

**NICHOLAS OF CUSA:  
METAPHYSICAL SPECULATIONS:  
VOLUME TWO**

by

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**DE LUDO GLOBI**  
**(The Bowling-Game)**  
by  
**NICHOLAS OF CUSA**

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## THE BOWLING-GAME (De Ludo Globi)<sup>1</sup>

### BOOK ONE<sup>2</sup>

*John:* Since I see you seated off to the side, perhaps tired from the bowling-game, let me speak with you about this game, if I see you to be willing.

*Cardinal:* Most willing.

*John:* All of us are fascinated with this new and fun game—perhaps because in it there is a symbolism of a certain deep speculation, a symbolism that we ask to have explained.

2 *Cardinal:* You<sup>3</sup> are rightly moved [to ask]. For certain sciences<sup>4</sup> have instruments and games: arithmetic has the rithmatia;<sup>5</sup> music has the monochord; and even the game of chess is not devoid of the symbolism of moral [lessons]. I believe that no decent<sup>6</sup> game is altogether lacking in [symbolic] learning. For example, this very fun game of bowling, it seems to me, symbolizes for us no small amount of philosophy.

*John:* So tell us something about it, we ask.

*Cardinal:* I hesitate to undertake a task that I see to be considerable and that must first be clarified by a lengthy meditation.

*John:* We do not ask that all points be explained in depth; rather, you will satisfy us with but a few points.

3 *Cardinal:* Although youth is eager and fervent, it is easily satisfied. So I will undertake the task and will sow in your noble minds certain seeds-of-the-sciences,<sup>7</sup> which, if you receive and keep, will yield as fruit the light of great discernment in regard to a most coveted knowledge of themselves.<sup>8</sup>

First of all, then, consider carefully both the bowling-ball and its movement, since they proceed from an intelligence.<sup>9</sup> For no beast makes a bowling-ball and makes it move toward a goal. Therefore, you see that these works of man are done by means of a power that surpasses [the powers of] other animals of this world.

*John:* Assuredly, we know the matter to be just as you declare.

4 *Cardinal:* And I think that you are aware of why the bowling-ball has received, by means of the art of the lathe-operator, the slightly concave shape that characterizes one of the halves of the sphere.

For unless the ball had such a shape, it would not make the movement that you see: viz., helicoidal movement, or spiral movement, or the involute movement of a curve. For the bowling-ball's part that is completely circular would be moved in a straight line were it not for the fact that, being a heavier and thicker<sup>10</sup> part, it retarded that movement and drew it back toward itself in a central way.<sup>11</sup> Because of this difference, the shape [of our bowling-ball] is suited to a movement that is not perfectly straight and that is also not perfectly circular as [perfect circularity] occurs in a *circle's* circumference, which is equally distant from the circle's center.

So, first of all, then, take note of the reason for the shape of the bowling-ball. With regard to this ball you see (1) the convex surface of the larger half of the sphere and (2) the concave surface of the smaller half of the sphere,<sup>12</sup> and you see that (3) the body of the ball is contained between these [two] surfaces. And note, as well, both that the bowling-ball can be fashioned variously, in an infinite number of ways, in accordance with differing relationships between its [two] just-mentioned surfaces, and that it can always be shaped for [producing] different kinds of movements.

*John:* We understand these points clearly. For we know that if a hoop could be a circle whose circumference had no width, and if the hoop were rolled over a perfectly flat surface (e.g., over [smooth] ice), it would describe [by its movement] only a straight line. And so, when in the present instance we see solidity added to a round hoop, [we see that] for this reason there is described not a straight line but, rather, a curved line—the curvature varying with the different shapes of the bowling-ball.

- 5 *Cardinal:* That's right. But you must also consider that the lines described by the movement of one and the same ball are different and that [one and] the same line is never again described—whether [the bowling-ball] is hurled by the same man or by someone else—because it is always hurled differently. And in the case of a greater thrust the line described is seen to be straighter; but in the case of a lesser thrust the line is seen to be more curved. Therefore, at the onset of movement, when the thrust is more proximal, the lines of movement are straighter than when the movement wanes. For the bowling-ball is thrust forth only in a straight direction. Hence, in the case of a more vigorous impulse the bowling-ball is forced to deviate more from its own nature, so that against its own nature it is moved in a straight line, to the extent that this can occur. But in the case of a less vigorous im-

pulse, the bowling-ball is indeed forced to move but its natural aptitude is less violated, and the movement follows the natural aptitude of the ball's shape.<sup>13</sup>

*John:* We experience these things to be plainly thus. For the bowling-ball is never moved at one time in the same way that it is at another time. This fact, then, must result from differences of throwing or from various intermediate factors.<sup>14</sup>

- 6 *Cardinal:* When someone throws a bowling-ball, he does not hold it in his hand at one time in the same way as at another time; or he does not release it in the same way or does not place it on the ground in the same way or does not impel it with an equal force. For it is not possible that anything be done twice in exactly the same way.<sup>15</sup> For it involves a contradiction [to say] that there are *two* and that they are in every respect equal, without any difference.<sup>16</sup> For how could a plurality of things be a plurality apart from any difference? Therefore, although one who is quite skilled always endeavors to act in the same manner [in throwing the bowling-ball], *that* is not precisely possible, even if the difference is not always detected.<sup>17</sup>

*John:* There are many things that cause variation, including (1) a difference of surface and (2) the intervening of small stones that impede the pathway and, oftentimes, obstruct it and (3) the dirty condition of the ball or, indeed, a crack that occurs in it—and many other such things.

- 7 *Cardinal:* It is necessary to take account of all these factors in order, by means of them, to arrive at the philosophical speculation that we are aiming to pursue. For example, the bowling-ball's motion sometimes ceases suddenly, when the ball lands on its own flat surface.<sup>18</sup> [And its motion] is impeded because of variation in the ball's condition and because of variation in circumstances. And the ball stops in a natural way when, at the axis, or mid-point, of its curved surface, the motion in it is gradually diminished.<sup>19</sup> These and many other factors must, it seems to me, be subtly noted, on account of the similarity of art and nature. For since art imitates nature,<sup>20</sup> we attain [a knowledge of] the powers of nature by means of the things that we subtly discover in art.

*John:* What do you mean by "variation in circumstances"?

*Cardinal:* [I mean, for example,] a change in the heavens, in [the position of] the stars, and a change of atmosphere and of season. If any of these are changed, they change the things that they encompass

and contain.

- 8 *John*: You said that the bowling-ball has a semi-spherical surface. Would it be able to have a smaller or a larger [surface] or to have the roundness of a complete sphere?

*Cardinal*: I do not deny that the bowling-ball can have a larger or a smaller [semi-spherical] surface or can have the surface of a complete sphere, if we are speaking of visible shape or roundness, which is in no respect true or perfect roundness. For roundness that could not be more round is not at all visible. For since the surface of a [true] sphere is everywhere equally distant from its center, the outer-extremity of what is [perfectly] round—given that it ends at an indivisible point—remains altogether invisible to our eyes.<sup>21</sup> For we see only what is divisible and quantitative.

- 9 *John*: Therefore, the world's outermost spherical roundness, which I think to be most perfect, is not at all visible.<sup>22</sup>

*Cardinal*: No, not at all [visible]. Indeed, the world's roundness is also not *divisible*, since it consists in an indivisible and unreplicable point. For it cannot be the case that roundness is *composed* of points. For since a point is indivisible and does not have either quantity or parts or front or back or other differentiations, it cannot be added to any other point. Therefore, it is not the case that anything is composed of points. For to add a point to a point is just the same as if you were to add nothing to nothing.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, the outer-extremity of the world is not composed of points; rather, its outer-extremity is a roundness that consists in a [single] point. For since there is [but] a single height as regards [perfect] roundness, which is everywhere equally distant from its center, and since there cannot be a plurality of precisely equal lines, there will be, as regards the roundness, only a single, equally distant height, which ends at a [single] point.

- 10 *John*: You make amazing statements. For I understand that all these various visible forms are enclosed in the world. And yet, if it were possible for someone to be situated outside of the world, the world [as such] would be invisible to him, after the fashion of an indivisible point.<sup>24</sup>

*Cardinal*: You<sup>25</sup> have understood perfectly well. And, thus, you conceive (1) that the world (than which there exists no greater quantity) is contained in a point (than which there is nothing smaller) and (2) that its center and circumference cannot be seen and (3) that there are not many different points, since a point is not repeatable. For example, in a plurality of atoms there is only one and the same point,

even as in a plurality of things white there is only one whiteness.<sup>26</sup> Hence, a line is the further development of a point. But to further develop a point is to unfold it. This unfolding is nothing other than a point's being present in a plurality of atoms in such a way that it is in each of them qua combined and connected.

**11**     *John:* Isn't, likewise, the outer-extremity of an angle invisible, since it is a point?

*Cardinal:* Yes, indeed. But if an angle were only an outer-extremity, as roundness is [only] the outer-extremity of what is round, then assuredly the entire angle would be invisible.

*John:* I understand; and the situation is as you say it is. And so, as regards what is [perfectly] round, neither what is outermost nor what is innermost can be seen, since both are [one and] the same atom. Now, whatever is present in a [perfect] sphere or in something [perfectly] round is both outermost and innermost; and so, neither the roundness nor any part of the roundness can be seen.<sup>27</sup> Nevertheless, I do not say that a round thing cannot be seen. Rather, the *roundness* of the thing is invisible; as regards true roundness, nothing is visible. Therefore, when sight judges something to be round, there is not true roundness in that thing. Indeed, it seems to me that you mean the following: viz., that the judgment of sight regarding that round thing is not true.

*Cardinal:* I mean these things [that you just mentioned]. For nothing is seen except in a material. But true roundness cannot exist in a material; rather, only an image of true roundness [can exist there].

**12**     *John:* Thus, in a material no form is a true form;<sup>28</sup> rather, it is only an image of the truth of a true form, since the truth of a form is free from all matter.

*Cardinal:* Although you speak the truth from Plato's point of view,<sup>29</sup> nevertheless there is a difference between roundness and [any] other form; for even if it were possible for roundness to be present in a material, it still would not be visible. The case is otherwise as regards other forms, since they could be seen if they were present in a material. However, [in a material] neither the roundness nor what-is-round-in-conformity-with-the-roundness could be seen. For only that which has length and width can be seen. But in the case of the roundness [in a material] there is nothing long or wide or straight; instead, there is [only] a certain circumference and a certain convexity continued circularly from point to point. This convexity's outermost-tip is present everywhere [that the circumference is] and is an atom, invisible be-



cause of its smallness.

- 13** *John:* Isn't a plurality of atoms a plurality of outermost-tips of the roundness, and can't [such a plurality] constitute a convex line that can be seen, and isn't in that way a part of the roundness [in a material] seen?

*Cardinal:* That cannot be the case, since whatever there is in the roundness is an outermost-tip. But since an atom has the utmost of roundness: from where would the eye take the start of its seeing the roundness? Not from an atom, since an atom is invisible! But from nowhere else than from the outermost-tip of the roundness could the eye receive the beginning of its seeing the roundness. For whatever there is in the roundness is an outermost-tip. Now, the outermost-tip is an atom. [So] if we assume that sight were to take its start from the outermost-tip of the roundness, wouldn't sight have to be led from outermost-tip to outermost-tip?<sup>30</sup>

*John:* Assuredly, this would have to be the case, since there is nothing in the roundness except an outermost-tip.

*Cardinal:* But the outermost-tip is an atom, which is not visible. Therefore, it is evident that Mercury<sup>31</sup> correctly maintained that the world is not visible in and of itself, because it is round and because nothing of it or in it is seen except the forms-of-things that are contained in it.

- 14** *John:* Given that the roundness of the world exists in matter and since because of the roundness's association with matter it is [only] the image of [true] roundness, why can't that image-of-roundness in matter be seen?

*Cardinal:* That image-of-the-roundness resembles true roundness to such an extent that it is hidden from sight and from all the other senses.

*John:* And so, we do not see the world except insofar as we see the forms of things, though never all at once. If these forms were removed, then we would not see either the world<sup>32</sup> or its form.

*Cardinal:* You are right. For the world's form is an invisible roundness. Therefore, if the visible forms were removed, there would remain on the whole world a single face:<sup>33</sup> viz., the possibility-of-being, i.e., invisible matter, in which the totality of things is said to be present. And we can concede, with sufficient philosophical reliability, that the roundness, because of its perfection,<sup>34</sup> [also] would be present there.

- 15** *John:* These [teachings] exceed my conceptual ability, although I mentally see that you are making true assertions. Nevertheless, I am

amazed that in the case of the world there is not true roundness but is only an image-of-roundness that closely resembles true roundness.

*Cardinal:* Don't be amazed. For since one round thing is more perfectly round than is another, there is never a round thing that is roundness itself or than which there cannot be something more greatly round.<sup>35</sup> This rule is altogether true, since in the case of all things that admit of more or less we do not arrive at an unqualifiedly maximum or at an unqualifiedly minimum, than which there cannot be a greater or cannot be a lesser.<sup>36</sup> For the capability-of-being-greater or the capability-of-being-lesser is not of the nature of the things that cannot be greater or that cannot be lesser—even as the mutable is not of the nature of the immutable and as the divisible is not of the nature of the indivisible and as the visible not of the invisible and the temporal not of the non-temporal and the corporeal not of the incorporeal, and so on. Therefore, the roundness that is attained by sight admits of more and less, since one round thing is more round than is another. Therefore, invisible roundness is not of that nature. Therefore, it cannot be partaken of by anything corporeal, as can be visible roundness. And so, no corporeal thing can be so round that it could not be more round. Therefore, although the corporeal world is round, its roundness is of another nature than is the roundness of any other round corporeal thing. But since not every corporeal thing is visible, but a certain size is required in order that it be seen, so too since an atom is not seen, its roundness is not visible. Therefore, the world in its roundness is invisible, because with respect to the roundness-of-the-world that which offers itself to sight is an atom.<sup>37</sup>

**16** *John:* You have spoken clearly and have explained many things in few words. But I want to know how you understand the roundness of the perfect world to be an image that is recognized always to be able to be more perfect.

*Cardinal:* I know that the roundness of one round thing is rounder than is another roundness and that, therefore, as concerns round things, we must come to a round thing that is [actually] of maximal roundness, than which there is no [actually] greater roundness, since there cannot be an infinite progression.<sup>38</sup> And this [actually greatest roundness] is the world's roundness; by partaking of it every round thing is round. For it is a roundness that is able to be partaken of by all the round things of this world, which bear an image of the world's roundness. But although the world's roundness is maximal, than which no other roundness is *actually* greater, nevertheless it is not absolute, most

true roundness itself; and so, it is an image of absolute roundness. For the round world is not roundness itself, than which there can be no greater roundness, but [is a roundness] than which there is not actually a greater. However, absolute roundness is not of the nature of the world's roundness but is the cause and exemplar of the world's roundness. I call absolute roundness *eternity*; the world's roundness is an image of eternity. For in a circle—in which there is no beginning or end, since in it there is no point that is a beginning rather than an end—I see the image of eternity. Therefore, I assert that [the world's] roundness is the image of eternity, since [absolute] roundness and eternity are the same thing.

- 17 *John*: Your assertions are pleasing. But I ask: Just as the world is said to be round, can't it also be called eternal? For, as it seems, since eternity and that absolute roundness are the same thing, so too the eternal is the same thing as the round.

*Cardinal*: I do not think that a man of understanding denies that the world is eternal, even though it is not Eternity.<sup>39</sup> For only the Creator of all things is so eternal that He *is* Eternity. If anything else is called eternal, it has this [name] not because it is Eternity itself but because it exists by means of a partaking of Eternity, i.e., because it is derived from Eternity. For Eternity precedes all things eternal, except for that eternal thing which is the same thing as Eternity.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, since Eternity-of-world is [the same thing as] Eternity (of world), it is prior even to the eternal world.<sup>41</sup> For the world has from Eternity the fact that it is eternal, even as what is white has from whiteness [the fact that it is white]. Therefore, since Eternity-of-world has [it to be] that which is Absolute Eternity,<sup>42</sup> it constitutes the world as eternal,<sup>43</sup> i.e., as never endable, or as perpetual. This [perpetual world] is called eternal, since it was never true to say "Eternity is" but that it was also true to say "the world is," although from Eternity the world is that which it is.<sup>44</sup>

- 18 *John*: If I understand rightly, then there can be only one eternal and maximally round world.

*Cardinal*: You have correctly understood. For since among round things it is necessary to arrive at one that is actually maximum (just as in the case of things that are hot it is necessary to arrive at fire, which is maximally hot), there will be only one world; and it has so much roundness that it approaches maximally to eternal roundness itself. And, hence, the world [as such] is also invisible;<sup>45</sup> hence, it can

be called eternal, as well, since the Apostle Paul says: “the things that are not seen are eternal.”<sup>46</sup>

The world is called eternal not because it is without a beginning but, rather, because to say “Eternity is” was never true but that it was also true to say “the world is.” For the world did not begin in time. For not time, but only Eternity, preceded the world. Thus, time, too, is sometimes spoken of as eternal (as the Prophet speaks of “eternal time”<sup>47</sup>), since time did not have a beginning in time. For time did not precede time, but [only] Eternity did. Therefore, time is called eternal because it flows from Eternity. Similarly, the world is also eternal because it is derived from Eternity and not from time. But it befits the world, more than it befits time, to be given the name *eternal*, since the duration of the world does not depend on time. For if the motion of the heavens and if time (which is the measure of motion)<sup>48</sup> were to cease, there would not cease to be a world. On the other hand, if the world were completely to perish, time would cease. Therefore, it befits the world, more than it befits time, that it be called eternal.

**19** Therefore, the Creating-Eternity-of-world is God, who made all things according as He willed to.<sup>49</sup> For the world is not so perfectly created that in creating it God did all that He was able to do,<sup>50</sup> even though the world was created to be as perfect as it could be made to be.<sup>51</sup> Therefore, God was able to create a more perfect and more round world,<sup>52</sup> as well as able to create a less perfect and less round world.<sup>53</sup> Yet, the world was created as perfect as it could be. For it was created to be that which it could be created to be. Moreover, its possibility-of-being-made<sup>54</sup> was also made. But that-which-was-made’s possibility-of-being-made is not the Omnipotent God’s absolute power-to-make. Although in God the possibility-of-being-made and the power-to-make are the same thing, nevertheless it is not the case that each thing’s possibility-of-being-made is the same thing as God’s power-to-make. From this fact we see that God created the world according as He willed to. Therefore, the world [was created as] exceedingly perfect because it was created in accordance with the altogether free will<sup>55</sup> of the altogether perfect God.

Let [the foregoing] now suffice as concerns this [topic], since these matters, clearly explained, can be read about in other places<sup>56</sup> [in my works].

**20** *John*: Return, then, to [the topic] of our game; and say something more about the motion of the bowling-ball.

*Cardinal:* Many things remain to be said, if I may relate what occurs. First of all, I notice—when (as concerns the motion of the ball)<sup>57</sup> I throw the ball from the point where I am standing toward the center-mark of the designated circle—that this throwing cannot occur in a straight line. For example, assume that point *a* is the standing-point and that *b d* is [the diameter of] a circle whose center is *c* and that the bowling-ball is *e*. I want to throw the ball from *a* to *c*. This throwing must be done through a line-of-the-ball's-movement—a line-of-movement that is not straight, no matter what the ball's shape is.

*John:* It seems that if the bowling-ball were spherical, then its movement could occur in a straight line, even as line *a c* [is a straight line]. For I do not see why a sphere could not be moved along line *a c* and come to rest at *c*.

- 21 *Cardinal:* You will readily recognize that you are mistaken, if you consider the fact that one line is straighter than is another and, thus, that (in accordance with the aforementioned doctrine)<sup>58</sup> we do not at all find a completely true, and completely precise, straight line. And so, it is not possible that even a completely perfect sphere<sup>59</sup> would travel in a precise straight-line from *a* to *c*—even granting that the surface of the ground were perfectly flat and that the ball were perfectly round. For such a ball would touch the plane-surface only at an atom.<sup>60</sup> By its motion the ball would describe only an invisible and indivisible line and not at all a perfectly straight line extending between points *a* and *c*. Nor would it ever come to rest at *c*. For how could it come to rest at an atom? Therefore, since a perfectly round bowling-ball's outermost-tip would also be what is innermost and would be an atom: after the ball began to be moved as best it could be, it would never stop moving, because it could never behave in a different way. For that which is moved would never stop moving unless it behaved in a different way at one time and another. And so, a sphere that behaved always in the same way, on a flat and even surface, would always be moved, once it began to be moved.<sup>61</sup> Therefore, the form of roundness is the form that is most suitable for the perpetuity of motion. If motion is natural to this form, then the motion will never cease. And so, if [a sphere] is moved on its own axis, so that it is the center of its own motion, then it is moved perpetually. And this motion is a natural motion. By means of a natural motion the outermost sphere [of the heavens] is moved without constraint or fatigue. All things having a natural motion partake of this [perpetual] motion [of the outermost sphere].

**22**     *John:* How did God concreate the motion of the outermost sphere [of the heavens]?

*Cardinal:* In a way resembling how you create the motion of the bowling-ball. For that [outermost] sphere is not being moved by God the Creator or by the Spirit of God—even as the bowling-ball is not being moved by you or by your spirit when you see the ball hastening onwards, even though you have set it in motion when executing your will through a hand-throw and when imparting to the ball the impetus by which, while it lasts, the ball is moved.<sup>62</sup>

*John:* Something similar, perhaps, could be said also about the soul, by means of which, while it is present in the body, a man is moved.

*Cardinal:* There is, perhaps, no better example for understanding the creation of the soul. (From the soul there results movement in a man.) For it is not the case that God is the soul or that the Spirit of God moves a man. Rather, according to the Platonists, there is created in you a self-moving motion: viz., the rational soul, which moves itself<sup>63</sup> and all that constitutes you.

*John:* To-enliven befits the soul. Therefore, enlivening is a moving.

*Cardinal:* To be sure, enlivening is a kind of moving.

*John:* [This view] is especially pleasing. For by means of this perceptual example<sup>64</sup> I now see that many men have erred in their considerations about the soul.

**23**     *Cardinal:* Keep in mind that the motion of the bowling-ball ceases but that the ball remains intact; for the ball has no natural motion but has [only] an accidental and forced motion. Therefore, the ball stops moving when the impetus that was impressed upon it ceases. But if the bowling-ball were perfectly round, then (as was said earlier) its motion would never cease, because a circular movement would be *natural* to that ball and not at all forced upon it. Similarly, because it is natural, the motion that enlivens an animal never ceases to enliven the body, as long as the body is healthy and capable of being enlivened.

**24**     And although the motion of enlivening the animal ceases when the body's health fails, nevertheless the intellectual movement of the human soul does not cease—a movement which the soul has, and exercises, apart from the body. And so, that motion-which-moves-itself-intellectually exists in and of itself and is a substantial motion. For motion that does not move itself is an accident, whereas self-moving mo-

tion is a substance. For movement does not *happen* to that whose *nature* is movement—as is true of the nature of the intellect, which cannot be intellect apart from intellectual motion, through which the intellect is in act. And so, intellectual motion is substantial, self-moving motion. Therefore, it never fails.

By contrast, enlivenment is a movement-of-life that *happens* to a body, which of its own nature is not alive. For without life the body remains a real body. Therefore, the motion that happens to a body can cease. But the substantial, self-moving motion does not on that account cease. For that power which is also called mind forsakes the body when it ceases, in the body, to enliven, to perceive, and to imagine. For in the body [that mental] power has these operations, which it also has even when it does not exercise them. It exists no less perpetually even if it is separated locally from the body. For although that [mental] power is circumscribed at a place, so that it is present only there, nevertheless it does not occupy a place, since it is a spirit. For it is not the case that by its presence air is displaced, or a place occupied, so that [that place] holds less of a corporeal object than [it did] before [the mind was present there].

**25** *John:* The comparison of the bowling-ball to the body and of its motion to the soul is especially pleasing. A man makes a bowling-ball and produces its movement, which he impresses upon it with an impetus; and the [impressed-movement] is invisible, indivisible, and present at no place—even as [is true of the movement of] our soul. But I would like to understand better the fact that our soul is a substantial motion.

*Cardinal:* God is the Giver of substance; man is the giver of an accident, i.e., of a likeness-of-substance. A bowling-ball's shape, given to the wood by man, is joined to the wood's substance; likewise, too, the motion is joined to the substantial form. However, God is the Creator of the substance. Many things partake of motion, so that they are moved because of a *partaking* of motion. Therefore, we arrive at one thing that is moved *per se*;<sup>65</sup> and in order for it to be moved, motion does not come to it as an accident, and because of participation, but comes to it, rather, because of [that thing's] own essence. And [that thing] is the intellective soul, for the intellect moves itself.<sup>66</sup> And so that you may grasp this point more clearly, take note of the fact that in roundness there is an aptitude for motion. For that which is more round is more easily moved. Therefore, if roundness were maximal, than which there could not be an even greater roundness, then as-

surely it would be moved through itself and would, through itself, be both moving and movable. Therefore, the movement that is called *soul* is created together with the body and is not impressed on the body, as occurs in the case of the bowling-ball. Rather, *per se* motion is joined to the body but is joined in such a way that it is separable from the body. Therefore, the motion is a substance.

26 *John*: Therefore, it is rightly said that that power which you are calling *intellective soul* suffers [punishment] or is rewarded.

*Cardinal*: Most assuredly, you may believe *that* to be true. For just as in the body the intellective soul is afflicted with the affections of the body,<sup>67</sup> so also apart from the body it is afflicted with anger, envy, and other afflictions, and is still burdened with bodily uncleanness and has not forgotten the body. It is also afflicted by a material fire that has been prepared for the following purpose: viz., so that the soul will feel the pain of the heat. For the soul could not be afflicted by our [kind of] fire. Likewise, too, that power (viz., the soul) is *saved* (i.e., abides in tranquility) and is not afflicted by any torments.<sup>68</sup>

*John*: I understand you now to be saying that the soul is an incorporeal substance and is the power of various powers. For the soul is [the power of] perception; it is also [the power of] imagination; it is also reason and intellect.<sup>69</sup> In the body it exercises both [the power of] perception and [the power of] imagination; apart from the body it exercises reason and understanding. There is [but] a single substance consisting of perceptuality, imagination, reason, and intellect,<sup>70</sup> although the senses are neither the imagination nor reason nor intellect. Likewise, neither imagination nor reason nor intellect is any of the others. For they are different modes-of-apprehending in the soul; one of these modes cannot be another of them. This is what I deem you to mean.

27 *Cardinal*: Assuredly, I mean just that.

*John*: You also seem to mean that in the body the soul is present at once in different places.

