

**COMPLETE PHILOSOPHICAL AND
THEOLOGICAL TREATISES
of
ANSELM of CANTERBURY**

Translated
by
JASPER HOPKINS
and
HERBERT RICHARDSON

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CHAPTER-TITLES
for
DE LIBERTATE ARBITRII

1. The ability to sin does not pertain to freedom of choice.
2. Nevertheless, the angel and the man sinned by means of this ability and by free choice; and although they were able to serve sin, sin was not able to master them.
3. How after [Satan and Adam] had made themselves servants of sin, they still had free choice. What free choice is.
4. How [Satan and Adam] have the ability to keep uprightness, which they do not have.
5. No temptation compels one to sin against his will.
6. How our will is powerful against temptations although it appears powerless against them.
7. How [the will] is stronger than temptation even when it is overcome by temptation.
8. Even God is not able to remove uprightness-of-will.
9. Nothing is more free than an upright will.
10. How one who sins is a servant of sin. It is a greater miracle when God restores uprightness to a will which has deserted it than when He restores life to the dead.
11. This servitude does not remove freedom of choice.
12. Why when a man *does not* have uprightness he is said to be free (on the ground that when he *does* have uprightness it cannot be taken away from him) rather than when he *does* have uprightness, being said to be a servant (on the ground that when he *does not* have uprightness he cannot recover it by himself).
13. The ability to keep uprightness-of-will for the sake of this uprightness itself” is the complete definition of “freedom of choice.”
14. The division of this same freedom.

FREEDOM OF CHOICE¹ (*De Libertate Arbitrii*)

CHAPTER ONE

The ability to sin does not pertain to freedom of choice.

Student. Since free choice seems to be opposed to the grace, predestination, and foreknowledge of God, I desire to know what freedom of choice is and whether we always have it. For if freedom of choice consists in being able to sin and not to sin (as some persons are accustomed to say) and if we always have this ability, how is it that we sometimes need grace? But if we do not always have this ability, why is sin imputed to us when we sin without a free choice?

Teacher. I do not think that freedom of choice is the ability to sin and not to sin. Indeed, if this were its definition, then neither God nor the angels who are not able to sin would have free choice—a blasphemous thing to say.

S. What if we say that the free choice of God and of the good angels is different from ours?

T. Although the free choice of men differs from that of God and of the good angels, nevertheless the definition of this freedom ought to be the same in both cases, in accordance with the name “freedom.” For example, although one animal differs from another either substantially or accidentally, the definition [of “animal”] is the same for all animals, in accordance with the name “animal.” Hence, it is necessary to give such a definition of “freedom of choice”—a definition which contains neither more nor less than freedom does. Therefore, since the free choice of God and of the good angels is not able to sin, “to be able to sin” does not pertain to the definition of “freedom of choice.” In fact, the ability to sin does not constitute either freedom or a part of freedom. To understand this point clearly, pay attention to what I am going to say.

S. That's the reason I am here.

T. Which will seems the more free to you: the will which so wills and is so able not to sin that it cannot at all be turned away

¹Written at Bec, probably between 1080-1085.

from the uprightness [*rectitudo*] of not sinning or the will which in some way is able to be turned to sinning?

S. I do not see why a will which has both abilities [viz., to sin and not to sin] is not the more free.

T. Don't you see that someone who so possesses what is fitting and advantageous that he cannot lose it is more free than someone else who possesses the same thing in such a way that he can lose it and can be induced to what is unfitting and disadvantageous?

S. I think that no one doubts this.

T. Will you admit that it is equally certain that sinning is always unfitting and harmful?

S. No one of sound mind thinks otherwise.

T. Then, the will which is not able to turn away from the uprightness of not sinning is more free than the will which is able to desert uprightness.

S. Nothing can more reasonably be asserted, it seems to me.

T. Do you think that something which if added decreases freedom and if subtracted increases it is either freedom or a part of freedom?

S. I am not able to think this.

T. Then, the ability to sin, which if added to the will decreases the will's freedom and if subtracted from the will increases its freedom, is neither freedom nor a part of freedom.

S. Nothing follows more logically.

CHAPTER TWO

Nevertheless, the angel and the man sinned
by means of this ability and by free choice;
and although they were able to serve sin,
sin was not able to master them.

T. Therefore, that which is so foreign to freedom does not pertain to freedom of choice.

S. I cannot at all contradict your reasoning. Yet, I am quite disturbed by the fact that in the beginning angelic nature and our nature had the ability to sin, without which neither would have sinned. If, then, each of these natures sinned by means of this ability which is so foreign to free choice, how shall we say that it

sinned by free choice? But if it did not sin by free choice, it is seen to have sinned of necessity. Surely [it sinned] either freely or of necessity. Now, if it sinned freely, how could it have failed to sin by free choice? Hence, if it did not sin by free choice, then surely it is seen to have sinned of necessity.

