

**PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM:
ESSAYS AND REVIEWS**

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CHAPTER THREE

AUGUSTINE ON FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREE WILL

During the past decade William L. Rowe's article "Augustine on Foreknowledge and Free Will"¹ has received quite favorable attention. Indeed, it has attained sufficiently high esteem to be reprinted in both *Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays* (edited by R. A. Markus) and *Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: An Analytic Approach* (edited by Baruch Brody).² It would seem that Rowe's interpretation of Augustine's configuration of arguments has now established itself as the standard interpretation. Accordingly, I want first to examine this interpretation and then to propose an alternative one which I take to be more accurate.

I

1. *Augustine's statement of the initial problem.* The standard interpretation deals mainly with Augustine's statements in Book 3 of *De Libero Arbitrio (On Free Choice)*.³ Rowe begins by presenting Augustine's version of an argument-to-be-refuted, which he formulates as follows:

1. God has foreknowledge of all future events.
2. Hence, if a man is going to sin, God foreknows that he will sin.
3. Whatever God foreknows must necessarily happen.
4. Hence, if God foreknows that a man will sin, he must necessarily sin.
5. But if such a man must necessarily sin, there is no voluntary choice in his sinning.
6. Therefore, such a man does not have free will.

2. *Augustine's solution.* Next, Rowe articulates Augustine's reasons for rejecting Step 5—the troublesome step. Rowe elicits these reasons from three passages, which I quote in full, and to which I append the letters 'A', 'B' and 'C'.⁴

A. But if he [a denier of free will] . . . says that, because he must necessarily so will, his will is not in his own power, he can be countered by the answer you gave me when I asked whether you could become happy against your will. You replied that you would be happy now if the matter were in your power; for you willed to be happy but could not achieve it We cannot say we do not have power unless we do not have what we will. If we do not have the will, we may think we will but in fact we do not. If we cannot will without willing, those who will have will, and all that is in our power we have by willing. Our will would not be will unless it were in our power. Because it is in our power, it is free. We have nothing that is free which is not in our power, and if we have something it cannot be nothing. Hence it is not necessary to deny that God has foreknowledge of all things, while at the same time our wills are our own. God has foreknowledge of our will, so that of which he has foreknowledge must come to pass. In other words, we shall exercise our wills in the future because he has foreknowledge that we shall do so; and there can be no will or voluntary action unless it be in our power.

B. . . . there is nothing so much in our power as is the will itself. For as soon as we will (*volumus*) immediately will (*voluntas*) is there. We can say rightly that we do not grow old voluntarily but necessarily, or that we do not die voluntarily but from necessity, and so with other similar things. But who but a raving fool would say that it is not voluntarily that we will? Therefore though God knows how we are going to will in the future, it is not proved that we do not voluntarily will anything.

C. For if that is to be called *our necessity* which is not in our power, but even though we be unwilling effects what it can effect—as, for instance, the necessity of death—it is manifest that our wills by which we live uprightly or wickedly are not under such a necessity; for we do many things which, if we were not willing, we should certainly not do. This is primarily true of the act of willing itself—for if we will, it *is*; if we will not, it *is* not—for we should not will if we were unwilling. But if we define necessity to be that according to which we say that it is necessary that anything be of such or such a nature, or be done in such and such a manner, I know not why we should have any dread of that necessity taking away the freedom of our will.

On the basis of these texts Rowe now proceeds to do two things: to state Augustine's view about what it is for something not to be in a man's power, and to cite Augustine's reason for

rejecting Step 5. According to Rowe, speaking on Augustine's behalf, x is not in a man's power "if and only if either (1) x fails to occur even though the man wills to do x . . . or (2) x occurs even though the man does not will to do x " (p. 358). And Augustine's reason for rejecting Step 5 is (according to Rowe): "Even though a man necessarily wills to sin, we cannot say that this sinful act of will is not in the man's power. For clearly the act of will would not occur if the man did not will. To say that the man's willing to sin is not in his power is to say that the man wills to sin even though he does not will to sin—and this is impossible" (p. 359). So a man's willing to sin is in his power and is, therefore, free; for all that is in a man's power is free with respect to him.