*Cardinal*: That's what I mean. For since the soul is a power and since according to true philosophy each part of a power is predicated truly of the whole [of which it is a power],<sup>71</sup> the soul's enlivening power *is* the soul. However, the soul itself enlivens the different bodily members, which are in different places. Therefore, the soul is present there where it enlivens. Therefore, when the soul exists in the body, its entire substance is present at different places. But when the



soul exists apart from the body, it is not present in different places—even as an angel, who does not enliven, is not present at different places. Therefore, in the body the whole soul is present in each part of the body, just as the soul's Creator is present in each part of the world.

*John:* Does the soul withdraw itself when a finger is cut off?

*Cardinal:* Not at all. Rather, it stops enlivening the finger. It does not withdraw itself, because it does not pass from one part of the body to another, since it is present at once in each and every part.

**28** *John:* Explain, I ask, still one more thing about the soul's movement: when you say that the soul moves itself, state by what kind of motion it moves itself perpetually.

*Cardinal:* The soul does not move itself by any of the six kinds of motion<sup>72</sup> but [moves itself only] in an equivocal sense of "move". The soul "moves" itself: i.e., it discriminates, abstracts, divides, and compounds. The capability of making rational inferences is the soul's power; therefore, it *is* the soul.<sup>73</sup> Some reasoning is perpetual and immutable: e.g., [the reasoning] that 4 is not 2: "since 4 contains three things, something which 2 does not contain, 4 is not 2." This reasoning is immutable. Therefore, the soul is immutable.<sup>74</sup> Now, when reason proceeds in this way by reasoning, then assuredly that procedure is rational. Therefore, the rational soul, in reasoning, is moved by itself.

Moreover, the soul is a power that is inventive of new arts and sciences. So in the case of that movement which is inventive of what is new, the soul can be moved only by itself. Likewise, when the soul makes itself to be a likeness of all things knowable,<sup>75</sup> it is moved by itself. [This occurs], for example, when in the senses it makes itself to be a likeness of perceptible things; in sight it makes itself to be a likeness of visible things; in hearing, of audible things; and so on. Thus, the soul is said to consist of *the same* and of *the different*, because of its universal movement of comprehending all things and its particular movement of comprehending different things. Likewise, [it is said to consist] of *the indivisible* and of *the divisible*,<sup>76</sup> because it conforms itself [also] to the divisible and mutable.<sup>77</sup> Hence, the soul is that power which can conform itself to all things.<sup>78</sup> And it makes itself to be the cause of the movement of the body (e.g., of the hand or of the foot) but not always deliberately, since there is also natural movement,<sup>79</sup> as occurs, for example, in regard to the movement of nerves and of a lung.

But because of its weakness the respective soul in children does not

make itself to be a likeness of things; but [it does do so] after the age of discernment, when the body has become strong and when discernment has been joined [to the soul], especially if the soul is exercised through education. For in children the soul is still unformed with respect to the use of reason, and it is subjected to nature in order that there may be made a strong and perfect man. And the soul's lack-of-formation is moved toward perfection through education and by exercise.

However, we can say in two senses that the soul moves itself: (1) either when the soul *makes itself to be the cause* of the body's movements (something which it does even during sleep) or (2) when it *makes itself to be a likeness* of things (something which it does even apart from the human body).<sup>80</sup> Moreover, [the soul's] being alive is seen to be its moving itself. Hence, because the soul is moved of itself, it is more truly alive than is the human body (*homo*), which is moved by the soul.

**30**     *John:* Accordingly, I think that God is more truly alive than is the soul.

*Cardinal:* You think correctly. But it is not the case that God moves Himself or makes Himself to be a likeness of things (something which the soul does), although in God all things are present in a certain simplicity. Rather, [He is more truly alive] because He is the true Being of things<sup>81</sup> and is the Life-of-lives. For He says the following: "I am Resurrection and Life."<sup>82</sup>

*John:* The things that you have just recounted about the invention of what-is-new are greatly pleasing; for in that act [of inventing], the soul is clearly seen to move itself. I would like for you to apply [this teaching] to the [bowling]-game.

**31**     *Cardinal:* I *thought about* inventing a game of wisdom. I *considered* how the game would have to be structured. Then I *determined* that it had to be made in the way that you see [it now]. Thinking-about, considering, and determining are powers of our soul. No beast has such a thought about inventing a new game. Therefore, a beast neither considers nor determines anything concerning a game. These powers are powers belonging to living-reason, which is called soul; and they are alive, because without the movement of living-reason they cannot exist. For in that [inventive] thought everyone who recognizes that thinking is a certain flow-of-thought detects the movement of the rational spirit. Something similar holds true for considering and determining. In this work [of inventing], the body furnishes

no assistance. And so, the soul, as best it can, withdraws itself<sup>83</sup> from the body in order better to think, to consider, and to determine. For the soul desires to be completely at liberty, in order to work freely. But this free power,<sup>84</sup> which we call the *rational soul*, is stronger in proportion to its being free from bodily restrictions. Therefore, the soul is not more alive in the body than apart from it. Nor is it dissolved along with the dissolution of the body's harmony, or temperament,<sup>85</sup> since it does not depend on the body's temperament, as does health. On the contrary, [the body's] temperament depends on the soul: if the soul does not exist, then neither does the temperament.

- 32 The soul is life, because it is reason, which is a living movement. Therefore, when I think-about, consider, and determine, what else occurs than that the rational spirit—which is a thinking, considering, and determining power—moves itself? And when I inquire about the determination of the soul, as to what the soul is, then don't I also think-about and consider? And I find that in this [mental activity] the soul moves itself with a circular movement, because that movement is turned back on itself. For when I think about thinking, [this] movement is circular and self-moving. And, hence, movement-of-soul, which is life, is perpetual, because it is a circular movement that is turned back on itself.

*John:* I well understand what you mean. And it is most gratifying to have heard about these three powers of the intellective soul—no one of which is the other, because thinking-about comes first, considering comes second, and determining<sup>86</sup> comes last. Thinking-about begets considering; and determining proceeds from thinking-about and considering; and [the three of them] are only one living-movement that moves itself perfectly. And I see that in this regard the intellective soul must be a triune power if it is to live perfectly—i.e., to be moved perfectly.

- 33 *Cardinal:* Add, as well, that the soul is all the more perfect because that infinite and most perfect Power, viz., God, shines forth more greatly in it. Accordingly, just as God is eternal, so the soul is perpetual; for Eternity shines forth better in the perpetual than it does in the temporal.

*John:* I am most willing to add the points that you enjoin me to; but I also do not want to neglect mentioning a further point that is most pleasing to me.

*Cardinal:* What's that?

*John:* If for the perfection of our spirit there is required, necessarily, that our spirit be triune, as you very rightly declared, then assuredly those who deny that the most perfect Spirit, viz., God, is triune are to be deemed ignorant.

*Cardinal:* Assuredly, it is a sign of ignorance not to affirm of God that which is characteristic of simplicity and perfection. Now, the more *unitive* oneness is, the more simple and perfect it is. Hence, the most perfect oneness is triune Oneness, which is so one that even in three persons (each of whom is one person) it is one; otherwise, it would not be most perfect Oneness, for it would lack both the nature [of oneness] and the things necessary for oneness's most perfect essence. But these points are deeper than the points that we are now investigating.

34 *John:* You seem cautiously to have stated that this thinking-about, considering, and determining of the [bowling]-game is not in [the power of] brute animals, though you do not deny that brute animals—in building nests, in hunting, and in other [activities] that we observe—think-about, consider, and determine. How, then, will you show that animals are not rational?<sup>87</sup>

*Cardinal:* [The reason that animals are not rational is] that they lack free power, which is present in *us*.<sup>88</sup> For example, when I wished to invent this game, I thought about, considered, and determined things which someone else did not think about or consider or determine. For each man is free to think about whatever he wishes to—and is free, likewise, to consider and determine whatever he wishes to. Therefore, not all men think about the same thing, since each man has his own free spirit. But beasts are not like that. And so, they are impelled by nature toward the things that they do; and beasts of the same species engage in similar methods of hunting and build similar nests.

*John:* But these [activities] are not done apart from reason.

35 *Cardinal:* Their nature is moved by an intelligence.<sup>89</sup> But [consider an analogy. Suppose that a monarchal] law-maker, moved by reason, has ordained the law (which moves his subjects) to be such as it is. [The subjects are moved] not [by] the rationale of the law, a rationale which is unknown to them, but [by] the imperial decree of their superior—an imperial decree that is binding. In a similar way, a brute animal rather than being moved by the guidance-of-reason, of which the animal is ignorant, is moved by an [intelligent] decree-of-nature<sup>90</sup> that constrains it. And so, we see that all things of the same species are compelled and moved by a single specific motion as by an innate

law of nature. [But] our spirit, which is regal and imperial, is not constrained by this force; otherwise, our spirit would not invent anything but would only comply with the impulse of its nature.

*John:* Since I see that spiders observe a single law in regard both to their webs and to their methods of hunting, and see that swallows observe a single law in their nest-building—and see countless other such things—I well understand that individual [animals] of the same species are moved by a single motion and that this motion is impelling. And so, I am satisfied [with your answer].

**36** *Cardinal:* In us some things (viz., things which our animality requires) are thought of, considered, and determined naturally, and there are other things (for example, the ones previously mentioned) that befit the spirit even apart from the body. When you take note of this fact, you recognize by experience that in the case of the former we are moved not freely but out of the necessity of our perceptual and corporeal nature, whereas in the case of the latter we are moved freely, since our free spirit moves itself. But our nature can never impose on our spirit any necessity; but well [can] our spirit [impose necessity] on our nature, as is evident with respect to *good* ([e.g.,] in cases of abstinence and in chastity) and with respect to *evil* ([e.g.,] when we sin against our nature and when the despairing lay hands on themselves and kill themselves).

**37** *John:* There remains one thing that I would like to understand more clearly: viz., how it is that the vegetative and perceptual powers operate differently in men and in brute animals. For you said that [in a man] there is a single substance which we call soul and that it is the power of many powers. In particular, [it is the power] of (1) the vegetative power and of the things enfolded in the vegetative power and (2) of the perceptual power and of the things contained in the perceptual power and also (3) of the intellective power and of the things which belong to it. But it is certain that this substance, in accordance with its intellective power, does not require a body. And so, since none of the soul's substance depends on a body,<sup>91</sup> the substance exists *per se*, apart from the body—although [the soul] exercises the other powers (viz., the perceptual and the vegetative powers) only while it is within the body. Therefore, the soul is not of less power outside the body than in the body, although [outside the body] the soul's exercising of the powers that require a body ceases.

But since the soul of a brute animal is a substance and power that

requires a body (because apart from a body the brute's soul has no operation), it seems that its soul perishes when its body perishes.<sup>92</sup> But since [the soul] is a substance that in man is an intellectual and un-failing power, it is seen never to perish. For substance is essence, which according to Dionysius is not corruptible<sup>93</sup> and which can be perpetual, since it is perpetual in the soul of man.

**38** *Cardinal:* You pose subtly your question, asking about the difference between the perceptual and the vegetative powers in man and in brute animals. We must first of all, it seems to me, take account of the fact that those powers—viz., the vegetative, the perceptual, and the imaginative—are present in man's intellective power in the way that a trigon is present in a tetragon, as Aristotle rightly stated.<sup>94</sup> Now, in a tetragon a trigon does not have its own trigonal form but has the form of the tetragon. But in brute animals the trigon does have the form of a trigon. Therefore, the trigon is of one nature, whereas the tetragon is of another nature. Likewise, too, the vegetative, perceptual, and imaginative powers that constitute the trigon that is called the brute animal's soul are of a more imperfect nature than they are in man, where, together with the very noble and very perfect intellectual power, they constitute the tetragon that is called man's soul.<sup>95</sup> For lower things are present in higher things in accordance with the nature of the higher.<sup>96</sup> For example, being alive is more noble in the perceptual power than in the vegetative power; and it is still more noble in the intellective power; but it is present most nobly in the Divine Nature, which is the Life of living things.<sup>97</sup>

**39** Therefore, it is not strange to suppose that these powers in a trigon are not of the nature of these powers in a tetragon, where they enter into a substantial identity with the incorruptible intellective power. For just as in the Divine Nature, which is the eternal Eternity,<sup>98</sup> the vegetative, perceptual, imaginative, and intellective powers are eternal, so in the intellectual nature, which is perpetual, the vegetative, perceptual, and imaginative powers are perpetual. And although it is not the case that the things in a brute animal are perpetual by virtue of a perpetuity of intellectual nature, nevertheless I do not think that any of those things vary in substance because of a variation of the body. For just as in the case of a man, when his hand withers, the substance of the vegetative soul and of the perceptual soul<sup>99</sup> does not wither but always remains, because the power of the man's soul is incorruptible, although the hand's growth and sensation stop: so, perhaps,

through the death of a brute animal or through the withering of a tree there does not perish that substance which is called *perceptual soul* or *vegetative soul*, although the substance does not exercise its operation, as it did previously.

40 *John*: How is it, then, that [the substance] remains

*Cardinal*: We cannot deny that man is said to be a microcosm<sup>100</sup> (i.e., a small world) that has a soul. Likewise, too, [we cannot deny] that the macrocosm [is said] to have a soul, which some men call nature,<sup>101</sup> whereas others call it the spirit-of-all-things, which inwardly sustains, unites, connects, supports, and moves all things. For that world-force, of which we have spoken and which moves itself and all other things, is perpetual, because it is a round and circular motion, containing within itself all motion—even as a circular [geometrical] figure enfolds within itself every other figure.<sup>102</sup> This [world]-soul is also called by many *connecting-necessity* and by others *substantified fate*.<sup>103</sup> It unfolds all things in an ordered way. The entire corporeal world is to this soul as the human body is to the human soul. In things perceptual this [world-force] is a perceptual soul; in things vegetable it is a vegetative soul; in elements it is an elemental soul. If it were to cease nourishing a tree or enlivening a brute animal, it itself would not on that account cease to exist—as was said [also] of man's soul.<sup>104</sup>

41 *John*: So the soul of one brute animal (or of one tree) is not different from the soul of another brute animal (or of another tree).

*Cardinal*: This [point of yours] in the way [that you have made it] must be conceded as concerns [the soul's] substance, since there is only one soul of all [brute animals (or of all trees)].<sup>105</sup> However, as concerns accidents, [there is a plurality of souls,] all of which differ.<sup>106</sup> By way of comparative illustration: The visual power in man does not differ, as concerns its substance, from the auditory power, because there is one soul, which is a visual and an auditory power. Yet, these powers differ accidentally, because the visual power happens to be in the eye and not in the ear and happens to be more apt in the one eye than in the other—more apt for executing its operation.

42 *John*: In accordance with this opinion it can perhaps be conceded that the world is threefold: a small world<sup>107</sup> that is *man*, a maximal world that is *God*, and a large world that is called *universe*. The small world is a likeness of the large world; the large world is a likeness of the maximal world. But since man is a small world, I have doubts about whether he is a part of the large world.

*Cardinal:* Assuredly, man is a small world in such a way that he is also a part of the large world. Now, a whole shines forth in all its parts, since a part is a part of the whole. Just as the whole man<sup>108</sup> shines forth in the hand, which is proportioned to the whole, but, nevertheless, the whole perfection of man shines forth in a more perfect manner in the head: so the universe shines forth in each of its parts, for all things have their respective relation and proportion to the universe, but, nevertheless, the universe shines forth more greatly in that part which is called man than in any other part.<sup>109</sup> Therefore, because the perfection of the totality of the universe shines forth more greatly in and through man, man is a perfect, but small, world and is a part of the large world. Hence, a man has particularly, specially, and distinctly the things which the universe has universally. And because there can be only one universe but there can be a plurality of particular and distinct things, many particular and distinct men bear an image of, and a specific resemblance to, the one perfect<sup>110</sup> universe. Thus, the stable oneness of the large universe is unfolded quite perfectly in such a variegated plurality of many small transient worlds that succeed one another.

43 *John:* If I understand rightly, then just as the universe is one large kingdom, so also man is a kingdom (but a small one) in a large kingdom, just as the kingdom of Bohemia is present in the kingdom of the Romans, i.e., in the universal empire.

*Cardinal:* Excellent! For man is a kingdom similar to the kingdom of the universe: [he is a kingdom] grounded in a part of the universe. For example, when he is an embryo in his mother's womb, his own kingdom does not yet exist. But after the creation of the intellectual soul, which is imposed by an act of creation, there arises a kingdom having its own king, and it is called a man. When the soul departs, he stops being a man<sup>111</sup> and a kingdom. But just as the body before the advent of the intellective soul belonged to the universal kingdom of the large world, so also it is returned to that kingdom. [By way of illustration]: just as before Bohemia had its own king it belonged to the empire, so too it will remain [a part of the empire] if its king is removed.

Therefore, in an immediate way man is subject to his own king, who reigns within him; but he is then subject in an intermediate way to the kingdom of the world. But when he does not yet have a king or when he has ceased to be, he is subject to the kingdom of the world immediately. Therefore, nature, or the world-soul,<sup>112</sup> exercises the



vegetative power in an embryo, even as it also does in other things having a vegetative life. And it also continues this exercise in some men who are dead, whose hair and nails continue to grow;<sup>113</sup> and it causes these things in them, as [it also causes things] in other physical objects that lack their own king. But I have written elsewhere,<sup>114</sup> more extensively, about how man is his own kingdom and is free and noble. And beautiful is our speculation, through which a man is made perfectly content when he (1) knows himself and finds that in his kingdom (although a small one) all things exist abundantly and without defect, and (2) recognizes himself to be happy, if he wills to be.

These points have now been touched upon, according as time has allowed.

**44**     *John:* Do not hesitate to add to those very beautifully made statements how it is that the maximal world, which is God, shines forth in the universal world.<sup>115</sup>

*Cardinal:* You are asking about deep matters. I do not know whether I am capable of giving adequate answers. However, as best I can, I will help myself by means of [the example of] the bowling-ball. For the visible ball is an image of the invisible ball that was in the mind of the artisan. Therefore, give careful consideration to the fact that mind has within itself a power-of-fashioning. For mind, which has within itself a free<sup>116</sup> faculty of conceiving, discovers the art of making its conception known. This art is then called a mastery-of-fashioning and is possessed by potters, sculptors, painters, lathe-operators, smiths, weavers, and other such artisans. Therefore, suppose that a potter wishes to express, and manifest visibly, jars, plates, pitchers, and any other such things which he mentally conceives—to manifest them to the end that he become known as a master-artisan. First of all, he strives to introduce possibility—i.e., to make the material apt for receiving the form of his art. Having prepared the material, he sees that without motion he cannot bring it into actuality so that it will have the form which he conceives in his mind. And he constructs a potter's-wheel, by whose motion he draws forth from the material's possibility, the preconceived form. And because one material is more apt than is another, no possibility can be altogether perfect. And so, in no material can the immaterial and mental form be reproduced exactly as it is. Rather, every visible form will remain [only] a likeness, and an image, of the true and invisible form, which in his mind is his mind.

**45**     So, then, since in the mind of the lathe-operator the bowling-ball

*is* the mind: when the mind wanted to make itself visible by means of that form which it conceived, and to which concept it assimilated itself, it adapted the material, viz., the wood, so that the wood would be capable of receiving that form. Thereafter, by means of a lathe's motion, [the artisan] introduced form to the wood. Accordingly, the ball was in his mind, and there the archetypal ball *is* the mind. The ball was potentially in the uncarved wood, and there it was the material. The ball was in the motion, when the ball was brought from potentiality into actuality, and there the ball was the motion. And the ball's possibility was brought into actuality, so that the ball exists actually, through the determination and definition of the possibility, which is actually determined in such a way that it is the visible bowling-ball.

Accordingly, from this likeness with the human art you know how you can, to some extent, make surmises about the Divine Creative Art,<sup>117</sup> although between God's creating and man's producing there is as much difference as between the Creator and the creature. Therefore, because within itself the Divine Mind conceives of the world, the Divine Mind is called the Archetypal World. (This [Divine] Concept is the Divine Mind, which is equal to<sup>118</sup> the Concept.) Now, God willed to manifest, and make visible, the beauty of His Concept. He created the possibility, or the capability,<sup>119</sup> of a beautiful world's being made. And He created the motion through which the world was derived from possibility, so that there was made *this* visible world, in which the possibility-of-there-being-a-world is such as God willed it to be and such as it was able actually to be determined to be.

46 *John*: Do you understand by "the capability-of-being-made" or by "the possibility-of-being-made" or by "matter" something [pre-existent] from which the world was made, as a bowling-ball is made from wood?

*Cardinal*: Not at all. Rather, [I mean] that the world passed from the mode that is called *possibility-of-being-made* or the *capability-of-being-made* or *matter* to the mode that is called *existing actually*. For nothing that was not able to be made is actually made. For how could there be made what is impossible to be made? Now, if matter were actually something, then assuredly it would be either Eternity itself or Eternity's product. [But] it cannot [rightly] be said that matter is Eternity, because Eternity is God, who is all that which can be. So matter, which is the possibility-of-being-made or the capability-of-being-made<sup>120</sup> or variability, is not Eternity. On the other hand, mat-

ter is also not Eternity's product. For if matter were made, it would have been able to be made. In that case, the possibility-of-being-made, viz., matter, would be made from matter and, thus, would be made from itself—something which is impossible.<sup>121</sup> Therefore, matter is not something actually existent; rather, a thing that is made is said to be made from matter because it was able to be made. For the Divine Mind would not be omnipotent if it could make something only from something else—a feat which a created mind, which is not at all omnipotent, does every day.

- 47 *John*: You do not deny that although the possibility-of-being-made is not something, it is the possibility-of-being-made-to-be-something. Therefore, it is not altogether nothing, since from nothing nothing is made. And since it is not God or is not something actually existent or is not from something else or is not nothing, then whatever it is it is from nothing. It is not from itself, since it cannot create itself from nothing. Therefore, it seems to be a creature of God, [who created it from nothing].

*Cardinal*: You infer excellently. For living reason requires that this inference be thus conceded, although reason does not detect [a basis for] how [what is inferred] can be conceived. For just as the concept of God excels all conception, so the concept of matter escapes all conception.

- 48 *John*: Are forms hidden in matter, as the bowling-ball was hidden in the wood?

*Cardinal*: Not at all. For when a lathe-operator makes a bowling-ball by paring away parts of the wood until he arrives at the form of a ball, the possibility which he saw in the wood has passed—when the possibility is conformed to the ball in his mind—from a possible mode of being<sup>122</sup> to actually existing. The material cause of the ball is the wood; the efficient cause is the artisan; the formal cause is the exemplar in the artisan's mind; and the final cause is the artisan himself, who did the work for his own sake; therefore, three causes concur in the artisan, and the fourth cause is the material cause. Similarly, God is a tricausal Cause (viz., efficient, formal, and final) of every creature and of matter itself, which causes something, although it is not anything [actual].<sup>123</sup> But without matter that which is made could not be made. For since that which is present in the Mind of God is God, who is Eternity, assuredly it cannot be made. On the other hand, there is not made anything that is not in God's Mind and Conception.

Therefore, it must be the case that the True Nature (*veritas*) of every thing that is made is only its Exemplar. This True Nature, [or Exemplar], is the Mind of God. And so, that which is made will be an image of the Exemplar-Form.<sup>124</sup> (For an image's true nature is not itself an image but is an exemplar.) Therefore, if [that which is made] is not the True Nature but is an image of the True Nature, then since that which is made descends from stable Eternity, it must be received in a changeable subject, where it is received not as it is in Eternity but [only] as it can be made to be.<sup>125</sup>

- 49 *John*: If I understand rightly all [that you have said]: (1) all things are present in God, and in God they are their true nature (*veritas*), which is neither more nor less; but there they are present enfoldedly,<sup>126</sup> as a circle is present in a point. (2) All things are present in motion; but there they are present as unfolded, as when the point of one foot of a pair of drawing-compasses is rotated unfoldedly around the other point; for then that [rotated] point unfolds a circle that was previously enfolded [in it]. (3) All things are present in the possibility-of-being-made, as a circle is present in a material that can be made to be circular. And (4) all things are present in determinate possibility, as a circle exists as actually described.

*Cardinal*: You have recapitulated, concisely enough, these points which somehow have entered into our discussion extraneously to our main theme. So let us now return to [considering] our game, and I will disclose very briefly my intent.

*John*: Were I not to see (1) that you have already satisfied us abundantly and more fully than we<sup>127</sup> were hoping and (2) that you have already disclosed a teaching that befits a great speculation (as accords with our great desire for learning), I would be urging you, although you are tired, to extend into further discussions these points which you have just begun. But do now as you are proposing. We will consult your books, which we expect are replete with these [further] salient points.

- 50 *Cardinal*: I believe that I have quite often spoken and written about those and other matters—[having done so], perhaps, better than now, since my powers are now more failing and since my memory responds slowly. However, it was my [present] aim to reduce to an order useful to our purpose this newly devised game, which all people, far and wide, readily understand and gladly play because of the frequent amusement which occurs as a result of the variegated and

never-certain course [of the ball]. And I made a mark where we stand throwing the bowling-ball; and in the middle of the level-surface I made a circle, at whose center there is the throne of a king, whose kingdom is a kingdom-of-life enclosed within the circle; and within the [one large] circle I made nine other circles.<sup>128</sup> Now, the game's directions require that the bowling-ball come to rest within a circle and that a ball closer to the center scores more points—according to the number assigned to the circle where the ball stops. And he who most quickly scores thirty-four points—which correspond to the number of years of Christ's life<sup>129</sup>—is the winner.

**51** This game, I say, symbolizes the movement of our soul from its own kingdom unto the Kingdom of Life, in which there is eternal rest and eternal happiness. In the Center of the Kingdom of Life our King and Life-Giver, Christ Jesus, presides. When He was like unto us,<sup>130</sup> He moved the bowling-ball of His own person in such a way that it would come to rest at the Center of Life. He left us an example<sup>131</sup> in order that we would do just as He had done and in order that our bowling-ball would follow [in the pathway of] His, although it is impossible that another ball come to rest at the [exact] same Center of Life at which Christ's ball comes to rest. For within a circle there are an infinite number of places and mansions.<sup>132</sup> For the bowling-ball of each individual comes to rest at its own point and atom, at which no other ball can ever arrive. And no two balls can be equally distant from the Center; rather, the one ball will always be more distant, the other less distant.

Therefore, each Christian must contemplate how it is that (1) some men have no hope of another life; and they move their bowling-ball [only] here on earth. (2) Other men have the hope of happiness, but they struggle to arrive at that [eternal] life by means of their own powers and laws, apart from Christ; and by following the powers of their mind and by keeping the commandments of their prophets and teachers, they cause their own ball to run toward high matters; yet, their bowling-balls do not reach the Kingdom of Life. (3) There is a third group of men, who embrace the Way which Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, preached and walked; they direct themselves toward the Center, where there is the throne of the King-of-Powers and of the Mediator between God and men.<sup>133</sup> And by following in the footsteps of Christ,<sup>134</sup> they impel their bowling-ball by means of a central pathway; [and] they alone obtain a mansion in the Kingdom of Life. For only the Son of God, who descended from Heaven, knew the Way-

of-Life, which he revealed to believers by His word and deed.