There is also something else which bothers me about this ability to sin. Someone who is able to sin is able to be the servant of sin since “He who does sin is the servant of sin.”¹ But whoever is able to be the servant of sin is able to be mastered by sin. So how is it that either of these natures was created free if sin was able to master it, or of what kind was that free choice which sin could master?

T. By means of an ability to sin, as well as freely and by free choice and of no necessity, our nature and angelic nature at first sinned and were able to serve sin. Nevertheless, sin was not able to master either nature so that the nature or its choice could be called unfree.

S. I need to have you disclose what you mean, for it is concealed from me.

T. The apostate angel [Satan] and the first man [Adam] sinned by free choice, for [each] sinned by his own choice, which was so free that it could not be compelled by any other thing to sin. Therefore, [each of them] is justly blamed because in spite of having this freedom of choice, each sinned freely and out of no necessity and without being compelled by anything else. However, each sinned by his own choice, which was free; but neither sinned by means of that in virtue of which his choice was free. That is, [neither sinned] by means of the ability in virtue of which he was able not to sin and not to serve sin; but [each sinned] by means of his ability to sin; and by means of this ability he was neither helped towards the freedom not to sin nor compelled into the service of sin.

But as for its seeming to you to follow that if either one were able to be a servant of sin, sin was able to master him and, thus, that neither he nor his choice was free: it is not true [that it follows. Consider,] for example, someone who has it in his power not to serve and whom no other power can force to serve, even

¹John 8:34.

though he can serve by his own power. As long as he uses not his power-to-serve but rather his power-not-to-serve, nothing can force him to serve. For example, even if a free rich man were able to make himself the servant of a poor man, nonetheless as long as he does not do this he is properly described as free, and the poor man is not said to be able to be his master (or if it is said, it is said improperly, because to master is not in the poor man's power but in the rich man's). Accordingly, nothing prevents the [apostate] angel and the [first] man, prior to sin, from having been free or from having had free choice.

CHAPTER THREE

How after [Satan and Adam] had made themselves servants of sin, they still had free choice. What free choice is.

S. You have convinced me that, before sin, nothing indeed prevented this [i.e., prevented Satan's and Adam's having had free choice]. But after they made themselves servants of sin, how is it that they were able to keep free choice?

T. Although they had subjected themselves to sin, they were not able to destroy their natural freedom of choice. However, they were able to cause themselves no longer to be able to use this freedom without a grace different from the grace they had originally possessed.¹

S. I believe, but I desire to understand.

T. Let us examine first the kind of freedom of choice they had before sin, when certainly they did have free choice.

S. I am expectantly awaiting this [examination].

T. For what end do you think they had that freedom of choice? Was it in order to obtain what they willed, or was it in order to will what they ought to will and what was advantageous for them to will?

S. To will what they ought to will and what was advantageous to will.

T. Therefore, the end for which they had freedom of choice is uprightness-of-will. For, surely, as long as they willed what they ought to have willed, they had uprightness-of-will.

S. That's right.

¹In the Latin text at S I, 210:30: "*non*" is to be deleted.

T. When we say that the end for which they had freedom is uprightness-of-will, there is still doubt unless we add a further point. So I ask: in what manner did they have this freedom whose end is uprightness-of-will? Did they have it (1) in order to acquire uprightness-of-will without anyone's giving it, since they did not yet have it, or (2) in order to receive the uprightness-of-will they did not yet have if it were given to them to have, or (3) in order to desert the uprightness-of-will they had received, and to recover it by themselves after they had deserted it, or (4) in order always to keep the uprightness-of-will they had received?

S. (NOT 1) I do not think they had freedom in order to acquire uprightness without anyone's giving it, because they were not able to have anything which they did not receive. (NOT 2) But because we must not believe that they were created without upright wills, we must not say that they had freedom in order to receive from a giver [the gift of the uprightness] that they did not yet have, in order that they might have it. Yet, we must not deny that they had the freedom to receive this same uprightness again if they deserted it and if it were returned to them by the one who originally gave it. (We often see evidence of this in men who are led back to justice from injustice by heavenly grace.)

T. It is true, as you say, that [Satan and Adam] were able to receive back the lost uprightness if it were given to them again. But we are asking about that freedom which they had before they sinned (when, no doubt, they had free choice), not about that freedom which no one would need if he had never deserted the truth.