3. *Two criticisms of Augustine's solution.* (a) Rowe now charges Augustine with an error in reasoning: "He [Augustine] argues . . . that to say *my willing to sin* is not in my power is to say that I will to sin even though I do not will to sin—which, of course, is impossible. But surely there is a mistake here. If the case of my willing to sin is to parallel the case of my growing old then to say that my willing to sin is not in my power is *not* to say that I will to sin even though I do not will to sin; rather, it is to say that I will to sin even though I do not will to will to sin" (p. 359).

(b) Rowe next asks about the sense of the expression "I will to will to refrain from sinning"—an expression which (according to Rowe) Augustine does not use but ought to, since his line of reasoning commits him thereto (pp. 359-360). Rowe surmises that—if the expression makes any sense at all—it might possibly mean (à la G. E. Moore) "I make an effort to will or choose to refrain from sinning." But on this construal Augustine's argument breaks down, claims Rowe, for I can make an effort to will to refrain from sinning and yet not will to refrain from sinning (i.e., the effort need not succeed). In such a case, then, my willing would not be in my power. And so either (1) Augustine is mistaken in regarding it as a necessary truth that my will

to refrain from sinning is always in my power, or (2) by the expression "to will to will to refrain from sinning" he means something which Rowe (and presumably the rest of us) cannot educe, or (3) the expression is unintelligible. On either alternative, it would seem, Augustine fails to show that Step 5 of the initial argument is false.

4. *Rowe's own solution to the initial argument.* The real confusion in the initial argument, Rowe points out, is that Step 3 is ambiguous: It may be construed as "It is necessary that if God foreknows *p*, *p* will happen" or as "If God foreknows *p*, *p* will happen necessarily." On the latter construal the inference from Premise 3 to Premise 4 will be valid; but Premise 3 itself will be false. And on the former construal, Premise 3 will be true; but the inference from Premise 3 to Premise 4 will be invalid.

5. *Augustine's additional argument.* Rowe concludes his article with an exposition of a further argument by Augustine. In this argument Augustine allegedly "shows that on Evodius' reasoning it is foreknowledge generally and not God's foreknowledge specially that causes the events foreknown to happen by necessity. This creates a difficulty for Evodius since he believes that we sometimes foreknow the decisions and actions of men without thereby rendering those decisions and actions *involuntary*" (p. 362). Rowe labels this reasoning "*ad hominem*" but remarks that it is nonetheless important. For hereby Augustine displays that the theologian faces no more or no less a difficulty than does anyone else who believes that a man can sometimes foreknow the free decisions and actions of other men.

II

Having sketched the five major points of the standard interpretation, I turn now to indicating the various respects in which each of them is mistaken. Thus, I will divide this section according to the order in which it deals with these five points.

1. & 4. When we look at *De Libero Arbitrio* III.iii.6, we see

that Rowe does not state precisely Augustine's initial argument. For the problem which Augustine entertains for discussion is constituted by the following hypothetical syllogism, whose conclusion poses a *dilemma* for the theologian, since he does not care to affirm either alternative:

- 1'. If God foreknows [all future things and hence foreknows] that a man is going to sin, it is necessary that the man sin.
- 2'. If it is necessary that the man sin, the man does not sin voluntarily but sins by necessity.
- 3'. So either God [does not foreknow that the man is going to sin and hence] does not foreknow all future things or else the man does not sin voluntarily but sins by necessity.⁵

This way of casting the argument is important because it shows that Augustine finds it just as difficult to deny that man has free choice as to deny that God has foreknowledge of all future events. For if man does not have free choice, then God, man's Creator, becomes directly responsible for man's sin, and the whole moral basis for redemption is undermined. The standard interpretation's statement of the argument obscures the theological dilemma by taking for granted God's foreknowledge and by questioning only how it is that man can have free will. But Augustine's actual statement of the argument leaves open the possibility of taking for granted man's free will and questioning how it is that God can have foreknowledge. And, in fact, this route is followed at a later time by St. Anselm in *De Casu Diaboli* 21, where he asks how what is able not to happen in the future can be foreknown. Moreover, earlier, this same route had been followed by Cicero, who denied that there can be foreknowledge of free human actions. In Book 5, Chapter 9 of *De Civitate Dei* Augustine explicitly contends with Cicero's theory.