52 *John:* You speak of believers. Who are they?

*Cardinal:* Those who believe that He is the Son of God and that the Gospel was preached by Him. They are certain about the truth of the Gospel because the Son of God does not lie.<sup>135</sup> And so, they prefer the promises of the Gospel to this life. They rejoice in dying here in order to enter with Christ into eternal life. Dying is inevitable. Therefore, to die on account of faith in the Son of God has the reward of eternal life. For how could God, who is just and gracious, fail to reward the faithfulness of one who dies for the sake of God's glory? Or what reward except the reward of *life* would God give to him who gave his life for Him? Is God less noble than is a nobleman who abundantly rewards—even to the point of sharing his kingdom—the faithfulness of his servant? And if a believer chooses to suffer even eternal death<sup>136</sup> for the sake of the glory of the Son of God, how will a reward be given to him unless it is a reward of a life in which he always and eternally knows that he will truly live and truly rejoice?

53 *John:* So those who do not die for the sake of God's glory, as did Christ, are not true Christians.

*Cardinal:* He is a Christian who prefers the glory of God to his own life and glory and who prefers it in such a way that if he were tested by persecution, he would be found to be just such [a convinced believer]. Christ lives in him, but he himself does not live.<sup>137</sup> Therefore, he is a despiser of this world and of this life;<sup>138</sup> in him, through faith, there is the spirit of the Son of God, Jesus Christ; and having died to the world,<sup>139</sup> he is alive in Christ.<sup>140</sup>

*John:* You see how *difficult* it is to direct the curved bowling-ball so that it follows the pathway of Christ,<sup>141</sup> in whom was the Spirit-of-God, who led Christ unto the Center of Life and the Fount of Life.

*Cardinal:* It is very *easy* for one who has true faith,<sup>142</sup> as I just said. Therefore, if the "bowling-ball" of your person is impelled by the spirit of *faith*, then (1) it is guided by steadfast *hope* and (2) by *love* it is bound to Christ, who will lead you with Him unto Life.<sup>143</sup> But such is impossible for an unbeliever.

*John:* I see the following to be altogether certain: He who does not believe in Christ as the Son of God clings to the world and does not look forward to a better life.<sup>144</sup> By contrast, a believer rejoices in adversity, because he knows that a glorious death will lead to immortal life.

But it seems scarcely possible that a bowling-ball, which by its nature is inclined downward, would not be moved downward and would not be moved in a curved direction, one ball more so than another.

- 54 *Cardinal*: This is the deepest symbolism of this game: viz., that we learn how to straighten out, by the practice of virtue,<sup>145</sup> these inclinations and natural curvatures—to do so in such a way that at length, after many variations and unstable circular movements and curvatures, we come to rest in the Kingdom of Life. For you see that one man throws the ball in one manner, another in another manner, while the same curvature remains in the ball. In accordance with the varying impulse, the bowling-ball is moved differently and stops at different places; and before it stops, we never know for sure where it will finally stop. Therefore, if one man sees that a ball thrown by another man has landed near the center, he thinks of choosing to imitate the other's method; and oftentimes he tries to, and he makes headway.

*John*: Each man is his own "bowling-ball," curved differently from [any] other bowling-ball. Therefore, one man cannot imitatingly follow another.

*Cardinal*: That's true. No one can follow precisely the pathway of another.<sup>146</sup> Rather, each man, by exerting himself, must govern the inclinations and tendencies of his own bowling-ball. After a while, made temperate in this manner, he strives to find a way whereby the curvature of his bowling-ball<sup>147</sup> does not prevent its arriving at the Circle of Life. This is the symbolic power of the game: that even a curved bowling-ball can be controlled by the practice of virtue, so that after many unstable deviations of movement, the ball stops in the Kingdom of Life.

- 55 *John*: I cannot deny (1) that while one [and the same] curvature of the bowling-ball remains, the ball is always moved differently in accordance with the different impetus given by each one who throws it and (2) that the same ball can be impelled in different ways by each man, as he pleases, so that the ball's movement is varied, even though in every case it is a curved movement. However, since the ball does not always come to a stop at the center of the circle, where each player intends to place it, and since one of the players [succeeds in] placing the ball at one time near the center, but at a subsequent time (although he has the same intention as before) the ball veers far from the center, we speak of its seeming to be the case that the ball is moved

not only in accordance with the intention of the thrower but also in accordance with chance.

**56** *Cardinal:* Chance (*fortuna*)<sup>148</sup> can be said to be that which happens independently of one's intention; and since each player aims at the center of the circle, it is not chance<sup>149</sup> if [his ball] arrives there. But it is not in our power that our will be perfectly accomplished; for when the ball hastens onward, we watch to see whether it approaches the center, and we would like to assist it, if we could, finally to stop there. But because we have not placed it on the route, nor given it the impetus, that is necessary for this outcome, we cannot by means of a supervening intention modify the course that we have impressed [upon the ball]. (By way of comparative illustration: when one who has begun to run down a mountain-side is at a fast speed, he cannot—  
even if he would want to—hold himself back.) Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to the inception of the motion. Consequently, a bad habit, which is a [kind of] movement,<sup>150</sup> does not allow anyone to do well, unless, after it has been set aside, he causes a movement of virtue to result in a good habit. Therefore, if those who are running flaggingly finish the race poorly, then even if they regret it en route, they have to impute this result not to a disposition that is usually called fate or bad luck but to themselves, because, foolishly, they started off too fast.

You see clearly that you place the bowling-ball into motion when and how you wish to. Even if the constellation of the heavens were to decree that the stationary bowling-ball is to remain stationary, the influence of the heavens would not keep your hands from moving the ball if you wished to. For the kingdom of each man is free, just as is also the kingdom of the universe,<sup>151</sup> in which the heavens and the stars are contained; in the smaller world<sup>152</sup> the heavens and the stars are also contained, but in a human way.

**57** *John:* According to this view, then, everyone ought to impute even adverse happenings only to himself.

*Cardinal:* This is true as regards morals and those works which are characteristic of man qua man. For no one is corrupt except through his own fault.

*John:* In that case, what is the meaning of saying that chance [*fortuna*] is omnipotent?

*Cardinal:* A poet<sup>153</sup> said this, knowing that the Platonic philosophers affirm it. For they say that fortune [*fortuna*] is the order and disposition of all things in those things' own being; and they call for-



tune *connecting-necessity*,<sup>154</sup> because nothing can resist that disposition.<sup>155</sup> That disposition, or fortune, is said to be neither favorable nor unfavorable except from our point of view and according to the outcome of things actually and in practice. For example, the disposition and order of being a man [*homo*] is such that all [man's] features are made as they are made; otherwise, a *man* would not be made. Therefore, chance, or fortune, is an inevitable necessity, which nothing can resist; and for this reason, it is [said to be] omnipotent. But although Socrates and Plato are actually disparate men, this fact does not come about because fortune (or order and disposition) is favorable and unfavorable—except insofar as relates to those [two] men, one of whom obtains things favorable in comparison with the other.

58 But in our kingdom that governess (*fortuna*) which a while ago was called the world-soul<sup>156</sup> does not dispose over the things that are of man. For each man has free choice,<sup>157</sup> i.e., the power to will and not to will; he knows [the difference between] virtue and vice, [between] what is honorable and what is dishonorable, what is just and what is unjust, what is laudable and what is reprehensible, what is glorious and what is shameful.<sup>158</sup> And he knows that good is to be chosen, whereas evil is to be shunned;<sup>159</sup> for he has within himself a king and a judge<sup>160</sup> over those things which, since brute-animals are ignorant of them, belong to man qua man. And in regard to those things his noble kingdom is not at all subjected to the universe or to another creature—[something] not [true] in regard to those extrinsic goods which are called fortuitous, of which a man cannot have as many as he wishes to, because they are not subject to his free will, unlike the aforementioned immortal goods, which are subject to the will. For if his immortal soul wills to, it finds and freely chooses the immortal virtues as immortal nourishment for the soul's own life, even as the body's vegetative soul [seeks and finds] bodily food suitable for itself.

Now, while the bowling-ball is moving, it is impossible for us to foresee at what point it will stop; and just because at times it enters the circle,<sup>161</sup> it does not for that reason always stop inside the circle. Nevertheless, from experience and continual practice we can foresee by means of a truthlike surmise that the ball will come to stop within the circle. However, it is more difficult to surmise at what particular level among the [ten concentric]<sup>162</sup> circles it will stop; and it is altogether impossible to surmise at what [exact] point it will stop. Therefore, the bowling-ball (which has a heavy body inclined toward

- the surface of the earth) and its motion (because it is effected by means of man's impelling) are somewhat like earthly man and his pilgrimage. For human movement cannot continue on in a straight line; soon it veers off and always moves in frequently different directions because of its earthliness. Nevertheless, through the practice of virtue it<sup>163</sup> can bring its own rolling-movement to a halt within the circle. And God, who is being sought by means of man's movement, assists a good and persevering intention and perfects a good will. For God is the one who guides the believer and brings him to perfection and who by His omnipotent mercy repairs the weakened condition of the one who hopes in Him. Therefore, although a Christian who does his best is aware that his own bowling-ball is proceeding inconstantly, he is not confounded, because he trusts in God, who does not forsake those who hope in Him.<sup>164</sup>
- 60** The foregoing is this game's symbolism, which, in accordance with the very limited time available, I have now explained sufficiently enough that from these few points you may elicit many others and may progress in movement, so that, in the end, we may happily obtain rest in the Kingdom of Life together with Christ our King, if He, who alone is Mighty and Blessed forever,<sup>165</sup> grants it. Amen.<sup>166</sup>

*Albert:*<sup>168</sup> You know, Father, that I have come here<sup>169</sup> with the highest hope both (1) of becoming better known to our Pope Pius<sup>170</sup> and to you and the other cardinals and (2) of learning [from you]. In this city I came upon illustrious Duke John, my very dear relative,<sup>171</sup> and I saw him take time (subsequent to discussions between us [such as are] common among friends) to read your short book *De Ludo Globi*. Afterwards, admiring both the game and the book, I endeavored to understand something [of them] in accordance with my adolescent capability. But it seemed to me that you had not explained the symbolic meaning of the [ten] circles<sup>172</sup> of the Region-of-Life.<sup>173</sup> Therefore, I ask that Your Grace not despise in me this incapacity to understand so deep a symbolism. It will be the case that when I am more learned, I will remember what I have heard and, by the gift of God, will further learn.

*Cardinal:* With great joy I saw you in this city with your brother Wolfgang. For your father, Albert,<sup>174</sup> illustrious Count Palatine and Duke of Bavaria, has been my exceedingly good friend for many years and has showed his affection. To me it is especially pleasing to see such a dear friend livingly present in sons who are illustrious and learned and excellently and nobly constituted. And, hence, I will gladly impart whatever possible.

In regard to the bowling-game, you are asking about matters which, when you hear [them expressed], you may perhaps not be able to discuss, because of the impediment of your [young] age. Nevertheless, you will be amazed and will, by means of a certain mental wrestling, lay hold of very lofty [truths] that will render you better able to soar unto all things knowable. However, you must open your mind's eye and totally elevate your sight in order to see, rather than just to hear, what I am going to say.

*Albert:* I will do all that my nature and my intelligence<sup>175</sup> will allow.

62

*Cardinal:* In order to understand this symbolism of the circles, keep in mind the following proposition: "There can be nothing greater or lesser than that which is present in all things and in which all things are present; therefore, it is the Exemplar of all things."

*Albert:* I now have this proposition fixed in my memory; but in order for my mind to see its truth, the proposition needs an expla-

nation.

*Cardinal:* A brief explanation will suffice: How could anything be smaller than that which is present in each thing? Or how could anything be larger than that in which all things are present? Therefore, if none of all things are either smaller or larger than it:<sup>176</sup> of necessity, all things are exemplifications of that one Exemplar.<sup>177</sup>

*Albert:* You have given a very concise explanation. Indeed, I see very clearly. Since an exemplification has nothing except from its exemplar, and since of all [the exemplifications] there is [only] one exemplar, which is present in them all and in which all of them are present, your explanation is clear. After I come to recognize the oneness of the exemplar of all the different exemplifications, you [will] have led me to a lofty contemplation.

*Cardinal:* You recognize clearly, [don't you], that an exemplification cannot exist unless its exemplar is present in it?

*Albert:* Most assuredly.

**63** *Cardinal:* But how is it an exemplification unless it is present in its own exemplar—the same exemplar [which is present in it]? For if an exemplification existed [totally] apart from its exemplar, how would it still be an exemplification?

*Albert:* Nothing hinders my seeing this point. For, assuredly, an exemplification must be contained in its own exemplar; otherwise, it would not be a true exemplification. And so, I see perfectly that, of necessity, the exemplar is present in its exemplification and (2) the exemplification is contained in, or is present in, its exemplar.

*Cardinal:* Therefore, an exemplar is present in all its exemplifications, and all its exemplifications are present in it. Therefore, none of its exemplifications are greater or lesser than it.<sup>178</sup> Hence, all the exemplifications are exemplifications of the one exemplar.

*Albert:* I see that such is most truly the case.

**64** *Cardinal:* And it is not necessary that because of the plurality of exemplifications there be also a plurality of exemplars, since a single exemplar suffices for an infinite number of exemplifications. For the exemplar naturally<sup>179</sup> precedes its exemplification. And prior to all plurality there is oneness,<sup>180</sup> which is the exemplar of the entire exemplifying multitude. And so, even if there were a plurality of exemplars, an exemplar-oneness would have to precede that plurality. Therefore, those many exemplars would not be, in equal measure, primary exemplars; rather, they would be exemplifications of a single

first exemplar.<sup>181</sup> Therefore, there can be only one first exemplar, which is present in all its exemplifications and in which all its exemplifications are present.

*Albert:* You have now shown me what I desired to see. For nothing prevents my seeing that oneness is the beginning of all multitude. From this fact I see the oneness of the exemplar of all exemplifications.

**65** *Cardinal:* I stated that oneness is the exemplar of all numbers—i.e., of all plurality, or multitude. For you see that oneness is present in every number<sup>182</sup> and that every number is contained in oneness. For any number is either 1 or 2 or 3 or 10, and so on.<sup>183</sup> Each is one number; but each could not be one number unless oneness were present in it and unless it were contained in oneness.

*Albert:* Hitherto I did not pay attention to these points, since it seemed to me that ten is greater than oneness and therefore is not contained in oneness. But now I see that since the number ten is *one* number ten, this fact can obtain only if the number ten is contained in oneness.

*Cardinal:* You must also take account of the fact that oneness cannot be either greater or lesser. That it cannot be lesser you will concede immediately. That it cannot be greater you will see, as well, when you note that what is greater than one is not one. And [note that] this fact also holds true of the number ten, which you would not be envisioning as ten if you envisioned it as greater or envisioned it as lesser. Now, each number has this fact—[viz., its being a number that cannot be greater or lesser]—from oneness, because a number is an exemplification of oneness, its exemplar.

*Albert:* The proposition that you have set forth seems to be the key for entering into an understanding of hidden matters, if the inquirer uses it rightly.

**66** *Cardinal:* Its use is not difficult. For if I ask you a series of questions, you will be led, by my questioning alone, unto a viewing of what is true. For example, I ask you whether you believe to be *something* all the things that you see. I think you will reply that all things are [something].

*Albert:* Since they are something, it must be the case that they exist.

*Cardinal:* In things existent, is there being?<sup>184</sup>

*Albert:* Of course. Otherwise, how would they exist if being were

not present in them?

*Cardinal:* Don't existent things exist in being?<sup>185</sup>

*Albert:* They certainly would not exist apart from being.

*Cardinal:* Therefore, the being of all things is present in all existing things, and all existing things exist in being.

*Albert:* I see that nothing is more certain than the fact that most simple being is the exemplar of all things.

*Cardinal:* This [Exemplar] is Absolute Being, which we believe to be the Creator of all existing things.<sup>186</sup>

*Albert:* Who could fail to recognize that your assertions are true?

*Cardinal:* You see, likewise, that a soul is present in that which is enlivened and that, at the same time, that which is enlivened is present in the soul. And [you see] that justice is present in that which is just and that that which is just is present in justice, even as whiteness is present in what is white and as what is white is present in whiteness. And [you know] that, in general, the absolute<sup>187</sup> is present in that which is contracted and that that which is contracted is present in the absolute—that humanity, [for example], is present in a man and that the man is present in humanity.

**67** *Albert:* I see assuredly that all these assertions must be true. But my imagination does not grasp how what is asserted could happen. For who could envision one thing's being in another and that other thing's being in that very same one?

*Cardinal:* The reason that this is unimaginable is that the imaginative power [always] takes as its object a quantity, for imagination does not attain the non-quantitative. Hence, when imagination directs itself toward *place*, which is quantitative, it does not grasp the fact that a container is present in what is contained [by it]. To imagination it seems as if someone were saying that for someone to be in a house is for the house to be in him. But the mind's eye, which looks unto intelligible things, which are above the imagination, cannot deny that it (1) sees the fact that all things—including imagination—are contained in being, which is beyond imagination, and (2) sees that unless being were in the things contained [by it], this [first] fact would not be true.<sup>188</sup>

*Albert:* Assuredly, I see these statements to be true; and there occurs to me an obvious example: Whatever things are attained by the senses and by the imagination are present in a substance.<sup>189</sup> They are called accidents; [and] they would not exist unless they were contained by a substance. Therefore, it must be the case that that which contains

those accidents is present in them and supports them, so that they exist in it. Therefore, substance—being of an intelligible nature and being beyond the scope of the senses and the imagination—both contains all its accidents and is present in the contained accidents. And the fact that the accidents are in their subject, which is the substance, is nothing other than the fact that the substance is present in its accidents. And I see the following to be a most important truth: viz., that accidents are not in a subject, or a substance, as in a place, for a place is not a substance but is an accident.

*Cardinal:* I'm glad that you have sound mental-vision. And when you extend this speculation to the rational soul, which is the substance of all its powers,<sup>190</sup> you will see that the rational soul both contains its powers and is present in all its powers.

*Albert:* I am beginning to savor this most wise<sup>191</sup> knowledge. I will exercise myself in it in order to acquire a fixed disposition<sup>192</sup> [for it]. But lest I detain you too long with this digression that was needful for me, you may proceed further toward your intended goal.

**68** *Cardinal:* I think that you now readily understand this Region of living things.<sup>193</sup> For in every living-being life must be present, and the living-being must be present in life. Therefore, the life of those who are Christ-like—i.e., of all those who are present in the Region of the living— is such that Life (which is Christ, who said “I am Life”)<sup>194</sup> is present in all those who are living there and is such that all those who are living there are present in Life, which is Christ. And so, the Life of Christ is the Exemplar-Form of all those who are living in that Region; they are exemplifications of that Form.

*Albert:* I see clearly that a living Christian must be such as you say. For it is necessary that the Life-of-Christ be in him and that he be in that same Life.

**69** *Cardinal:* This life of the Region of the living is symbolized by the figure that you see to be round.<sup>195</sup> Now, insofar as all the circles [of the game] have the same center, they are instances of roundness. Roundness is a circularity that characterizes the movement of perpetual and unendable life. In every thing that is round there must be roundness, in which the round thing is present. The essence of what is round (or perpetual) and our knowledge of what is round (or perpetual) can be obtained only from the center, around which the perpetual movement is rotated;<sup>196</sup> thus, if the center does not exist, then neither perpetuity nor the movement-of-perpetual-life (which harks

back, in equality, to an identity with the center) can be either known or existent. Hence, in an analogous way, so too is the Center-that-is-Christ to all circularities.

Therefore, the circles here [in our bowling-game] symbolize a movement-of-life. And faster movements are represented by the circles that are nearer to the center, which is [symbolic of] life; for [the life] is a life, i.e., a center, than which there cannot be either a greater or a lesser. For in it is contained every vital movement, none of which can exist apart from life. For unless life is present in any given vital movement, [that] movement is not at all vital. Now, the movement that is the Life of the living is circular and central. The closer a circle is to the center, the faster it can be rotated. Therefore, the circle which is circle in such a way that it is also center can be rotated in the instantaneous *now*.<sup>197</sup> Therefore, the movement will be infinite. Now, a center is a fixed point. Therefore, where the center and the circumference are the same thing, the movement will be both maximal (i.e., infinite) and minimal. And we call that movement the Life-of-the-living; it enfolds in its fixed Eternity every possible vital movement.

**70** *Albert:* I understand you to mean that the smallness of the circles symbolizes a faster and quicker movement-of-life, since [the smaller circles] come closer to the center, which is [symbolic of] the Life of living things. But explain why you have used as symbols *nine* circles.<sup>198</sup>

*Cardinal:* We know that some men are swift in regard to the movement of their reason, whereas others are slow; but [all men's minds] are different, as we experience from the differences in their mental abilities. Some men enjoy such swiftness [of mind] that they make inferences very quickly; others make inferences more slowly, and they scarcely ever advance in any respect. Christ, who is Life, is also Wisdom, i.e., Wise Knowledge.<sup>199</sup> With respect to the fact that knowledge is wise, it is shown to be a living apprehension; and intellectual life is the apprehension of wisdom, or of wise knowledge. Therefore, [a man's] every living, rational movement occurs in order that he may see the Cause of his life and may feed immortally on such Wisdom. But if he does not arrive at this goal, he is not alive, since he does not know the Cause of his life.

**71** Now, the [Cause, or] Giver, of life is God, whom no one will see unless Christ, the Son of God, reveals Him.<sup>200</sup> This revealing pertains only to Christ, because only a son can reveal his father as father. But



of Christ and of ourselves there is a single Father, who is Fatherhood itself, which is present in all fathers and in which all fathers are present and contained. But in order to see more clearly that Christ is the Revealer of the Father, consider the fact that Christ is Truth. For He called Himself the Way and the Door, Life and Truth.<sup>201</sup> A true and certain revelation can be made only by means of truth. By contrast, falsity errs and deviates; it is ascribed to the lying Devil, who is the Seducer.<sup>202</sup> The Sonship of God is revealed in Christ, because He is Truth. And he who truly sees Christ sees in Him the Father and sees Him in the Father.<sup>203</sup>

72 So the circles are gradations of seeing. In each circle the center common to them all is seen—seen more closely in the circles nearer [to the center] and more distantly in the circles more distant [from the center]. Since the center, which is seen only within [each of the] circles, cannot be seen outside a circle: [by analogy, outside the Circle-of-Life]<sup>204</sup> the Life of the living, or the Light of intellectual lights, is not seen. And so, [those who exist outside the Region of Life] in darkness and in the shadow of death<sup>205</sup> lack life—just as an intact eye when amid darkness lacks life, because its seeing is its living. But in the absence of light it cannot see anything, even though it is a healthy eye. Similarly, if the soul, although it is incorruptible, lacks Revealing Light, which is Christ, it does not see anything and cannot be alive with an intellectual life. For just as perceptual vision needs disclosing perceptual-light in order to be true-and-living vision, so also intellectual vision needs the intellectual light of truth if it is to see, or live.<sup>206</sup> And because every number has its termination in the number ten,<sup>207</sup> I have symbolized by means of nine circles the ascent unto a tenth circle, because the tenth circle is a circle in such a way that it is a center.<sup>208</sup>

73 *Albert:* Although I have not grasped with a gusto of understanding all the points that you have suitably made, nevertheless I have recognized that they are true. Only, I wonder how the gradations arise, since the infinity of Central Light most abundantly diffuses itself.

*Cardinal:* This Light does not diffuse itself throughout corporeal places in the same way that corporeal light does, which more greatly illumines places that are nearer [to its source]. Rather, it is a Light that is not enclosed in a place or impeded by an obstacle—even as our mind's thoughts are not [thus enclosed or impeded]. Now, the things that are illumined can only be different [from one another], be-

cause in the absence of difference the many and the multiple would not be many and multiple but would be the same thing.<sup>209</sup> Therefore, the reception of light is different on the part of different minds, even as the reception of a single perceptual-light is done differently by different eyes—being done by one eye in a truer and clearer way than by another eye,<sup>210</sup> in accordance with the ocular capability, which cannot be equal in different eyes.

Therefore, [by analogy], all those who are Christ-like receive sufficiently the Light of glory; but they receive it differently, in accordance with each's capability.<sup>211</sup> By way of illustration: although a Gospel-preacher diffuses a single [mental-]light equally to individual listeners, nevertheless the light is not received equally by all the listeners, since they are not of the same mind and capability.

**74** *Albert:* Since no one except one who is blessed is present in the Region of the living, and since he alone is blessed who has that which he desires, and since only one thing constitutes the quiescence of desires, viz., to see the Center of one's life in the best and most perfect way in which this seeing can occur: I wonder about the fact that you have depicted some men as approaching nearer to the Center, since men who are more distant [from the Center] do not comprehend in the best way in which this comprehending can occur.

*Cardinal:* Blessed enjoyment is represented by a drinking from the Fount of life; and drinking and seeing are the same thing. There is a single Living Fount that supplies the entire Region of the living; from it each [of the blessed] drinks as much as he thirsts-for and desires. Two men cannot in equal measure thirst for, and desire, a drink. And so, although all men most fillingly drink as much as they desire to, nevertheless they do not drink in equal measure, since they do not thirst in equal measure. Love, which is different in different men, induces thirst. Thus, Christ symbolized the Kingdom [of God] by a wedding at which He ministers to each that which each desires.<sup>212</sup> Therefore, all [of the blessed] are filled up to the extent that they have desire and hunger—although some men are more desirous, others less desirous.

**75** *Albert:* These views please me. And I see that there are not just nine circles of glory but countless circles, since each of the blessed has his own circle.

*Cardinal:* Although the situation is such that the entire breadth of the Kingdom of Life extends from the center to the circumference,

and although this breadth can be conceived after the fashion of a line that contains within itself an infinite number of similar lines extending from the center to the circumference, and although there is one common center for all the lines and although there is a [distinct] circumference for each of them, nevertheless that countless multitude of circumferences is separated into nine gradations, so that by stages we are led through that Kingdom (which is decorated with very beautiful orderliness) unto the place where the common Center and the particular Circumference are the same, viz., unto Christ. For in Christ the Center of His Life as Creator and the Circumference of His life as creature are the same. For Christ is both God and a human being, is both the Creator and a creature. Therefore, He is the Center of all the creatures who are blessed.

