sine alio . . . ."

139. I regard the passage in question as emphasizing the harmonic oneness-in-plurality of the universe. Cf. *DI* III, 3 (201:4-6): "All things were created by Him and in consequence of Him in a most excellently and most perfectly congruent order . . . . It is not the case that anything could be more perfect if this order were removed . . . ." (See my list of *corrigenda* for the Latin text of *DI*—a list found on p. 161 of *Nicholas of*

*Cusa on Learned Ignorance.*

140. *DI* II, 5 (118:7-8).

141. *DI* II, 4 (116:23-25). It seems to me that this passage and the one in n. 140 above are reconcilable if we take seriously the words "as if."

142. *DI* II, 5 (118:3-4).

143. *DI* III, 4 (204:17-19): "Omnia . . . in deo sunt secundum se cum graduum diversitate." N. B. Both in *PNC* and in *Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance* I opted for this latter interpretation. (See especially *PNC*, p. 169, n. 153.) I reasoned along the following lines: As things exist in God they are God; hence, they do not exist in God according to themselves and do not exist in Him with degrees, for He is absolute Simplicity. [Cf. *DI* I, 24 (77:1-7).] Moreover, Nicholas says explicitly that as enfolded in God things are not present in accordance with their finitude [*DI* I, 24 (77:6)]; but as things exist actually, they are finite; thus, as things actually exist, they are not enfolded in God. They nonetheless exist in God in a second sense of "existing in God": and they exist *immediately* in God in that there is no intervening world-soul between them and God.

Although this interpretation still seems to me to be viable, I am currently persuaded that both the passage at II, 5 (118:3-8) and the one at III, 4 (204:17-19) refer to the enfolded state. Things are *in God* in one way only: viz., they are *enfolded in God*. Each actually existing thing, Nicholas is claiming, can be viewed in two different ways: (1) as its own created (i.e., unfolded) finite self with its own form; (2) as enfolded in God as God (rather than as its finite self). In other words, each thing which is *unfolded from* God is also eternally *enfolded in* God. Thus, at I, 23 (70:22-23) Nicholas says that "all existence exists actually insofar as it exists actually in the Infinite"; and at I, 22 (69:10-11) he maintains that if unfolding is posited, enfolding is also posited (though not vice versa). Similarly, in *Ap.* 8-9 he writes: "No being can be absent from the most absolute, most perfect, and most simple Form, since this Form bestows all being. And since all being is from this Form and cannot be outside it, all being is in this Form. However, in this Form all being can be nothing other than this Form. For this Form is the infinite, most simple, and most perfect Form of being." In *DP* 8-9 we read: "Everything that in any way either exists or can exist is enfolded in this Beginning. And whatever either has been created or will be created is unfolded from Him, in whom it is enfolded . . . I want to say that as-enfolded-in-God all these things are God; similarly, as-unfolded-in-the-created-world they are the world." And *DP* 16 tells us the same thing: "Clearly,

Actualized-possibility is all things and includes all things; for nothing which is not included [in it] either exists or is able to be made. Therefore, in it all things exist and have their movement and are what they are (regardless of what they are)." Finally, we can remind ourselves of the familiar passage in *DD* 3 (106): "There is not one world which with the Father is an eternal world and another world which through descent from the Father is a created world. Rather, the very same world [is] without beginning and, by means of a descent, [is] received in its own being with a beginning. With the Father the world is not a changeable world but—existing with perpetual stability and in supreme brightness and without any variation of shadow—is the same as the Father. But as it is received in its own being, in the descent from the Father, it is changeable and fluctuates unstably with variation of shadow."