However, if we wanted, heuristically, to take it for granted that God foreknows the future, then we could restate this initial argument of Augustine's as follows:

- 1." God foreknows all future things and hence foreknows that a man is going to sin. (assumption)

- 2." If God foreknows all future things and hence foreknows that a man is going to sin, it is necessary that the man sin. (premise)
- 3." So it is necessary that the man sin. (1")(2")
- 4." If it is necessary that the man sin, the man does not sin voluntarily but sins by necessity. (premise)
- 5." So the man does not sin voluntarily but sins by necessity. (3")(4")

This formulation of Augustine's initial argument is not only textually more justified than is Rowe's formulation: it is also clearer than his formulation.⁶ For there is no ambiguity in the proposition which corresponds to Rowe's third premise ("Whatever God foreknows must necessarily happen")—a premise⁷ about which Rowe asks: Does it mean "It is necessary that if God foreknows *p*, *p* will happen" or "If God foreknows *p*, *p* will happen necessarily"? In the new formulation above, there is no doubt about the fact that "necessary" has as its scope "that the man sin," or "that a man is going to sin." Accordingly, there is also no doubt about the fact that Augustine's initial argument is valid and that Augustine aims to show that Premise 4" is false. Thus, Rowe's own solution to the argument is wrong. For he regards the argument as having *either* an invalid logical form *or* a false Premise 3. But, in fact, when accurately stated, the argument is obviously valid and Premise 2" (which replaces Premise 3) is not *obviously* false. Augustine's solution to the accurately stated argument consists in his claim that in Premise 4" the conditional statement is false, since there are cases where the antecedent is true even though the consequent is false.

2 & 3. It is true that Augustine's solution does not, after all, succeed; but the reasons for this lack of success have not been accurately stated by Rowe. In fact, Rowe's objections seem to me to be based upon a misapprehension about what points Augustine is making. Let us reexamine Augustine's position—beginning with a retranslation of Passages A, B, and C, which I render as follows:⁸

B. *Evodius*: If I had the power to be happy, then surely I would now be happy. For I will even now [to be happy] but am not [happy], since

I [do] not [make myself happy] but He makes (*facit*) me happy.

Augustine: Most truly, the truth cries forth from you. For you could not deem anything else to be in our power except that which we effect (*facimus*) when we will. Therefore, nothing is so in our power as is willing (*ipsa voluntas*). For (assuredly) willing occurs, without any interval, as soon as we will. And so we can rightly say "We grow old not of our own will but by necessity," or "We fall ill not of our own will but by necessity," or "We die not of our own will but by necessity"—and similarly for anything else of this kind. But would anyone—even a madman—dare to say "We *will*, but not of our own will"? Therefore, although God foreknows our future willings, from this fact it does not follow that we will something but not of our own will.

A. *Augustine*: But suppose . . . he [*viz.*, the denier of free will] says that since it is necessary that he will, he does not have willing [*ipsa voluntas*] in his power. In that case, he will be opposed by what you said when I asked whether you were going to be happy against your will. For you replied that you would now be happy if you⁹ had the power [to be happy]; for you said that you willed [to be happy] but were not yet able [to be happy]. Whereupon, I stated that the truth had cried forth from you; for only when we do not have what we will [to have] can we [sensibly] deny that we have power [with respect to it]. But when we will: if we do not have this willing (*voluntas ipsa*), then surely we do not will. Now, if it is not possible that when we will we do not will, then (assuredly) we have this willing when we will. And nothing else is in our power except what we have when we will. Therefore, our willing would not even be a willing unless it were in our power. Indeed, because it is in our power it is free with respect to us. For what we do not have in our power is not free with respect to us; and what we do have [in our power] cannot fail to be [free with respect to us]. In this way, it comes to pass (1) that we do not deny that God foreknows all future things and (2) that, nevertheless, we do will what we will. For since He foreknows our willing, our willing is going to be that which He foreknows [it to be]. Therefore, it is going to be a willing, since He foreknows a willing. And it cannot be going to be a willing unless it is going to be in our power. Hence, He foreknows even the power. So it is not the case that [this] power is removed from me on account of its being foreknown—a power which I shall all the more assuredly possess by virtue of the fact that He whose foreknowledge is unfailing foreknew that I would possess it.