S. Well then, I shall proceed to reply to what remains of your question. (NOT 3) It is not true that they had freedom in order to desert this uprightness, for to desert uprightness-of-will is to sin, and you have already shown that the ability to sin is neither freedom nor a part of freedom. Nor did they receive freedom in order to recover, by their own efforts, the uprightness they had deserted; for this uprightness was given to the end that it never be deserted. For the ability to recover uprightness-once-deserted would beget a negligence in keeping uprightness-already-possessioned. (4) Therefore, it follows that freedom of choice was given to rational nature in order to keep the uprightness-of-will which it had received.

T. You have given a good reply to my questions. But we must

still examine that on account of which rational nature was under obligation to keep this uprightness: Was it for the sake of the uprightness itself or was it for the sake of something else?

S. If freedom-of-choice had not been given to rational nature in order for it to keep uprightness-of-will for the sake of this uprightness itself, then freedom would not have been conducive to justice, since it is evident that justice is uprightness-of-will kept for its own sake. But we believe that freedom of choice is conducive to justice. Therefore, we must maintain incontrovertibly that rational nature did not receive freedom except in order to keep uprightness-of-will for the sake of this uprightness itself.

T. Accordingly, since all freedom is ability, that freedom of choice is the ability to keep uprightness-of-will for the sake of this uprightness itself.

S. It cannot be anything else.

T. So it is now clear that a free choice is nothing other than a choice which is able to keep uprightness-of-will for the sake of this uprightness itself.

S. This conclusion is certainly obvious. But as long as [choice] had this uprightness, it was able to keep what it had. However, after it has deserted uprightness, how is it able to keep what it does not have? Therefore, in the absence of the uprightness which can be kept, the free choice which is able to keep uprightness is also absent; for a choice is not able to keep what it does not have.

T. Even if uprightness-of-will is absent, rational nature still has without diminution what belongs to it essentially. For in my opinion we have no ability which by itself suffices to any actual deed; nevertheless, when those conditions are absent without which our abilities are not at all brought into operation, we are said to have these abilities in ourselves without diminution. Indeed, no instrument suffices by itself to accomplish anything; nevertheless, when those conditions are absent without which we cannot use the instrument, we say without falsity that we have the instrument for a given kind of work. I shall give you an example of this in one case so that you may notice it in many cases. No one who has sight is said to be altogether unable to see a mountain.

S. Surely, anyone who is unable to see a mountain has no sight.

T. So anyone who has sight has the ability and the instrument for seeing a mountain. However, if there is no mountain present

and you say to someone, “See the mountain,” he will answer: “I cannot, because there is no mountain here; but if there were a mountain here, I would be able to see it.” Likewise, if there were a mountain but were no light, he would answer the one instructing him to see the mountain: “I cannot, since there is no light here; but if there were light, I would be able [to see the mountain].” Or again, if a mountain and light are present to a man who has sight, but if something obstructs his sight—for example, if someone covers the man's eyes—then he will say that he is not able to see the mountain; but if nothing were blocking his sight, without doubt he would have the ability to see the mountain.

S. Everyone knows all this.

T. So don't you recognize that the power of seeing a material object is (1) one power in the one who sees, (2) another power in the object to be seen, and (3) still another power in the medium (i.e., neither in the one who sees nor in the object to be seen)? Moreover, that power which is in the medium is (3a) one power with respect to aiding [the seeing] and (3b) another power with respect to not impeding [the seeing], i.e., when nothing that could impede does impede.

S. I see this clearly.

T. Therefore, these capabilities are four in number. If any one of them is missing, the other three are not able to accomplish anything either singularly or collectively. Nevertheless, when other of the capabilities are absent, we do not deny that the man who has sight does have sight (i.e., the instrument or ability to see) or that the visible object is able to be seen or that light is able to aid sight.

CHAPTER FOUR

How [Satan and Adam] have the ability to keep uprightness,
which they do not have.

T. However, the fourth power [viz., 3b] is called a power improperly. For when what is accustomed to obstruct sight does not obstruct sight, then it is said to give the capability to see only because it does not remove the capability to see.

However, the power of seeing light consists only of three factors, for in this case what is seen and what aids sight are identical. Doesn't everyone know this?

S. Surely no one is ignorant of it.

T. Therefore, if there is no object nearby to be seen and if when we are placed in darkness and have our eyes closed or covered, we still have within us the ability to see any visible thing whatsoever, what prevents our having the ability to keep uprightness-of-will for the sake of this uprightness itself—even in the absence of this uprightness—as long as within us we have *reason*, by which to recognize it, and *will*, by which to hold it fast? For the previously mentioned freedom of choice consists of both of these.

S. You have convinced me that this ability to keep uprightness-of-will belongs always to rational nature, and that this ability was free in the choice of the first man and [in the choices] of the angels, from whom uprightness-of-will was not able to be removed against their wills.