And notice carefully that Christ's Circumference is of the (circumferential) nature of all the circumferences, i.e., of all rational creatures. And since by virtue of His personal identity He is the same being as the Center-of-all-things, viz., the Creator: all the blessed (who are symbolized by the circumferences of the circles) find rest in, and attain their goal in, Christ's Circumference, which is of a created nature similar [to theirs. They find rest and attain their goal] on account of the hypostatic union of the circumference-of-His-created-nature with His Uncreated Nature, than which no nature can be greater. Herefrom you see that Christ is so necessary for all who are to become blessed that without Him no one can be happy,<sup>213</sup> since He is the one and only Mediator<sup>214</sup> through whom access to Living Life can be had.<sup>215</sup>

**76** *Albert:* You have made important and lovely statements. If, as I wish, the enemies of Christians would consider them, they would soon make peace with Christ and Christians. And just as I said a bit earlier about substance and accidents,<sup>216</sup> so too it occurs to me that by means of nine circumferential determinations<sup>217</sup> the center [of the circles] is reached, even as by means of nine accidents a substance is reached.

*Cardinal:* A number-of is a distinction-between—that is, [is a distinguishing] of one thing from another. And this distinguishing [is done] with respect to one thing or another thing or a third thing—and so on, up to the number ten,<sup>218</sup> where it is stopped. Therefore, every number is terminated in the number ten. So too, accidents are distinguished by means of nine very general kinds; and accidents conduce to a knowledge of quiddity, or substance. For [the substance is known]

either through one accident or through two accidents or through three accidents or four or five or six or seven or eight or nine—at which point there is the completed number that is enfolded in the oneness of the number ten. To number is to distinguish-between. Now, things are distinguished [from one another] chiefly in terms of substance;<sup>219</sup> and substances are distinguished [from one another] in terms of quantity, quality, and the other accidents, [all of] which are enfolded in the nine kinds of accidents. Therefore, in order to represent a complete number of distinctions, I made a symbolic representation such [as I did].<sup>220</sup>

77 *Albert*: I have heard that even the angels are distinguished by means of nine choirs.

*Cardinal*: Angels are intelligences.<sup>221</sup> And because angels are different [from one another], it is necessary that their intellectual [*intelligentiales*] viewings and discernments be distinguished intellectually through orders and grades—from the lowest [rank of angel] to the highest [rank of angel], which is Christ, who is called “the Messenger (*angelus*) of great counsel.”<sup>222</sup> On the basis of this distinction [among angels], there are found to be three *orders*, and in each order there are three *choirs*. And the termination [of these orders and choirs] is the Center,<sup>223</sup> just as the number ten is the termination of nine digits,<sup>224</sup> The first order [of angels] is closest to the Center and consists of *intellectible spirits*,<sup>225</sup> who by means of a simple beholding of the Center, or Omnipotent Exemplar, comprehend all things apart from successiveness (whether temporal succession or natural<sup>226</sup> succession) and comprehend them all at once. These angels assist the Divine Majesty, from whom they have the ability to view all things in that [immediate] way. For just as God has this discernment from Himself, so that in His own simplicity He beholds all things at once, because He is these things’ Intelligent Cause, so God gives to His assisting spirits the gift of seeing, in His Divine Simplicity, all things at once. Although these angels are *created*, they are called *eternal*<sup>227</sup> because they comprehend all things at once.

A second [angelic] order is the order of *intelligences*, who comprehend all things at once but not apart from a natural<sup>228</sup> successiveness, i.e., [not apart from] the fact that some things have [the property of] deriving naturally from other things. And although they understand apart from temporal successiveness, nevertheless because they cannot understand apart from a natural ordering, a certain weakening of cognition characterizes them. And so, they are not said to be eter-

nal, as are the intellectible beings, but are said to be perpetual, because they understand in terms of a natural ordering and of a natural successiveness.

The third order [of angels] is called *rational*, because although their comprehending is certain, nevertheless they understand less perfectly than do the others.

**78** The first order contains three choirs, which behold, although differently [from one another], the Divine Will *in God*; and they imitate God's [way of] discerning. But the three intelligible choirs comprehend the Divine Will *in and through the intellectible choirs*. And the three rational choirs behold the Divine Will *in and through the intelligible choirs*. Therefore, there are nine orderings; and God, who includes and contains all things within Himself, is symbolized as the tenth ordering.<sup>229</sup> Therefore, each of the nine orderings has its own theophany, i.e., its own manifestation of the Divine; and God has His own—viz., the tenth—theophany,<sup>230</sup> from which all the other theophanies emanate. Consequently, there are ten different kinds of distinction, viz., (1) the Divine Distinction, which is symbolically represented as the Center and as the Cause of all things, and (2) the other nine [kinds of distinction, which are represented] by the nine choirs of angels. And there are no more numbers or no more distinctions [than these ten]. Hence, it is evident why I symbolized the Kingdom of Life as I did and why I have likened the center to the sun's light<sup>231</sup> and have depicted the three circles nearest [to the center] as fiery, the next [three] as aerial, and the [last] three, which end in earthen black, as aqueous.<sup>232</sup>

**79** *Albert:* Since the number ten enfolds all distinguishing, why does a progression stop at four? For example, there are said to be only four causes-of-things, or reasons-for-things, and only four elements and only four seasons of the year, and so on.

*Cardinal:* If you number from the largest outer-circle [in the bowling-game] to the smallest inner and central circle—by first saying “one” once and then by counting “one” twice, then “one” three times, and, finally, “one” four times—[the count of] four will end at the center. In this way you see that 1 and 2 and 3 and 4, added together, make 10. Therefore, the progression comes to an end with the number four,<sup>233</sup> since there is neither any distinguishing-between nor any number which is not found to be present in the number four. Notwithstanding, you see in every number only *one*.<sup>234</sup> Moreover,

there both is and can be only one one; more [than one one] would not be one. Similarly, in regard to all the circles, you see only a circle of a single definition, even though the circumference of one circle is farther from the center than is that of another circle. This [difference in the sizes of the circumferences] happens necessarily in the case of a plurality [of circles], since it is not possible that a plurality of circumferences be equally distant from the same center.<sup>235</sup> Therefore, otherness follows from plurality.<sup>236</sup> Therefore, although there is only one Being in all beings and although all beings are in the one Being (which is God),<sup>237</sup> so that in order to discern between all beings qua beings there is need to have only a discerning of the one Being: nevertheless, since otherness follows from multiplicity, then in order for there to be a distinguishing between all beings qua multiple beings, number—the distinguisher of otherness—is necessary, without which one thing cannot be distinguished from another.

**80** *Albert:* Then God does not have a knowledge of beings.<sup>238</sup> Knowledge is a distinguishing-between, which seems not to be possible without number.

*Cardinal:* Cardinal: For God *to know* is for Him *to be*; for Him *to be* is His *being*. For God to know is for the Divine Being to be present in all beings. Our mind is not present in the things that it knows, as is [the Mind of] God, who, in knowing, creates and forms. But our mind, in knowing, discerns between created things, so that it embraces all things by its conceptual power. As God has within Himself exemplars<sup>239</sup> of all things in order to be able to form all things, so our mind has within itself exemplars of all things<sup>240</sup> in order to be able to know all things. God is Creative Power; in accordance with this Power He makes all things truly to be that which they are, since He is the Being of beings.<sup>241</sup> Our mind is a conceptual power; in accordance with this power it makes all things to exist in a conceptual way.<sup>242</sup> Hence, truth is our mind's object; if our mind assimilates its conceiving to truth, it has all things within its knowledge. And these things are called entities of reason.<sup>243</sup> For example, in our mind's knowledge a stone is not a real being but is an entity-of-reason. So you see that God does not need number in order to discern. On the other hand, apart from number *our* mind does not discern things' alterities and differences.

**81** *Albert:* Doesn't the Creator create even otherness [*alteritas*]? If so, then since He does not create what He does not understand, and

since otherness is not understood without number, then surely He discerns by means of number.

*Cardinal:* God creates all things, even things that are alterable and changeable and corruptible; however, He does not create otherness and mutability and corruption.<sup>244</sup> Since God is Being, He creates being, not destruction. But things do not have from the Creator the fact that they perish or are altered; rather, it happens to be so. God is the Efficient Cause of matter—not the Efficient Cause of privation and of lack but of opportunity, or possibility, upon which lack follows, so that there is no opportunity apart from lack, which comes about contingently. Therefore, evil and the capability-of-sinching and dying and being-altered are not creatures of God, who is Being. Therefore, otherness cannot belong to anything's essence, since in otherness being is not present nor is otherness present in being. Moreover, otherness does not belong to the essence of twofoldness, although by virtue of there being a twofoldness, otherness happens to be present.<sup>245</sup> By way of illustration: If a multitude of peas is thrown—with a single toss—onto a level floor, they arrange themselves (1) in such a way that no pea is either moved or at rest equally as another and (2) in such a way that each's place and movement is different. Nevertheless, this otherness and difference does not result from the one who throws them all at the same time and with an equal toss; rather, it comes about from contingency,<sup>246</sup> since it is not possible that the peas be moved equally or that they come to rest at the same place.

82 *Albert:* Is it not characteristic of *being* to unite and unify?

*Cardinal:* Yes, indeed.

*Albert:* However, it must be the case that the things that are to be united are different and other and discrete.

*Cardinal:* Although God, who is Union,<sup>247</sup> is not the Cause of discreteness, He is the Creator of all different and discrete things. Now, union precedes discreteness, since discreteness presupposes union. Therefore, oneness, which is being,<sup>248</sup> unites different discrete things into a single concordant harmony. For the many qua many have being only insofar as they are united.<sup>249</sup> Union proceeds from oneness and equality. Therefore, the many beings do not have from oneness, or being, that they *not* be many.<sup>250</sup> But since they cannot be many unless they are both different and discrete: in order that they exist in oneness, they are united through Being (which is God)—united by union, which by nature is earlier than is discreteness.

Therefore, if you look closely, you will see that being is oneness,

which begets from itself an equality; from the oneness and the equality there proceeds a union, which is the union of the oneness and of the equality. Now, prior to all inequality and otherness, the equality can be the equality only of distinct but equal hypostases.<sup>251</sup> Therefore, if we look at the one universe's plurality of creatures, we find in these creatures oneness (which is the being of them all) and equality-of-oneness. For in equal measure they all have being, since one being is neither more a being nor less a being than is another. In each and every being, being as a whole is present in equal measure.<sup>252</sup> And the reason all beings are united into one is that in each and every being there is the union-of-being-and-of-equality that proceeds from oneness and from equality.<sup>253</sup> In this way you see that the First Cause is *one* because it is First and is *trine* because it is Oneness, Equality, and Union. And unless this statement were true, the First Cause would not be the Being of beings. Therefore, God, because He is the Creator, can be only trine and one. Hence, there exists a created world in order that in the world the trine and one Creator may be seen. He is called Father since He is Oneness that is Being; and He is called Son because He is Equality-of-Oneness (for Oneness-that-is-Being begets Equality, which is Equality-of-Being); and He is called Holy Spirit because He is the Union, or Love, of Oneness and of Equality—as I have explained more extensively elsewhere.<sup>254</sup>

**83** *Albert:* It is expedient that these points—which I hope I will better savor in the future—be repeated quite often, because they are useful and rare. Turning now to [considering] the very simple center, I see it to be the beginning, the middle, and the end of all the circles. For its simplicity is indivisible and eternal, enfolding all things in its indivisible and most strict *oneness*. It is the beginning of *equality*; for unless all lines from the center to the circumference were equal, surely it would not be the center of the circle. The indivisibility of the center is the simple beginning of equality; and unless the center's punctiliar simplicity were *united with* the equality,<sup>255</sup> assuredly it could not be the center of the circle, the essence of which is equidistance from the circumference. Thus, I see in the center-point oneness, equality, and the union of both.

**84** *Cardinal:* You are descrying penetratingly. After you take note of the saying of the wise man who said that God is a Circle whose Center is everywhere,<sup>256</sup> you will see that just as a point is found everywhere in whatever is quantitative, so God is present in all things. How-



ever, it is not the case that there is a plurality of points simply because the mind everywhere finds a point in what is quantitative. Similarly, there are not many Gods, although God is seen in each thing.

*Albert:* I don't really understand this. Explain, I ask, how even though everywhere in what is quantitative a point is seen, it is not the case that a point is replicated, so that there are many points.

*Cardinal:* If by means of writing, you fill a piece of paper by writing down everywhere on it nothing but the word "one," then assuredly although you would everywhere on it see "one" to be written, there would not on that account really be more than one one everywhere written about. For although you would many times write down "one" in different places, it would not on that account be the case that one itself would be changed and made multiple.

*Albert:* It is certain that I would have replicated the inscription of "one" but would not have replicated one itself.

- 85** *Cardinal:* Just as in all things white the mind sees whiteness, although there is not on this account a plurality of whitenesses, so in all atoms the mind sees a point, although there is not on this account a plurality of points.<sup>257</sup> You will understand this assertion more clearly when you consider the fact that the most simple *one* enfolds within itself all multitude and, thus, is unreplicable, since it is the enfolding of all multiplication, or multitude. Therefore, it is seen in all multitude, because multitude is only the unfolding of oneness. Likewise, you see that something similar must be said regarding the point, which is the enfolding of magnitude.

*Albert:* I see these assertions to be true.

- 86** *Cardinal:* So open the eye of your mind and you will see that God (1) is present in all multitude because He is present in the one and (2) is present in all magnitude because He is present in the point. Herefrom it is evident that Divine Simplicity is more subtle than are the one and the point, to both of which God gives, [respectively], the enfolding-power of multitude and of magnitude. Therefore, God is a Power more greatly enfolding than are the power of the one and the power of the point.

*Albert:* Assuredly, God's simplicity is greater than is the simplicity of the one and of the point.

*Cardinal:* Therefore, it is also more greatly enfolding. For enfolding-power is present in terms of simplicity: power is more simple and more enfolding the more unified it is.<sup>258</sup> And so, God, who is a

Power than which there can be none greater, is a Power that is maximally unified and maximally simple. Therefore, He is maximally powerful and maximally enfolding. Hence, He is the Enfolding-of-enfoldings.

*Albert:* You state things that are altogether true.

**87** *Cardinal:* Assume, then, that [finite] being is the enfolding of all [finitely] existing things.<sup>259</sup> Since, in that case, there is not [finite] being unless Being itself<sup>260</sup> is in it, you see most assuredly that God, by virtue of the fact that He is the Being itself in [finite] being, is present in all [finitely existing] things. And although [finite] being<sup>261</sup> is seen to be in all [finitely] existing things, nevertheless it is only *unitary* being, just as was said about *one* and *point*. And to say that God is present in all [finitely existing] things is to say nothing other than that Being itself is present in [finite] being, which enfolds all [finitely existing] things. Thus, he who said “Because God is, all things are”<sup>262</sup> saw [this truth] most clearly.

*Albert:* The conclusion of that man would be acceptable were it not for the opposing fact that God has existed from eternity, whereas creatures have had a beginning.

*Cardinal:* You are mistaken,<sup>263</sup> for you are imagining that prior to the creation of the world God existed but not creatures. But when you take cognizance of the fact that whenever it was true to say that God existed, it was also true that creatures existed,<sup>264</sup> [you will see that God is not properly said to have *existed prior to* creatures.]<sup>265</sup> For it is not possible that something *existed* but that time did not yet exist,<sup>266</sup> since “existed” is indicative of past time. Time is eternity’s creature; for time is not eternity, which is present as a whole at once,<sup>267</sup> but is the image of eternity, since it consists of successive-ness.

**88** *Albert:* Why is time said to be the image of eternity?<sup>268</sup>

*Cardinal:* We conceive of eternity only in terms of duration.<sup>269</sup> We cannot at all imagine duration apart from successive-ness. Hence, successive-ness, which is *temporal duration*, presents itself whenever we attempt to conceive of eternity. But our mind tells us that *absolute duration*, which is eternity, naturally precedes<sup>270</sup> successive duration. And so, by means of successive duration, as by means of an image, duration-in-itself, free from successive-ness, is seen—even as truth [is seen] by means of its image.

*Albert:* Therefore, imagination assists the mind, which is united

to it.

*Cardinal:* It is altogether certain that one-who-understands derives his mental viewing from images of incorruptible things.<sup>271</sup> Now, images are things that the imagination adduces. Hence, subtle imaginings hasten more quickly to assist one who is reasoning about, and seeking, truth. For unless our mind needed the assistance of imagination (as one who vaults over a ditch needs a pole) in order to arrive at truth (which exceeds the imagination and which the mind alone seeks), our mind would not be united to imagination.

Let what has now been said about these matters suffice.

**89** *Albert:* As is known, you have written more extensively about these matters elsewhere.<sup>272</sup>

As we return now to [the topic of] our game's circular markings, state whether any hidden-meaning remains.

*Cardinal:* There remain so many things that they cannot be sufficiently explained. For example, just as we stated about the hierarchical orders of the good spirits, so too a speculator will discover many things regarding the evil, apostate spirits and their fall, because from each order and each choir certain transgressors fell; and their fall is their having fallen ruinously from the certainty of knowledge into uncertainty. The divisions of the heavens can also, to some extent, be investigated. For example, certain saints have understood there to be a visible heaven, an intelligible heaven, and an intellectual heaven;<sup>273</sup> and they understood there to be in each of them a threefold division, so that a ninefold number of heavens is perfected in a tenth heaven, where the throne of God is situated above the Cherubims.<sup>274</sup>

*Albert:* I do not doubt that there is a distinction of number and that every number and every distinction is included in the number ten.<sup>275</sup> But those things that are numbered and distinguished [from one another] by man have, from the distinguishing, not their *being* but, rather, their *being distinguished* [from one another]. For unless they existed, how could they be distinguished? Therefore, regarding the distinguishing power, which is subsequent to the constituting power,<sup>276</sup> a beautiful speculation appears, about which please say something.

**90** *Cardinal:* I will touch upon the topic, in order to comply with your noble desire. That distinguishing power is called, in us, the rational soul. To be sure, the soul distinguishes by means of reason; reasoning is reckoning and enumerating. Although the soul grasps visible things by means of sight, audible things by means of hearing—

and, in general, grasps perceptible things by means of the senses—nevertheless, it distinguishes only by means of reason. For example, when we hear those who are singing in concert, we attain their voices by means of our senses; but we measure the voices' differences and agreements by means of our reason and learning. This [rational] power we do not find in brute animals,<sup>277</sup> for animals do not have the power of numbering and of proportioning. And so, they have no capability for the learning of music, although by means of their senses they attain the sound of voices, as do we, and although by the harmony of the voices they are made to feel pleasure. Therefore, our soul is rightly called rational, because it is an inferring-power, an enumerating-power, a distinguishing power, and a proportioning power—a power that enfolds within itself all things. Without these powers, perfect discernment cannot occur. For example, when by means of the sense of hearing the soul is moved with a movement of pleasure as a result of the pleasant harmonic agreement [of the voices], and when it finds within itself that the reason for the concordance is based on a numerical proportion, then by means of number it invents the discipline of making inferences about musical concordances. Therefore, the soul is seen to be that living oneness—[that] beginning-of-number enfolding within itself every discrete number—which unfolds number from itself. The soul is like a living spark of distinct light, a spark that diffuses itself unto the things which it desires to discern and withdraws itself from those things which it does not desire to know—even as the soul turns its perceptual sight toward a visible thing which it desires to see and turns its sight away from a visible thing which it spurns.

**91**     *Albert:* I desired to hear about these things. But since earlier you spoke of God as Oneness and now you are calling the soul oneness, tell me how I am supposed to understand these statements [consistently].

*Cardinal:* God is the Oneness that is also Being,<sup>278</sup> which enfolds all things insofar as they can exist. By contrast, the rational soul is a oneness that enfolds all things insofar as they can be known and be discerned. The oneness of the rational soul is enfolded in the Oneness that is God in order that it can be that which it is, i.e., [be that which it is] insofar as it is a soul that enfolds within itself all things conceptually.<sup>279</sup> Therefore, all things, insofar as they can exist and be known, are enfolded in the Oneness that is God, since in God Oneness and Being are the same thing. And so, in God, Being and Being-known are, likewise, the same thing. However, the oneness that the ra-

tional soul is is not the same thing as the Being which is the Form-of-being, through which Form even the rational soul has the fact that it exists. Yet, a oneness-of-soul is rightly convertible with [that] soul's own being but not with *being* in an unqualified sense. For a oneness-of-soul is not *oneness* in an absolute sense but is the proper oneness of that soul, even as a soul's being [is not *being* in an absolute sense but is being that is proper to that soul].

**92** Hence, the rational soul is the enfolding power of all conceptual enfoldings.<sup>280</sup> For example, it enfolds the enfolding-of-multitude (viz., the *one's* enfolding) and the enfolding-of-magnitude (viz., the *point's* enfolding); for without them—i.e., without multitude and magnitude—there is no distinguishing. The rational soul enfolds the enfolding-of-motions, an enfolding that is called rest; for nothing except rest is seen to be present within motion, for motion is from a state of rest to a state of rest. Moreover, the rational soul enfolds the enfolding-of-time, which is called *the now* or *the present*; for time is found to consist only of the now.<sup>281</sup> And about all other enfoldings something similar must be said: viz., that the rational soul is the simplicity of all conceptual enfoldings. For the very subtle power of the rational soul enfolds, within its own simplicity, all other enfoldings, without which enfoldings perfect discernment cannot occur. Therefore, in order to discern multitude, the soul assimilates itself to oneness, i.e., to the enfolding of number. And from out of itself the soul unfolds a multitude's conceptual number.<sup>282</sup> Likewise, the soul assimilates itself to *point*—which enfolds magnitude—in order to unfold from itself conceptual lines, conceptual surfaces, and conceptual three-dimensional figures. And from the enfolding of those things—viz., of oneness and of point—the soul unfolds geometrical figures (both circular and polygonal) which cannot be unfolded without both multitude and magnitude. Similarly, the soul assimilates itself to rest in order to discern motion; and it assimilates itself to the present, or the now, in order to discern time. And since all these enfoldings are united in the soul, the soul qua the enfolding-of-enfoldings distinguishes in an unfolded way all things, and it measures time and motion and fields and everything quantitative.

**93** And the soul invents branches of learning—e.g., arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy—and it experiences that they are enfolded in its power; for they are invented, and unfolded, by men. And since they are incorruptible and always remain in one and the same way,

the soul sees truly that it itself is incorruptible and always truly abiding.<sup>283</sup> For only in the rational soul and in its power are the mathematical branches-of-learning enfolded; and only by its power are they unfolded. [This fact is true] to such an extent that if the rational soul were not to exist, then those branches of learning could not at all exist. Hence, too, the ten categories<sup>284</sup> are enfolded in the rational soul's conceptual power. So too [are enfolded] the five predicables<sup>285</sup> and whatever logical principles<sup>286</sup> and other things are necessary for perfect conceiving (whether they exist independently of the mind or not),<sup>287</sup> since without them no discernment and conception can be perfectly possessed by the soul.

*Albert:* How greatly it pleases me to have understood that if the rational soul were removed, then time (which is the measure of motion)<sup>288</sup> could neither be nor be known,<sup>289</sup> since the rational soul is the measuring-scale of motion, or the numerical-scale of motion! And how greatly it pleases me that things conceptual, insofar as they are conceptual, have this fact from the [rational] soul, which is the creator of things conceptual, even as God is the Creator of things really existent!<sup>290</sup>

- 94** *Cardinal:* The soul by its own inventiveness creates new instruments in order to discern and to know. For example, Ptolemy invented the astrolabe, and Orpheus invented the lyre, and so on. [These] inventors created these instruments not from something extrinsic but from their own minds. For they unfolded their conceptions in a perceptible material. Similarly, *year*, *month*, *hours* are instruments of a temporal measure created by man. Thus, since time is the measure of motion, it is the instrument of the measuring soul. Therefore, the soul's measuring-scale does not depend on time; instead, the scale for the measuring of motion—a measuring which is called time—depends on the rational soul. Therefore, the rational soul is not subjected to time; rather, it exists antecedently<sup>291</sup> to time, just as antecedently to the eye there is sight, which, although it does not see without the eye, nevertheless does not have from the eye the fact that it is sight, since the eye is sight's instrument. Likewise, although the rational soul does not apart from time measure motion, nevertheless the rational soul is not on this account subjected to time.<sup>292</sup> Instead, the converse is the case, since the rational soul uses time as its instrument-and-tool for distinguishing between motions. Therefore, the soul's movement-of-distinguishing cannot at all be measured by time; and so, the soul's movement cannot come to an end at some time; therefore, its move-

ment is perpetual.<sup>293</sup>

- 95** *Albert:* I see most clearly that the rational soul's movement-of-distinguishing—a movement which temporally measures all motion and rest—cannot be measured by means of time. What are the temporally immutable arts and branches-of-learning other than [forms of] reason? Who doubts that the form [*ratio*] of circle is supra-temporal and that it naturally<sup>294</sup> precedes all circular movement and, thus, is altogether free of time? And where is the form of circle seen? [It is] not [seen] outside of reason. But where is reason except in the rational soul? Therefore, if the rational soul sees within itself the form of circle, a form which is beyond time, then (whether or not the rational soul is reason or learning or art or knowledge) assuredly, as is evident, it must be beyond time. And these [considerations] suffice for my knowing that the rational soul cannot at any time cease or perish. But if I see some man who lacks reason, even though he is vigorous with respect to his senses, then I wonder whether that man's soul should not be considered to be like the soul of a brute animal.

*Cardinal:* Man's soul is unitary<sup>295</sup> and is called rational, although it is [also] perceptual, as in the case of brute animals. For as I recall having said elsewhere—in an earlier discussion<sup>296</sup>—to Duke John about a trigon in a tetragon: the perceptual power in man is the power not of a brute soul but of a rational soul—a fact which is made manifest by Saint Augustine in Book XIV of the *City of God* in an example about the priest Restitutus.<sup>297</sup>

*Albert:* How so?

- 96** *Cardinal:* Augustine reports that this priest, Restitutus, of the Diocese of Calama,<sup>298</sup> [did the following] when it pleased him or when he was asked to do it: viz., in the accompaniment of [someone else's] simulated moans, as if from a man in mourning, he so withdrew himself from his senses and so lay like a dead man that not only did he not at all feel those who pinched him and poked him but also at times when fire was brought near, he was burned without any feeling of pain. And, as in the case of a dead man, no breathing was detected. Nevertheless, he reported afterwards that he heard quite clearly, [though] as from afar, the voices of the men when the men spoke. This feat by his *will* shows that his rational soul withdrew itself from his body so that he did not even feel anything. Herefrom it is evident that the rational soul and the perceptual soul are separated by the will and that the rational power rules over the perceptual power.