C. For if the label "our necessity" is to be given to that which is not

in our power and which, although we are not willing, does (*efficit*) what it has the power to (as, for example, is [the case with] the necessity of death), then clearly the willings [*voluntates nostrae*] by means of which we live rightly or wrongly are not under such a necessity. For we do (*facimus*) many things which, surely, we would not do if we were not willing. This [point] applies in the first instance to our very willing (*ipsum velle*). For if we will, the willing occurs; if we do not will, the willing does not occur, for we would not will if we were not willing.

The first thing to be noticed is that in Passage B Augustine *does*—in the way he poses the problem—keep the parallel between growing old and willing: Because growing old is not in my power I can grow old unwillingly; similarly, if my willing were not in my power, I could will unwillingly. “But would anyone—even a madman—dare to say ‘We *will*, but not of our own will?’” Thus, willing is in our power, whereas growing old is not. Hence, Augustine rightly *does not*—in the way he resolves the problem—keep the parallel between growing old and willing. Augustine’s rhetorical question implies that whenever we will, we will willingly. And this implied answer coincides with his having written in *De Libero Arbitrio* I.xiii.29 “*se velle vult*” and in *De Trinitate* X.xi.18 “*volo me velle*.”

By conflating Passages A, B, and C, Rowe views Augustine as arguing straightforwardly “that to say *my willing* to sin is not in my power is to say that I will to sin even though I do not will to sin—which, of course, is impossible” (p. 359). And, thinks Rowe, Augustine has here *mistakenly* not kept the parallel with “My growing old is not in my power.” But where in Passages A, B, and C does Augustine argue as Rowe has just said he does? For the arguments in A, B, and C are something like the following:¹⁰

Argument B

1. If I make x be when I will, then x is in my power. (premise)
2. So if I make my willing be when I will, my willing is in my power.
3. I make my willing (*voluntas*) be as soon as I will. (premise)
4. So my willing is in my power. (2)(3)
5. If my willing is in my power, then it is not the case that when I will, I will not of my own will but by necessity. (premise)

6. So it is not the case that when I will, I will not of my own will but by necessity. (4)(5)
7. So when I will, I will of my own will and not by necessity. (6)

Argument A

1. When I will, then if I do not have this willing, I do not will. (premise)
2. It is not possible that when I will, I do not will. (premise)
3. So when I will, I have this willing. (1)(2)
4. If I have x when I will, then x is in my power. (premise)
5. So if I have my willing when I will, then my willing is in my power. (4)
6. So my willing is in my power. (3)(5)
7. So unless my willing were in my power, it would not be a willing. (1) - (6)
8. What is in my power is free with respect to me. (premise)
9. So my willing is free with respect to me. (6)(8)
10. God foreknows all future things. (premise)
11. So God foreknows my future willing. (10)
12. If God foreknows my future willing, then my future willing is going to be that which He foreknows it to be. (premise)
13. So my future willing is going to be a willing. (11)(12)
14. So God foreknows that my future willing is going to be in my power. (7)(10)(11)(13)
15. So God’s foreknowledge is compatible with my future willing’s being in my power. (14)

Argument C

1. X is my necessity if and only if x is not in my power and x occurs although I am not willing.
2. So my willing is my necessity if and only if my willing is not in my power and my willing occurs although I am not willing. (1)
3. But my willing *is* in my power; for when I will, my willing occurs; [and what occurs when I will is in my power (cf. Argument B)].
4. Moreover, it is not the case that my willing occurs although I am not willing; for when I do not will, my willing does not occur. (premise)
5. So it is not the case that my willing is my necessity (i.e., it is not the case that my willing is done under necessity). (2)(3)(4)