CHAPTER FIVE

No temptation compels one to sin against his will.

S. But in what way is the choice of the human will free by virtue of this ability, since oftentimes a man who has an upright will deserts this uprightness against his will because of the pressure of temptation?

T. No one deserts this uprightness except by willing to. So if “against one's will” means “unwillingly,” then no one deserts uprightness against his will. For a man can be bound against his will, because he can be bound when he is unwilling to be bound; a man can be tortured against his will, because he can be tortured when he is unwilling to be tortured; a man can be killed against his will, because he can be killed when he is unwilling to be killed. But a man cannot will against his will, because he cannot will if he is unwilling to will. For everyone-who-wills wills that he will.

S. If someone who lies in order not to be killed does so only willingly, then how is it that he is said to lie against his will? For just as against his will he lies, so against his will he wills to lie. And someone who against his will wills to lie, unwillingly wills to lie.

T. Perhaps he is said to lie against his will because when he so wills the truth that he does not lie except for the sake of his life, then he both wills the lie for the sake of his life and does not will it for its own sake (since he wills the truth). Thus, he lies both willingly and unwillingly. For the will by which we will something

for its own sake (as when we will health for its own sake) is different from the will by which we will a thing for the sake of something else (as when we will to drink absinthe for the sake of health). Therefore, perhaps it can be said that the man lies both against his will and not against his will, in accordance with these different wills. Accordingly, when the man is said to lie against his will because insofar as he wills the truth he does not will to lie, this statement does not contradict my claim that no one deserts uprightness-of-will against his will. For in lying, the man wills to desert uprightness for the sake of his life; and in accordance with this will he deserts uprightness not against his will but willingly. This is the will we are now discussing, for we are speaking about the will by which a man wills to lie for the sake of his life rather than about the will by which he does not will the lie for its own sake. On the other hand, he surely does lie against his will, in that against his will he either-lies-or-is-killed (i.e., against his will he is in a predicament in which, necessarily, one or the other of these happens). For although it is necessary that he either-lie-or-be-killed, it is not necessary that he be killed, because he can avoid being killed if he lies. And it is not necessary that he lie, because he can avoid lying if he [lets himself] be killed. For neither alternative is determined necessarily, because both are in his power. So, too, although against his will he either-lies-or-is-killed, it does not follow that he lies-against-his-will or that he is-killed-against-his-will.

There is another reason—one contained in common usage—why someone is said to do against his will and unwillingly and of necessity that which nevertheless, he does willingly. For that which we are able to do only with difficulty and hence refrain from doing, we say that we are not able to do and that we give up of necessity and against our wills. And that which we are not able to cease doing without difficulty and hence continue to do, we say that we are doing against our wills and unwillingly and of necessity. In this manner, then, someone who lies in order not to die is said to lie against his will and unwillingly and of necessity, because he is not able to avoid the lie without incurring the hardship of death. Therefore, just as someone who lies for the sake of his life is improperly said to lie against his will (since he lies willingly), so he is improperly said to *will to lie* against his will (since only willingly does he will to lie). For just as when he lies he wills

that he lie, so when he wills to lie he wills that he will.

S. I cannot deny what you are saying.

T. So how is it that the will, which without its own consent an alien power cannot subject, fails to be free?

S. By like reasoning, can we not say that the will of a horse is free because it serves the appetite of the flesh only willingly?

T. No, the case of a horse is not similar. For in a horse the will does not subject itself but is naturally subjected and always serves the appetite of the flesh by necessity. However, in a man, as long as the will is upright it neither is subjected to nor serves what it ought not; and it is not turned aside from uprightness by any alien force unless it willingly consents to what it ought not. And it is clearly seen to have this consent from itself and not by nature or of necessity, as in the case of a horse.

S. You have satisfactorily met my objection regarding the will of a horse. Return to where we were.

T. Will you deny that any given thing is free from a second thing by which it cannot be constrained or restrained except willingly?

S. I do not see how to deny this.

T. Tell me as well how an upright will overcomes and how it is overcome.

S. To will uprightness perseveringly is for it to overcome; but to will what it ought not [to will] is for it to be overcome.

T. I think that only with the will's own consent can temptation keep an upright will away from uprightness or force it to what it ought not, so that the will does not will uprightness but wills what it ought not [to will].

S. I don't see this to be false in any respect.

T. Then, if without the will's own consent no temptation can turn the will away from uprightness toward sin—i.e., toward willing what it ought not [to will]—who can deny that the will is free in order to keep uprightness and is free from temptation and sin? Therefore, when the will is overcome, it is overcome not by another power, but by its own.