The passage in *DI* III, 4 (204:17-19) is especially difficult to understand, though to John Wenck it seemed obviously heretical (*IL* 38:18-23). But we know that it cannot violate the doctrine of divine simplicity, since Nicholas asserts this doctrine in the very same breath with affirming that "all things are in God according to themselves with a [respective] difference of degree." At the present moment I am inclined to take this statement to embody a continuation of the point made at *DI* II, 3 (108:4-11): "Just as number arises from our mind by virtue of the fact that we understand what is commonly one as individually many: so the plurality of things [arises] from the Divine Mind (in which the many are present without plurality, because they are present in Enfolding Oneness). For in accordance with the fact that things cannot participate equally in the Equality of Being: *God, in eternity, understood one thing in one way and another thing in another way*. Herefrom arose plurality, which in God is oneness."

144. Cf. *DI* I, 24 (78:1-2); I, 26 (88:16-17); II, 2 (102:4-5); II, Prologue (90:7-15); II, 13 (180:7-8); II, 2 (100:12-14).

145. *DI* II, 12 (172:8-9).

146. *DI* I, 24 (76:9-11).

147. *DI* I, 24 (76:6).

148. *DI* I, 24 (77:13-15).

149. *DI* II, 2 (100:12 and 15-17).

150. *DI* I, 4 (11:4-11); I, 24 (76-77). Cf. *DP* 26:1-12; 74:1-2.

151. Cf. *DI* I, 18 (52:23-27) with *DI* II, 4 (115:7-8).

152. Nicholas uses the expression "in the order of nature" to mean "ontologically."

153. At *DI* II, 4 (115:10) Nicholas calls the universe contracted *quiddity*,

or essence.

154. See the reference in n. 145 above.  
 155. *DI* II, 11 (161:12-13).  
 156. *DI* II, 4 (115:9).  
 157. *DI* I, 24 (77:5-7).  
 158. *DI* I, 22 (69:10-11); I, 23 (70:20-23). See n. 143 above.  
 159. Cf. *DI* I, 11 (30:11-13).  
 160. Cf. *DP* 69:1-2.  
 161. *DI* I, 3 (9:13-15).  
 162. *DI* III, 3 (201:8-11); II, 5 (121:1-7).

### NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. This is the interpretation which I have already partially developed in my earlier works on Nicholas of Cusa.
2. "Contractio dicit ad aliquid, ut ad essendum hoc vel illud."
3. Also note *De Genesi* 2 (158:10-11).
4. Also note the contrast between "contractio" and "attractio" in *De Visione Dei* 20 and the interchanging of "contracta" and "constricta" at *DC* II, 4 (94:10 and 12).
5. *De Beryllo* 36 (64:15).
6. *DI* I, 2 (5:13-14).
7. *DI* II, 6 (124:11-12).
8. Cf. his redundant expression "comparativa proportio" in the second of the following sentences: (1) "Comparativa igitur est omnis inquisitio medio proportionis utens" [*DI* I, 1 (2:17-18)]. (2) "Omnis igitur inquisitio in comparativa proportione facili vel difficili existit" (*ibid.*, 3:1-2).
9. *DI* II, 2 (102:12-15). *DD* 2 (98:3-7).
10. *DD* 2 (102:2-5).
11. *DD* 3 (104:5-8).
12. *De Visione Dei* 6. *DI* II, 9 (148:8; 150:9-10); II, 13 (177:9-10); III, 1 (182:5-6; 183:10-13). *Ap.* 8:19. N. B. The phrase "secundum contractiorem," as it appears on p. 14, lines 19-20 of Hoffmann and Klibansky's edition of the sermon "*Dies Sanctificatus*" (*SHAW*, 1929), is mistaken. According to R. Haubst the correct reading is "secundum contractum modum."
13. See *De Beryllo* 16 (18:1-10) and *VS* 22 (65:26-27). Regarding the word "likeness," see n. 17 below.