Therefore, in man the rational soul and the perceptual soul are a unitary soul. And although in a given man the exercise of reason does not appear to be evident, nevertheless his soul is not that of a brute. By way of illustration: if a material object were so reduced or diminished that it could not really be seen or felt, it would not on that account cease being a material object, since it could not be reduced to something non-material. Likewise, it is not at all possible that a man, once having come to possess reason through the infusion of a rational soul, could later be robbed of the rational soul, even though no use of the reason might be detected. (For this use is more obvious in one man and less obvious in another.) And so, [that] use can never be minimal and altogether nothing, even if it were so small that it could not be detected by others. This fact is evident from the rule of learned ignorance, which holds that with regard to things admitting of more and less, we do not arrive at an unqualifiedly maximum or at an unqualifiedly minimum.<sup>299</sup>

**97** *Albert:* Since folly, which we experience in many men, creates doubt about whether reason is present in them, it seems that this doubt can be resolved in the following way by means of an analogy: Certain men have eyes that are intact, but these men do not distinguish anything. However, they do not on that account lack visual power; rather they lack its use,<sup>300</sup> which, in order to manifest itself, requires a better disposition of the instrument [i.e., of the eye]. And just as sometimes the eye receives a better disposition and then the use of the sight appears, and sometimes the eye remains indisposed and the use of the sight does not appear,<sup>301</sup> so too with folly: when there arrives a healthy condition of the instrument without which the use of reason cannot be present, and when the use of reason appears, the folly ceases; but it does not cease when a defective condition of the instrument is not removed. But I think the following: viz., that just as the eye<sup>302</sup> is never found to be so indisposed that it does not sense light, even though it might not distinguish anything, so too something analogous must be asserted about the fool.

Even if the foregoing matters are such as you allege, there still remain certain things that trouble me. Since the soul is the cause of the body's movement, how can this [causing] occur without change [on the part of the soul]? And if in moving [the body] the soul is changed, then assuredly the soul is temporal. For whatever is changed is impermanent and cannot at all be perpetual.



**98**     *Cardinal:* We must maintain that the soul causes movement but that it is not changed, even as Aristotle said<sup>303</sup> that God, qua object of desire, causes movement. For in Himself God remains that fixed Good which is desired by all things; and He moves toward Himself all things that desire the good. [Analogously,] the rational soul intends to produce its own operation; with its steadfast intention persisting, the soul moves the hands and the instruments when a sculptor chisels on a stone. Intention is seen to persist immutably in the soul and is seen to move the body and the instruments. In a similar way, nature (to which certain men give the name “world-soul”<sup>304</sup>), moves all things, while there persists its unchanging and permanent intention to execute the command of the Creator. And the Creator, with His eternal, unchanging, and immutable intention persisting, creates all things.

**99**     Now, what is an *intention* except a *conception*, or a *rational word*, in which all the [respective] exemplars of things are present? For it is a formal limitation that determines, [or delimits], the infinity of all possibility-of-being-made.<sup>305</sup> Therefore, the one eternal and most simple Divine Intention, which is abiding and permanent, is the Cause of all things. Similarly, in the rational soul there is one perpetual and final intention to acquire a knowledge of God—i.e., to possess conceptually that Good which all things seek.<sup>306</sup> For the rational soul, insofar as it is rational, never changes that intention. There are [in the soul] also other, secondary, intentions, which, when they deviate from that primary intention, are changed, though the primary desire remains unchanged. But it is not the case that because of the changing of such [secondary] intentions the rational soul is changed; for it remains steadfast in its primary intention. And the immutability of that primary intention is a cause of the changing of such secondary intentions.

**100**     *Albert:* By means of few [words] you have led me to see that all things are made to happen, and are moved, while the [respective] intention in God and in the rational soul—the intention through which and according to which God and the rational soul work and cause movement—remains stable. Nor is there doubt that if the [respective] steadfast intention persists, then God and the rational soul cause movement but are not themselves moved or changed. For while the intention remains, assuredly there remains the one-who-intends, who is not moved by his [steadfast] intention. And in God intention is nothing other than God-who-intends; similarly, in the rational soul intention is nothing other than the intending soul. And that which you said about

secondary intentions must be especially noted; and it eliminates many doubts.

- 101**     *Cardinal:* When I intend to see something visible, I direct my eyes [toward it]. When I intend to hear [something audible], I direct my ears [toward it]. When I intend to walk [toward something], I direct my feet [toward it]. And, in general, whenever I intend to perceive, I direct my senses [toward the thing to be perceived]. When I intend to view what I have [previously] perceived, I direct my imagination or my memory [toward it]. Therefore, I proceed toward all material objects by means of a bodily instrument.<sup>307</sup> But when I wish to turn toward things incorporeal, I withdraw myself from things corporeal; and the more truly I intend to view incorporeal things, the more truly I withdraw myself from corporeal things. For example, when I wish to view my soul, which is not an object for perceptual sight, I will view it better if my physical eyes are closed. Moreover, I make my soul my instrument for seeing incorporeal things. For example, when I intend to comprehend the branches-of-learning, I turn toward my soul's intelligential power; and when I intend to see the Reason and Cause of all things, I turn toward my soul's intellectible, most simple, and most strong power. Hence, the soul sees things incorporeal in a better way than it sees things corporeal, because it sees incorporeal things by going inward, toward itself, but it sees corporeal things by going outward, away from itself.

But in all [its viewings] the soul intends but one thing: viz., to see and to comprehend, through its rational strength, the Cause of itself and of all other things. For example, when the soul detects that the Cause and Reason for all things, including itself, is present in its own living reason, then it enjoys supreme good and perpetual peace and perpetual delight. For what else does the rational spirit, which by nature desires to know,<sup>308</sup> seek other than the Cause and Reason for all things?<sup>309</sup> Nor does the rational spirit find rest unless it comes to know itself—something which cannot occur unless it sees and senses within itself, i.e., within its rational power, the Eternal Cause of its knowing its own desire, i.e., the Eternal Cause of its own reason.

- 102**     *Albert:* You make important and assuredly true statements. Since the rational soul is brought to a supreme desire for discerning and knowing—brought thereto when it is brought to seeing within itself, i.e., within its distinguishing-power, the Cause of such great desire—assuredly, it has within itself a knowledge of the Giver of the desire.

And it can desire nothing which it does not see to be within itself. For when what-is-caused sees within itself a knowledge of its Cause, what could be more desired by one who desires to know? For then he possesses the Rationale and Art of his creation—a Rationale and Art that is the perfection and complement of all desire-to-know. Nothing happier and more blissful can come to rational nature, which is most desirous of knowledge, than can this complement and perfection [of knowing]. For in comparison with [the possession of] the Creative Art-of-all-arts: to have a knowledge of all knowable [human] arts is but something small. Only, it seems to me problematical that the creature, no matter how rational and teachable, can grasp the Creative Art, which God alone possesses.

*Cardinal:* The creative art that the happy soul acquires is not that Art which God is essentially but is a sharing-in, and a partaking-of, that Art. Analogously, to acquire whiteness by a partaking of the whiteness that is absolutely and essentially such, and that is not an acquired whiteness, is not a transforming of the white thing into the whiteness; rather, it is a conforming of the acquired whiteness to the non-acquired whiteness, in a case where the acquired whiteness can do something not at all by its own power but only by the power of the non-acquired whiteness. For that which is white causes-to-be-white only by the power of whiteness, from which what-is-white has the fact that it is white—i.e., has the fact that it is *conformed* to the whiteness that *forms* things that are white.

**103** *Albert:* These [points] are pleasing, for Scripture says of the Son of God: “When He appears in glory, we shall be *like* Him”,<sup>310</sup> it does not say that we shall *be* Him.

But because you have spoken of the rational soul’s senses: in what way do you understand the senses to be present in the intellectual nature?

*Cardinal:* Oftentimes we do not perceive passers-by either by our sight or by our hearing, because we are not attentive to this [event];<sup>311</sup> but when we *are* attentive, we do notice them. In our respective soul we possess, potentially, the respective form of, and the knowledge of, things knowable; nevertheless, we do not actually perceive the reality of this [possession] unless we turn attentively toward seeing it. For example, although I have a knowledge of music, nevertheless when I am busy with geometry, I am not aware of myself as a musician. Therefore, thinking-that-is-attentive makes me aware of intelligible things which previously I had not been noticing. For just as the cen-

ter of all circles is deeply hidden—in the simplicity of which center there is present the power that enfolds all things [belonging to circles]—so in the center of the rational soul there are enfolded whatever things are included in [the power of] reason; but they are not noticed unless, by means of attentive thinking, that [rational] power is stimulated and unfolded.

*Albert:* You respond excellently and most pleasingly in all respects. As I recognize, you are now fast approaching the end. Add something, I ask, about the *hidden* and the *disclosed*. For it seems, from the described diagram [of the game], that all power is hidden in the center.

**104** *Cardinal:* It is written that God is hidden from the eyes of all the wise;<sup>312</sup> and everything invisible is hidden in what is visible. The visible is evident to the eyes, and the invisible is hidden from the eyes. Aristotle says that beginnings are minimal in quantity and maximal in power.<sup>313</sup> Power is immaterial and invisible, and the power of a spark of fire is as great as is the power of the whole fire. In a single small grain of mustard as much power is present as is present in many grains of mustard—indeed, as is present in all the grains of mustard that there can be.<sup>314</sup> The end of the manifest is the hidden, and the end of the extrinsic is the intrinsic.<sup>315</sup> Skins and peels exist for the sake of the inner flesh and the inner pulp; and these latter exist for the sake of the intrinsic, vital, invisible power. Elemental power is hidden in chaos; [mineral power is hidden in elemental power; vegetative power is hidden in mineral power]; perceptual power is hidden in vegetative power; imaginative power is hidden in perceptual power; logical, or rational, power is hidden in imaginative power; intelligential power is hidden in rational power; intellectible power is hidden in intelligential power; and in intellectible power the Power of powers<sup>316</sup> is hidden. You may detect these points, in a concealed way, in the diagram of the circles. The outer and circumscribing circle symbolizes confused chaos; the second circle symbolizes elemental power, which is closest to the chaos; the third circle symbolizes mineral power. And these three circles end in a fourth circle, which is the circle that symbolizes the vegetative power. Thereafter comes the fifth circle, which symbolizes the perceptual power; then comes the sixth circle, symbolizing the imaginative, or imagining,<sup>317</sup> power. And these three circles—viz., the fourth, the fifth, and the sixth—end in a fourth circle (viz., the seventh circle), symbolizing logical, or rational, power. Next come the eighth circle, symbolizing the intelligential power, and the

ninth circle, symbolizing the intellectible power. And these three circles—viz., the seventh, the eighth, and the ninth—end in a fourth circle, viz., the tenth circle.

**105** *Albert:* You have now made beautiful statements about how there is a progression from the confused to the distinct. And by means of this consideration we ascend from everything imperfect unto what is perfect, from confused darkness unto discrete light, from the flavorless unto the flavorful by way of in-between flavors, from the black unto the white by way of in-between colors, and so on regarding odors and all things with respect to which we arrive at what is perfect; and by means of the example given by you, [we ascend] from the corporeal nature unto the immaterial nature, the experiencing of which nature man finds within himself and [thereby] finds out why he is called a microcosm.<sup>318</sup> Accordingly,<sup>319</sup> do not be hesitant to add at least a few more words of explanation about this very wonderful and richly suggestive progression—an explanation that will be applicable to everything knowable.

**106** *Cardinal:* Just as all distinguishing is contained in the number ten,<sup>320</sup> so too, of necessity, is every progression contained in the number four.<sup>321</sup> For 1 plus 2 plus 3 plus 4 is 10. Since distinguishing is present in 10, progression-of-distinguishing is also [present in 10]. Nor can there be more than three such progressions,<sup>322</sup> since the third progression ends at 10. These [three progressions] are necessarily related in such a way that the highest of the first progression becomes the lowest of the second progression, and the highest of the second progression becomes the lowest of the third progression, so that there is one continuous progression that is likewise trine. Therefore, just as the first progression, which sets out from what is incomplete, ends with the number four, so the second progression begins with the number four and ends with the number seven. And the third progression, which ends with the number ten, begins with the number seven.

**107** You want to hear an explanation of the foregoing [claim]; you will understand the explanation to be as follows. Since, of necessity, there is an ordering of all the works of God (as the Apostle rightly said when he stated that whatever things are from God are ordained),<sup>323</sup> the ordering can neither exist nor be understood to exist without a beginning, a middle, and an end. Now, [this order—viz., of beginning, middle, and end—] is a most perfect and most simple Order, than which there can be no order that is more perfect or more simple. It is pres-

ent in everything that is ordered, and in it all ordered things are present—present in the way in which we premised in the general proposition at the outset<sup>324</sup> [of our discussion]. But in this Order,<sup>325</sup> which is the Exemplar of all orders, it is necessary that the Middle be most simple, since the Order is most simple. Therefore, the Middle will be so equal that it will be Equality itself. This Order cannot be understood by us by means of any other distinguishing than by means of a most well-ordered progression that begins with oneness<sup>326</sup> and ends with the number three. In this progression the very simple middle-term is equally in between the beginning-term and the end-term. For 2 is the precise and equal [arithmetical] mean between 1 and 3, and it is the precise third part of the entire order and progression. We cannot discern most simple Divine Order otherwise than by means of this just-mentioned [arithmetical] progression. And since [in God] the Middle is an equal Middle: just as it is undifferentiated from Equality, so too it remains the same in essence as the Beginning and the End. For of different essences there cannot be precise equality.

**108** Now, no order that has from the aforementioned most simple Order the fact that it is an order can have a simple and equal middle. For every order except the most simple Order is a composite. But everything composite is composed of unequals. For it is impossible that a plurality of composable parts be precisely equal. For [if they were precisely equal], they would not be either a *plurality* or *parts*. Moreover, equality is not repeatable. And so, in the first, most simple Order there is a single Equality of three hypostases;<sup>327</sup> for it is impossible that there be more than one Equality, since plurality is a consequence of otherness and of inequality. Therefore, if in an ordained order, i.e., in a created order, there cannot be a simple and equal middle, then [that order] does not come to an end with a three-term progression [such as the progression 1, 2, 3]. Rather, there is a further progression into compositeness. Now, the number four takes its beginning immediately from the first progression [viz., from the progression 1, 2, 3]; and it would not do so unless [its progression] were an ordered progression. Therefore, that which is required by an ordered progression that begins from the first and very well ordered progression [viz., the progression 1, 2, 3] is, necessarily, present in the four-term progression. And so, [the four-term progression, viz., 1, 2, 3, 4,] has a composite middle-term, viz., 2 and 3, which, taken together, are the mean of the entire progression. For 1 and 2 and 3 and 4, added together, are 10; but 2 and 3, added together, are 5, which is the mean

of 10. The situation is analogous for [the progression] 4, 5, 6, 7 and for [the progression] 7, 8, 9, 10.<sup>328</sup> And in this way you see the explanation of my previous claim.

**109** *Albert*: The forcefulness of your explanation is great, as I see. But I wonder about your having said that nothing is composed of equals. Isn't the number 4 composed of two twos?

*Cardinal*: Not at all. For every number is either even or odd. And if it is a composite, it is a composite only of number,<sup>329</sup> i.e., only of the even and the odd, or only of oneness and otherness.<sup>330</sup> I do not deny that the *quantity* of the number four is that of two twos; but [I maintain] that its *substance* consists only of the even and the odd.<sup>331</sup> For between parts that are supposed to compose something it is necessary that there be proportion and, therefore, difference. Accordingly, Boethius rightly denied that anything is composed of things equal.<sup>332</sup> For example, harmony is composed of both treble and bass in a given proportion to each other. Something similar is true of all composites. Hence, the number four is composed of the number three and of the next number [viz., four];<sup>333</sup> the number three is odd; the next number, [viz., four], is even. Similarly, the number two [is composed] of the unit and of the next number, [viz., two]. (The otherness, [or nextness], is [here] said to be even because of its falling away from indivisible oneness into divisibility, which is present in an even number.) Likewise, the number four is composed of the number three (i.e., of an odd and indivisible number) and of the next number (i.e., of a divisible number).<sup>334</sup> For every number is composed of (a) number (of), because it is composed of one thing and of another thing; the one thing and the other thing constitute a number [of things].

I recall that I have written more extensively about the foregoing items elsewhere, especially in my book *On Mind*.<sup>335</sup> But let those points be repeated now, in the way they have been, in order that you may better know that the soul's reason, i.e., its distinguishing power, is present in number, which is from our mind, and in order that you may better know that that distinguishing power is said to be composed of the *same* and the *different*, and of *one* thing and *another* thing—just as is number, because number is number by virtue of our mind's distinguishing. And the mind's numbering is its replicating and repeating the common *one*, i.e., is its discerning the one in the many and the many in the one and its distinguishing one thing from another. Pythagoras, noting that no knowledge of anything can be had except through distinguishing, philosophized by means of number. I do not

think that anyone else has attained a more reasonable mode of philosophizing.<sup>336</sup> Because Plato imitated this mode, he is rightly held to be great.

**110** *Albert:* I grant these points in the way that you state them. Now, I ask, since the day is tending toward evening, make this discussion valuable and memorable by [adding] an agreeable conclusion.

*Cardinal:* I will try. But there does not occur to me a way in which I may better make valuable what I have said than if I speak about value.

*Albert:* Superb!

*Cardinal:* Being is something good and noble and precious. And so, whatever exists is not devoid of value. For nothing can at all exist that does not have some value. Nor can there be found<sup>337</sup> to be anything that is of least value, so that it could not be of lesser value; nor is anything of such great value that it could not be of greater value. However, only value that is the Value of values and that is present in all things valuable, and in which [all] things valuable are present, enfolds within itself all value and cannot be more or less valuable. Therefore, conceive of this Absolute Value, which is the Cause of all value, as concealed [symbolically] in the center of all the circles [in our game]. And make the outermost circle to be farthest from value and to be almost of no value; and consider how it is that, by means of a triune progression unto ten, value is increased in the manner that has often been mentioned; and, [thereupon], you will enter into a delicious speculation.

**111** *Albert:* I think that if you were to limit your discourse to [the topic of] the price of value, you would instruct us the more greatly.

*Cardinal:* Perhaps you mean [for me] to speak about money.

*Albert:* Yes, I want [you] to.

*Cardinal:* I will do so in awhile. But right now take note of how it is that the value of all things is nothing but the being of all things. And just as in the unqualifiedly maximal Value, which is singular and altogether incomposite and indivisible, all the value of all things is most truly present: so too in most simple Being itself, the being of all things is present. By way of illustration: In the value of a florin there is present the value of one thousand small denarii; and in a doubly more valuable florin there is present the value of two thousand denarii; and so on, *ad infinitum*. Similarly, in the most valuable florin, than which there could not be a better one, there would have to be present



the value of an infinite number of denarii. And just as you see this fact to be true, so it would really and truly be true.

*Albert:* That is certainly right.

- 112** *Cardinal:* But when you see within yourself that this truth is true: what is the value of the eye-of-your-mind, which within its own power discerns all value? For in your mind's sight there is the value of each and every thing, but [it is] not [present in the mind] as [it is present] in the Value of values.<sup>338</sup> For it is not the case that just because the mind sees that which is worth all things, it itself is worth all things. For values are not present in the mind as in their Essence but [are present there] as in a conception of them. For value is something real (just as the value of a mind is something existent and something real); and in that way value is present in God as in [Him who is] the Essence of value. Value is also a conceptual being, because it can be known; and in that way it is present in the intellect as in a knower of value; it is not present there as in a greater value or as in the cause and essence of value. For it is not the case that just because our intellect knows a greater or a lesser value, it itself is a greater or a lesser value; for this knowledge [of value] does not give being to value.

- 113** *Albert:* Doesn't this knowledge of a value that is greater than the value of the knower increase the knower's value?

*Cardinal:* The value of the knower's knowledge is increased in the sense that the knower comes to know more things, whether these things are of greater or of lesser value than is the knower's value. The value of what is known does not enter into the value of the knower and thus make the value of the *knower* greater—although his *knowledge* does become greater. By way of illustration: to know evil does not make the knower worse, or to know good does not make the knower better; yet, it does make him more knowledgeable.

*Albert:* I understand. For we likewise call someone a valuable teacher, even though many men who are unlearned are more valuable than is he.<sup>339</sup> Nevertheless, the value of the intellectual nature is exceedingly great, because in that nature there is a discerning-of-values, which is wonderful and which excels whatever things lack discernment.

- 114** *Cardinal:* If you consider [the matter] deeply, [you will see that] the value of the intellectual nature is the supreme value after the value of God. For the value of God and of all things is present conceptually and discernedly in the intellectual nature's<sup>340</sup> power. And although

the intellect does not give being to value, nevertheless without the intellect value cannot be discerned<sup>341</sup>—not even the fact that it exists. For if the intellect were removed, there could be no knowledge of whether there is value. If the rational and proportioning power did not exist, then appraising-judgment would cease; and if this latter were not to exist, then surely value would cease.<sup>342</sup> Hereby the mind's preciousness appears, since without the mind all created things would be devoid of value.<sup>343</sup> Therefore, if God willed that His own work should be *esteemed to be*<sup>344</sup> of some value, it was necessary that He create among these works the intellectual nature.

**115** *Albert:* It seems that if we liken God to a Minter of coins, the intellect will be like a banker.<sup>345</sup>

*Cardinal:* This is not an absurd likeness if you conceive of God as an Omnipotent Minter who can produce all coinage by means of His excellent and omnipotent power. To suppose the following would be a fitting likeness;

Some [minter] is of such great power that by his own hand he produces whatever coinage he wills to. And he establishes a banker who has in his power the discernment of all the coins and a knowledge of counting—with the art of minting being reserved only for the minter. The banker makes known the coins' nobility, as well as [making known] the value, number, weight, and measure<sup>346</sup> that the coinage has from [the minter, viz.,] God, so that the price of the minter's money and its value—and thereby the power of the minter—become known.

*Albert:* Great would be the power of this minter, who would have in his power the entire treasury of all coins. And from this treasury he could produce new and ancient coins—and gold, silver, and copper coins of maximal, minimal, and in-between values—while the treasury would remain ever equally infinite, inexhaustible, and undepleteable. And great would be the discernment of the banker, discerning between these coins and counting and weighing all these (howsoever many) different coins and measuring all the value of them all. But God's art would be infinitely superior to the banker's art, because God's art would cause *to be*, [whereas] the banker's art would cause only *to be known*.<sup>347</sup>

**116** *Cardinal:* Do you not thus see that the mode-of-being of the coinage is one mode in the Art of the Omnipotent Minter, is another mode in the mintable material, still another mode in the motion and the instruments [used] in order that the material may be minted, and

still another insofar as the material is actually minted? And all these modes have to do with the *being* of the coinage. There is yet another mode (which has to do with these just-mentioned modes-of-being): viz., [mode] insofar as concerns reason's distinguishing between the coinage. That which makes [the material] to be *coinage*, or a *coin*, is the image, or sign, of him from whom it issues. But if it issues from the minter, then it bears his image, viz., the likeness of his face, as Christ teaches us when, having been shown a coin, He asked whose image it bore, and He was given the answer "Caesar's".<sup>348</sup> Face is knowledge; by means of its face we distinguish one coin from another. Therefore, there is a single face of the minter; by means thereof he is known, and it reveals him who<sup>349</sup> otherwise would be invisible and unknowable. And since the likeness of his face is present on all the coins, the likeness displays only a knowledge of—i.e., only the face of—the minter, from whom the coinage issues. Now, the image [on a coin] is nothing other than an inscribed name. Accordingly, Christ asked, "of whom is the coin's image and inscription?" They answered: "Of Caesar".

**117** Therefore, the Minter's Face and Name and the Figure-of-His-substance and His Son are the same thing. Therefore, the Son is the Father's Living Image and is the Figure of the Father's substance and is the Father's Splendor.<sup>350</sup> Through the Son the Father-Minter makes, or mints, or places, His sign<sup>351</sup> upon all things. And since without such a sign there is no coinage, that one thing which is signified by every coin is the unique Exemplar and the Formal Cause of all the coins. Hence, if the Minter is Oneness, or Being: Equality, which is naturally begotten from Oneness, is the Formal Cause of beings. Therefore, in Equality, which is singular and simple, you see the true nature [*veritas*] of all the things which exist or can exist—you see it insofar as these things have been imprinted [with being] by Being itself. In the Equality you also see Oneness—just as in the Son you see the Father.<sup>352</sup> Therefore, whatever things exist or can exist are enfolded in that Figure of the substance of the Father-Creator. Therefore, the Creator-Minter is present in all the coins by means of the Figure of His substance, just as a single signified thing is present in its many signs. For if, in all the coins, I behold the quiddity of that which is signified, I see only the one from whom the coinage issues. But if I turn toward the signs that characterize the coins, I see the plurality of the coins, because the one signified-thing I see to be signified by means of many signs.

**118** But notice that when what is mintable is imprinted with a sign, it is a coin or is coinage. For example, imprinted copper—imprinted, that is, with a sign of the likeness of the imprinter—is coinage. Mintable material becomes a coin by means of the sign. And it is called ‘imprinted material, or befigured material, that has received a determination of its possibility-of-being-a-coin.’ In this way, I see the signified (1) prior to its sign, (2) in its sign, and (3) subsequently to its sign: *prior to its sign* [I see it] as the true nature (*veritas*) that precedes its own befigurement; *in its sign* [I see it] as the true nature in its own image; and *subsequently to its sign* [I see it] as what-is-signified is signified by its sign. The first signified-thing is Infinite Actuality; the last signified-thing is infinite possibility; the in-between signified-thing is twofold: (a) either it exists in the way that the first signified-thing is present in its sign or (b) it exists in the way that the sign is present in the last signified-thing. The first signified-thing, which I have said to be Infinite Actuality, is called Absolute Necessity, which is omnipotent, constraining all things, and which nothing can resist. The last signified-thing, viz., infinite possibility, is called both absolute possibility and indeterminate possibility.<sup>353</sup> In between these [two] extreme modes-of-being are two [other modes]. The one mode contracts necessity into a union and is called connecting necessity—e.g., the necessity of being a man. For the necessity-of-being that is contracted to man—a necessity that is called humanity—enfolds those things which are necessary for that mode-of-being. (A similar point holds true for all other things.) The second mode-of-being, which elevates possibility unto actuality by means of a determination, is called determinate possibility—e.g., *this* florin or *this* man.

**119** Consider, then, a certain coin, e.g., a papal florin; and in your conception cause it to be alive with an intellectual life, and cause it to look into itself mentally. In that case, the coin, by looking at itself, will find these things and all things that have been spoken of or that can be spoken of. No animal is so obtuse that it does not discern itself from others and does not recognize, within its own species, other animals of the same species. But that which is alive with an intellectual life finds all things [present within itself] in an intellectual way, i.e., finds within itself concepts of all things.<sup>354</sup> For the intellectual power enfolds all things intelligible.