S. What has been said proves this conclusion.

T. Don't you see too that from what has been said it follows that no temptation is able to overcome an upright will? For if temptation were able, it would have the power to overcome and would

overcome by its own power. But this cannot occur, since the will is overcome only by *its* own power. Therefore, temptation is not at all able to overcome an upright will; and when it is said [to be able], it is said improperly, for nothing else is understood than that the will is able to subject itself to temptation. Similarly, but conversely: when a weak man is said to be able to be overcome by a strong man, he is said *to be able* not with respect to his own ability but with respect to another's ability, for there is signified only that the strong man has the ability to overcome the weak man.

CHAPTER SIX

How our will is powerful against temptations although it appears powerless against them.

S. You so subdue all assaults on our will and so forbid any temptation to master it that I am not at all able to resist your claims. Nevertheless, I cannot keep from mentioning that in our will there is a powerlessness which nearly all of us experience when we are overcome by the "irresistible appeal" of temptation. Accordingly, unless you render consistent the power you prove and the powerlessness we feel, my mind cannot come to rest regarding this topic.

T. In what do you think the aforementioned powerlessness of will consists?

S. In the will's not being able perseveringly to cling to uprightness.

T. If because of powerlessness the will does not cling to [uprightness], then it is turned away from uprightness by an alien force.

S. Admittedly.

T. What is this force?

S. The force of temptation.

T. This force does not turn the will from uprightness unless the will wills what the temptation suggests.

S. That's right. But the temptation by its own force compels the will to will what it is suggesting.

T. How does temptation compel the will to will?: in such a way that the will is indeed able to keep from willing, though not without great difficulty (*molestia*), or in such way that the will is not at all able to keep from willing?

S. Although I must admit that sometimes we are so pressured by temptations that we cannot without difficulty (*difficultate*) keep from willing what they suggest, I cannot say that they ever pressure us to the point that we cannot at all keep from willing what they advise.

T. Nor do I know how it can be said. For if a man wills to lie in order to avoid death and to save his life for a while, who will say that it is impossible for him to will not to lie in order to avoid eternal death and to live endlessly? Hence, you ought no longer to doubt that this powerlessness-to-keep-uprightness which you say is in our will when we consent to temptations is the result not of impossibility but of difficulty. For we are accustomed to say that we cannot [do] a thing, not because the thing is impossible for us [to do], but because we cannot [do it] without difficulty. But this difficulty does not destroy freedom of will. For it is able to beset the will though the will dissent, but it is not able to vanquish the will unless the will consent. In this way, then, I think that you are able to see how the power of the will which true reasoning ascribes is consistent with the powerlessness which our human nature feels. For just as difficulty does not at all destroy freedom of will, so that powerlessness which we say to be in the will only because the will cannot keep its uprightness without difficulty does not remove from the will the ability to persevere in uprightness.

CHAPTER SEVEN

How [the will] is stronger than temptation even when it is overcome by temptation.

S. Just as I am not at all able to deny what you prove, so I am not at all able to affirm that the will is stronger than temptation when it is overcome by temptation. For if the will-to-keep-uprightness were stronger than the force of temptation, then in willing what was in its possession the will would resist more strongly than temptation would insist. For on no other basis do I know that I have a will that is more or less strong than that I will more or less strongly. Therefore, when I will less strongly what I ought than temptation suggests what I ought not, I do not see how it is that temptation is not stronger than my will.

T. As I see, an equivocal sense of the word "will" is deceiving

you.

S. I would like to know about this equivocation.

T. Just as the word “sight” is said equivocally, so also is the word “will.” For we call sight the *instrument-for-seeing*, i.e., the ray passing through the eyes, by which ray we perceive light and the objects which are in the light. And we also speak of sight as the *activity* of the instrument when we use the instrument: i.e., [we speak of it as] the act of seeing. In the same way, will is said to be the instrument-for-willing, which is in the soul and which we direct towards willing this or that thing, even as we direct sight towards seeing various objects. Moreover, will is spoken of as the *use* of the will which is the instrument-for-willing, just as sight is spoken of as the use of sight which is the instrument-for-seeing. Now, even when we are not seeing, we have sight that is the instrument-for-seeing; but only while we *are* seeing is there present sight that is the activity of the instrument. Similarly, even when it is not willing anything (e.g., during sleep), the will—viz., the instrument-for-willing—is always in the soul. But the will that I call the use or the activity of this instrument, we have only when we will something. Hence, the will which I call the instrument-for-willing is always one and the same thing regardless of what we will; but the will which is the instrument's activity is as multiple as the number of things we will and the number of occasions upon which we will. Similarly, the sight which we have even in darkness or with our eyes closed is always the same regardless of what we see; but the sight, i.e., the activity-of-sight, which is also called the act-of-seeing, is as multiple as the number of things we see and the number of occasions upon which we see.