14. *De Aequalitate*, Paris ed., Vol. II, f. 16<sup>v</sup>.
15. *DI* II, 2 (104:6).
16. *De Visione Dei* 13: "Infinitum enim non est contrahibile, sed manet absolutum . . . . Et sicut nihil addi potest infinito, ita infinitum non potest ad aliquid contrahi, ut sit aliud quam infinitum." Paris ed., Vol. I, f. 106<sup>f</sup>.
17. In *DP* 10:15 Nicholas speaks of a *disproportionate likeness* (*similitudo improportionalis*). But a disproportionate likeness is a *symbolic* likeness. Created things do not resemble God otherwise than symbolically, teaches Nicholas.
18. *De Visione Dei* 13.
19. *DI* I, 26 (89:12-13). *DP* 10:11-18.
20. Cf. *DI* I, 24.
21. *De Ludo Globi* 2 (66): "Sic vides in animato animam, et simul ipsum animatum in anima. Et in iusto iusticiam, et ipsam [sic!] in ea. Sicut in albo albedinem, et ipsum in ea. Et generaliter in contracto absolutum, et ipsum contractum in absoluto. Humanitatem in homine: et ipsum in humanitate." *Humanitas* is not altogether absolute (as is God) but is absolute only in a qualified sense—viz., as a universal which is considered in itself even though it does not exist in itself. Cf. (1) *DI* II, 4 (114:15-17): ". . . as if whiteness had, in itself, absolute being apart from any abstracting on the part of our intellect . . . ." (2) *DI* II, 6 (125:12-13): "Although universals do not exist as actual apart from particulars, nevertheless they are not mere rational entities." (3) *DI* II, 6 (125:18-20): "Absolute being cannot befit universals. For the altogether absolute universal is God."
22. *DI* III, 1 (183:1-2).
23. *DC* I, 4 (16:1-7): "Prima unitas penitus existit absoluta; ultima vero, quantum possibile est, omnem absolutionem exiens, contracta est; secunda multum absoluta, parum contracta; tertia parum absoluta multumque contracta. Quapropter, sicut intelligentia non est penitus divina seu absoluta, ita nec rationalis anima penitus divinitatis exit participationem . . . ."
24. *DC* I, 4 (16:1).
25. *Ap.* 8:20-21.
26. *DI* I, 5 (14:5).
27. *Ap.* 8:19.
28. *De Aequalitate* (Paris ed., Vol. II, f. 16<sup>v</sup>): "Et cum [anima] videat tempus contractum in temporalibus et in se absolutum a contractione, videt tempus non esse aeternitatem, quae non est contrahibilis nec participabilis."

29. *De Visione Dei* 22: “. . . sed impropotionaliter *absolutior* est vis divina . . .” Paris ed., Vol. I, f. 111<sup>v</sup> (my italics).
30. *DI* I, 8 (22:7-8).
31. *DI* II, 7 (130:14-15). Also note *DI* I, 17 (48:3; 51:7-8).
32. *DI* I, 17 (48:16-20).
33. *DI* I, 17 (50:17-19).
34. *DI* I, 16 (45:4); II, 7 (130:14-15).
35. *DI* II, 4 (115:7-8).
36. *DI* II, 9 (148:11-13); II, 13 (177:7). *Ap.* 26:4-19.
37. *DI* I, 18 (52:23-27): “Similarly, some beings—viz., simple finite substances—participate more immediately in Maximum Being, which exists in itself. And other beings—viz., accidents—participate in [Maximum] Being not through themselves but through the medium of substances.” *DI* I, 18 (53:15-16): “Wherefore, Aristotle was right in dividing all the things in the world into substance and accident.”
38. See the references given in n. 35 and 36 above. Cf. *De Visione Dei* 9: “Es igitur essentia essentiarum, dans contractis essentis ut id sint quod sunt. Extra te igitur, domine, nihil esse potest. Si igitur essentia tua penetrat omnia, igitur et visus tuus, qui est essentia tua. Sicut igitur nihil omnium quae sunt potest fugere ab esse suo proprio, ita nec ab essentia tua, quae dat esse essentiae omnibus.” (Codex Cusanus 219).
39. *DI* I, 17 (49:8-11).
40. *DI* I, 17 (49); I, 18 (52:18-27) Cf. pp. 48-49 *supra*.
41. Cf. *Ap.* 26:10-11.
42. *DI* I, 24 (77:5-7).
43. *DI* II, 3 (110:4-6).
44. *Ap.* 28:18-19.
45. *DI* II, 4 (116:4-9); II, 2 (101:10-13).
46. *De Mente* 5 (65:13-14); 13 (104:7-9). *DI* II, 9. Though Nicholas sometimes speaks, plurally, of eternal *forms* in God (e.g., *DP* 4:11), he believes that in God these so-called forms are not actually plural but are the Word of God Himself [*DI* II, 9 (148:11-13)].
47. *DI* II, 13 (175:19-28). Moreover, the intelligences (e.g., angelic and human intellects) are incorruptible [*DI* III, 10 (240:1-2)].
48. *Ap.* 28:20.
49. *De Visione Dei* 9.
50. *Ap.* 26:7-8.
51. *DI* II, 13 (179:19).
52. *Ap.* 26:4-7.
53. See the whole of *DI* II, 2. Also see *DI* II, 3 (110:1-3).