All existing things are intelligible,<sup>355</sup> just as all colored things are visible. Some visible things exceed the power of sight, as does light that is excellent; and some things are so small that they do not affect

sight, and they are not seen directly. For example, the excellence of sunlight is seen *negatively*, because that which is seen is not the sun; for so great is the excellence of the sun's light that it cannot be seen. Similarly, the indivisible point is not a thing which is seen,<sup>356</sup> for it is smaller than that which can be seen. In this manner the intellect sees Infinite Actuality (viz., God) negatively and sees infinite possibility (viz., matter) negatively. The intellect sees in-between things positively by means of its intellectual and rational power. Therefore, as a living mirror,<sup>357</sup> the intellect contemplates within itself the modes of being, insofar as they are intelligible.

Therefore, the intellect is that coin which is also a banker, even as God is that coin which is also a Minter. Therefore, the intellect finds to be innate to itself the power of knowing every coin and of numbering every coin.<sup>358</sup> But from the things that I disclosed when I was considering the intellect,<sup>359</sup> you can take an example of how it is that the living coin that is the intellect finds, when it seeks, all things to be present within itself in an intellectual way.<sup>360</sup> Someone who enters into these matters more acutely than have I will be able to view them, and disclose them, more precisely [than have I].

Let these statements have been made in this way as regards the Minter and the banker.

**120** *Albert:* You have amply adapted that which I stated simply. Listen only to the following, for the sake of instructing me. You mean, it seems [to me], that if the papal florin were alive with an intellectual life, then assuredly it would know itself to be a florin and, therefore, to be a coin of him of whom it bears the sign and image. For it would know that it did not have from itself the being of a florin but had it from him who impressed his own image upon it. And because the living florin would see a similar image in all living intellects, it would know all the coins to be of the same minter. Therefore, seeing a single face in the signs of all the coins, it would see that a single equality (through which each coin would be actually constituted) is the cause of each possible coin of the same minter.

Moreover, since the living florin is a minted coin, it would rightly see that it was *able to be made* to be a coin and that it was mintable before it was actually minted. And, in this way, it would see within itself the material which the impressing of a sign determined to be a florin. And since it is a coin of him of whom it is a sign, it would have its being from the *true nature* [veritas] that is present in the sign, not from the *sign* impressed on the material. [And it would see] that

in the different signs a single true nature determines the material differently. For there cannot be a plurality of signs unless difference accompanies plurality; and in different signs the true nature can determine the material only in different ways. Consequently, each coin cannot but agree with [each] other coin, for they are coins that agree in that they are coins of the same minter, although they differ inasmuch as they are different from one another.

That living florin would make such observations, and many others, in regard to itself.

- 121** *Cardinal:* You have recapitulated clearly all that I said. Nevertheless, keep in mind, more particularly, that there is only one true and precise and most sufficient Form; it forms all things and shines forth differently in its different signs; and it forms differently things that are formable, and it determines them, or posits them, in actuality.<sup>361</sup>

## ABBREVIATIONS

- Ap* *Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae* [Vol. II (edited by Raymond Klibansky) of *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Leipzig/ Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1932)].
- CA* *Cribratio Alkorani* [Vol. VIII (edited by Ludwig Hagemann) of *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1986)].
- DB* *De Beryllo* [Vol. XI, 1 (edited by Hans G. Senger and Karl Bormann) of *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1988)].
- DC* *De Coniecturis* [Vol. III (edited by Josef Koch and Karl Bormann) of *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1972)].
- DI* *De Docta Ignorantia* [Latin-German edition: *Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues in deutscher Übersetzung*, published by F. Meiner Verlag. **Book I** (Vol. 264a), edited and translated by Paul Wilpert; 3rd edition with minor improvements by Hans G. Senger, 1979. **Book II** (Vol. 264b), edited and translated by Paul Wilpert; 2nd edition with minor improvements by Hans G. Senger, 1977. **Book III** (Vol. 264c); Latin text edited by Raymond Klibansky; introduction and translation by Hans G. Senger, 1977].
- DM* *Idiota de Mente* [Latin text contained in J. Hopkins, *Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge* (Minneapolis: Banning, 1996)].
- DP* *De Possess* [Latin text as contained in J. Hopkins, *A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa* (Minneapolis: Banning, 3rd ed. 1986)].
- DVD* *De Visione Dei* [Latin text as contained in J. Hopkins, *Nicholas of Cusa's Dialectical Mysticism: Text, Translation, and Interpretive Study of De Visione Dei* (Minneapolis: Banning, 2nd ed. 1988)].
- LG* *De Ludo Globi* [Vol. IX (edited by Hans G. Senger) of *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1998)].
- MFCG* *Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft*, edited by Klaus Kremer and Klaus Reinhardt. A continuing series. Volumes I-XVII published in Mainz, Germany by Matthias-Grünewald Verlag. Volumes XVIII and higher published in Trier by Paulinus-Verlag.
- NA* *De Li Non Aliud* [Latin text as contained in J. Hopkins, *Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-other: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Li Non Aliud* (Minneapolis: Banning, 3rd ed. 1987)].

- p* *Nicolai Cusae Cardinalis Opera* (Paris edition, 1514). [Reprinted Minerva Verlag (Frankfurt am Main, 1962)].
- PF* *De Pace Fidei* [Vol. VII (edited by Raymond Klibansky and Hildebrand Bascour) of *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1970)].
- PL* *Patrologia Latina*, edited by J.-P. Migne. Series published in Paris.
- S* F. S. Schmitt, editor. *Sancti Anselmi Opera Omnia* (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons). 6 Vols. (1946-1961). Vol. I first published in Seckau, 1938; Vol. II first published in Rome, 1940. All volumes reprinted by Friedrich Fromann Verlag (Stuttgart, 1968). “S I, 237:7,” for example, indicates Volume I, p. 237, line 7.
- SCG* Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* [in Vol. II, edited by R. Buser (1980), of *Index Thomisticus. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia*. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog Verlag].
- ST* Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* [in Vol. II (1980) of *Index Thomisticus, ibid.*].
- VS* *De Venatione Sapientiae* [Vol. XII (edited by Raymond Klibansky and Hans G. Senger) of *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1982)].



## PRAENOTANDA

1. (a) In the English translations brackets are used to indicate words supplied by the translator to complete the meaning of a Latin phrase, clause, or sentence. (b) When a clarifying Latin word is inserted into the translation, brackets are used if the case ending or the verb-form has been modified; otherwise, parentheses are used.
2. All references to Nicholas of Cusa's works are to the Latin texts in the following editions (unless explicitly indicated otherwise):
  - A. Heidelberg Academy edition of *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Felix Meiner Verlag: Hamburg): *De Concordantia Catholica*; *De Coniecturis*; *De Deo Abscondito*; *De Quaerendo Deum*; *De Filiatione Dei*; *De Dato Patris Luminum*; *Coniectura de Ultimis Diebus*; *De Genesi*; *Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae*; *De Pace Fidei*; *De Theologicis Complementis*; *De Beryllo* (1988 edition); *De Principio*; *Cribratio Alkorani*; *De Ludo Globi*; *De Venatione Sapientiae*; *De Apice Theoriae*; *Sermones* (Haubst's numbering of the sermons is given in roman numerals; margin number and line numbers are given in parentheses.)
  - B. Texts authorized by the Heidelberg Academy and published in the Latin-German editions of Felix Meiner Verlag's series *Philosophische Bibliothek*: *De Docta Ignorantia*.
  - C. Editions by J. Hopkins: *De Aequalitate* [in *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: Volume One*]; *Idiotae de Sapientia, de Mente, de Staticis Experimentis* [in *Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge*]; *De Visione Dei* [in; *Nicholas of Cusa's Dialectical Mysticism* (2nd ed.)]; *De Possesit* [in *A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa* (3rd ed.)]; *De Li Non Aliud* [in *Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-other* (3rd ed.)]; *Compendium* [in *Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge*]. Except in the case of *De Aequalitate*, the left-hand margin numbers correspond to the margin numbers in the Heidelberg Academy editions; line numbers and some paragraph-breaks differ.
  - D. Paris edition (*Nicolai Cusae Cardinalis Opera*, 1514): some sermons.

The references given for some of these treatises indicate book and chapter, for others margin number and line, and for still others page and line. Readers should have no difficulty determining which is which when they consult the particular Latin text. E.g., 'DI II, 6 (125:19-20)' indicates *De Docta Ignorantia*, Book II, Chapter 6, margin number 125, lines 19-20 of the edition in the series *Philosophische Bibliothek* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag).
3. References to the Bible are given in terms of the Douay version. References to chapters and verses of the Psalms include, in parentheses, the King James' locations.
4. Italics are used sparingly, so that, as a rule, foreign expressions are italicized only when they are short. All translations are mine unless otherwise specifically indicated.
5. Citations of Nicholas's sermons are given in terms of the sermon numbers as-

signed by Rudolf Haubst in fascicle 0 [=zero], Vol. XVI of *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1991), pp. XLVII-LV. These numbers revise Josef Koch's earlier numbers. Haubst's dates are also used. [For Josef Koch's earlier numbers and dates, see Koch, *Cusanus-Texte. I. Predigten. 7. Untersuchungen über Datierung, Form, Sprache und Quellen. Kritisches Verzeichnis sämtlicher Predigten* [Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse (1941-1942, Abhandlung 1)].

A reference such as "*Sermo XX* (6:26-29)" indicates Sermon XX [Haubst number], margin number 6, lines 26-29.

## NOTES TO *DE LUDO GLOBI*

1. *De Ludo Globi* is one of Nicholas's latest works. Books One and Two were written with an interval in between them; their respective dates of composition are not known exactly. Hans G. Senger accepts the judgment that Book One was written some time after March, 1462 but before March 6, 1463 and that Book Two was completed some time after March 6, 1463. (See his reasoning on pp. XXII - XXIV of his edition of *De Ludo Globi*, being Vol. IX in the series *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1998)). Both books were completed prior to the *Compendium* (1464), which refers to "*De Globo*" in a singular way. We may not unreasonably presume that Book One is to be dated, grossly, as 1462 and Book Two as 1463. The latter was composed at Rome, as the former may also have been. Yet, the possibility is not excluded that Book One was written at Orvieto or at Città della Pieve (region of Perugia) or at Chianciano (region of Siena).

In *De Venatione Sapientiae* 22 (67:17-18) Nicholas mentions having written in Orvieto a book on the shape of the world. The question has arisen as to whether this *libellus de figura mundi* is really Book One of *De Ludo Globi*, composed, then, not at Rome but at Orvieto. Some scholars have suggested that the title "*De Figura Mundi*" is simply an alternative title for *De Ludo Globi*, inclusive of Book Two. Others more rightly favor the conclusion that *De Figura Mundi* is a lost work, drafted at Orvieto in 1462. For a fuller discussion see the following: Gerda von Bredow, "Der Gedanke der singularitas in der Altersphilosophie des Nikolaus von Kues," *MFCG* 4 (1964), in particular, pp. 382-383. Gerda von Bredow, "Figura Mundi. Die Symbolik des Globusspieles von Nikolaus von Kues," pp. 193-199 in Johannes Tenzler, editor, *Urbild und Abglanz. Beiträge zu einer Synopse von Weltgestalt und Glaubenswirklichkeit* (Regensburg: Habel, 1972), in particular, p. 193. Gerda von Bredow, pp. 109-110 of her German translation *Vom Globusspiel. De Ludo Globi* (Hamburg: Meiner, 2nd edition, 1978). Raymond Klibansky and Hans G. Senger, editors, *De Venatione Sapientiae - De Apice Theoriae* [= Vol. XII (1982) in the series *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag)], pp. 155-156.

2. The superscript in *Codex Latinus Cusanus* 219 [Cusanus Hospice, Bernkastel-kues], f. 138<sup>r</sup> reads: "De ludo Globi. Dialogus de ludo Globi. Interloquutores Nicolaus Cardinalis tituli Sancti petri ad vincula et Iohannes dux Baioharie". ("The Bowling-Game. Dialogue on the Bowling Game. The interlocutors are Nicholas, Cardinal, by title, of St. Peter in Chains, and John, Duke of Bavaria".) I have added the caption "Book One." *De Ludo Globi* is also contained in *Codex Latinus Cracoviensis* 682

[Jagiellonian University Library, Cracow]. I have examined both manuscripts on site. The excerpts of *De Ludo Globi* that are found in the Hispanic Society of America's Latin ms. HC 327/108 are unimportant, since they are copied from the Straßburg printed edition of 1488. See Hans G. Senger, "Philippus Hersfeldiae Minorita. Ein unbekannter Cusanus-Bearbeiter der Reformationszeit," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales*, 64 (1997), 400-419.

According to Erich Meuthen [pp. 111-113 of his "Nikolaus von Kues und die Witelshuber," *Festschrift für Andreas Kraus zum 60. Geburtstag*, edited by Pankraz Fried and Walter Ziegler (Kallmünz: Lassleben, 1982)] Nicholas's interlocutor in Book One is *not* Duke John of Munich but, rather, Duke John of Mosbach, who was about twenty years old at that time and who was the son of Count Palatine Otto I of Mosbach.

3. Nicholas's use of the Latin plural form of "you" indicates the presence of at least one person other than himself and John, even though John is the only interlocutor. A bit later (*viz.*, at 10:5) Nicholas switches to the singular, since only John is responding. But prior to 10:5—*viz.*, at 3:5—he also uses the singular, even though at 3:9 he again has a plural. See n. 25 and n. 127 below.

4. "... certain sciences": *i.e.*, certain branches of learning.

5. The *rithmatia* (here I have used the spelling in *Codex Latinus Cusanus* 219) is a game of numbers, whose rules have been lost. See Du Cange's *Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis*, under "*ritmachia*".

6. "... no decent game": *i.e.*, no game worthy of the name "game".

7. These *scientiarum semina* (seeds of the sciences) are the various disciplines that constitute learning. These seeds include the rules that have been insightfully pointed out by Karl Bormann and Hans Senger in connection with their and Josef Koch's edition of the treatise *De Coniecturis*. See pp. 201-203 of their Vol. III (1972) in the series *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag).


8. "... of themselves": *i.e.*, of the sciences, or disciplines. Once the knowledge of the various disciplines-of-learning is possessed, it leads to a knowledge of oneself, as Nicholas observes in *LG* II (93). Cf. *DC*, Prologue to Book II (70:8-13). See, above, n. 190 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*.

9. "... proceed from an intelligence": *i.e.*, proceed from an intellect. Oftentimes Nicholas uses "*intelligentia*" and "*intellectus*" interchangeably as in *LG* I (26:10-17). See n. 34 of Notes to *De Aequalitate* in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]* (Minneapolis: Banning, 1998). [Although the 1998 printing does not contain the words "Volume One" in the title, any future printings will add these words.] In that same volume see also n. 214 of the Notes to *De Venatione Sapientiae*. Finally, in this present volume see n. 36 and n. 397 of the Notes to *De Coniecturis*, as well as *DC* II, 16 (159:1-10). Cf. *Sermo* XXII (8:1-5).

10. Here is an example of a positive adjective ("*corpulenta*") whose meaning is comparative ("thicker").

11. The bulkier part of the bowling-ball retards the ball's movement because such a ball loses its impetus more quickly than it would if its part were less bulky. See n. 13 below.

12. Thus, the bowling-ball is not divided into *equal* halves. Nicholas does not indicate how much of the ball's surface is concave, except for telling us that the concavity is slight (*figura aliquantum concava*) and that the concave half of the ball is



smaller than is the convex half. The concavity has to be great enough to create lopsided weights but small enough so that the curved movement is not too uncontrollable. Nothing in Nicholas's description requires that the depth of the concavity reach the axis that passes through the center of the ball. Regarding the circles that are being aimed at, see n. 128 below.

13. In *LG*, as also elsewhere, Nicholas accepts the impetus theory—rather than the Aristotelian account of projectile motion. See *LG* I (22-25 and 55). *DP* 23.

14. "... various intermediate factors": e.g., the factors mentioned in John's next speech.

15. *DI* II, 1 (94:6-11). See, above, n. 3 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*.

16. See n. 102 of the Notes to *De Venatione Sapientiae* in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]*, *op. cit.* (n. 9 above).

17. See n. 209 below.

18. "... lands on its own flat surface": i.e., lands on its concave tip.

19. "*In sphaera occurrunt* 1. *centrum seu punctum* a quo peripheria undique abest aequaliter 2. *axis*, seu linea transiens per centrum, suasque extremitates applicans ad sphaerae circumferentiam ex utraque parte, ut circa illam fiat revolutio 3. *poli seu cardines* i.e. extremitates axis ex utraque parte." Johannes Micraelius, *Lexicon Philosophicum Terminorum Philosophis Usitatorum* [Düsseldorf: Stern-Verlag Janssen, 1966 (reprint of the 1662 edition published in Stettin), column 1283 (under the general entry "*sphaera*")].

20. *DI* II, 1 (94:11-12). *DC* II, 12 (131:10). *Sermo* XXXVIII (11:5). *Sermo* CCXVI (27:5-6). Aristotle, *Physica* II, 2 (194<sup>a</sup>21-22).

21. A perfect circle touches a perfectly flat plane at only one point, Nicholas assumes. *De Theologicis Complementis* 8:1-4. This point is invisible, because it is so small. *LG* I (11:1-2). *LG* II (119:13-14). Ultimately, there is only one non-geometrical, ontologically real point, maintains Nicholas [*LG* I (10) and II (85)].

22. By "world" Nicholas here means *universe*. Regarding the world's "perfect" sphericity, cf. *DI* II, 11 (157:17-21). And see, especially, the clarifying passage at *LG* I (16). Cf. *DI* II, 12 (164:1-5).

23. *DM* 9 (118:1-3). See also the references in n. 80 of Notes to *De Theologicis Complementis* in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]*, *op. cit.* (n. 9 above).

24. The world qua world would be invisible; but the contents of the world would be visible (though not as a whole).

25. Here Nicholas switches from the second person plural to the second person singular and continues with the singular for most of the remainder of both books. See n. 3 above and n. 127 below.

26. *DM* 9 (119:5-7). *LG* II (85:1-3). Nicholas holds to a theory of universals that is often called moderate realism—a kind of Thomistic-Aristotelian view. Cf. *DI* II, 6 (125-126). *DI* III, 10 (240). *Sermo* XLI (9). *Sermo* LIV (4:30 - 5:9), (5:20-26), (5:41-42). *Sermones*, p, Vol. II, f. 146<sup>v</sup>, lines 19-10 from bottom.

27. Roundness itself has no parts. Nicholas, through John, is distinguishing roundness itself from the roundness of the universe, which is partaken of and is perceptually present in a round thing. Participant roundness he calls an image of exemplar-roundness, which is true roundness [*LG I* (11:15 - 12:6)]. One must be careful, however, *not* to interpret Nicholas as believing that (1) these “image-forms” are not real forms or (2) that none of the objects in which they are present are substances or (3) that no thing’s form is an essential form—and must be careful *not* to interpret him as endorsing, wholesale, a Platonistic theory of universals.

28. See n. 27 above. The “truth of a form” is the form as considered in and of itself, the true form.

29. Nicholas holds that forms are immaterial and that they exist in three ways: in the Mind of God as exemplars (n. 9 and n. 25, above, of Notes to *De Coniecturis*); in material objects as observable determinants; and in the intellect as concepts. Because Nicholas is an exemplarist, he is able to agree with Plato that there is a χωρισμὸς εἰδῶν—i.e., that forms are “separable from” particulars—while disagreeing about their independence of all mind. Forms qua exemplars are present in the Mind of God more truly than forms qua concepts are present in human minds, so that, for Nicholas, both concepts and *formae in materia* can be referred to, in Platonistic language, as “images of exemplars.”

See n. 124 below.

30. “... from outermost-point to outermost-point”—and, thus, from the invisible to the invisible. See the definition of “atom” at *DM 9* (119:12-13).

31. Mercury, also known as (Pseudo-) Hermes Trismegistus, *Asclepius* 17 [p. 316 in Vol. II of *Corpus Hermeticum*, edited by Arthur D. Nock and translated into French by A.-J. Festugière (Paris: Société d’Édition ‘Les Belles Lettres’, 1945)].

32. See n. 22 above.

33. The Latin text’s editor (Hans G. Senger) here cites Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*, Book One, line 6.

It seems strange that Nicholas refers to something that would be invisible—viz., pure matter—as a “face” of the world. Yet, like God, it is “visible” insofar as we can conceive *that* it is and *what* it is not.

34. This perfection was asserted by John at the outset of *LG I* (9).

35. *DI II*, 11 (157:18-19).

36. *DI II*, 1 (96:1-8). See the passage marked by n. 299 below.

37. The roundness of the universe is an atom, maintains Nicholas, in the sense that, like an atom’s roundness, the universe’s “perfect” roundness can never be observed by finite minds. The universe, as he has stated, is not absolutely round—i.e., is not such that God could not have created a universe still more round—but is as round as *it* can be. Therefore the universe is the roundest of all actually existing finite things. The universe’s roundness offers itself to sight invisibly. See section 4.2 of Part One of my Orienting Study.

38. *DI I*, 6 (15:8-9).

39. Only God is Eternity. The world is eternal in a reduced sense, which Nicholas proceeds to explain. Accordingly, Eternity ontologically precedes all finite “eternal” things. These so-called eternal things are better called perpetual. That which is perpetual has a beginning but never comes to an end, because God wills to sustain it endlessly. See n. 51 of Notes to *De Aequalitate* in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Meta-*

*physical Speculations: [Volume One]*, *op. cit.* (n. 9 above). See also, above, n. 99 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*.

40. E.g., the Eternal Word of God, the second member of the Trinity, is also Eternity itself.

41. At *LG I* (19:1) Nicholas identifies the Creating-Eternity-of-world with God. This would be God the Son, by whom all things were created (John 1:3. Colossians 1:16) and in whom all things were present, as God, ontologically prior to their creation. Cf. n. 43 below. Cf. also *Sermones, p.*, Vol. II, f. 80<sup>r</sup>, lines 20-11 from bottom. Nicholas's terminology, as Klaus Kremer rightly remarks, is promiscuous. (See the full reference to Klaus Kremer's article, in n. 32 of Notes to *De Apice Theoriae* in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]*, *op. cit.* (n. 9 above).) Nicholas's recourse to the expressions "Eternity-of-world" and "Creating-Eternity-of-world" is unfortunate, since these expressions tend seriously to mislead. Nicholas refers to God not only as Eternity-of-world but also as Maximal World [*LG I* (42)] and Archetypal World [*LG I* (45)]. Cf. *Sermo XXII* (28:1-4). *Sermo XXX* (12:29-32).

42. That is, since Eternity-of-world is Absolute Eternity ....

43. See *De Dato Patris Luminum* 3 (106), which also expresses the view that the "eternity" of the world is an originated eternity, deriving from Eternity itself, i.e., from God. In that passage Nicholas speaks of the world's descending from, i.e., deriving from, God the Father and of the world's being antecedently present in God the Father. Yet, this understanding does not exclude the world's descending from God the Son, in whom it is also present antecedently (Ephesians 3:9).

44. *LG II* (87:9-17). Nicholas subscribes to the Augustinian view, widely adopted in the Middle Ages, that the universe has existed at all *times*, since time was created with the universe, or world. God precedes the world ontologically, not chronologically. Since the world was created by Eternity (i.e., by God), it also partakes of Eternity. Participant eternity is perpetuity, i.e., is created, temporal unendedness. The human soul is also perpetual, or (as Nicholas says) "eternal".

See n. 23 of Notes to *De Venatione Sapientiae* in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]*, *op. cit.* (n. 9 above).

Nicholas is also influenced by *Liber de Causis*, XXIX (XXX) and by Aquinas's commentary on it. Regarding this influence, see also, below, n. 96 and n. 262, where the edition of the Latin text is cited fully.

45. *LG I* (13:15-17).

46. II Corinthians 4:18.

47. Baruch 3:32: "... qui praeparavit terram in aeterno tempore..." (Vulgate).

48. Aristotle, *Physica* IV, 11 (219<sup>b</sup>1-2). Cusa, *DM* 15 (157:9).

49. Job 23:13. Psalms 113:3<sup>b</sup> (115:3). Psalms 134:6 (135:6). Jonah 1:14. *DB* 17:10. *CA I*, 20 (83:18-19). *Sermo XXIV* (19:3-6). *Sermo XXXVII*<sup>a</sup> (7:1). See n. 55 below.

50. *DI III*, 1 (185). *DP* 8:12-16.

51. *DI II*, 1 (97:19-20). *Sermo CCXVI* (24:23-28).

52. *DI II*, 1 (96:19-21). *DI III*, 3 (201). *Sermo XLV* (4:4-7).

53. Although God could have created a more perfect or a less perfect world, the world that He actually created is as perfect as *it* can be. (See the cross-references in n. 50 and n. 51 above.) Therefore, as originally created, the world was not absolutely perfect; indeed, only God is absolutely perfect, just as He is Absolute Perfection.

The world became less perfect as a result of the Fall. Nicholas does *not* teach that the present state of the world is the best of all possible states for a world of its kind.

54. "... its possibility-of-being-made": "*fieri-posse*" or "*posse-fieri*" is here used by Nicholas to indicate a finite thing's capability of being made or of coming to be. See *VS* 3 and *VS* 9 (25) - 10 (29) and *VS* 13 and *VS* 21 (61). See n. 19, n. 23, and n. 328 of Notes to *De Venatione Sapientiae* in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations*: [Volume One], *op. cit.* (n. 9 above). See also *DP* 6 and *LG* I (45:17 - 49:8) and *De Apice* 26, as well as n. 121 below. In *DM* 11 (131) Nicholas speaks of *absolutum posse fieri* as the first member of the Divine Trinity—a member symbolized also as Oneness. This understanding of *posse fieri* is, of course, different from the understanding of finite *posse fieri*, which Nicholas refers to in *DM* 11 (133).

55. Here and elsewhere [e.g., *Sermo* CCXVI (25:21-22)] Nicholas refers to the will of God as free. (See the references in n. 49 above.) This view is not at odds with other of his statements, in *DI* and elsewhere, to the effect that the (created) world emanated from God [*DI* II, 4 (116:1-4). *DB* 37:12 - 38:3].

56. E.g., *DI* II, 1 (96-97). *De Dato* 2 and 3. *Sermo* CCXVI (21-26).

57. At *LG* I (20:4) I follow Codex Latinus Cusanus 219 and read "*dum de motu globi*" in place of the Heidelberg Academy edition's "*de motu globi dum*".

58. *LG* I (15:6-9). Cf. *LG* I (4, John's speech).

59. "... a completely perfect sphere": i.e., a completely perfect spherical bowling-ball.