S. I see this clearly, and I am delighted by this distinction [of meanings] of “will.” And I now seem to see what deception I was experiencing because of ignorance of this distinction. But go on, nevertheless, with what you have begun.

T. Then, since you see that there are two wills (viz., the instrument-for-willing and its activity), in which of these two do you understand strength-of-willing to reside?

S. In the will which is the instrument-for-willing.

T. Then, if you knew a man so strong that while he was holding a wild bull, the bull was unable to get away, and if you saw the same man so holding a ram that the ram shook itself loose

from the man's hands, would you think that the man was less strong while holding the ram than while holding the bull?

S. I would judge him to be equally strong in each task but would maintain that he did not use his strength equally, for to hold a bull takes more strength than to hold a ram. Now, the man is strong because he has strength; but his action is called strong because it is done strongly.

T. Know, then, that the will which I call the instrument-for-willing has an inalienable strength which cannot be overcome by any other force. And in willing, the will uses this strength now more, now less. Hence, when presented with that which it wills less strongly, the will does not at all desert what it wills more strongly; and when it is offered what it wills more strongly, it immediately abandons what it wills less strongly. In that case, the will which we can call the act of the instrument, since the instrument does its own work when it wills something—in that case, I say, this act of willing is called more or less strong since it is done more or less strongly.

S. I must admit that your explanation is now clear to me.

T. You see, then, that when a man deserts—under an assault of temptation—the uprightness-of-will that he possesses, he is drawn away by no alien force, but he turns himself to something which he wills more strongly.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Even God is not able to remove uprightness-of-will.

S. Is God able to remove uprightness from the will?

T. See how it is that He cannot. Indeed, He can reduce to nothing an entire substance which He has created from nothing, but He is not able to separate uprightness from a will which has it.

S. I very eagerly await from you an argument for this claim of yours, which I have not heard before.

T. We are discussing that uprightness-of-will by virtue of which the will is called just, i.e., the uprightness which is kept for its own sake. However, no will is just except one which wills what God wills that it will.

S. The will which does not will this is obviously unjust.

T. Therefore, to keep uprightness-of-will for the sake of up-

rightness itself is, for everyone keeping it, to will what God wills him to will.

S. Yes, I must agree.

T. If God were to separate this uprightness from someone's will, He would do it either willingly or unwillingly.

S. He cannot [do it] unwillingly.

T. Then, if He were to remove (the aforementioned) uprightness from someone's will, He would will what He did.

S. Yes, without doubt, He would will it.

T. From whomever's will He would will to separate this uprightness, surely He would not will this [person] to keep uprightness-of-will for the sake of uprightness itself.

S. This follows.

T. But we have already posited as true that to keep uprightness-of-will in this manner [viz., for its own sake] is, for everyone keeping it, to will what God wills him to will.

S. Even if it had not already been posited, nevertheless it would be true.

T. Hence, if God were to remove (the oft-mentioned) uprightness from someone, He would not will him to will what He wills him to will.

S. Nothing follows more logically, and nothing is more impossible.

T. Therefore, nothing is more impossible than for God to remove uprightness-of-will. Nevertheless, He is said to do this [viz., to remove uprightness-of-will] when He does not cause this uprightness not to be deserted. On the other hand, the Devil or temptation is said to do this [viz., to remove uprightness] or to overcome the will and to separate it from the uprightness it is keeping. [This is said] because unless the Devil or temptation permitted to the will, or threatened to remove from it, something which it preferred to uprightness, the will would not at all turn itself aside from that uprightness which it was willing in some measure.

S. What you say seems so obvious to me that I think nothing can be said against it.

CHAPTER NINE

Nothing is more free than an upright will.

T. Thus, you understand that nothing is more free than an upright will, from which no alien force can remove its uprightness. Surely, if we say the following, it is not true: viz., that when [the will] wills to lie in order not to lose life or safety [*salus*], it is compelled to abandon the truth from fear of death or from torment. For the will is no more compelled to will life than to will truth. Rather, since it is prevented by an alien force from keeping both at the same time, it chooses the one it prefers. To be sure, it chooses freely and not unwillingly, although unwillingly and unfreely it has been placed under the necessity of abandoning either alternative. For it has no less strength for willing the truth than for willing safety; but it wills safety more strongly. For if it were to see as present both the eternal glory which it would immediately attain upon keeping the truth and the torments of Hell to which it would immediately be delivered upon telling a lie, then without doubt it would readily be seen to have sufficient strength to keep the truth.

S. This point is seen clearly, since the will would display greater strength for willing eternal salvation [*salus*] for its own sake and truth for the sake of [this] reward than [it would display] for keeping temporal salvation [*salus*].