54. “Hac via dum sensibile ad rationem elevamus aut intelligentiam sive primam absolutissimam unitatem, de eo secundum illius regionis regulas loqui necesse est. Dum enim unitatem lapidis ab omni sensibili, rationali aut intellectuali pluralitate absolverimus et in simplicitatem infinitam redigerimus, non est amplius aliquid de eo affirmabile; neque enim tunc potius est lapis quam non lapis, sed est omnia. Ita de reliquis. Et hoc absque scrupulositate intelliges, si advertis absolutam unitatem lapidis non esse plus lapidis quam non lapidis, quodque omnium una est absoluta unitas quae est deus. Unde sicut absoluta unitas lapidis istius sensibilis et nominabilis est deus, sic eius intellectualis unitas est intelligentia.”
55. See n. 62 of the notes to Chap. Three.
56. *Ap.* 17:17-18. Absolute Oneness is present *absolutely* in all things in the sense explained in Sec. 3.2.3 of Chap. 3 above.
57. *DI* II, 6 (124:3).
58. *DI* II, 8 (140:7-8).
59. Except, that is, for the contracted maximum individual—viz., Jesus—who attains the limit of the species *humanity*. Nicholas’s metaphysic of contraction is necessarily incomplete without its accompanying Christology. See my analysis of this Christology in the Introduction of *Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance*.
60. Ernst Cassirer rightly calls Nicholas the first modern thinker, but in doing so his emphasis is wrong. The title befits Nicholas by virtue of his metaphysics, more than by virtue of his epistemology.
61. J. Koch, *Die Ars coniecturalis des Nikolaus von Kues* (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1956), p. 16.
62. *DC* I, 5 (19:11-12). In *DC* Nicholas links the notions of being and oneness, just as he had done in *DI*. Cf. *DC* II, 17 (172:1-2) with *DI* I, 8 (22:6-7). Also note p. 14, line 7 of Hoffmann and Klubansky’s edition of the sermon *Dies Sanctificatus* (*SHAW*, 1929), where, as I learned from Martin Bodewig, the reading “Omnia autem, in quantum sunt, unum sunt” should be corrected to “Omnia autem, in quantum sunt unum, sunt”, thus corresponding to *VS* 21 (59:24-25).
63. *DC* II, 2 (81:3-5). Cf. *Ap.* 14:12-17.
64. *DC* I, 5 (20:10-18).
65. *DC* II, 7 (107:22-24).
66. *DC* I, 10 (48:6—49:17).
67. See K. Jacobi’s sound critique of Koch in *Die Methode der cusanischen Philosophie*, pp. 30-31, n. 34. Cf. Josef Stallmach, “Zum Charakter der cusanischen Metaphysik,” *MFCG*, 14 (1980) 87-103.

68. *DI* 1, 2 (5:12-13).

69. See *De Genesi*. Cf. *DI* 1, 9 (25:6-7).

70. *Intellect* includes angelic intellect. Angels *are* intelligences, whereas human beings possess an intellectual faculty.

71. *DC* 1, 8 (35:14-27).