In none of these passages does Augustine discuss, as such, our willing to sin; and in none of them does he explicitly argue “that to say *my willing* to sin is not in my power is to say that I will to sin even though I do not will to sin.” Rowe has *reconstructed*

this argument from Augustine's three different but interrelated arguments. So Rowe's claim ought to be *not* that Augustine *does* argue this way but that he *would* argue this way—or, perhaps, that he *should* argue this way, because some of his premises commit him to this line of reasoning. Yet, with all due respect to Rowe, I do not see either that Augustine would so argue or that he should so argue.

We must be cautious in reformulating Augustine's premises and in reconstructing his arguments. For example, someone might suppose that in Argument B the first premise can legitimately be expanded as follows:

1'. If I make x be when I will [for x to be], then x is in my power.

For he might suppose that this formulation simply restates Augustine's meaning more explicitly. Accordingly, he might then surmise that Premise 3 ought to be

3'. I make my willing be as soon as I will [for my willing to be].

And he might conclude that Augustine's argument is mistaken because although Augustine intended for 1 to be understood as 1', he did not intend for 3 to be understood as 3'. (Rowe seems to be thinking in somewhat this way.)

But, on the other hand, it can also be argued that Augustine understood Premise 1 as

1". If I make x be when I will [what I will], then x is in my power.

and that he understood Premise 3 as

3." I make my willing be as soon as I will [what I will].

After all, Augustine does later (viz., in Passage A) use the expression "*Ita fit ut . . . velimus quod volumus.*" Moreover, 1" and 3" make perfectly good sense within Augustine's argument. For example, if I make myself more admirable when I will to tell the truth, then being more admirable is in my power. But what I will is to tell the truth, not to be more admirable.

Similarly, someone might suppose that in Argument C the first premise should be expanded as

1'. X is my necessity if and only if x is not in my power and x occurs although I am not willing [for x to occur].

and that Premise 2 should therefore be read as

2'. My willing is my necessity if and only if my willing is not in my power and my willing occurs although I am not willing [for my willing to occur].

And he might conclude that Augustine's argument is mistaken because although Augustine intended for 1 to be understood as 1', he did not intend for 2 to be understood as 2'. (Rowe seems to be thinking in exactly this way.)

But, on the other hand, it can also be argued that Premise 1 is to be reformulated as

1". X is my necessity if and only if x is not in my power and x occurs against my will.

so that Premise 2 will become

2". My willing is my necessity if and only if my willing is not in my power and my willing occurs against my will.

Indeed, the expression "My willing occurs although I am not willing [for my willing to occur]" seems to be but a clumsy way of saying "My willing occurs against my will."¹¹

Thus, the problem with each of Augustine's three arguments is that in each of them (1) the meaning of some of the premises seems to be left implicit *and* (2) we do not in each instance know how Augustine would have wanted these premises to be construed. Moreover, the *prima facie* plausibility of the arguments (as Augustine himself was well-aware) depends upon our *not* reformulating the premises. In this light, we see that Rowe's criticism of Augustine misses the mark for several reasons: (1) the criticism depends upon our restating one of Augustine's premises without our consistently proceeding to restate another

of them; (2) it conveys the impression that *our* inconsistency in restating is somehow really *Augustine's* inconsistency in formulating; and (3) it insinuates that Augustine here neglects to teach that everyone-who-wills wills willingly (i.e., that no-one-who-wills wills unwillingly).

Finally, Rowe's suggestion about how to analyze "I will to refrain from sinning"—an expression which he thinks Augustine ought to have used but failed to use—is not at all in tune with Augustine's remarks. For Augustine shows clearly enough that he is making a *conceptual* rather than a *psychological* point. Obviously enough, his reasoning does not trade upon the view that we sometimes *make an effort* to will. Rather (as we saw earlier), by the affirmation "I will that I will" and the negation "It is not the case that I will but not of my own will" Augustine is asserting that whenever I will, I will willingly; and he is denying that at any time when I will, I will unwillingly.