CHAPTER TEN

How one who sins is a servant of sin. It is a greater miracle when God restores uprightness [to a will] which has deserted it than when He restores life to the dead.

T. Therefore, a rational nature always has free choice since it always has the ability to keep (although sometimes with difficulty) uprightness-of-will for the sake of uprightness itself. But when free will deserts uprightness because of the difficulty of keeping it, then, assuredly, free will subsequently serves sin because of the impossibility of recovering uprightness through its own efforts. So, then, it becomes “a wind that goes out and does not return,”¹ since “he who commits sin is the servant of sin.”² Indeed, just as before having uprightness, no will was able to take it without God's giving it, so upon deserting the uprightness which has been received, the will is unable to recover it unless God gives it again.

Moreover, I think it a greater miracle when God restores to the

¹Psalms 77:39 (78:39). ²John 8:34.

will the uprightness it has deserted than when He restores to a dead man the life he has lost. For in dying by necessity, the body does not sin and consequently never receive life again; but in deserting uprightness by its own efforts, the will deserves always to lack uprightness. And if someone voluntarily takes his own life, he does not remove from himself what was never going to be lost; but someone who deserts uprightness-of-will throws away that which was supposed to be kept always.

S. I regard as exceedingly true what you say about the servitude by which one who commits sin is made a servant of sin and about the impossibility of recovering uprightness, once deserted, unless it is returned by the one who originally gave it. And it is supposed to be observed unceasingly by all those to whom it is given, so that they may keep it always.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

This servitude does not remove freedom of choice.

S. Nonetheless, by this conclusion you have greatly curbed my joy because I was already supposing myself to be certain that a man always has freedom of choice. Therefore, I ask that this servitude be explained to me lest perchance it seem opposed to the freedom we were discussing. For both this freedom and this servitude are in the will; and in accordance with each a man is either free or enslaved. If, then, he is a servant, how is it that he free? Or if he is free, how is it that he a servant?

T. If you distinguish clearly, [you will see how] a man is both servant and free, without contradiction, when he does not have the uprightness we have been discussing. For he never has the ability to acquire uprightness when he does not have uprightness; but he always has the ability to keep uprightness when he does have it. With respect to the fact that he cannot return from sin, he is a servant; with respect to the fact that he cannot [forcibly] be drawn away from uprightness, he is free. Now, he can be turned away from sin and from servitude-to-sin only by someone else; but he can be turned away from uprightness only by himself; and he cannot be deprived of his freedom either by himself or by anyone else. For he is always naturally free for keeping uprightness if he has it, and even when he does not have any to keep.

S. This consistency which you have worked out between this servitude and this freedom convinces me that they both can be present in the same man at the same time.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Why when a man *does not* have uprightness he is said to be free (on the ground that when he *does* have uprightness it cannot be taken away from him) rather than when he *does* have uprightness, being said to be a servant (on the ground that when he *does not* have uprightness he cannot recover it by himself).

S. But I greatly desire to know why when a man *does not* have uprightness he is said to be free (on the ground that when he *does* have uprightness it cannot be taken away from him by someone else) rather than when he *does* have uprightness, being said to be a servant (on the ground that when he *does not* have uprightness he cannot recover it by himself). For with respect to the fact that he cannot return from sin he is a servant; and with respect to the fact that he cannot [forcibly] be drawn away from uprightness he is free. And just as he can never [forcibly] be drawn away [from uprightness] if he has it, so if he does not have it he can never return [from sin]. Therefore, just as he always has this freedom, so he seems always to have this servitude.

T. This servitude consists in nothing other than an inability to avoid sinning. For whether we call this servitude the inability to return to uprightness or the inability to recover uprightness or to have it again, a man is a servant of sin for no other reason than this: because he is not able to return to uprightness or to recover it or to have it, he is unable to avoid sinning. However, when he has this uprightness, he does not have an inability to avoid sinning. Therefore, when he has this uprightness, he is not a servant of sin. However, he always has the ability to keep uprightness—both when he has uprightness and when he does not—and so, he is always free.

However, you are asking the following question: Why when a man *does not* have uprightness he is said to be free (on the ground that when he *does* have uprightness it cannot be taken away from him by someone else) rather than when he *does* have uprightness,

being said to be a servant (on the ground that when he *does not* have uprightness he cannot recover it by himself)? It is as if you were asking: Why when the sun is absent is a man said to have the ability to see the sun (because of the fact that he is able to see the sun when it is present) rather than being said, when the sun is present, to have an inability to see the sun (because of the fact that when the sun is absent he is unable to make it be present)? For even when the sun is absent we have in us sight, by which to see the sun when it is present; similarly, even when uprightness-of-will is lacking to us, we have in us the ability to understand and to will, by which ability we are able to keep uprightness for its own sake when we have it. Now, when we lack nothing for seeing the sun except the sun's presence, only then do we lack the capability which its presence produces in us. Similarly, only when we lack uprightness do we have the incapability which its absence produces in us. Therefore, a man always has freedom of choice; but he is not always a servant of sin. [He is a servant of sin only] when he does not have an upright will.