60. "... only at an atom": i.e., only at a single point. *LG* I (8:8-10) and (13:5-6).

61. Here is an idea that has a modern ring to it, once we realize that in thinking of a "flat and even surface" Nicholas is also thinking of a frictionless surface.

62. See n. 13 above.

63. *Sermones*, p, Vol. II, f. 124<sup>r</sup>, lines 3-5. Once again, Nicholas's conception of motion is anti-Aristotelian; for according to Aristotle, the soul is not rightly said to move itself but is rather to be understood to be moved by an object of desire, for example. The anti-Aristotelianism becomes even clearer in *LG* I (24). See n. 13 and n. 26 above, and n. 65, n. 75, n. 94, n. 303, and n. 308 below.

64. That is, the example of the thrown bowling-ball.

65. Like Thomas and Aristotle, Nicholas holds that there cannot be an infinite series of movers each of which is moved by another mover. Here he departs from the impetus theory of motion and reverts to an Aristotelian conception of motion.

66. *DM* 15 (157:19-20).

67. "... the affections of the body": the so-called bodily affections are really affections of the soul that relate to the use of the bodily instrument. The body itself has no affections.

68. That is, some souls will be rewarded, just as others will be punished.

69. "... and intellect": "*et intelligentia*". See n. 9 above.

70. These are the levels of cognition usually pointed to by Nicholas. *DI* I, 4 (11). *DC* II, 14 (141). *DC* II, 16 (157). *De Quaerendo Deum* 5 (49). *De Sapientia* I (25:21-23). *Sermo* XXII (7:1-8). See p. 290 (beginning with the last paragraph) through the end of n. 17 on p. 293 of Notes to *De Quaerendo Deum* in my *Miscellany on Nicholas of Cusa* (Minneapolis: Banning, 1994).

71. *DC* II, 16 (158:2-5).

72. Aristotle, *Physica* III, 1 (201<sup>a</sup>10-15): alteration, increase, decrease, coming-

to-be, passing-away, locomotion.

73. It is the soul because, as was stated in *LG I* (27), a power is predicated of the whole which has that power. Regarding the soul's discriminating, abstracting, dividing, and compounding, see the cross-references *LG II* (90:10-13) and *DC I*, 1 (6:8-9) and (6:18-19).

74. *DM 15* (157-158).

75. This is a Thomistic-Aristotelian conception of empirical knowledge. *DM 4* (78). Cf. n. 303 of Notes to *De Venatione Sapientiae* in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]*, *op. cit.* (n. 9 above). See n. 354 below. See also, above, n. 481 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*, as well as n. 14 and n. 71 thereof.

76. The soul is "composed" of the same and the different, of the divisible and the indivisible, and in this respect it resembles number [cf. *DM 6* (96) with *DM 11* (140)]. Hence, together with the "platonists," Nicholas calls the soul "self-moving number." *DI II*, 9 (145). *DM 7* (98:1-2). Thus, Nicholas disagrees with Albertus Magnus, who repudiates the view that the soul is self-moving number. See his *De Anima I*, 2, 10 [p. 44, line 4 through p. 45, line 66 of Vol. VII, Part I (edited by Clemens Stroick, 1968) of *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia* (Münster: Aschendorff)].

77. "... conforms itself [also] to the divisible and mutable": i.e., in addition to conforming itself to immutable truths.

78. *DM 7* (99-105), especially 7 (105:14-15). *Sermo XXXVIIIA* (4:4-6). See n. 71 of Notes to *De Principio* in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]*, *op. cit.* (n. 9 above). Further references may be found in the first section of Klaus Kremer's "Das kognitive und affektive Apriori bei der Erfassung des Sittlichen," cited in n. 158 below.

79. This so-called natural movement is caused by the soul without deliberation; it is what, today, we call non-voluntary movement. It is not a movement that belongs naturally to the bodily members apart from the soul.

80. Even apart from the human body the soul can conform itself to numerical truths and can construct numerical proofs, for example, and can refine its mathematical concepts. *DM 9* (125).

81. "... is the true Being of things": See, above, n. 12 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*. *DI II*, 7 (130:14-15).

82. John 11:25.

83. That is, the soul withdraws its attention from the body by seeking to suspend its consciousness of the body. Nicholas is not here contradicting his earlier statement that the soul does not withdraw itself when, for example, a finger is cut off. *LG I* (27:11-12). *LG I* (39).

84. Nicholas often alludes to human free will, especially in his sermons. Yet, he does little to analyze the notion. *DVD 4* (12:10-12). *DVD 7* (27). *VS 20* (58:1-7). *VS 27* (82:13-14). *LG I* (34-36). *LG I* (58:2-15). *De Apice* 21:4-5 and 23:2-10. *Sermo CXXXIX* (7:1-3). *Sermo CXXXV* (7:1-7) and (15:9-10). *Sermo CXXXVIII* (5:8-14). *Sermones*, p., Vol. II, ff. 103<sup>r</sup>, 104<sup>v</sup>, 109<sup>v</sup>, 111<sup>v</sup>, 130<sup>r</sup> & <sup>v</sup>.

85. Johannes Micraelius, *Lexicon Philosophicum Terminorum Philosophis Usitatorum*, *op. cit.* (n. 19 above): "TEMPERAMENTUM, *temperatura*, proportio ex mutua primarum qualitatum actione et passione in mixtione orta; qualitas corporis mixti, constans ex gradibus remissis quatuor primarum qualitatum, adeoque media quasi quaedam qualitas, ex primis qualitibus coniunctis orta." (Temperament is "a pro-



portion arisen, by means of a mixture, from a mutual activity and receptivity of the primary qualities [viz., the hot, the cold, the dry, the moist]; a quality (of a mixed body) consisting of reduced gradations of the four primary qualities, and so a certain intermediate quality, as it were, that has arisen from the primary qualities in combination.”) These combinations are as follows: the hot and the moist (which together produce the sanguinary temperament), the hot and the dry (which produce the choleric temperament), the cold and the dry (which produce the phlegmatic temperament), the cold and the moist (which produce the melancholic temperament).

See especially Aquinas, *Commentum in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum* II, 15, 2, 1c [pp. 516<sup>b</sup>-517<sup>a</sup> of Vol. VI (1948) of *Sancti Thomae ... Opera Omnia* (New York: Musurgia)].

86. “... determining comes last”: i.e., deciding actually to make a game comes last.

87. Other passages in which Nicholas comments on the rationality or non-rationality of non-human animals include *DI* II, 3 (108:2-4). *DC* I, 2 (7). *DC* II, 10 (123-124). *DC* II, 16 (163). *Ap.* 14-15. *De Sapientia* I (5:9-11). *DM* 5 (83). *LG* I (3). *Sermo* XLI (8:7-15). *Sermo* CXXVII (4:6-10) and (11:6-10). *Sermo* CXXVIII (5:3-8). Nicholas denies that non-human animals have *ratio* (reason) *in the way that human beings do*. For animals cannot count and measure, etc. Yet, they do have a power of inference which could be called a lower form of *ratio*—and which Nicholas sometimes refers to as *ratio* [*DM* 5 (83)]—but which he prefers to call *astutia* [*Sermo* CXXVIII (5:3-8)]. Non-human animals are called brutes inasmuch as they have no rational capacity, properly speaking. They do have the sort of inferential power that Augustine termed “inner sense” and that Nicholas sometimes thinks of as partaking dimly of reason.

88. See n. 84 above.

89. *DM* 13 (145-146). *DB* 51. *Compendium* 11 (35:6-10). Anonymous, *Liber de Causis* VIII (IX), 82 [Latin text edited by Adriaan Pattin and published in *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* (Louvain), Vol. 28 (March, 1966), pp. 90-203. Translated into English by Dennis J. Brand (Marquette, WI: Marquette University Press, 1984 (revised edition)].

90. “... decree-of-nature”: i.e., a decree of the animal’s nature.

91. None of the soul’s substance depends on a body because the intellective power does not depend on a body and because the soul is a substantial unity, whose powers can be distinguished but not substantially separated.

92. At *LG* I (39:12-14) Nicholas suggests that the substance of a perceptual soul and that of a vegetative soul may not perish when a brute animal or a tree perishes.

93. *DI* I, 17 (48:4-5). *DM* 6 (96:1-3). Cf. *NA* 10 (37:1-24). *VS* 10 (29). See Pseudo-Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus* IV, 20 (*Dionysiaca* I, 274) = IV, 23 (*PG* 4:723).

94. Aristotle, *De Anima* II, 3 (414<sup>b</sup>28-32). Cusa, *De Theologicis Complementis* 10:21-23.

95. The trigon of powers in animals (viz., vegetative, perceptual, and imaginative powers) is included in man’s tetragon of powers (viz., vegetative, perceptual, imaginative, and intellectual powers). And the intellectual power encompasses the rational power.

96. Albertus Magnus, *Super Dionysium de Divinis Nominibus* VII, 33 [p. 361, lines 17-20 in Vol. XXXVII, Part I (edited by Paul Simon, 1972) of *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia* (Münster: Aschendorff)]. Anonymous, *The Book of Causes* [*Liber de*

*Causis*] XI (XII), 107 [Translated by Dennis J. Brand (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1984 edition), p. 30]. See, in n. 89 above, the publication data for Patin's edition of the Latin text.

97. "... which is the Life of living things": *Ap.* 33:21-23.

98. Whereas God is eternal Eternity, the soul is a perpetual eternity, according to Nicholas's terminology. See, above, n. 39 and n. 44.

99. See n. 91 above.

100. *DI* III, 3 (198). *DC* II, 14 (143:8-10). *VS* 20 (56:16-17). *VS* 32 (95:9-12). *LG* II (105:8). *Sermo* I (14:1-6). *Sermo* II (5:11-13). *Sermo* XXII (32-33). *Sermo* XXX (8:1-2 and 9:4-5). *Sermo* XLV (5:1). *Sermo* CXXII (2:17-19). *Sermones*, p, Vol. II, ff. 57<sup>r</sup>, 93<sup>r</sup>, 112<sup>r</sup>, 163<sup>r</sup>. Aquinas, *ST* I, 91, 1c.

101. According to Nicholas there is no world-soul as such. He seems to favor identifying as *nature* or *world-force* that which some men call world-soul. *LG* I (43:16-17). *DI* II, 9 (148-150). *DI* II, 10 (153-154). *DC* II, 10 (123-124). *DM* 13 (145-147). *DB* 36-37. *DP* 12:14-18. However, nature is directed by Divine Intelligence. See the passage marked by n. 89 above.

102. *De Theologicis Complementis* 5:10-12.

103. *DI* II, 9 (142:1-5).

104. *LG* I (37, end).

105. That is, animals of the same species have the same specific soul, the same nature—as do plants of the same species. These souls are, however, numerically distinct. Nicholas regards numerical distinctions within a species as accidental, i.e., as non-substantial, differentiations. (Cf. *De Theologicis Complementis* 10:50-53.) No two things can differ in number alone [*VS* 13 (35:10-13)]. See n. 102 of Notes to *De Venatione Sapientiae* in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]*, *op. cit.* (n. 9 above). See also n. 26 above, as well as Nicholas's example, in *DM* 15 (143-144), of the voices and of the candles.

106. "However ... differ": literally, "However, they all [*omnes*] differ accidentally."

107. Man is a *parvus mundus*—or, as earlier expressed, a *microcosmos*. See the references in n. 100 above.

108. "... the whole man..." ("*totus homo*"): i.e., the whole human nature (which consists of a body and a soul), since in the purposeful movement of a hand the rational soul is also manifested.

109. Here Nicholas clearly allies himself with Renaissance humanism.

110. See n. 53 above.

111. "... stops being a man (*homo*):" i.e., stops being a whole man, a *totus homo*.

112. See n. 101 and n. 103 above, as well as the passage marked by n. 112 below.

113. "... whose hair and nails continue to grow": This is a common misimpression that arises from the fact that a corpse's skin shrinks, giving the appearance of longer nails and hair.

114. *DC* II, 14-17. *DVD* 7 (26-28). *VS* 20. Man is a kingdom (*regnum*) or a region (*regio*).

115. "... in the universal world": i.e., in the universe, or what Cusa earlier called *magnus mundus* [*LG* I (42)].

116. See n. 84 above. See also the passage marked by n. 88 above.

117. *DM* 13 (147-148). *CA* I, 20 (82-85). *De Genesi* 3 (163-164). *Sermo* XXII (23:12-15 and 27-30). *Sermo* XXX (8:3-7).

118. "... which is equal to the Concept": i.e., which is, equally, the Concept.

119. See n. 54 above.

120. In general, as also here, Nicholas uses "*possibilitas fieri*" and "*posse fieri*" interchangeably. By contrast with matter, God is all that which can be [*DI* I, 4 (12:4-5). *DP* 12. *VS* 13].

121. In *VS* 3 Nicholas teaches that *posse-fieri* is not *made* (either from itself or from anything else) but is created *ex nihilo*. Yet, since it will never come to an end, it is perpetual. See the other references in n. 54 above.

122. "... from a possible mode of being": i.e., from the mode of possible being." Regarding form in matter, cf. *DI* II, 8 (134-135).

123. Cf. *DB* 17:4-6. *DP* 12:19. *VS* 7 (18:18-19). *Sermo* XXXVIII (10:21-25). At *LG* I (48:10) I am following *Codex Latinus Cusanus* 219, which—as it seems to me—rightly does not have the word "*non*" ("not") in the phrase "*quae causat aliquid*". With the addition of the word "*non*" ("*quae non causat aliquid*") the passage would read: "... and of matter itself, which does not cause anything, since it is not anything." However, just one line earlier [*LG* I (48:9)] Nicholas accepts the view that material cause is a cause. (And, thus, "*non*" is not omitted by *Codex Cusanus* but is added by *Codex Latinus Cracoviensis* 682.) Cf. *DC* II, 6 (101). *VS* 39 (123:7).

Regarding God as tricausal: Nicholas ascribes this view even to Aristotle. See Cusa, *Sermones*, p. Vol. II, f. 134<sup>r</sup>, lines 3 to 1 from bottom.

124. All material objects have their corresponding exemplar, so to speak, in the Mind of God. Yet, strictly speaking, these "exemplars" are only a single Exemplar, viz., the Word (or Son) of God. See the references in n. 47 of Notes to *De Beryllo* in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]*, *op. cit.* (n. 9 above). See also n. 29 above, as well as n. 25 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*.


By calling material objects images of their exemplars, Nicholas does not mean to deny that they are substances, having their own essential forms. In other words, Nicholas's referring to the exemplar as the material object's true nature does not imply that material objects have no respective nature of their own and are but accidents, differing from one another only non-essentially since God—the Being of beings and the Essence of essences—is their common and sole Essence. See my "Nicholas of Cusa and John Wenck's Twentieth-Century Counterparts," pp. 3-38 in my *Miscellany on Nicholas of Cusa* (Minneapolis: Banning, 1994).

125. See n. 53 of Notes to *De Beryllo* in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]*, *op. cit.* (n. 9 above). Cf. Anonymous, *Liber de Causis* XXIII (XXIV), 179, first two lines, *op. cit.* (n. 89 above).

126. The one English word "enfoldedly" suffices to translate "*complicite et involute*" here at 49:2-3.

127. In this passage John uses both the singular "I" and the plural "we," indicating that others besides himself are present with the Cardinal. See n. 3 and n. 25 above.

128. Nicholas makes clear that there is one large circle that includes within itself nine other circles and that all the circles have a common center. Cf. *LG* II (72:12-14) and (104:14-24), as well as *LG* II (77) and (78). The center is not itself one of the circles, except in the sense that the tenth circle's circumference coincides with its



center. Since the tenth circle's circumference coincides with its center, Nicholas sometimes speaks of only nine circles (as at 70:3-4). Following this scheme, he is able to contrive special symbolic meanings for both nine and ten. See the last sentence of n. 322 below. *Codex Latinus Cusanus* 219 contains no diagram; and the diagram in *Codex Latinus Cracoviensis* 682 is not by Cusanus himself. The diagram above is my own.

129. Why does Nicholas give the number of years of Christ's life as 34 instead of as (the traditional) 33? This number is especially curious given that Nicholas founded his hospice for 33 elderly men, a number that accords, he tells us, with the number of the years of Christ's life. Gerda von Bredow suggests the following answer: "Die 34 Lebensjahre Christi sind aus der alten Zählweise zu verstehen, die Anfang und Ende mitzählt. So sprechen wir noch von '8 Tagen' und meinen eine Woche von 7 Tagen" [p. 107, n. 91 of her German translation *Vom Globusspiel* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952)].

130. Philippians 2:6-7.

131. I Peter 2:21.

132. John 14:2.

133. I Timothy 2:5.

134. I Peter 2:21.

135. John 14:6. Titus 1:2. Numbers 23:19.

136. Gerda von Bredow rightly points us to Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* XIII, 7 for an understanding of this otherwise bizarre-seeming Cusan passage [Bredow, p.

- 107, n. 96 of her translation entitled *Vom Globusspiel*, *op. cit.* (n. 129 above)].
137. Galatians 2:20.
138. I John 2:15.
139. Galatians 6:14.
140. Romans 6:11.
141. Matthew 16:24.
142. Matthew 11:30.
143. Nicholas here mentions the three “theological virtues,” indicated in I Corinthians 13:13.
144. Contrast Hebrews 11:16.
145. See my article “Die Tugenden in der Sicht des Nikolaus von Kues. Ihre Vielfalt, ihr Verhältnis untereinander und ihr Sein. Erbe und Neuanatz,” *MFCG* 25 (1999), 9-37.
146. *LG* I (20-21).
147. “... the curvature of his bowling-ball”: i.e., the imperfect curvature thereof—imperfect because of the concavity of a portion of the ball and because of the lopsided weight-condition resultant therefrom.
148. The Latin word “*fortuna*” is here translated as chance, luck, fortune.
149. “... it is not chance...”: i.e., it is not chance, although it may involve some element of chance....
150. The King James translation of Romans 7:5 has the wonderful metaphor “the motions of sins.”
151. It is unclear in what respect the universe is supposed to be free, even granting that Nicholas is taking a non-mechanistic, quasi-Aristotelian view of the heavens.
152. “... in a smaller world”: i.e., in man, the microcosm. *LG* I (42).
153. Virgil, *Aeneid* VIII, 334. See the secondary references given by Hans Senger on p. 63 of Vol. IX (*De Ludo Globi*) of *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1998).
154. *DI* II, 9 (142).
155. Cf. *LG* I (40).
156. *LG* I (40).
157. See the references in n. 84 above.
158. *DM* 4 (78:1-7). *PF* 16 (59:10-15). *De Aequalitate* 13. *VS* 20 (57). *Compendium* 6 (17:17-22). *Sermo* XL (7:19-29). *Sermo* LI (8). *Sermones*, p, Vol. II, f. 173<sup>v</sup>, lines 9-17, f. 175<sup>v</sup>, lines 8-22. Cf. n. 354 below and n. 75 above. See also Albertus Magnus, *De Bono* V, 1, 1, solutio [p. 263, lines 19-83 of Vol. XXVIII, edited by Heinrich Kühle *et al.* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1951) in the series *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*]. See also Klaus Kremer, “Das kognitive und affektive Apriori bei der Erfassung des Sittlichen,” *MFCG* 26 (2000), 101-144.
159. Thomas Aquinas, *ST* Ia-IIae, 94, 2c.
160. *LG* I (43:5-14).
161. “... enters the circle”: i.e., enters somewhere within the area encompassed by the largest of the ten circles of the game.
162. See the diagram that is referred to in n. 128 above.
163. In this Latin sentence (59:1-4) the word “*qui*” at 59:3 refers to *motus humanus*—and thus indirectly to *homo*, so that the translation “... through the practice

of virtue a man can bring his own rolling-movement to a halt...” would not be wrong.

164. Hebrews 13:5. Joshua 1:5.

165. Romans 9:5.

166. Appended to *De Ludo Globi* I are sixty-six lines-of-verse that were written by someone other than Nicholas of Cusa. I do not translate them here. See Karl Bormann, “Nicolaus Cusanus als Poet?” *Mittelateinisches Jahrbuch*, 20 (1985), 184-192. See also pp. XXVII - XXIX of *Dialogus de Ludo Globi*, *op. cit.* (n. 1 above) and my note 361 below..

167. In *Codex Latinus Cusanus* 219 the incipit reads: “Dialogi de ludo Globi secundus liber incipit. Interloquutores Albertus adolescens dux Bavarie et Nicolaus Cardinalis, etc.” The Latin name “Albertus” corresponds to the English Name “Albert” and to the German names “Albert” and “Albrecht”.

168. Albert (Albrecht) IV of Munich was slightly over 15 years old at the time of this conversation. See the reference (in n. 2 above) to Erich Meuthen’s article.

169. “... have come here”: viz., to Rome.

170. Pius II (Enea Silvio Piccolomini) was pope from August 19, 1458 until his death on August 15, 1464.

171. The relative mentioned is Duke John of Mosbach. See n. 2 above.

172. See n. 128 above.

173. The Region of Life, or Kingdom of Life, is symbolized by the area within the largest of the ten circles. Since the circles are concentric, this area includes the areas of the other circles. The Cardinal addresses this topic in *LG* II (68-69).

174. Father and son both have the name Albert (Albrecht). Albert III of Munich was Count Palatine and Duke of Bavaria. See p. XXX of *Dialogus de Ludo Globi*, *op. cit.* (n. 1 above).

175. “... my intelligence” (*ingenium*): in the sense, that is, of my degree of smartness. See, above, n. 36 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*.

176. Cf. *DP* 9.

177. See n. 124 above.

178. The exemplifications are, in the respect that is under consideration, neither greater nor lesser than their exemplar. (That is, they do not fail to exemplify it because of some excess or defect on their part.) However, in another respect, the exemplification is less perfect, and therefore lesser, than is its exemplar.

179. “... naturally precedes”: i.e., ontologically precedes.

180. *VS* 21 (59:10). See the references in n. 165 of Notes to *De Venatione Sapientiae* in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]*, *op. cit.* (n. 9 above).

181. Cf. Anselm’s reasoning about natures, in *Monologion* 4.

182. See the text marked by n. 234 below. See also *Ap.* 16:24 - 17:2. *VS* 21 (61). *Sermo* CCXVI (7:1-4).

183. *LG* II (79:11-12). Although *unitas* (oneness) is not a number but is the enfolding-beginning, or enfolding-source, of all number, nevertheless for purposes of enumerating, the unit (*unitas*) is regarded as a number. *DI* I, 5 (14:1-8). Boethius, *De Institutione Arithmetica* I, 23. Note Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica* I, 4, 13 [p. 66, lines 68-70 of Vol. XVI, 1 (edited by B. Geyer, 1960) in the series *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia* (Münster: Aschendorff): *Secundum Pythagoricos primi numeri “sunt unitas et binarius, quia unitas est principium numeri et binarius est principium pluralitatis.”* See

also his *Metaphysica* V, 1, 10 (*ibid.*, 231<sup>b</sup> through 233<sup>b</sup>).

184. “In existentibus estne ipsum esse?” No technical philosophical distinction between *being* and *existing* is implied here.

185. Here (66:9) the Latin in Vol. IX of *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1998) needs to be corrected to read: “CARDINALIS: Nonne quae existunt in ipso esse existunt?”

186. *DM* 10 (127:13-14). See n. 124 above.

187. “... the absolute”: i.e., that which is uncontracted, though not necessarily uncontracted in every respect. For example, humanity (i.e., human nature) may be contracted to Socrates or to Plato or to Aristotle, etc. But considered in itself humanity is uncontracted to anyone. Nevertheless, it is not absolutely uncontracted, because it is *humanity* (and not, for instance, horseness or dogness, etc.). Only God is absolutely uncontracted—i.e., is without differentiation, finite determination, or restriction to *this* or to *that*. *DI* II, 9 (148:8 and 150:7-10). Only an infinite being can be absolutely uncontracted.

188. Here Nicholas makes a “modern” distinction between imagining and conceiving. But cf. n. 269 below.

189. *DI* I, 18 (53:15-16). Although in many respects Nicholas’s metaphysics agrees with that of Aristotle, his representation of Aristotle is not always accurate and his adherence to Aristotle’s teachings is highly selective. See n. 124 of my *Nicholas of Cusa: on God as Not-other* (Minneapolis: Banning, 3rd ed., 1987). See also n. 63 above.

190. “... of all its powers” (“*omnium virium et potentiarum suarum*”): The single English word “powers”—here and in the remainder of the sentence—sufficiently translates the two Latin words “*vires*” and “*potentiae*”.

191. “... most wise knowledge” [*scientia sapidissima*]: This most wise (*sapidissima*) knowledge is at the same time a most appetizing (*sapidissima*) knowledge. Cf. *LG* II (70:9), where wisdom (*sapientia*) is understood to be *sapida scientia*. The same expression occurs in *VS*, prologue (1:19). Cf. *VS* 15 (44:1). *VS* 18 (53:8). Cf. *Sermo* XXIV (25:1-4). See especially *Sermones, p*, Vol. II, f. 179<sup>f</sup>, lines 14 to 13 from bottom.

192. “... a fixed disposition”: i.e., a *habitus*.

193. “... this Region of living things”: See n. 173 above. Nicholas now begins to answer the question posed by Albert in his first speech..

194. John 14:6.

195. “... symbolized by the figure that you see to be round”: i.e., symbolized by the largest circle—and the nine enclosed concentric circles—of the game.

196. *LG* I (21:15-16).

197. *DP* 18-19.

198. “... nine circles”: i.e., nine circles in addition to the tenth, and innermost, circle, so that altogether there are ten circles. See the last sentence in *LG* II (72). See also n. 128 above.