5. The standard interpretation also misleads us about Augustine's last argument against Evodius. It misleads (1) by claiming—in an unqualified way—that Evodius "believes that *we* [ourselves] sometimes foreknow the decisions and actions of men . . ." (p. 362), (2) by implying that Augustine does not think that "there is a *special* problem for the theologian who believes in divine foreknowledge and human freedom," and (3) by trying to get us to believe that the argument really is *ad hominem*.

There is nothing in the text which justifies attributing the foregoing belief to Evodius. For Augustine presents Evodius with a *hypothetical* case, contrary to fact: "If you foreknew that someone were going to sin, would it not be necessary that he sin?" And Evodius affirms that it would be necessary. (In the pericope under discussion, Augustine nowhere maintains—and Evodius nowhere contends—that, as a matter of fact, any human being ever does have such foreknowledge.) Augustine uses Evodius' affirmative response as the basis for concluding, a few lines later:¹² 'Your foreknowledge, Evodius, would not compel this other individual to sin, even though he would be

going to sin. Accordingly, just as by your foreknowledge you would know what the other is going to do of his own will, so God—though compelling no one to sin—foresees those who shall sin of their own will.' So Augustine is reasoning *ex hypothesi* and *ex concessio*. He is saying, as it were: 'Suppose you had foreknowledge of someone else's free choice. I think you would *concede* that your foreknowledge would not compel this other individual to sin. So why should God's foreknowledge compel him to sin?'

In last analysis, Augustine does not believe that any human being has foreknowledge of another's free choice—except in the rare case where this knowledge has been revealed to him by God.¹³ In other words, Augustine *does* believe that the problem of the relationship between foreknowledge and free choice is a *special problem* for the theologian. For since any human being's foreknowledge of another's free choice would have to be God-given, there is no possibility (within the Augustinian scheme) of eliminating the (background) reference to God. And so, for Augustine, there is no such thing as the non-theological problem of the foreknowledge of human free choices. In *De Civitate Dei*, Book 20, Chapter 7 he makes it clear that he considers no human being to know either his own or another's future self.¹⁴ This same point is also made in *Epistola* 73, Chapter 3 (*PL* 33:248), where, in addition, we are told explicitly that we do not foreknow the future wills, or inclinations, [*voluntates*] of our friends. (Augustine does, however, leave open the question about whether or not angels have foreknowledge of future things, i.e., whether or not God has given them this foreknowledge.) In *De Trinitate* 4.17, where he discusses different respects in which human beings may be said to have foreknowledge of future things, there is no explicit mention of the foreknowledge of future human choices. Instead, the impression is left that any such foreknowledge could be acquired only by divine revelation. And (according to Augustine's theory) even God Himself does not, strictly speaking, have *foreknowledge* of *future* things.

Rather, He has knowledge of *present* things; for all things are present at once to His knowledge.¹⁵

So when Augustine gets Evodius to admit that the problem about free choice and foreknowledge would be a problem in the case of any man's foreknowledge of any other man's free choice, Augustine does not suppose that anyone besides God (together with those to whom God gives it) has such foreknowledge. But if Augustine's purpose in making this move (*vis-à-vis* Evodius) has nothing to do with suggesting that the problem of compatibility is not a special one for the theologian: why, then, does he make it? Well, does he not do so because he believes that Evodius (as well as others like him) will more readily discern the truth of "God's foreknowledge does not deprive a man of free choice" if he recognizes the truth of "My own foreknowledge (if I had any) would not deprive a man of free choice"? I surmise that something like the following consideration underlies Augustine's move: Evodius, Augustine realizes, is tempted to picture God's foreknowledge as having some causal effect upon human free choices—perhaps because, in general, he pictures God as so very powerful. Augustine attempts to break the influence of this picture by getting Evodius to think, contrary to fact, in terms of his (*i.e.*, Evodius') foreknowledge. If Evodius becomes self-conscious about his belief in the powerlessness of his own knowledge—powerlessness to affect future human choices and actions, powerlessness to force those choices and actions to occur—he will (thinks Augustine) be more likely to escape from the spell of his picture of God's foreknowledge as causing us, compelling us, to will and to act. In taking this approach, Augustine is not committing a logical fallacy—the fallacy of *argumentum ad hominem*. On the contrary, since he is attempting to *persuade* Evodius, he appeals to a point that he supposes Evodius will concede. And on the basis of this concession, he tells Evodius that he, Evodius, now has no special grounds for not conceding a corresponding point in the case of God.