S. If I had thought carefully about what was said earlier, when you distinguished into four capabilities the capability to see, I would not have been puzzled here. Therefore, I acknowledge that my confusion was my own fault.

T. I won't hold it against you now, provided that henceforth you will keep our points so at hand when needed that we shall not have to repeat them.

S. Thank you for your indulgence. But do not be surprised if those points about which I am unaccustomed to think are not all continually present in my mind for viewing after [only] one hearing.

T. Tell me whether you have any further qualms about our definition of "freedom of choice."

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

"The ability to keep uprightness-of-will for the sake of this uprightness itself" is the complete definition of "freedom of choice."

S. There is one thing which still disturbs me somewhat about this definition. For we often have an ability to keep something,

and yet that ability is not free to the point that it cannot be impeded by an alien force. Hence, when you say that freedom of choice is the ability to keep uprightness-of-will for the sake of uprightness itself, see whether perhaps [a clause] should be added which would indicate that this ability is so free that it cannot be overcome by any force.

T. If the ability to keep uprightness-of-will for the sake of this uprightness itself could ever be found to be present apart from the freedom which we have examined, then it would be useful to add what you state. But since with respect to genus and differentiae the proposed definition is so complete that it includes neither more nor less than the freedom we are examining, nothing can conceivably need to be added to it or subtracted from it. For *ability* is the genus of *freedom*. However, the addition of “to keep” distinguishes this ability from every ability which is not an ability to keep—as, for example, the ability to laugh or the ability to walk. But by adding “uprightness,” we distinguish this ability from the ability to keep gold and whatever is not uprightness. The additional words “of will” separate this ability from the ability to keep uprightness [*rectitudo*] of other things—as, for example, the rightness, or straightness, [*rectitudo*] of a stick or the rightness, or correctness, [*rectitudo*] of an opinion. However, by the words “for the sake of uprightness itself” this ability is distinguished from an ability to keep uprightness-of-will because of something else—as, for example, when uprightness is kept for the sake of money or because of natural inclination (*naturaliter*). For example, a dog keeps uprightness-of-will by natural inclination when it loves its puppies or the master who cares for it. Therefore, since in this definition there is nothing which is not necessary for encompassing the freedom of choice of a rational will and for excluding other things, and since freedom is adequately included and other things are adequately excluded, then surely our definition is neither too broad nor too narrow. Doesn't this seem to you to be the case?

S. Yes, the definition seems to me to be complete

T. Tell me, then, whether you wish [to know] anything more about the freedom in virtue of which we hold its possessor accountable for his good and evil deeds. For our present discourse deals only with this freedom.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

The division of this same freedom.

S. What remains now is for you to divide this same freedom. For although in accordance with your definition, freedom is common to every rational nature, nevertheless God's freedom is quite different from the freedom possessed by rational creatures; and among rational creatures there are differences of freedom.

T. [Here are the distinctions appropriate to freedom:]

I. There is an unoriginated freedom of choice, which was neither created by nor received from anyone else; this freedom is characteristic only of God.

II. There is a freedom of choice which was both created by and received from God; this freedom is characteristic of men and angels. However, this created or received freedom of choice either (A) *does* have uprightness to keep or (B) *does not* have uprightness to keep.

II-A. The freedom of choice which has uprightness keeps it either (1) so as *to be able* to lose it or (2) so as *not to be able* to lose it.

II-A-1. The freedom of choice which keeps uprightness so as to be able to lose it was characteristic of all angels before the good ones were confirmed and the evil ones fell; and it characterizes prior to death all those men who have this uprightness.

II-A-2. But the freedom of choice which keeps uprightness so as not to be able to lose it is characteristic of elect angels and elect men—of elect angels after the fall of the reprobate angels, and of elect men after death.

II-B. However, the freedom of choice which does not have uprightness lacks it in such way as either (1) *to be able* to recover it or (2) *not to be able* to recover it.

II-B-1. The freedom of choice which does not have uprightness and yet is able to recover it characterizes only men who lack it during their lifetime—although many might never recover it.

II-B-2. However, the freedom of choice which does not

have uprightness and is not able to recover it is characteristic of reprobate angels and men—of reprobate angels after their fall and of reprobate men after their lifetime.

S. Through the favor of God you have so satisfied me with your definition and division of *freedom of choice* that I can find nothing which I must ask regarding them.