199. See n. 191 above.

200. John 14:6. John 14:9.

201. John 14:6. John 10:9.

202. John 8:44. Revelation 12:9.

203. John 10:30. John 14:10. John 14:20. John 17:21.

204. See n. 173 above.
205. Luke 1:79. Job 10:21. Psalms 106:10 (107:10). And so on.
206. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* XII, 7, 16 (PL 34:459).
207. *LG* II (76:7-8). *LG* II (106). *DC* I, 7 (29:2-3).
208. See n. 128 above.
209. No two things differ in number alone. See n. 102 of Notes to *De Venatione Sapientiae* in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]*, *op. cit.* (n. 9 above). See also *Sermo* XXII (24:4-6).
210. Nicholas sometimes—as at 41:8 and 49:4—uses “*unus,-a,-um ... alius,-a,-ud*” to mean “the one ... the other [of two]”. (See, especially, 49:4.) It would not be incorrect to use that translation here (“the one eye ... the other eye”).
211. See, above, the references in n. 141 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*.
212. Matthew 22:2-4.
213. See the title of *DVD* 21 and the title of *CA* III, 19.
214. I Timothy 2:5.
215. John 10:10.
216. *LG* II (67).
217. The nine circumferences are the circumferences of the nine concentric circles surrounding the innermost—or tenth—circle, whose circumference coincides with its center, which is also the common center of all the circles.
218. *LG* II (72:12-13 and 77:6-7 and 89:13-14).
219. Neither in this late work nor in the early work *DI*—nor at any time—is Nicholas a functionalist, as Heinrich Rombach maintains that he is. See Chap. 3 (“Nicholas of Cusa and Functionalist Ontology”) of my *Nicholas of Cusa’s Metaphysic of Contraction* (Minneapolis: Banning, 1983). See also n. 189 above.
220. Nicholas is referring to his use of ten circles as a symbolic representation.
221. *DC* II, 16 (160:8-12). Angels are also called *mentes caelestes* or *supernae mentes*. *DM* 14 (154:1). *De Theologicis Complementis* 9:61.
222. “... ‘the Messenger [Cusa: *angelus*] of great counsel’”: Isaiah 9:6 [Septuagint: ἄγγελος]. Some printings of the Septuagint have this verse as 9:5.
223. The Center is symbolized by the common center of the ten concentric circles. The tenth circle, where, symbolically, the Throne of Christ is situated, is such that center and circumference coincide. See n. 128 above.
224. See the references in n. 218 above.
225. See, above, n. 402 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*. Regarding the hierarchy of powers, cf. *LG* II (104) and *De Concordantia Catholica* I, 7, 40.
226. “... natural succession”: i.e., ontological successiveness, or ontological subordination.
227. See, above, n. 99 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*. Cusa’s use of the word “eternal” is very loose. (See, above, n. 39, n. 41, and n. 44.)
228. See n. 226 above.
229. The tenth ordering corresponds to the tenth, and smallest, circle of the bowling-game. There are ten circles and not just nine, even though the tenth circle is such that its circumference coincides with the center, which is its center, as well as being the common center of the other nine circles. See the passages marked by n. 208 and n. 128 above. See also *LG* II (79:5-6), where the minimum circle (i.e., the tenth circle) is called a circle and not just a point.



Each of the three orders of angels contains three choirs, with the result that there are nine divisions, or orderings, of angels.

230. God's theophany, or manifestation, is Christ. See the references in n. 200 and n. 203 above.

231. Christ, who is the Center of the Kingdom of Life, is likened to the sun. Cf. *LG II* (72:1-12). *LG II* (69:10). *DC II*, 13 (136:5-6).

232. See, above, n. 302 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*. See also *DC II*, 6 (103:1-8).

233. *LG II* (106). *DC I*, 3. *DC I*, 13 (66).

234. *DI II*, 3 (105:14-16). See the text marked by n. 182 above. See also n. 183 above.

235. See the references in n. 209 above. See also *De Theologicis Complementis* 3:6-11.

236. See the text marked by n. 245 below. If there are two or more things, then it must be the case that they differ more than just numerically. See n. 209 above.

237. See, above, the references in n. 12 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*.

238. Neither of the two mss. has a question mark here, although the Paris edition (1514) and the Heidelberg edition (1998) editorially add one. The Cardinal goes on to disagree with Albert's assertion here. I have no objection to adding the question mark, although to do so is not necessary. (A similar point applies to John's first speech at *LG I* (53), where the mss. have no question mark but where one might acceptably be added editorially, although to do so would not be necessary.)

239. See n. 29 above, together with its links.

240. "... exemplars of all things": i.e., concepts for all things. These concepts are innately present in the mind only as potential concepts, which in the course of experience the mind *makes* to be actual. The mind, however, never innately has actual concepts for each and every thing, nor does it ever actually come to know all things. So when Nicholas writes, a few lines later, that the mind "has all things within its knowledge," he means that "*omnia quae sunt, intelligibilia sunt, sicut omnia colorata sunt visibilia*" [*LG II* (119:8-9)]. But no human being ever actually sees all visible things; similarly, no purely human being ever actually conceives all conceivable things or ever actually knows all knowable things [*VS* 29 (88:7-8). *DP* 41:16-19] or ever actually understands all understandable things. Even in the next life—when believers will have become confirmed as true sons of God and will have become intellects having universal knowledge, this universal knowledge will fall infinitely short of being omniscience; for omniscience is an attribute rightly ascribable, though in a symbolic way, only to God. [See *De Filiatione Dei* 2 (58) - 3 (62).] Cf. the passage marked by n. 279 below.

241. "... the Being of beings": *DC I*, 5 (20). See also the reference in n. 237 above. God is also called the Not-being of not-being. *NA*, Propositions (115:5).

242. *LG II* (93:17-18). *DM* 7 (99:4-10). *DB* 7.

243. "... entities of reason": i.e., concepts.

244. *DI II*, 2 (98:11-15).

245. See n. 236 above and the text marked by it.

246. *DI II*, 2 (99:6-13). *De Dato* 2 (99). See the reference in n. 211 above, as well as the passage marked by the note.

247. *DI I*, 9 (26). *DC I*, 1 (6).

248. *DI* I, 8 (22). *DI* II, 7 (129:3-4). But cf. *VS* 21 (59:21 - 60:2). See also *VS* 24 (72:6-9). See the passage marked by n. 278 below. See the additional references, above, in n. 33 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*. Note also Thierry of Chartres, *Lectiones in Boethii Librum de Trinitate* VII, 5 in Nikolaus M. Häring, editor, *Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1971)].

249. *VS* 21 (61).

250. That is, a plurality of beings, qua plurality, has from oneness that it be a plurality united by oneness.

251. When Nicholas uses “oneness,” “equality of oneness,” and “union of oneness and of equality of oneness” to refer symbolically to the Divine Trinity, the word “*hypostases*” signifies the three *persons* in God. When Nicholas is referring to the image-of-Triunity that characterizes each created being (because each consists of a oneness, an equality, and a union), then “*hypostases*” signifies the fact that oneness, equality, and union are equal *bases* of any created being.

252. Here Nicholas allies himself against the Neoplatonic doctrine of degrees of existing. There are, he holds, only degrees of perfection of being. Contrast someone such as Anselm of Canterbury, who maintains that a horse *exists* more than does a stone (*Monologion* 31).

253. I am reading, here at 82:24, “*entitatis*” (with Codex Cracow 682) in place of “*entitas*” (as found in Codex Cusanus 219).

254. Nicholas uses this symbolism throughout his works—for example, in *DI* I, 9 (26). *DC* I, 1 (6). *DM* 6 (95:13-19). *PF* 8 (22:6-9). *PF* 8 (23). *CA* II, 7 (104-105). *VS* 24. *Sermo* XXXVII (5:6-26). *Sermo* XL (6:4-17). The symbolism is borrowed, ultimately, from Augustine’s *De Doctrina Christiana* I, 5, 5 (*PL* 34:21), perhaps by way of Thierry of Chartres’ commentaries on Boethius. [See Häring, *op. cit.* (n. 248 above), p. 224.] See also, in Häring, p. 306—in particular, the anonymous *Tractatus de Trinitate* 12. From Thierry of Chartres and his school Nicholas also borrows the terminology of *deus ut* (1) *forma essendi*, (2) *complicatio omnium rerum*, (3) *forma formarum*, (4) *essentia omnium*, and (5) *aequalitas essendi*. In referring to the Platonists, Nicholas is, sometimes at least, referring to the twelfth-century School of Chartres and its associates.

255. “... *united with the equality*”: i.e., united with the equality of the equal line-lengths, or radii.

256. *DI* II, 11 (157:23-26). *DI* II, 12 (162:15-17). Pseudo-Hermes Trismegistus, *Liber XXIV Philosophorum*, Proposition II [p. 208 of *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*, Vol. 25, Heft 1/2 (1927)], in the section entitled “Das pseudo-hermetische ‘Buch der vierundzwanzig Meister’ (Liber XXIV philosophorum),” by Clemens Baeumker.

257. “... there is not ... a plurality of points”: *DI* II, 3 (105:17-25). *DM* 9 (118). *LG* I (10:8-9).

258. *PF* 8 (23:15-18). *DVD* 14 (64). *Compendium* 10 (30:9). *Sermo* CCXII (11:13-16). *Sermones*, p, Vol. II, f. 56<sup>r</sup>, lines 17-18.

259. Here (87:1-2) the Latin text reads: “*Esto igitur ens esse omnium existentium complicationem.*” Although Nicholas does sometimes refer to God as *ens* and as *ens entium* [e.g., *Sermones*, p, Vol. II, f. 128<sup>r</sup>, lines 4-5, and *DI* II, 7 (130:14-15)], he is not here using “*ens*” to signify God. Cf. *DI* II, 4 (116:14-25) and II, 5 (117:7-

8) and II, 5 (118). Note also Anonymous, *Liber de Causis* IV, 37. (See the publication data in n. 262 below.) At times, Nicholas refers to God also as *entitas* and as *esse ipsum*.

260. Being itself (*entitas*) here refers to God.

261. "... although [finite] being": "*licet ens ipsum ...*" (87:4). The entire passage, from 87:1 to 87:8 reads (as punctuated by me): "Esto igitur ens esse omnium existentium complicationem. Tunc, cum nullum ens sit nisi in ipso sit entitas, certissimum esse vides deum—eo ipso quod entitas est in ente—esse in omnibus. Et licet ens ipsum in omnibus quae sunt videatur, non est tamen nisi unum ens, sicut de uno et puncto dictum est. Nec aliud est dicere deum esse in omnibus quam quod entitas est in ente, omnia complicante. Sic optime ille vidit qui dixit: Quia deus est, omnia sunt." Cf. *DI* II, 4 (116:22-25). *DI* II, 5 (118:8-17).

262. Anonymous, *The Book of Causes (Liber de Causis)*, XVII (XVIII), 143 [translated from Latin by Dennis J. Brand (Marquette, WI: Marquette University Press, 1984 (revised edition))]: "All things [are] beings [*entia*] because of the First Being, all <living > things are self-moving because of the First Life, and all intelligible things have knowledge because of the First Intelligence." ["Res omnes entia propter ens primum, et res vivae omnes sunt motae per essentiam suam propter vitam primam, et res intellectibiles omnes habent scientiam propter intelligentiam primam." *Liber de Causis*, Latin text edited by Adriaan Pattin and published in *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* (Louvain), Vol. 28 (March, 1966), pp. 90-203.] Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio in Libro de Causis*, Lectio XVIII [Vol. XXI (1949) of *Sancti Thomae ... Opera Omnia* (New York: Musurgia Publishers)]: "Et hoc idem dicitur in libro [Elementationis Theologicae] Proculi centesimasecunda propositione sub his verbis: Omnia quidem, qualitercumque entia, ex fine sunt et infinito et propter primum ens" (p. 746<sup>a</sup>). "Sed secundum Dionysium, primum ens et prima vita et primus intellectus sunt unum et idem, quod est Deus" (p. 746<sup>b</sup>). See also *VS* 12 (31:9-10) and its context. Cf. *DVD* 12 (50:15-16). *Sermo* CCXVI (4:34-35).

263. That is, you are mistaken about the opposition (but not about the fact that creatures have a beginning).

264. Latin: "*Sed dum attendis quod numquam verum fuit dicere deum fuisse quin et creaturae essent ...*" Regarding Nicholas's view of time and creation, see *Sermo* CCXVI (22-24).

265. The Straßburg, Paris, and Heidelberg editions rightly add, editorially, the words "*vides deum ante creaturas non proprie dici fuisse*".

266. Indeed, since "existed" is a verb of past tense, it is a temporal verb, presupposing time. Nicholas holds with Augustine that time was created together with the world. See n. 44 above.

267. Boethius, *De Consolatione Philosophiae* V, Prosa 6 (*PL* 63:858).

268. Plato, *Timaeus* 37D.

269. Here Nicholas seems at first not to be true to his earlier distinction between imagining and conceiving. (See n. 188 above.) He should say, it seems, that we cannot *imagine* eternity except as endless duration, although we can *conceive of* it as non-temporal. Yet, what he means is that although we can *conceive that* eternity is non-temporal, we cannot *conceive of* it (positively) except in terms of endless successive-ness. Anselm held [*De Concordia* I, 5 (S II, 254:19-26)] that we can conceive it, to some extent positively, according to a likeness with our unchanging temporal past.

270. "... naturally precedes": i.e., ontologically precedes.
271. From images are derived concepts of essences; according to Nicholas and Pseudo-Dionysius and others, essences are incorruptible. See, above, n. 93 and the text that is marked by it.
272. E.g., in *DM* 4 and 5 Nicholas discusses the cognitive need for images and discusses the relationship between images and concepts. Regarding the "vaulting use" of images, see the example of the map-maker in *Compendium* 8.
273. *DC* I, 9 (39).
274. Psalms 98:1 (99:1).
275. See the references in n. 218 and n. 233 above.
276. *LG* II (80:9-12). *DM* 7 (99:7-10).
277. See n. 87 above.
278. See the references in n. 248 above.
279. See n. 240 above.
280. In this way the rational soul imitates God, who is the Enfolding of enfoldings [*LG* II (86:10-12)].
281. *Sermo* CCXVI (5). Cf. Augustine, *Confessiones* XI, 16 and 20. The present is now; the past is no longer now; the future is not yet now.
282. *DM* 7 (98:12-15). See, above, n. 21 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*.
283. *DM* 15.
284. Aristotle's ten categories are here said to be enfolded in the rational soul's conceptual power. It does not follow, however, that the categories—some of them, at least—do not also characterize objects independently of the human mind. On Nicholas's view, substantial things are substances even apart from the human mind. And apart from the human mind they continue to have location and size and quantity and relation, for example. See n. 303 of Notes to *De Venatione Sapientiae* in my *Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One], op. cit.* (n. 9 above). See also *DM* 10 (128:15-18). *DM* 11 (135).
285. *DM* 11 (133), including n. 117 of Notes to *Idiota de Mente* in my *Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge* (Minneapolis: Banning, 1996).
286. Throughout his works Nicholas mentions a number of *a priori* logical principles—such as that (1) each thing either is or is not the case [*Compendium* 11 (36:8)], (2) nothing can be the cause of itself [*Sermo* XL (5:9)], (3) oneness ontologically precedes multiplicity [*LG* II (64:3-4)], (4) the part is not known unless the whole is known [*DM* 10 (127:3-4)], and (5) what is caused cannot know itself if its Cause remains unknown [*DP* 38:13-14].
287. See pp. 38-39 of the Introduction in my *Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge, op. cit.* (n. 285 above).
288. "... time ... the measure of motion": *LG* I (18:19-20). See the reference in n. 48 above.
289. Nicholas does not teach that plurality and change depend upon the rational soul. [*DM* 6 (92:25 - 93:16)]. Time depends upon change, since time is the measure of change. However, the human mind constructs its own measuring-scale of one kind or another (e.g., years, months, days, hours, minutes, seconds). Time qua measure depends upon the rational soul in the sense that the increments as marked off by the human mind will no longer be marked off as such without the human mind. However, angelic beings—who are not souls and, therefore, not rational souls—will

still be beings who can learn and who can experience succession and who can measure motion. Finally, God Himself can measure change, even though He is (on the medieval view) absolutely unchanged and unchangeable. See Albert of Saxony's discussion of whether time exists apart from the soul: Book IV, Question 16 of his *Acutissimae Quaestiones super Libros de Physica Auscultatione* [A commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*], Venice, 1516. Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Physica* IV, 3, 3.

290. Since God is the Creator of really existent things, the existence and multiplicity of these things do not depend upon the human mind. See the passage marked by n. 241 and n. 242 above.

291. "... antecedently to time": i.e., ontologically prior to time.

292. "... is not ... subjected to time": i.e., is not such that it will come to an end in time, is not such as to be limited in time.

293. See n. 39 above.

294. "... naturally precedes": i.e., ontologically precedes.

295. The soul is unitary in that the vegetative and perceptual powers are a unity with the more perfect rational power, so that there is but one soul in each man. Nicholas also emphasizes the unity of soul and body [DC II, 10 (121). *Sermo* CCVI-II (2:8-11). But cf. n. 91 above.].

296. *LG* I (38).

297. *DVD* 23 (103:1-3). Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 24, 2 (*PL* 41:432-433).

298. Calama is the present-day city of Guelma in Algeria.

299. See, above, n. 36 and the passage marked by it.

300. Medieval philosophers adopted from Augustine (*De Libero Arbitrio* II, 19) and Anselm (*De Libertate Arbitrii*) the distinction between having an ability and using (or not using) it.

301. The indisposition of sight to distinguish objects or to distinguish them clearly occurs, for example, when the eyelids are closed or when one is in a state of darkness or when one's eyes are flooded with tears or when one looks at very intense light.

302. "... just as the eye": i.e., just as a healthy eye ....

303. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* XII, 7 (1072<sup>a</sup>24 - 1072<sup>b</sup>4). Nicholas means that the soul qua substance is not changed, does not perish.

304. See, above, n. 101 and n. 103, as well as the passage marked by n. 112.

305. See n. 54 above.

306. *DI* II, 13 (179:7-10). *DI* III, 10 (240:7-9). *DVD* 16 (72-73). *Sermo* XXXII (6:6-8). *Sermones*, p, Vol. II, f. 119<sup>v</sup>, lines 11-10 from bottom, and f. 159<sup>r</sup>, lines 10-11, and f. 169<sup>r</sup>, line 20.

307. The bodily instruments are the eyes, ears, feet, etc. Imagination and memory are closely associated with the body but are mental powers, as are the power of sight, the power of hearing, etc. *DC* II, 14 (145:12-17).

308. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, opening sentence. Cusa, *DC* I, 1 (5:19-20). *De Sapientia* I (9:3-4). *PF* 6 (16:7-8). *DB* 65:3-5. *VS* 12 (32:10-13). *Compendium* 2 (4:13). *Sermones*, p, Vol. II, f. 104<sup>r</sup>, line 10 from bottom. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 9, 26 (*PL* 32:1255).

309. Nicholas accepts the principle of sufficient reason, including the view that God Himself never acts without a reason. *DB* 51:12-19. *VS* 28 (83:11-12). *Sermones*, p, Vol. II, f. 80<sup>r</sup>, line 21.

310. I John 3:2.

311. The same example (viz., of passers-by) is used at *DC* II, 16 (157:15-16). *De Quaerendo Deum* 2 (33). *DVD* 22 (97:1-4). *Compendium* 13 (41:7-11).
312. Job 28:20-21. Isaiah 45:15. *Ap.* 4:13-14. *CA* II, 1 (88:15). *Sermo* XL (2:12-13).
313. Aristotle, *De Sophisticis Elenchis* 34 (183<sup>b</sup>22-25).
314. *DVD* 7 (23). *Sermo* III (24:26-28).
315. That is, the end-goal of the manifest is to disclose the hidden, and the end-goal of the extrinsic is to externalize the intrinsic.
316. The Power of powers is God. Regarding the ascending hierarchy of powers as rational, intelligential, and intellectible, cf. *LG* II (77).
317. "... the imaginative, or imagining, power" [*virtus imaginativa sive phantastica*]: Nicholas here uses "*phantastica*" pleonastically.
318. See the references in n. 100 above.
319. The Latin word "*ideo*" here at 105:8 is coordinated with "*quia*" in line 105:2.
320. *LG* II (76). *DC* I, 7 (29). Also see the references in n. 218 above.
321. See, above, the references in n. 233, as well as the text marked by it.
322. "... three such progressions": viz., three progressions of four terms that "lead up to" ten: 1, 2, 3, 4 and 4, 5, 6, 7 and 7, 8, 9, 10. All of Nicholas's numerology both in *LG* and in *DC* is contrived and tendentious.
323. Romans 13:1.
324. *LG* II (62:1-4).
325. "... this Order": viz., God.
326. See n. 183 above.
327. See n. 251 above.
328. That is, 4, 5, 6, and 7, when added together, make 22; and 5 plus 6 makes 11—which is half of 22. Similarly, 7, 8, 9, and 10, when added together, make 34; and 8 plus 9 makes 17—which is half of 34.
329. See, above, n. 22 of Notes to *De Coniecturis*. See also n. 333 below.
330. "... only of oneness and otherness": i.e., only of the unit and of another number. See note 10 on pp. 192-193 of the Heidelberg Academy's edition of *De Coniecturis* [*Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia*, Vol. III (Hamburg: Meiner, 1972), edited by Josef Koch, Karl Bormann, and Hans G. Senger]. In the present passage of *LG* (viz., 109:5-6), oddness corresponds to oneness (in the sense of the unit), whereas evenness corresponds to otherness, as Nicholas goes on to explain. Hence, here at 109:5-6 he might better have written "*ex impari et pari sive ex unitate et alteritate*" instead of "*ex pari et impari sive ex unitate et alteritate*".
331. Boethius, *De Institutione Arithmetica* I, 2. Cusa, *DM* 6 (96).
332. Boethius, *De Institutione Arithmetica* I, 2. Cusa, *VS* 23 (69-70).
333. *DC* I, 2 (8:19-22): "The number four is composed of three, which is odd, and of four, which is even. The fact that four seems to be combined from two twos is not to be attributed to the essence of the number four but to its quantity." Cf. Aquinas, *Expositio in XII Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* V, 16 [p. 417<sup>a</sup> in Vol. XX of *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis ... Opera Omnia*, edited by Vernon J. Bourke (New York: Musurgia, 1949): "Et huic concordat litera sequens, quae dicit, quod substantia cujuslibet numeri est id quod semel dicitur. Sicut substantia senarii est quod dicitur semel sex, non quod dicitur bis tria, vel ter duo: sed hoc pertinet ad ejus *quali-*

*tatem*" (my emphasis).

Since a quadrangle has four sides, it also has three sides and two sides and one side. Similarly, the number four has 4 united units and 3 united units and 2 united units and 1 unit. Thus, the number four is composed of 4 and 3 and 2 and 1—the “and” not being understood as additive. Since the number four is composed of itself and of the number three, it is composed of the even and the odd. Similarly, each number (except for the unit) is composed of itself and its predecessor. Thus, each number is composed of the even and the odd. Following Boethius, Nicholas speaks of the even and the odd as the substance of number (versus number’s quantity). See the first reference in n. 329 above.

334. “... of a divisible number”: i.e., of a number divisible into equal halves. Nicholas follows Boethius (*De Institutione Arithmetica* I, 3) in regard to the definition of “evenness” and “oddness”.

335. *DM* 6. See also *DC* I, 2 (8). *Sermones*, p, Vol. II, f. 119<sup>r</sup> & v.

336. Cf. *DP* 44:1-4.

337. “... nor can there be found”: i.e., nor can there be found among finite beings ....

338. “... in the Value of values”: i.e., in God.

339. Nicholas hereby indicates his own judgment about the value of the *idiota*, that is of the man who is without formal schooling but who nonetheless possesses a kind of wisdom and insight that often eludes the learned and erudite.

340. We must remember that included among the intellectual natures are not only human beings but also angels.

341. This is Nicholas’s basic point here. Without the intellect there would be no human or angelic knowledge of values. There would, however, still be value, and it would be recognized by the Divine Intellect.

342. Here and in the next sentence, Nicholas expresses himself misleadingly. Apart from finite intellects, value as it is appraised by such intellects would cease. But value as appraised by God would not cease.

343. “... all created things would be devoid of value”: i.e., would be devoid of recognized value—of value recognized by finite beings—since the human and the angelic measuring-scales of values would have ceased.

344. Note, importantly, that Nicholas does not assert that ‘if God had created the world without including in it intellectual nature, then the world would have been without value.’ He says, rather, that in *that* case the world would not have been *esteemed to be* of value. That is, no part of creation could have recognized its own value—something that, among finite beings, only the intellectual nature can do. (Here “intellectual nature” is used generally, so that no distinction is being made between *intellectual nature* and *rational nature*.) See the passage flagged by n. 347 below.

345. “... a banker” (*nummularius*): A *nummularius* is someone who is familiar with the different denominations of different currencies, someone who handles money-exchanges and money-conversions, and someone who loans money.

346. Wisdom 11:21. Cf. Cusa, *De Sapientia* I (5:10-11): “Brute animals cannot number, weigh, and measure.”

347. See, above, n. 341, n. 342, n. 343, and n. 344.

348. Matthew 22:20-21.

349. Here at 116:12 I am reading “*qui*” (as does the Paris edition) in place of “*quae*”.

350. Hebrews 1:3.

351. Psalms 4:7 (4:6). Quoted by Cusa also at *VS* 15 (42:4-5) and *Compendium* 10 (33:14-15).

352. John 14:9.

353. Regarding absolute possibility see *DI* II, 7-8.

354. Initially, the concepts of all things are present in the mind only potentially, in the sense that the mind has the *power* to make these concepts; in the course of experience some of them become actual. When Nicholas says, in *LG* I (28), that the rational soul “makes itself to be a likeness of all things knowable,” he means that the mind makes itself to be a likeness of whatever it knows and that it has the power to liken itself to whatever is knowable by it. He does not mean that the mind actually has concepts for all things. [Cf. Nicholas’s saying in *Sermo* XXII (17:4) “Nihil est, quod non recepimus,” which says “There is nothing which we have not received” but which means (as employed by Nicholas) “Whatever we have, we have received” (cf. I Corinthians 4:7).]

Not all concepts are derived from experience, since some are *a priori*. But even *a priori* concepts need the stimulus of experience in order to become actual. Propositions that are known to be true *a priori* are such that they are *recognized* to be true as soon as their concepts (which may be empirical) are understood. See especially *Compendium* 11 (36). See also the references in n. 158 above. Cf. the references in n. 75 above. Finally, note *LG* II (103:11-16).

355. Nicholas does not hold the modern period’s view that some portion of reality may escape all intelligibility. According to him some realities, and truths about reality, may *transcend* human and angelic understanding; but none of them are *opposed* to reason or to intellect. Although what God is is not knowable to finite beings, it is knowable by (and known to) God Himself. *DI* I, 26 (88:16-20). *CA* II, 1 (88:15-19). *Sermones*, p, Vol. II, f. 156<sup>v</sup>, lines 16-35.

356. *LG* I (8).

357. According to Cusa the intellect is a living mirror *reflecting* reality, not *constructing* it in some Kantian-like way. Of course, some fashioning—some comparing, measuring, compounding, abstracting, selecting—does occur in the forming of empirical concepts [Cf. *LG* I (28:5-6).] But, nonetheless, empirical concepts are said by Nicholas to be derived from sensory images, which are “likenesses” of material objects. And Nicholas does not consider *a priori* concepts to be Kantian-like categories.

358. Innate to the intellect is the *power* of knowing the coins, not the *knowledge* of the coins. Cf. n. 354 above.

359. E.g., in *LG* II (101).

360. See n. 354 above.

361. Appended to *De Ludo Globi* II are sixteen lines-of-verse that were written by someone other than Nicholas of Cusa. I do not translate them here. See n. 166 above.