However, since Augustine is speaking both for himself and

for Evodius in this dialogue, he might be thought to be moving too quickly in putting words of concession into Evodius's mouth. If so, then there might be a "fallacy" involved; but it would be more like the fallacy of special pleading.

Conclusion. The standard interpretation does not suggest that Augustine's treatment of the relationship between human freedom and divine foreknowledge makes any significant philosophical contribution. Instead, it rests content with articulating Augustine's initial argument, criticizing his solution thereto, and proposing its own "better" analysis of this initial argument. I have tried to show that all five of the major theses of the standard interpretation are mistaken. In fact, I have seldom seen an interpretation that collapses so completely. By calling attention to this collapse, I am not suggesting that Augustine's position is any the more viable. Rather, I am insisting that philosophers be more careful in interpreting Augustine's views and in identifying his missteps. And I am signaling the fact that any analysis of Augustine's philosophy is likely to be unsuccessful unless it goes behind a given translation and reexamines the Latin texts themselves.

PRAENOTANDA

1. References to the Bible are given in terms of the Douay version. (References to chapters and verses of the Psalms include, in parentheses, the King James' locations.)
2. Where, for purposes of clarification, words from a Latin text are inserted into an English translation therefrom, the following rule is employed: when the Latin term is repeated exactly as it appears in the Latin text, parentheses are used; when the case endings of nouns are transformed to the nominative, brackets are used.
3. American-style punctuation is used, except where clarity occasionally requires placing a comma or a period outside of quotation marks.
4. As a general rule, longer foreign-language expressions are not italicized.

ABBREVIATIONS

- BN* Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*. Translated by Hazel Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956.
- CD* Aurelius Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei* (PL 41).
- DT* Aurelius Augustinus, *De Trinitate* (PL 42).
- HE* Rudolf Bultmann, *History and Eschatology*. New York: Harper Torchbook, 1962; first published in 1957.
- IH* R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.
- PL* *Patrologia Latina*. Edited by J.-P. Migne. Series published in Paris.
- S* F. S. Schmitt, editor. *Sancti Anselmi Opera Omnia*. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: F. Frommann Verlag, 1968.

NOTES TO ROWE ON AUGUSTINE

1. *Review of Metaphysics*, 18 (December 1964), 356-363.
2. Published, respectively, by Doubleday & Co. (1972) and Prentice-Hall (1974).
3. All of my references to *De Libero Arbitrio* will be to the critical edition of the Latin text published in Vol. 29 (1970) of CCSL=*Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina* (Turnhout, Belgium). E.g., *DLA* III. iii.6 indicates Book 3, Chapter 3, Section 6.
4. Rowe quotes Passages A and B from John H. Burleigh's translation of *DLA* III.iii.8 and III.iii.7. Burleigh's translation is found in *Augustine: Earlier Writings*, translated and introduced by J. H. Burleigh (The Library of Christian Classics, Vol. 6. London: SCM Press, 1953). It is based upon the Latin text found in *PL* (= *Patrologia Latina*, edited by J.-P. Migne), Vol. 32. I have excerpted A and B directly from Burleigh and not from Rowe.
Rowe quotes Passage C from J. J. Smith's translation of Book 5, Chapter 10 of the *City of God* (in *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine*, Vol. 2, edited by Whitney Oates. New York: Random House, 1948). This translation appeared earlier in Vol. 2 of *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, edited by Philip Schaff, and still earlier in *Works of Aurelius Augustine*, edited by Marcus Dods.
5. "Certe enim hoc te mouet et hoc miraris, quo modo non sint contraria et repugnantia, ut et deus praescius sit omnium futurorum et nos non necessitate, sed uoluntate peccemus. Si enim praescius est deus, inquis, peccatum esse hominem, necesse est ut peccet; si autem necesse est, non ergo est in peccando uoluntatis arbitrium, sed potius inuitabilis et fixa necessitas. Qua ratiocinatione hoc uidelicet ne conficiatur times, ut aut deus futurorum omnium praescius impie negeter aut, si hoc negare non possumus, fateamur non uoluntate sed necessitate peccari. *DLA* III.iii.6.
6. Rowe does not accurately quote Burleigh's English text. Thus, in citing *DLA* III.ii.4 he has "Since God knew that man would sin" whereas Burleigh has "Since God foreknew . . ." And at *DLA* III.iii.6 he has "For if, you say, God foreknew that a man will sin" whereas Burleigh has "For if, you say,

God foreknows” However, these errors are not important ones.

7. Rowe draws this premise from *DLA* III.ii.4. But, in fact, the premise does not enter into Augustine’s statement of the argument in *DLA* III.iii.6. Yet, even if it had, there would have been no ambiguity, inasmuch as the passage at III.ii.4 says: “quoniam peccatum esse praesciuerat, necesse erat id fieri quod futurum esse praesciebat deus: “Since God foreknew that [the man] was going to sin, it was necessary that there happen that which God foreknew was going to happen.” That is, it was necessary that the man was going to sin. And this latter statement corresponds to my Premise 3”, just as the whole “quoniam . . . deus” statement corresponds to my Premise 2”.

8. I have reversed the order of Passages A and B, since B precedes A in the Latin text. I have also included several additional sentences at the end of A and at the beginning of B; and I have deleted a sentence at the end of C, since it opens a new line of consideration.

9. Augustine understands “tibi” in “si [tibi] potestas esset.” Cf. the opening sentence of Passage B (in my translation), where Evodius says “Mihi si esset potestas” Unfortunately, Rowe places Passage B after Passage A, even though in *De Libero Arbitrio* B precedes A.

10. I say “something like” because Augustine does not state his arguments rigorously. And so there is some flexibility in the way they may be formulated.

11. So Argument C would read:

- (1”) X is my necessity if and only if x is not in my power and x occurs against my will.
- (2”) So my willing is my necessity if and only if my willing is not in my power and my willing occurs against my will.
- (3”) But my willing is in my power; for when I will, my willing occurs; [and what occurs when I will is in my power (cf. Argument B)].
- (4”) Moreover, it is not the case that my willing occurs against my will; for against my will, no willing of mine occurs.
- (5”) So it is not the case that my willing is my necessity.

See my alternative translation of C in n. 29 of Chapter Two above.

N.B.: Anselm and (presumably) Augustine regard “invitus” and “nolens” as interchangeable. See Anselm’s *De Libertate Arbitrii* 5 (Schmitt edition, Vol. I, p. 214, lines 18-23): “Nemo illam [i.e., rectitudinem] nisi volendo. Si ergo invitatus dicitur nolens, nemo deserit illam invitatus. Ligari enim potest homo invitatus, quia nolens potest ligari; torqueri potest invitatus, quia nolens potest torqueri; occidi potest invitatus, quia nolens potest occidi; velle autem non potest invitatus, quia velle non potest nolens velle. Nam omnis volens ipsum suum velle vult.”

12. The single quotes indicate that this is a paraphrase, not a direct quotation or translation.

13. The standard interpretation conveys the impression that Augustine believes that some human beings foreknow the future choices of other human beings, but without God’s having specially revealed this knowledge to them.

14. “Sic enim eos novit Dominus, ut Deus quem nil latet etiam futurorum, non ut homo, qui hominem ad praesens videt (si tamen videt, cuius cor non videt), qualis autem postea sit futurus nec se ipsum videt.” *CCSL*, Vol. 48, p. 711, lines 107-110.

15. *Ad Simplicianum de Diversis Quaestionibus* II.ii.2 (*CCSL*, Vol. 44, p. 76). This same point is made by Anselm in *De Casu Diaboli* 21.